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Abstract
Impact of Ethnic Conflict on Development: A Case Study of Guyana
By
Visnoonand Bisram

Adviser: Professor Stanley Aronowitz

The study presents an alternative framework, from the dominant political and
economic theories, for explaining the feeble and relatively slow pace of development of
an ethnically divided, resource rich country.
The study, using primary and secondary sources, empirical evidence, and
interpretive analysis, examines the emergence and role of racial conflict and its stifling
impact on national development in Guyana, which represents an extreme case of a society
plagued by racial division. Organizations including labor unions and political parties, as
well as occupations and aspects of the economy, among other social constructs, are all
racially divided. Utilizing an inter-disciplinary (sociology, political science, economics,
history, anthropology, culture) scope of investigation, the study explains: how Guyana
became a multi-ethnic state, how ethnic rivalry emerged during colonialism; how
ethnicity has shaped its development; how racial conflict was advanced by colonial forces
to serve their interests; how it became institutionalized; how it was used by the US and
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UK to delay the independence of the colony; and how the race conflict affected the
political and economic development of the post-colonial state including its debilitating
impact on social change.
The study determines that the failure of development in Guyana is tied to a range
of interrelated social issues and problems associated with ethnic identity and rivalry. The
study discusses various theories on economic development and on ethnic conflicts in
order to explain Guyana’s ongoing racial conflict and illustrates some effects of conflict
on Guyana’s development. It examines, discusses, interprets, and analyzes various
variables (power and economic control) impacting on ethnic relations and politics in
Guyana and their effects on the country’s overall development. It also looks into the
causes for heightened ethnic competition and conflict attributing blame to both major
(largely ethnic) political parties, PPP and PNC, and their respective founding leaders, Dr.
Cheddi Jagan and Mr. Forbes Burnham as well as their respective supporters, Indians and
Africans.
The study also proposes solutions as models of governance to manage ethnic
conflict to facilitate development. The study has implications for similar societies serving
as a guide to help resolve ethnic conflicts that could affect national development.
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-Time Line1814: Britain occupies Guyana during the Napoleonic Wars.
1831: Guyana is officially declared a British colony.
1834: Slavery is abolished; many slaves leave plantations to set up their own free
holdings and settlements
1838: Portuguese from Madeira arrive in Guyana to work on sugar plantations
Indentured workers imported from India to work on sugar plantations.
1851: Chinese indentured laborers arrive in Guyana to serve the estates
1943: Dr. Cheddi Jagan returns from the U.S and organizers workers
1947: Political Affairs Committee (PAC) formed under Jagan’s leadership
Dr. Jagan contests as an independent and wins a seat to legislature
1949: Burnham returns to Guyana from his law studies in England; joins PAC
1950: PAC is transformed into Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) with Jagan as leader,
Forbes Burnham as Chairman
1953: Britain grants Universal Suffrage
PPP wins first election under universal suffrage with Jagan appointed as Chief
Minister. Britain suspends Guyana's constitution, sends in troops and installs an
interim administration after democratic elections for parliament produces a result not to
its liking.
1955: PPP splits into two faction – Jagan and Burnham faction
1957: Britain restores Guyanese constitution; PPP formally splits along racial lines, with
Cheddi Jagan leading a mostly Indian party and Forbes Burnham leading a party of
African descendants; Jagan’s PPP wins election. Jagan named Premier
1958: League of Colored People (Middle Class Africans and Mixed race) joins
Burnham’s PPP faction to form People's National Congress (PNC).
1959: Burnham wins Mayoralty of Georgetown, capital and largest city of Guyana
1960: Peter D’Aguiar bursts onto political science launching the United Force party
1961: Jagan wins re-election and named Prime Minister. Guyana granted full autonomy,
with Britain retaining control over internal and defence matters.
1962: Ethnic tensions increase resulting in racial violence. British troops rushed in.
1963: Racial riots between people of African origins and Indian supporters of Jagan
become widespread.
1964: Violence subsides! At independence talks in London, Britain decides to change
method of electing parliament shifting from first past the post to Proportional
Representation (PR).
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Timeline Continues --1964: Elections held; Jagan wins plurality but Britain invites Burnham to
form a coalition government with the help of a junior partner representing the interests of
Europeans, Mixed and Amerindians.
1964: PNC-UF coalition forms with Burnham as Premier and D’Aguiar as Finance
Minister
1966: Guyana becomes independent with Burnham as prime minister.
1967: Fallout between Burnham and D’Aguiar with D’Aguiar charging ethnic
discrimination and calling for investigations of allegations of corruption involving
officials close to Burnham
1968: Burnham jettisons UF; rig general elections giving himself two-thirds majority to
change the constitution.
Judicial Appeals to British Privy Council abolished derailing any challenges to rigged
elections.
1969: An Amerindian group opposed to the PNC government of dictatorial President
Forbes Burnham stages an uprising in the Essequibo region. It was asserted that
Venezuela had trained and armed the militants. Burnham crushes rebellion.
Economy slides downward
1970: Burnham declares Guyana a republic within the British Commonwealth and
appoints a Chinese, Raymond Arthur Chung, as titular president.
1973: Burnham rigs elections
1978: Burnham rigs referendum to draft a new constitution; opposition wages successful
boycott of referendum; only 10% participated; Burnham claims massive victory.
1980: Burnham promulgates a new constitution without electoral approval
Historian Dr. Walter Rodney murdered by the government.
Burnham declares himself first executive president.
1985: Burnham dies in August
Desmond Hoyte (PNC) becomes president.
Hoyte rigs elections in December 1985
Economy continues downward deterioration.
1988: Hoyte invites Commonwealth and IMF Team of Economists to review economy
1989: Hoyte embraces structural reforms
1990: US calls for political reforms in Guyana
1991: Hoyte invites President Carter for consultation on free and fair elections
1992: Hoyte agrees to hold free and fair elections under international supervision
Jagan wins first completely free parliamentary elections since independence;
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Timeline Continues --1992: October, Jagan sworn in as President
1997: Jagan dies and is replaced by Prime Minister Sam Hinds as President
Jagan’s wife, Janet, led the party into elections; PPP wins re-election;
PNC refuses to accept results and brought supporters onto streets.
1998: Government declares state of emergency in Georgetown in response to violent race
riots amid allegations of discrimination against Afro-Guyanese by PPP gov’t.
Accord is signed in which PPP agrees to give up two years of term and holds early
election.
1999: President Janet Jagan resigns for health reasons
Bharrat Jagdeo becomes president.
2001: New Elections is held; PPP wins re-election
Sources (Guyana Timeline)
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/gy.html
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/sa/guyana/
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/gytoc.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1211428.stm
Guyana Chronicle
Guyana Kaieteur News
Guyana Stabroek News
Guyana Times
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-Acronyms & AbbreviationsCaricom – Caribbean Community of regional English Speaking nations
PNC -- Peoples National Congress founded by Forbes Burnham (African)
PPP -- Peoples Progressive Party founded by Dr. Cheddi Jagan (Indian)
PAC – Political Affair Committee that became PPP
ROAR -- Rise Organize And Rebuild
U.F -- United Force Founded by Peter D’Aguiar (Portuguese)
WPA -- Working Peoples Alliance founded by Dr. Walter Rodney

-Political Leaders-

Cheddi Jagan (Indian) - Ruler 1957-64, 1992-97
Forbes Burnham (African) -- Ruler 1964-85
Desmond Hoyte -- (African) Ruler 1985-92
Janet Jagan -- (White) Ruler 1997-99
Bharath Jagdeo – (Indian) Ruler 1999-2011
Donald Ramotar -- (Indian) Ruler December 2011 to Present
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Background to Ethnic Conflict
In recent decades, diverse people have become increasingly dependent on one another
resulting in a breaking down of various social barriers to allow for greater economic
integration that should result in a better quality of life. Yet, in many societies, especially in
the developing world, a barrier in the form of race or ethnicity1 is increasingly dividing
people and impacting negatively on their way of life and standard of living and even on the
growth of a nation (Laguerre: 2013; Gurr: 1994; Hechter: 1987; Horowitz: 1985; Brass:
1976; Hechter: 1974). In many multi-ethnic societies, ethnic identity (ethnic assertiveness)
and discord have been on the rise with many ethnic groups2 placing increasing demands on
the state for a more “fair” (or greater) share of resources and political power (participation
and significant positions in governance). People have been viewing issues through ethnic
lens and pursuing or advocating policies that are geared towards serving the interests of
people of their own ethnic groups rather than the entire nation of multi-ethnic groups
(Hechter: 1978; Barth: 1969). Also, they tend to pledge greater loyalty and allegiance to
their group rather than to the state. In addition, the members of ethnic groups have been
asserting their ethnic identity (described as ethno-nationalism or a kind of ethnic
assertiveness in their group identity) in matters pertaining to the state and the economy often
making (at times unreasonable) political and economic demands for their group3 (Bonacich:
1 Ethnicity refers to the passionate loyalty one displays for his/her ethnic group.
2 An ethnic group is defined on the basis of race or cultural criteria, namely a group sharing a
distinctive homeland or territory (nationality), or language, or religion, or some other form of
common ancestry (such as tribe or race, among others).
3 From a sociological or anthropological perspective, ethnic consciousness and the value of
ethnicity are social labels imposed from outside a person’s group of physical like-minded
individuals and that indeed has been the social reality of life among people in multi-ethnic
societies. People are described by the color of their skin or by their ancestors’ geographic
locations like Indians or Africans or Chinese or Portuguese or Turkish or their religion, or their
language, etc., as is the case in so many places. In these societies, ethnicity (or ethnic
identification becomes inordinately significant to the people. Their physical identity and group
differences (from others) are always emphasized and instilled into their psyche by others
- 1 -

1972). Such demands made primarily out of ethnic considerations, and for whatever
reasons, are increasingly becoming a relevant focus for so many peoples' socio-economic
and politico attitudes and their overall behavior in many multi-ethnic nations primarily in
developing nations (Young: 1975). This often leads to violent ethnic conflict4 that has an
adverse effect on investment and productivity hurting national economic growth and quality
of life (Allahar: 1996; Geertz: 1973). In short, ethnic conflict generally impact on national
development and social change.
As gleamed from the literature and from empirical observations, race or ethnic
conflict is the single most intractable barrier to social change, progress, growth and
development, especially among countries in the developing world. Ethnic division in
developing states tends to be much more evident and pronounced than in developed
countries, and it seems to have greater effects on development on the former than on the
latter. Very few nation states are spared the travails of ethnic conflict and violence,
especially in the developing world, which have affected overall development in many of
them impacting on standard of living and quality of life (Richardson: 1996, Dew: 1994). In
many of these multi-ethnic states, especially in the Third World, the ethnic conflict has been
so acute that the nation has experienced (or is on the verge of) a civil war (like Rwanda,
Burundi, Zaire, Sudan, among others) that has damaged their economies -- rendering
infrastructure dysfunctional, destroying large swaths of buildings, as well as making farming
and business activities almost impossible (Horowitz: 1985). Thus, ethnic conflict, especially

(including in the media). Not unexpectedly, people tend to accept or see themselves in terms of
how they are described by others thereby reinforcing their identity especially when seen by
members of other ethnic groups as belonging in that group category.
4 Ethnic conflict is a struggle (could be peaceful like using protests or violent with clashes)
between or among rival groups seeking to maintain or gain access to resources or control of state
power. The latter has been the primary motif or raison d’etre of most ethnic groups in conflict.
- 2 -

when it is expressed in extreme forms of physical violence or even through persistent
protests that lead to instability, can negatively impact the overall social, economic and
political development of societies (social change) (Bonacich: 1972). This inevitably results
in a declining standard of living or quality of life as reflected in measurements of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita, economic growth rates, health and social indices,
and other social and economic indicators of many of these multi-ethnic nations.
There is pronounced ethnic conflict in too many nations. In virtually every multiethnic nation, people tend to coalesce around their group or an organization (s) advocating
the interests of their ethnic group; or they may rally behind a leader (or leaders) who is (are)
the advocate (s) of their group or they are influenced by political (ethnic) leaders and or
ethnic organizations that advocate on behalf of their group or they support those who they
perceive to be representing their ‘ethnic’ interests (group). The organizations are usually
composed of members of their own ethnic group, and they make demands that may be in
conflict with (members of) other organizations representing the interests of other ethnic
groups that have similar (or even conflicting) demands on the state vis-à-vis their groups
(Alahar: 1996; Hechter: 1995; Horowitz: 1985; Hechter: 1974). Ethnic groups tend to
display self-interest and have defined their goal not in terms of what is in the national
interest but what they perceive to be in the groups’ interest. Not surprisingly, many groups
demand autonomy or greater amounts of power for their group with reference to control
over the state and or its allocation of resources (Hechter: 1987 & 1978; Gordon: 1975).
Such demands conflict with those of other groups and they inevitably lead to sociopolitico instability resulting in major problems in nation building, including effects on
social change and standard of living (that tend to decline).

- 3 -

Also, in several multi-ethnic societies, especially in the developing world, politics is
practiced at a primordial (or tribal) level where organizations or political parties are formed
(often endorsed by political leaders and politicians) to advocate the interests of their own
ethnic group rather than that of the entire nation (state) of all ethnicities. Such fragmentation
of the nation often leads to a clash between or among the diverse groups and or with the
state (that may be under the control of another group) (Alahar: 1996, Dew: 1989; Nagel:
1984). Very often, the focus of the leadership of a group is on capturing the state for its
(their) members (or for a small group of ethnic entrepreneurs who claim leadership or are
chosen as leaders of the group). The goal of the ethnic leadership is not necessarily that of
developing the state for the benefit of all its citizens but rather to guarantee the interests of
the group or those of its selfish leaders are foremost served (Gur: 1994). The objective of
the state should not be that of serving the vital interests of one ethnic group (as in minorityruled Rhodesia or apartheid South Africa or Shiite-ruled Iraq) but to promote national
development that can lead to a higher collective standard of living for everyone in the nation
as generally happens in developed nations. However, ethnic leaders and their followers or
their organizations (including ethnic political parties) often lose sight of this important fact,
and they tend to pursue a narrow (ethnic) agenda that is not in the best interests of the nation
and or at times not even in the interest of the group but of their own apparent self-interest
(Hechter: 1987). In some cases, it appears the mission of ethnic leaders or their organization
is simply to capture the state (peacefully or violently) regardless of the socio-economic
consequences (such as destruction of infrastructure and loss of lives) on their supporters or
on the nation at large – a grab for power by ethnic leaders who exploit ethnic conflict
without concern for the resulting fallout. In ethnically polarized states, groupings (including
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political parties) tend to be (willfully or strategically or organically) organized along ethnic
lines or become ethnically oriented. The leaders of these groups (political parties, in
particular) advocate the interests of their own groups often to the exclusion of other groups.
The preoccupation by ethnic leaders and or their support group and or their parties and or
ethnic organizations to focus on the interests of their own groups in national politics
inevitably lead to antagonisms with other groups and or their ethnic leaders (Laguerre: 2013
& 1984). This tends to lead to tension and pitched battles between members of groups and
or between organizations and or parties representing other ethnic groups for state control
(based on ethnic demands) or for ethnic predominance in the country to access or control
resources for the group (LaGuerre: 2013). Ethnic tensions and animosity are often followed
by violent ethnic conflict (leading to political instability) (Bonacich: 1972) as has been
witnessed in so many countries, especially in recent years.
To the extent that political parties or organizations in a state are ethnic in nature, the
competition for political control of the state between or among the parties may often mirror
the ethnic conflict. That is to say, distinct ethnic groups within a nation have political parties
or organizations representing them (as in Libya or Iraq) and they are in conflict with other
ethnically based parties or organizations for control of state power and domination (over
economics, resources, culture, politics, etc.)(Geertz: 1973). These ethnically based political
parties tend to mobilize support, covertly if not overtly, based on ethnicity (Dew: 1989).
Once in power, the leaders (of the party or group in power) tend to reward their (or its) own
supporters in a client-patron relationship in order to maintain the support of their base, often
to the exclusion (or neglect) of members of other ethnic groups, with the goal of
perpetuating political and economic control over the state as well as over the group. The
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neglect and marginalization of other (subordinated) groups by the dominant group (in
control of the state) solidifies and even exacerbates the ethnic conflict (that may lead to
violence and destruction). Challenges are mounted against the dominant group by other (out
or subordinate) groups furthering the conflict. Also, the competition for control over the
state and or for resources along ethnic lines is bound to lead to violence and instability
especially when there is inequitable distribution of resources (Geertz: 1973). As observed in
so many societies, serious ethnic conflict often leads to physical violence. And once there is
violence and political instability, especially over a prolonged period, the economy suffers
and with it the standard of living declines (Hechter: 2000, 1995).
In short, in several of these multi-ethnic nations, groups are in conflict with one
another or with the state (government) leading to political instability that tend to disrupt
economic activities impacting on the development (projects) of the state as well as on social
change (Horowitz: 1985). Ethnic competition (conflict) tends to lead to physical violence
between and or among groups and or protests that feed socio-politico instability which can
negatively affect investment, productivity, tax revenues, food and other commodity
production, growth and development, infrastructure, standard of living, etc., as have been
observed in so many countries. Instability often leads to economic problems. Investors tend
to be reluctant to pour money into societies where there are political (or ethnic) troubles that
would make recovery of financial investments or assets very difficult if not impossible. In
such troubled societies, as businesses withhold investment, the economy will not grow,
economic progress becomes stymied and the standard of living inevitably suffers (stagnate
or decline) as observed in many societies. Even state owned corporations are not exempt
from the effects of conflicts; they also experience problems during periods of political
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instability resulting in reduced productivity and loss of revenues. Several countries suffer
from this syndrome (ethnic conflict leading to political instability that impact on the
economy). The causes (of ethnic conflict) need to be addressed (and resolved) by
policymakers so that conditions can be established for the diverse groups of people (in
conflict) to live peaceably allowing the societies to maximize their economic potential
resulting in an improvement in the collective standard of living of all irrespective of
ethnicity and (positive) social change (Bonacich: 1972; Barth: 1969; Despres: 1967).
One society where ethnic conflict has severely impacted development is Guyana in
Northeast South America. It is a pluralist, racially polarized and politically unstable state.
Guyana is an artificially constructed society in the sense that except for one ethnic group
(indigenous Amerindians), all the others were imported from Europe, Africa, and Asia to
service sugar plantations during the colonial era (Rabushka: 1972; Cross: 1971; Young:
1975). The ethnic groups were historically divided and segregated by race living in separate
communities after their importation and settlement in Guyana with very little co-mingling.
Segregated residential patterns have affected all aspects of relations among the diverse
groups to the point where the society is ready to racially explode at any time that would
wipe out whatever little economic gains it has made over its short history as a nation.
The ethnic groups in Guyana have been at each other’s throats ever since they came
into contact in the 1840s. There was serious racial conflict between and among the groups
(Amerindians, Africans, Indians, Portuguese, Chinese, and Mulattoes or Mixed) with some
incidents involving physical violence including loss of lives since that time (Samaroo: 1987;
Despres: 1967). The two major races, Indians and Africans5, represented by their respective

5 Indians (the majority race) and Africans (the minority race) are the major racial groups in
Guyana. There are also a few ethnic minorities – Whites, (Portuguese, British, and Europeans),
- 7 -

race (ethnic) dominated political parties, Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) and Peoples
National Congress (PNC), have competed for control of state power since the mid 1950s
(Glasgow: 1970) resulting in almost a perpetual state of instability. As a result of this acute
(at times often violent) ethnic conflict, the country has experienced serious difficulties in
nation building and in attaining socio-economic development6 (Bartels: 1977).
Section A: Ethnic Conflict in Guyana:
There are numerous heterogeneous societies with their social, political and ethnic
conflicts. But Guyana’s represent an extreme case of ethnic division where almost every
aspect (union affiliation, occupation, politics, economics, religion, education, among
other social constructs) of life is linked to ethnicity and or is viewed in ethnic terms7.

Coloreds or Mixed races (product of inter-racial parents), Chinese and Amerindians. Indians
constitute approximately 51% of the total population and tend to support the PPP while Africans,
who make up about 31% of the population, tend to identify with the PNC (Table p ix). The other
races make up the rest of the population of approximately 750,000. The Indians and Africans
have been the primary groups involved in ethnic conflict over control of the state. They are the
main contenders for political power. And since 1955, the two major ethnic groups, as indeed the
others, have supported a political party or organization or political force that they have perceived
to represent their interests or ethnic group. Two major political parties have shaped and
dominated Guyana's political development since adult suffrage was granted in 1953, the People's
Progressive Party, founded by Cheddi Jagan (an Indian who considered himself to be a Marxist),
and the People's National Congress (PNC) founded by Forbes Burnham (an African who
viewed himself as a moderate socialist but who was an ally of Britain and the U.S).
6 Social scientists view development from their respective disciplinary perspectives and there is
disagreement on what constitutes development – whether it should include life expectancy, infant
mortality rate, fertility rate, GNP per capita, GDP growth rate, socio-politico role of women,
political and economic freedom, nutritional intake, among other indicators. Development is used
here in generic terms to include all aspects of human conditions and living. But the focus is on
growth rates and GDP per capita and various aspects relating to the economy and life.
7 With regards to the distribution of career employment, occupations have also been shaped by
ethnicity with Indians mostly employed in agro related jobs and Afros employed in civil service
or state jobs as well as in the security forces. Some fifty years after independence, most Indians
are still employed in agriculture, growing sugar and rice and engaging in the retailing sectors of
the economy. On the other hand, most Africans have lived in urban areas and are largely
dependent on the state for employment and their economic survival. “Until the 1930s, AfroGuyanese, and those of mixed African and European descent, comprised the bulk of the nonwhite
professional class. Beginning in the 1930s, as Indians began to enter the middle class in large
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There is spite and hatred among the members of a group for members of other groups.
Ethnic tension has been running continuously high, a holdover from colonial times after
the groups were imported into the colony during slavery and the indentured period. They
could not be bothered by deeper meanings of life like freedom and human rights, of a
social contract, of peaceful co-existence, of appreciation of other peoples’ culture, of
living together and in harmony, and of live and let live. People have been willing to
sacrifice their own higher standard of living on the altar of social division arising out of
petty ethnic jealousies, prejudice, stereotyping, ethnocentrism, and racial politics. The
population has allowed themselves to be manipulated by ethnic leaders
Ever since the election of 1957, the first in which racially based parties contested,
racial tensions have been running very high. The groups have exhibited a feeling of
ethnic insecurity when their ethnic party lost an election. They have also displayed
jealousy especially in seeing members outside of their racial group making economic
progress and or controlling the state (government) and or aspects of the economy. They
have voted to keep the other race (party) out of office and for their race to govern rather
than for which party or political force is most capable of governing (with better policies
and programs) that would lead to socio-economic progress. Race relations have
gradually worsened since universal suffrage (in 1953 when the races formed a multiracial alliance) with the country experiencing sporadic periods of violent Indian-African
racial disturbances post 1957 (as it did during the indentured era between African and
Portuguese and African and Chinese) including loss of human lives, large scale
destruction of infrastructure and property, and reduced productivity (including farm
numbers, they began to compete with Africans for professional positions exacerbating ethnic
conflict”. (http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html).
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produce) that resulted in negative economic growth rates for most of those years.
(http://www.guyana.org/govt/From_Autocracy_to_Democracy_in_Guyana.pdf).
Leadership feuds8 between Dr. Cheddi Jagan (leader of the Indians) and Forbes Burnham
(leader of the Africans) driven by sentiments of ethno nationalism (among supporters of
each racial group) have shattered the dream of inter-ethnic labor solidarity, national unity
and political stability, thereby severely impacting on the country’s ability to realize its
economic potential with its vast supply of resources. The economy experienced a
downward spiral between 1966 and 1992 not seen in any other country during that period
(http://countrystudies.us/guyana/53.htm). And during this period, politics was polarized
along ethnic lines with political parties largely coinciding with members of one race
(Laguerre: 2013; Alahar: 1996). With virtually no tradition of unity during the colonial
era except briefly between 1950 and 1953, the new nation formed in 1966 has been
severely weakened by serious ethnic conflict including physical violence that has
impacted on development and social change (GC Jul 10, 2012, KN Feb 26, 2010). Under
the tyranny of the PNC ethnic dictatorship, between 1968 and 1992, Guyana experienced
the worst form of racial politics and governance with non-supporters (Indians, Whites,
Chinese, Amerindians) being victimized and discriminated against primarily on account
of their race and politics (supporting other parties). Guyana suffered significant
psychological, political, social, and economic ills with too many victims (SN Jul 8, 2011;
GT Jan 21, 20 2015). During the 1970s and 1980s, racial animosity intensified to the
extent that there were bold, malicious daylight robberies that targeted Indians and Indian-

8 Neither Dr. Jagan nor Burnham was willing to yield to the other for the top post of leader of the
multi-ethnic movement and or to cooperate for the betterment of the working class. They were
driven by political egos and self-centered ambitions and by racial distrust among their followers
for the other groups (SN June 4, 2011).
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owned businesses. During the nights, there occurred what came to be known as kick down
door banditry (against Indian homes), some allegedly carried out by forces allied with
(and some even sent by) the PNC regime (Guyana Times Jan 24, 2015; Aug 2, 2014; Jul
5, 2014; KN May 1, 2011) (www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham2.htm).
It was alleged by Dr. Jagan and Indian leaders that the PNC government was
behind (supported, aided and abetted) or at a minimum closed its eyes to the crime spree
against Indians committed by individuals allied with the government (Ibid; KN May 4,
2011; Feb 21, 2010). “Fear gripped the land and no one dared question the government
(or the kabaka ruler as Burnham was called) of the day - from 1966 thru 1992”
(Rampertab: 2001). For 28 years, the ruling PNC was accused of discriminating against
Indians, Whites, Chinese and other groups and openly patronizing Africans at the
expense of all other groups (Ibid; KN Nov 4, 2014; GT Nov 14, 2014). Scholars noted
that politics in Guyana under Burnham and the PNC was associated with “murder,
mayhem, starvation, financial scandals, election rigging, unprincipled calculations of
self-interest, fraud, racism and corruption” (Rampertab: 2001). The ruling PNC
(December 1964 to October 1992) practiced intense racism and interfered in every aspect
of peoples’ lives from food consumption (telling them what to eat and banning imports)
to housing and transportation (outlawing private buses from plying the road). It interfered
in the judiciary, media, state corporations, union, military and the public service. It even
blocked appointments of people it deemed as opponents as happened to Dr. Walter
Rodney (as Professor of History) at the University of Guyana (Erriah: 89). Burnham also
compromised the independence of labor unions forcing Black unions to affiliate with the
PNC (GT Jun 4, 2014). “Labor strikes were regarded as subversive activities and striking
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workers were beaten and often jailed. The judiciary was politicized with independent
judges removed and or coerced into following government dictates. The constitution was
amended to the extent that the President was not answerable to any court. Trial by jury
was infringed”. (http://www.guyanaundersiege.com/History/wismar/wismar%20page.htm) (see
also SN Mar 10, 2007; Nov 10, 2012; Jan 18, 2007). The PNC wanted absolute control of

the society and adopted repressive measures to acquire total control with little concern for
the economic, political or social consequences of its policies. The PNC was unconcerned
about how it was viewed by the population at large – the ends justified the means. Not
surprisingly, political support for the PNC regime fell to an all time low as reflected, as
an example, in only a 12% turnout at the 1978 referendum to amend the constitution to
make Burnham de facto President for life although Burnham claimed 80% turnout
(Rampertab: 2001; SN Mar 16, 2014; SN Feb 14, 2013; SN Oct 6, 2010).
After independence, Guyana had become a lawless state, and, for all practical
purposes, a fascist one party state that intimidated, beat, harassed and killed opponents
who threatened the ruling PNC’s hold on power (Thomas: 1984). Opposition political
figures were often picked up and charged for crimes without evidence and on trumped up
charges like what happened to University of Guyana Profs. Omowale, Walter Rodney
and Rupert Roopnarine when they formed a political party, Working Peoples Alliance
(WPA) (Pierce: 1984). A fugitive from justice, Black American David Hill, led a team of
thugs that frequently used violence, at the behest and instruction of Burnham, to beat
workers, break up labor strikes and disrupt political and union meetings in the presence
of the police who would make no effort to stop the thugs from unleashing terror on
workers and innocent citizens (GT Jun 4, 2014; KN Jul 27, 2013; SN Jul 18, 2010, Sep
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11, 2009). So violent and feared was this group, called House of Israel (no connection to
the state of Israel and not recognized as Jewish by any other Jewish organization) led by a
Black American fugitive (David Hill who called himself Rabbi Washington) who
Burnham refused to extradite back to the US, and Black Guyanese (many former
criminals), that police refused to take actions against them for criminal acts including for
murders. For example, on July 14, 1979, some of its members armed with staves,
cutlasses and knives, viciously attacked and murdered Catholic priest Father Bernard
Darke in the presence of police who looked on and did nothing, fearing the loss of their
jobs, to protect the priest (KN Jul 27, 2013; SN Jul 31, 2009). The police did not charge
the murderers as they had enjoyed state protection (GT June 26, Jun 6, Jun 4, Jun 3, May
17, Apr 30, 2014). It is widely known that the group’s 10,000 members acted as a
paramilitary wing of Burnham’s PNC terrorizing people and demanding protection
money or face the wrath of its thugs (KN Jan 10, 2013). They carried out criminal acts
with impunity (Ibid). Father Darke’s killers were only charged after Burnham’s death (in
1985) on order from Burnham’s successor Desmond Hoyte after sustained pressure from
domestic and international human rights groups (Harry Gill KN May 17, 2011) to bring
the culprits to book. Political and ethnic crimes decreased after David Hill (self
proclaimed Rabbi or Jewish priest) was put away in jail and several violent members of
his group executed for capital and other serious offenses (SN Oct 13, 2009).
The PNC’s ties with criminal outfits and underlings and its authoritarian and
racist policies led to the mass migration first of the wealthy class (Portuguese, Chinese
and Indian entrepreneurs) and then the middle class (professionals and skilled Guyanese)
and even the poorer class (under employed and unemployed and low skilled workers)
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looking for any type of work (GT Jan 25, 2015; Nov 17, 2014, KN Nov 4, 2014) to earn
a living. Human rights abuses, food shortages, high unemployment, political
victimization, and racial discrimination under PNC rule caused large numbers of
Guyanese to migrate. Some 2% Guyanese emigrated annually during the 1970s and about
4% annually since 1980 as compared with less than 1% during the colonial era prior to
1966) (KN Apr 14, 2014). They migrate legally and illegally (what is called backtrack in
Guyana) to North America, the United Kingdom, South America, and throughout the
Caribbean. Some migrated as refugees and were granted refugee status in Canada and
many sought the same in the US (Erriah: 91; KN Oct 6, 2009). Some visited other
countries with the intention of not returning to Guyana. As a result of such huge
migration waves during PNC rule, Guyanese are found in every corner of the globe (KN
Apr 15, 2014; Oct 11, 2009) and the country has had negative population growth post
independence (SN Aug 6, 3, Jul 1, 2014; KN Aug 31, 2011). As a result of the brain drain
attributed to the ill-advised policies of the PNC regime, the economy slid to unbelievable
levels with no country experiencing the kind of decline Guyana experienced after it
obtained independence in 1966 (http://countrystudies.us/guyana/55.htm;
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5417.html
Section B. Economic Decline of Guyana:
Data shows that from 1966 onward, there was a downward slide (including falling
revenues, declining economic investment, etc.) of a once-booming and stable economy as
a consequence of racial instability and the failure to adhere to common sense fiscal
management guidelines and democratic governance (KN Sep 1, 2014; Aug 10, 2012; May
29, 2011)(World Bank Annual Reports). Foreign investors had played a key role in the
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expansion and growth of the economy all throughout the colonial era. But after
independence, they have been kept away by social instability, rising prices, adverse terms
of trade, economic nationalism, the devaluation of the once high Guyana dollar (that
traded in the 1960s at around two to one for the US dollar and now around two hundred
to the US dollar) and other socio-economic and political factors. As a result of the ethnic
conflict that impacted on all aspects of the economy, people have not been able to enjoy
the economic potential of the nation and or experience a relatively reasonable standard of
living as compared with other countries that became independent around the same time as
Guyana (SN Jan 25, 2010). And worse, there has been a climate of social and economic
gloom and uncertainty about the future because of frequent threats of racial violence that
frighten away investors and that even discourage local investment (SN Sep 9, 2011; Apr
10, 2009). Ethnic conflict had triggered capital fight and a brain drain with migration of
the country’s best brains affecting development (GT Jan 25, 2015; SN Aug 4, 2014; Jun
22, 2013; Mar 3, 2012; KN Aug 7, 2011; Apr 18, 2011; Jul 7, 2010).
Guyana was in terrible shape during the 1970s and 1980s with crumbling streets,
collapsing infrastructure, mass starvation, unruly gangs attacking people, criminality,
beggars, kids with bloated bellies roaming the streets, animal carcasses on the roads,
among other aspects of social malaise (KN May 24, 2011; Apr 4, 2011; Jun 5, 2010).
Guyana looked no different from say depressed African economies during the 1980s
(http://monthlyreview.org/2009/07/01/sub-saharan-africas-vanishing-peasantries-and-thespecter-of-a-global-food-crisis) (SN Nov 28, 2010; Aug 30, 2008). Guyana, in the 1980s,
resembled a poverty-stricken, starvation-prone depressed country in the throes of civil
war as was observed in Central America (SN May 17, 2013; Jan 13, 2012; Dec 4, 2011;
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Jan 24, 2011; Aug 7, 2009). Evidence of poverty and depression was everywhere:
malnourished bodies, horrific social conditions, declining educational standards, and
garbage strewn around in the streets (SN Dec 30, 2010; May 5, 2009). Most of the
country was ramshackle with dilapidated buildings as in depressed African countries that
were affected by severe drought in the 1980s (SN May 31, 2012; Dec 29, 2011; Oct 30,
2011; Jul 22, 2011; Aug 13, 2008). But Guyana was/is actually not a poor country in
terms of its natural and human resources and potential and strategic location for trade and
investment (SN Jul 22, 2012; Aug 7, 2011; Erriah: 2011, Manley: 1984, Mandle: 1978).
By any measure of development9, such as economic growth, GDP per capita,
standard of living, among others, Guyana should have been a very prosperous country
because of its vast assets in natural resources and its skilled, qualified and talented
personnel with sound managerial capacity (Ibid). However, because of political
instability and race riots during the early 1960s impacting on productivity, the country’s
growth and development began to stagnate after experiencing a slight rise in its standard
of living during the late 1950s. But political stability had returned to the colony at the
time of independence in 1966, and the economy had begun to make a turn around with
slight growth. The colonial rulers had left the country with a relatively decent
infrastructure, a disciplined workforce (including bureaucracy) and legal structure
(respect for law), and democratic institutions to facilitate development. But the country
began to experience a rapid deterioration in all aspects of life right after independence.
The two major political parties inherited the leadership mantle from the exploitative

9 Guyana has been considered underdeveloped because of the poor quality of roads and other
infrastructural aspects of the economy, limited availability of skilled personnel, low level of
technology, a few industries, high unemployment, extreme levels of poverty, frequent electricity
blackouts, limited running water, and stagnant or negative growth, among other measurements.
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bourgeois imperialist British, but they have failed in effecting significant social change
such as reducing impoverished conditions and in developing the nation with the result
that between 40% and 60% of the nation have lived below the poverty level between
1960 and the present (http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/guyana;
Standing: 1979; Gafar: 2004; KN Mar 16, 2014; SN Jul 3, 2010; SN Mar 21, 2009). Very
few benefits have trickled down to the poor or to the rural and hinterland areas where the
Amerindians, Indians and poorest of the Africans are concentrated (SN Sep 17, 2010; KN
Jul 15, 2012). The big wigs in the PNC filled their bank accounts while the poor were
neglected (SN Jul 5, 2012; Aug 3, 2009). In this socialist economy, really a state capitalist
economy under the PNC (Pierce: 1984), the rich were getting richer (through their
affiliation with the ruling party apparatchik) while the poor were getting poorer (SN May
16, 2011; May 25, 2010; SN Mar 28, 2011; Dec 14, 2008; Aug 31, 2008).
Guyana should never have been a poor, underdeveloped country. It is a state rich
in mineral resources (including gold, diamond, bauxite, and manganese) and abundant
agricultural land that can grow food to feed the entire Caribbean region. Also, it has not
experienced major climate issues or natural calamities that would impact on
development. There were unlimited amounts of water from its fresh water rivers to
sustain agricultural development in the vast expanse of arable land like what took place in
nearby Brazil and Argentina. There have been unlimited resources essential for agro
growth to fuel industrial growth and development to be the Singapore or Taiwan or
Malaysia or New Zealand of the Caribbean. Agriculture, for example, could have raised
significant capital to finance industrial development similar to what took place in
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile and Brazil in their early phase of development
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subsequently becoming industrial giants and self sufficient in food production. But the
governing ethnic PNC regime, from 1966 onwards, moved away from agricultural
development and other successful small-scale private industries that were predominated
by supporters of the other parties (http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/guyana.html;
http://www.guyana.org/features/postindependence/chapter5.html).
The PNC focused instead on state-led import substitution and industrialization
(ISI) by invitation and bureaucratic expansion (hiring more state workers who were
supporters of the party – a policy of patronage and clientelism) that led to disastrous
economic consequences (SN Jun 13, 2009). Most of the state owned industries as well as
the bureaucracy (some 95%) were under the control of (African and Mixed) supporters of
the PNC. Agriculture, the mainstay of the economy, historically dominated by Indians
was neglected and undermined; the Indian-backed PPP government committed
significant resources to agricultural expansion during its term in office between 1957 and
1964 leading to modest growth (SN Oct 27, 2010; Nov 12, 2009). However, after the
PNC came to office, Burnham shifted resources away from agriculture and towards ISI to
punish Indians for supporting the PPP and to benefit his ethnic supporters. The PNC
government undermined the productive sectors of the economy such as agriculture and
fisheries because the workers in those industries supported the opposition PPP (SN Jun 5,
2009). Growth took a turn for the worse (GC Sep 14, 2014) hurting even PNC
supporters in the process. The PNC government was not so much focused on economic
consequences of its policies but of retaining its support base (from among the African
workers in the civil service, security and mining sector) and weakening the PPP base. The
PNC did not want to pursue policies that would aid supporters of the PPP even if the
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neglect of agriculture and fisheries would undermine development and the general
welfare of the entire population (Africans included) – a case of political decision
trumping the economic good of a society (SN May 31, 2014; Oct 13, 2009; Aug 17, 2009;
Jan 5, 2009). Similarly, private industries, dominated by the Whites, Mixed, and Chinese
– all of whom the PNC considered as its opponents because they supported other political
parties – were marginalized. Analogous to Indians who were punished for supporting the
PPP, members of other groups (Whites, wealthy Coloreds, Chinese, Amerindians) were
punished for supporting the UF party. Burnham government’s policy was to shift control
of the commanding heights of the economy (controlled by wealthy Portuguese, Coloreds,
Chinese and other non-supporters of the PNC) away from those not supportive of the
PNC and put them under state control (that would now be under the absolute control of
his African supporters who had almost total control over the state after 1966) (SN May
27, 2012). In so doing, Burnham felt he would undermine the political strength of the
PNC’s political opponents (PPP and UF) while simultaneously he would appease its own
African supporters to remain loyal to him and the PNC (SN May 16, 2013; Aug 17,
2009). Burnham transformed the liberal democratic state into an autarchic repressive
dictatorship (controlling the courts, media, and parliament) with supporters providing full
backing (SN Apr 12, 2014). Although under colonial control, Guyana was one of the
most progressive and liberal-minded societies prior to independence, and it was always
open to the world for intellectual interaction as well as for trade. Parties and politicians
advocated a variety of political ideologies. And books and products could be found in the
country from all over the world. People were relatively free to criticize the government
prior to independence. But once Burnham assumed power in 1966, the country was held
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under his sway and basic freedoms disappeared. Basic imports (including food staples)
were banned and people were forced to accept Burnham’s policies or pay with their lives
in defying them. Electoral fraud, denial of civil liberties and civil rights, political
assassinations and killing of priests, and economic underdevelopment characterized PNC
rule from 1966 thru 1992 (GC Oct 28, 2014; SN Nov 22, 2007). Elections in 1968, 1973,
1980 and 1985 and the referendum in 1978 were rigged (www.gina.gov.gy/). Civil
liberties were eroded (www.guyana.org/; SN Oct 30, 2011) and the government
nationalized all foreign owned businesses as well as clamped down on the free press (GT
Nov 5, 2014; KN May 17, 2011; SN Nov 12, 2009; Nov 4, 2008).
(www.stabroeknews.com/.../education-policy-changes-and-economic-crisis-in- guyana1970-1985/; countrystudies.us/guyana/17.htm; https://nacla.org/.../after-34-..)
Burnham had become a despot wielding enormous power in an oppressive way
abusing and terrorizing everyone not supportive of his regime and party (Ibid). The
security forces kept watch on everyone’s activities (www.mirrornewsgy.com/ Jun 28,
2014). Labor strikes and opposition gatherings were broken up with violence at the
behest of Burnham. Freedom of the press was abolished; non-government media was
denied newsprint paper (Ibid; GC Jun 30, 2014). In 1973, Burnham sent his secret agents
to seize paper stocks from the opposition PPP political organ, Mirror newspaper
(http://www.answers.com/topic/forbes-burnham#ixzz1tBtJfT15). Burnham acquired
control of most of the economy (over 80% of economic activities) leaving virtually no
avenues for his opponents to launch a challenge to his rule and for private businesses to
prosper (SN Dec 15, 2008; Jan 17, 2007). Burnham brought out the troops against striking
workers, hired scabs to break strikes and used soldiers with inappropriate technical skills
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and virtually no business management background to run state owned enterprises.
Opponents of the government were cruelly beaten by party thugs, some hounded out of
the country, and a few assassinated including Jesuit priest Father Bernard Darke (KN
May 17, 2011) and the world respected historian Dr. Walter Rodney, the leader of the
opposition Working People's Alliance, who was boldly assassinated in broad daylight.
Fear stalked the land with people becoming passively submissive to the regime
(www.answers.com/topic/forbes-burnham#ixzz1tBtJfT15; KN Mar 19, 2014; May 2, 2014).

After independence in 1966, with Burnham and his PNC in total control of the
government, and ruling with fear, Guyana has failed to make meaningful economic
progress (Grenade: 2011; SN Oct 31, 2012; May 27, 2012; May 20, 2012; Nov 3, 2010).
Guyana's per capita income and growth rate from 1960 thru 2010 was among the lowest
for underdeveloped countries when just a few years earlier it was among the highest for
Caribbean countries and way above most African countries (World Bank Annual
Reports/Tables; countrystudies.us/guyana/53.htm). Whatever else may be said about
Guyana, virtually no improvement took place in the quality of life after independence.
(https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=economic+decline+in+guyana+during+1980s).
And little structural transformation of its largely poverty-stricken economy has
occurred after independence (www.guyana.org/), and what is even more striking, none
seems likely in the immediate future because of the large amounts of time the
government and the opposition have spent on addressing ethnic matters rather than on
substantial issues of development. Some 48 years after independence, Guyana has not
been able to realize its economic potential as a nation with unlimited resources. Today,
about half the population still have to eke out a living with just one 1970 dollar with an
official poverty rate of around 40 percent. According to the World Bank Report (2009),
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47% of the Guyanese population is classified as poor (having a nominal income of less
than US $240 a month with 29% classified as ‘extremely poor’ (less than US $100
monthly), figures that put Guyana just above Haiti in terms of standard of living in the
western hemisphere. As the World Bank report (2011) concluded, some 45 years after
independence, Guyana seems unable to eradicate poverty, lift peoples’ income and
standard of living, and at times it could not even grow enough food for them to meet
domestic needs (SN Jul 23, 2011; Nov 12, 2010, Standing: 1979).
World Bank data show that countries worse off than Guyana in the 1950s and
1960s have utterly transformed themselves in various forms of social and economic
measurements for the corresponding period between 1960 and 1990 whereas Guyana did
not (SN Sep 27, 2012; Apr 21, 2011). The country’s economic ranking slid spirally
downward after the PNC took office with the economic slide worsening each year
between 1965 and 1992; the slump was worst after a one race dictatorship was
established post 1968. Life became so miserable in the country that it prompted the
eminent economist Prof. Clive Thomas of the University of Guyana to say “life was
worse under the PNC than under slavery and indenturedship” noting that under slavery or
indenturedship, the slaves and indentured laborers still had food but under PNC rule,
food was hardly available (SN Dec 5, 2008). When Guyana obtained its independence in
May 1966, it had the potential of being the most developed country in the English
speaking Caribbean because of its skilled human and limitless natural resources. But in
less than two decades, the economy declined significantly placing it at the bottom among
13 Caricom regional countries and way below par of poor African countries and the
Asian miracle economies. In 1960, for example, Guyana had the fourth highest per
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capita income (World Bank Country Report) separated by just a few dollars from the top
three (Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados) (see tables in appendix) among the 13 English
speaking Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries, a very educated labor force, and
exhaustive raw materials to fuel development to make Guyana like that of an East Asian
giant in the Caribbean region. But since independence, instead of the economy growing
and peoples’ lives becoming prosperous with a rising standard of living as in the rest of
the Caribbean region or as happened in the East Asian miracle economies like Singapore
or Malaysia, fellow Commonwealth nations (SN Aug 21, 2014), Guyana’s economy has
declined precipitously making it the poorest nation in the Commonwealth and second
poorest in the Western hemisphere (SN Dec 30, 2013; KN Jun 19, 2013; SN Aug 31,
2011). The data showed that Guyana’s GDP ranking slipped from 50th. in the world in
1965 to 133rd in 1992 (SN Apr 21, 2011). And during this period, as well as since 1992,
racial strife has worsened often experiencing physical violence
(http://www.guyana.org/features/conflicts_indiansandblacks.html). Since the 1960s,
Guyana has not experienced much real economic growth compared or significant
improvement in its global rankings or in its economic and social indicators or in its
quality of life as well as standard of living (SN Dec 30, 2013; KN Oct 5, 2013).
It was only in the 1960s that Guyana’s standard of living was way above most
developing nations and close to that of the East Asian tigers (SN Aug 21, 2014; World
Bank Annual Tables). During the 1980s and even today, on every economic indicator,
Guyana has lagged miserably behind such island nations as Singapore, Malaysia, and
Hong Kong (ex-British colonies like Guiana) and Taiwan that had lower levels of
‘education’ and standard of living than Guyana at independence in 1966. In 1960, for
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example, Guyana’s GDP per capita was almost US $300, relatively high for that period of
time when most of the then developing world’s GDP per capita was less than US$150.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_past_and_projected_GDP_%28nomin
al%29percapita. A similar trend was observed when compared with Caricom (grouping
of Caribbean) countries (Ibid). For example, Belize’s GDP per capita was $308 in 1960
but by 1980, it was three times Guyana’s (Ibid). In 1960, St. Vincent’s GDP per capita
was just over half of Guyana’s, but by 1990, St. Vincent’s was three times Guyana’s
(Ibid). In 1960, Guyana’s GDP per capita was almost on par with the three larger
economies (Trinidad, Barbados, Jamaica) of CARICOM and just below that of the Asian
miracle economies, while Sub-Sahara Africa was about US $150 or half of Guyana’s.
But in 1990, Guyana’s GDP per capita climbed to only US $550 (nominal dollars) while
other Caricom countries were ten times that of Guyana’s GDP per capita and historically
poverty stricken Sub-Sahara Africa went past Guyana to $900 – an indication of how
badly Guyana’s economy had declined or stagnated while others progressed. Guyana’s
GDP in 1992 was US$371 million (SN Feb 11, 2013) for a per capita of about $560 while
Sub-Sahara Africa hit almost $1,000. Countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Taiwan and the Maldives, which had been behind or at par with Guyana in development
and GDP/per capita during the 1950s and 1960s, had surpassed it by the 1970s (World
Bank Country Report; Tables p ix-x). While these and several other countries were

experiencing positive growth, Guyana’s economy was growing negatively or not at all
and or experiencing a declining quality and standard of life as measured by any reliable
social indicator. Guyana was fast going downhill without economic brakes. South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia, to mention a few prominent Asian Tigers,
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went from largely poor, illiterate and agrarian societies in the 1950s, similar to Guyana,
to middle class, literate, urbanized, industrialized, and developed societies with standards
of living vastly superior to Guyana’s by 1990. And they were able to create jobs for their
population whereas Guyana could not even provide basic jobs for its small available
workforce with unemployment of over 50% in 1990. They almost wiped out poverty
whereas poverty rate increased in Guyana to about 60% by 1990 (SN May 23, 2010).
It is noted that government’s revenue in 1992 was only US$141 million while
countries (like Singapore, Haiti, Somalia, etc.) with less resources than Guyana in 1960
collected many, many times the revenues of Guyana in 1992. Also, it was noted that
Guyana’s revenue to debt (almost fifteen times) was extremely high compared with other
countries, several (over five) times that of other countries. Guyana’s debt was about US
$30,000 per person in 1992 as compared with less than $100 in 1960 (SN Dec 16, 2009).
Caribbean countries’ per capita debt is only a minute fraction (less than 10%) of
Guyana’s by 1992. Singapore and other Asian tigers and poverty stricken Somalia’s debt
per capita was a fifth of Guyana’s around 1992. The debt for the size of Guyana’s
population and its income and GDP was unsustainable during the 1970s and 1980s
causing the economy to slide downwards and standard of living to tumble. Guyana’s
public debt to GDP ratio in 1992 amounted to over 600 percent (SN Feb 11, 2013) as
compared with Caribbean countries whose debt to GDP ratio was less than 50%,
substantially less than Guyana’s. It took, for example, 94% of the revenues just to sustain
the debt (pay the interests) of Guyana during the early 1990s as compared with just a
tenth of the national revenues of other Caricom countries to meet their debt obligations
(Ibid; SN Feb 11, 2013; Aug 21 & Nov 19, 2011; May 27, 2009).
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By way of a specific comparison with CARICOM partner Barbados, to show how
badly Guyana lagged in progress behind similar countries, the two nations had about the
same GDP per capita in 1960 of about $300. But by 1990, when Guyana's GDP per
capita was about $550, Barbados, with no natural resources to build an industrialize base,
was almost $7000 or twelve times that of Guyana’s (DaCosta in World Bank
Development Indicators, 2003; Tables p x). The December 2013 World Bank Report
lists Guyana’s Gross National Income as less than a fourth of fellow Caricom nation
Barbados when in 1966 Guyana was slightly ahead of Barbados. Other Caribbean
countries were more than ten times Guyana’s GDP per capita income and the East Asian
miracle economies were some twenty times that of Guyana’s (World Bank Report 2003).
By way of another example, during the 1960s, Guyana was way above Haiti (less
than US $100) in terms of per capita income and other features in being a poor country.
But some twenty years later by the mid 1980s, Guyana’s GDP was just a little above
Haiti’s. Also, during the 1960s, Guyana was way above Haiti in terms of being the
poorest country in the hemisphere and way above on various social and economic
indicators. But during the mid 1980s, Guyana just bettered Haiti on the list of the poorest
countries in the Western Hemisphere, with high levels of unemployment, double-digit
inflation, declining currency value, extreme poverty of over 40% of the population living
below the poverty line (65% overall), and a decline in all social indicators including
infant mortality and maternity deaths. International reports noted that Guyana was
declared the poorest of the poor countries in the western hemisphere and hope for a better
future was non-existent (Guyana Chronicle May 2, 2011). The devastation of the country
by the end of the 1980s (some 25 years after the British left) included a bankrupted
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economy, lowest standard of living in the region (SN Aug 31, 2011), and a crippling debt
burden (that sucked some 94% of revenues to service the foreign debt alone during the
1990s) (see Tables p x) that for years “inhibited any pretence to stability and/or growth in
the economy, indexed as poorest in the world, even for some years below Haiti, the poorest
country in the hemisphere” (GC May 25, 2011).
Looking at countries by GDP per capita (according to the IMF, World Bank Report
2009), Guyana was in 126th place, one place ahead of overpopulated India with its 1.2
billion people – a substantial decline since 1960 when it was ranked 45th and India 150th.
Clearly, India went up in development index whereas Guyana went down. A similar trend is
noted when Guyana is compared with poverty stricken countries of Africa (Ibid). Even
adjusted for purchasing power parity10 (GDP or GNP based on what one can actually buy
in a country, as living on a dollar a day is very different, for example, in Guatemala and the
United States and in other countries), in 1990 Guyana was only two places ahead of poverty
stricken Congo (in Africa) that was nearly 100 place behind Guyana during the 1960s.
Guyana was and still is far behind in GDP per capita in what were once hopelessly destitute
African countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, Malawi, and Swaziland – these are
very poor countries which were way behind Guyana in national development (per capita)
during the 1960s thru the 1970s. According to World Bank data (Ibid), during the 1976–88
period, real GDP per head fell by 31 percent, inflation soared eightfold, foreign exchange
reserves dwindled, and government debt rose from 31 percent of GDP to 475 percent –
figures that were worse than those for poor African countries. In 1984, for example, real

10 PPP measures the GNP or GDP not in absolute dollar terms but in the quantity of goods and
services the money can purchase in the country under question for a particular year.
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GDP fell to its lowest level since 1955, and the size of the informal underground
economy was estimated at 40 percent of the formal economy and by the end of the
decade the informal economy was larger than the official economy. Indeed, for most of
the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s GDP per capita in U.S. dollars was substantially
lower than in sub-Sahara African countries (Ibid).
When the ethnic PNC dictatorship was toppled from power in October 1992, the
economy was in shambles though on the mend with the return of an open economy and a
relative improvement in ethnic relations. Instead of building the economy during its
period of governance, the PNC wrecked it. A government that promised to ‘house, clothe
and feed’ the citizens of Guyana in just a few years, left people homeless, virtually naked,
starving and penniless by 1992 (Rampertab: 2001). Between 1966 and 1992,
infrastructure became dilapidated with roads and bridges collapsing and telephones
hardly working. There was virtually no water in the pipes that had rotted away with
people depending on rainwater for home use including cooking and drinking. State
owned utility companies generated inadequate electricity, less than half the country’s
needs, while the government outlawed the sale of power from private generators (SN Nov
11, Jul 3, 2010; KN Jul 21, 2009). Transportation was at a standstill with virtually no fuel
to run vehicles. The closure of the rail system (condemned as a symbol of imperialism)
affected commuting. Roads were in total disrepair with huge potholes all over the country
that were left unfixed for years because of a lack of funds. Schools (that were seized from
their owners) and hospital buildings were literally collapsing having been neglected for
two decades (KN Nov 29, 2014). Hospitals lacked basic supplies such as plaster and antiseptic liquid. Many students stopped going to school because of a lack of food, books and
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other educational supplies, and transportation preferring instead to peddle goods to
support families. The lone university was badly neglected with desks and walls of
buildings crumbling and students hustling to earn money so they can acquire a meal or
provide for their families. People were virtually starving under PNC governance (GT Oct
13, 2013). Food was virtually unavailable similar to what occurred under the oppressive
communist Pol Pot regime in Cambodia during the 1980s or North Korea in the 1990s
(SN Aug 14, 2009). People became almost completely dependent on families abroad for
barrels of used clothing, basic foods, medicine, and cash handouts (SN Dec 15, 2008).
Destitute children and adults foraged garbage heaps for food and clothing similar to what
was seen on TV as taking place in sub-Sahara Africa, parts of Central America and Haiti
during the drought stricken years of the 1980s.
So why have other poor countries done so much better than Guyana after
independence even though Guyana was/is better endowed with natural resources and an
educated work force? The answer may lie in “ethnicity” (ethnic conflict that leads to
instability affecting development). It is noted, for example, that while other multi-ethnic
countries (Singapore and Trinidad, for example) were experiencing political stability,
Guyana was experiencing serious ethnic conflict and racist governance, sabotage of
industries, politically motivated strikes, and inappropriate policies. A US Aid report
(http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK761.pdf) hinted that social (ethnic) and political
tensions were responsible for the poor state of the Guyana economy. Dacosta (2005), in
his study of Guyana, noted that while fellow Caricom member country “Barbados was
experiencing political stability and growing, Guyana was experiencing serious ethnic
conflict and malignant racist policies stifling industries and development”. Some of
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Guyana’s poor growth performance can be attributed to occasional natural disasters (e.g.,
severe flooding from time to time), poor economic policies, mismanagement and etatist
policies, and international conditions. But it is my view that ethnic conflict (ethnic riots,
strikes in ethnically dominated sectors, etc.) also played a significant role in the stagnant
growth or contraction in GDP and low productivity between 1960 and 1992 and for the
failure of the country to realize its full potential. The Black supported PNC government
pursued racially discriminatory policies that led to the exclusion of Indians other ethnic
groups (like Portuguese, Amerindians, and Chinese) that were non-supportive of the
PNC, from most aspects of the economy and even seizing their assets without fair
compensation (KN Nov 4, 2014; SN Oct 1, 2013; Jan 13, 2011; Jul 16, 2009; Jan 18, 2009).
It should be noted that after political independence in 1966, the African PNC
government refused to work with or to consult the opposition forces (that represented the
60% majority of the population) for their input on economic, political or social policy to
reduce ethnic conflict (KN Jun 19, 2012). There was no consultation with representatives
of other ethnic groups on the distribution of resources or the nation’s wealth in an
equitable manner that would benefit everyone and help to reduce conflict. There were no
talks with religious leaders or others on policymaking and implementation that would not
be based on ethnicity (KN Jul 28, 2011). And there was no consultation or discussion
with opposition forces on how to grow the economy so that people can enjoy a higher
standard of living and workers can experience better conditions and higher salaries. The
post independence period was also a time when the government refused to consult with
the business community (KN May 10, 2013) for ideas on how to promote investment and
development, foster growth, expand operations, create jobs, or support development
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initiatives so standard of living can increase or promote social change. This was a period
when the government pursued a policy of nationalization of foreign owned assets and
institutionalized racism that drove away large numbers of people (not supportive of the
African PNC) who felt discriminated against based on their ethnicity. It was also a period
of electoral riggings and the rise of a fascist, racist authoritarian state to prevent the other
races from capturing political power (KN Jun 12, 2013). It was a period when the
government rewarded members of its own ethnic group of virtually all the government’s
resources in a client-patron relationship and victimized other ethnic groups who support
the other ethnic parties (KN Feb 9, 2009). It was also a period that saw the rise of the
ethnic dictatorship and minority apartheid like rule (KN Apr 4, 2013; Aug 16, 2009). It
was also a period of Soviet-type collectivization of economic production that discouraged
entrepreneurial activities (KN May 22 & 13, 2014). The period also corresponded with
negative real growth rate and declining GDP per capita that resulted in a sharp decline in
the quality of life (Grenade: 2011, Dacosta: 2005, Gafar: 2012). Caribbean economists
(Dacosta, Grenade, Mandle, etc.) and analysts feel that Guyana should have been much
better developed than her fellow CARICOM states and other developing nations and far
more prosperous than it was during the 1990s instead of barely staying ahead of Haiti in
GDP per capita. Recent figures from the World Bank Report (2011) also show it has not
improved significantly since the 1990s. The quality of life in Guyana relative to other
countries tells the world that there has been something seriously amiss in that nation.
A trend is observed that after every period of ethnic violence in Guyana – such as
late 1950s, early 1960s, early 1970s, mid 1970s, most of 1980s, early 1990s, mid 1990s,
early 2000s, etc. – economic growth was affected, GDP/per capita impacted and the
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standard of living declined. In analyzing the political situation in the country and looking
at economic data, it seems whenever there was a rise in ethnic conflict (prolonged period
of violence), the economy suffered jolts resulting in a decline in growth. Consider, for
example, that between 1950 and 1957 when the races united against colonial rule and
there was societal calm, the economy experienced real annual growth of 2% (World Bank
Report; SN Apr 21, 2011). In contrast, for the next three years, 1958-1960 when racial
conflict intensified with Africans defying government policies and African state (public
sector) workers refusing to cooperate with the PPP government, and calling for the
regime’s downfall, there was no real economic growth under the Jagan-led Indian PPP
administration11. And for the period 1960-64, when Guyana experienced deteriorating
race relations including riots that led to extended period of instability, the economy grew
negatively (declined in real terms) by an average 0.8% per annum. After 1964, when
stability resumed, the economy began a turn around but remained largely stagnant
growing a few years and then registering negative growth for several years. During this
same period of time, race relations in the nation, buttressed by feelings of racial
insecurity and an all out racial competition for political power, worsened. This was
accompanied by increasing political instability seriously impacting economic growth and
productivity (World Bank Report 1989; www.worldbank.org; KN Feb 20, 2014; SN Aug
31, 2011). A World Bank Report on Guyana (May 6, 1994) was scathing in its
commentary on the deterioration of quality of life. It noted:
“The period following independence (1966) to mid 1988 was, on the
whole, characterized by economic and social decline caused by misdirected
government policies and an over-extended role of the state. Real GDP grew at less
than population growth. Economic performance worsened significantly during the
11
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1980s. Demand management policies were expansionary. The economy lost
competitiveness. External balances came under pressure, and the government
relied increasingly on price controls and quantitative restrictions on trade.
Notwithstanding the rapid economic recovery, poverty prevails. The government's
capacity to deliver essential services has virtually collapsed. Infrastructure
remains severely dilapidated. The supply of potable water is limited to a small
proportion of the population, drainage and irrigation systems have deteriorated to
the point that they are no longer useful, and health and education services have
become so inadequate that social indicators for the country have fallen to among
the lowest in the Caribbean”.
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/whats-new?docty_exact=Pre2003+Economic+or+Sector+Report&qterm=&lang_exact=English&country_exact=Guya
na).

In analyzing Guyana’s economic growth from the 1960s onwards, it is observed
that when there was political and or racial stability, the economy grew; and when there
was instability, the economy declined and with it the standard of living (Tables p x). As
data on Guyana reveals (Ibid, World Bank annual tables), during the period between 1960
and 1992, especially for those years (1961-64, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2005, etc.) when there
was violent competition for political power between the two major races and the
politicization of state employees, Guyana experienced very low per capita income,
especially in the violence prone years and an overall negative growth rate unlike anything
seen for any other developing country (Guyana - Public Sector Review Vol. 2 of 2; May
17, 1993; http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/whats-new?docty_exact=Pre2003+Economic+or+Sector+Report&qterm=&lang_exact=English&country_exact=Guyana).

It is noted that ethnic violence and political instability raised its ugly head at every
election (1957, 68, 73, 78, 80, 85, 90, 92, 97, and 2001) and the economy then suffered
during that period of time. And when stability returned, the economy expanded and grew.
There was also racial violence between 2003 and 2005 as well as in 2008 that was
accompanied by political instability and stagnant economic growth. (see World Bank
Reports) (http://www.cepal.org/en/publications/economic-survey-latin-america-and- 33 -

caribbean-2003-2004). When stability returned, the economy rebounded and per capita
income rose. It seems that whenever there were racial disturbances from rallies, marches
and impractical demands made by ethnic groups on the state, productivity was affected
because people didn’t go to work out of fear for their physical well being. It seems the
extent of the shrinking of the economy was largely tied to the loss of manpower time
when workers were off the job, which in itself was influenced by the period of political
instability. When normalcy and political stability returned, people resumed work and
their routine activities with the result that productivity increased. So it is no coincidence
that deterioration in the economic condition and in ethnic or race relations occurred
simultaneously. It seems that as race relations have worsened over time (accompanied by
violent ethnic conflict), so has the per capita income and as race relations have improved
with a lull in violence and protests (extended stability), the per capita income rises
(http://www.guyana.org/govt/From_Autocracy_to_Democracy_in_Guyana.pdf).
So what has gone wrong in Guyana since the 1960s that led to negative growth,
stagnant development, significant decline in standard of living and a near total
collapse of the economy during the 1980s that eroded quality of life? It is my contention
that the ethnic conflict (in the form of a struggle by the two major races for state
domination and the attendant power that flow) in Guyana has most significantly affected
economic development, and it has been a major hindrance to a rise in the standard of
living from the country’s lower middle income status (ranking) in the 1950s and 1960s).
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Chapter 2: Purpose of Study, Rationale, Hypotheses, & Methodology
Section A Purpose:
The purpose of this study is to explain why Guyana has failed to develop after
independence in spite of its abundant natural resources and skilled human resources. It is
my contention that the decline in the economy and standard of living cannot be attributed
solely to colonial economy, economic policies like nationalization of major foreign
owned corporations, acquiring state control of the commanding pillars of the economy,
and downturn in the global economy, or on “economics” issues alone. Rather, it is my
view that an investigation is needed regarding the impact of the ethnic conflict on
development (particularly standard of living and social change) and on government
policy making that also shapes economic development. Social scientists must not neglect
the effects of a sociological issue like ethnic conflict on a society’s economy.
The paralyzed state of ethnic relations or ethnic conflict between the two major
racial groups in Guyana has had a significant effect on the economy. Ethnic conflict has
been neglected by social scientists in seeking to explain negative growth rates and an
overall lack of development in Guyana. In order to fully understand why Guyana's
development is still born resulting in declining economic growth and declining standard
of living, one must examine the complexity of Guyana's peculiar race relations as it has
impacted on politics, economic planning, and policy-making. I believe that in order to
fully comprehend why Guyana has sunk economically, academics need to examine issues
and their effects relating to the struggle for political power between the two major
ethnically based parties representing their race groups. In addition, researchers need to
look at the socio-politico and economic policies of the government particularly between
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the years 1965 and 1992 especially as they relate to the state of race relations and the
policies’ effects on national development or on social change. This was a period of time
when race relations between the ruling African race (represented by the PNC) and the
others (represented by the Indian PPP and European UF) worsened (at times even
becoming violent) with non-supporters (Indians, Whites, Chinese, Amerindians) being
completely marginalized in all aspects of life in the society including in the economy (SN
Aug 31, 2010; Apr 28, 2008). Local investment was curtailed through cumbersome
bureaucratic red tapes causing businesses to lose money (SN Jan 26, 2011; Jun 9, 2010).
The PNC’s policies caused large numbers of Whites, Chinese, and Indians to migrate,
capital flight, and a brain drain that devastated the economy (SN Apr 3, 2010).
Utilizing empirical evidence, like what is happening in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq,
Afghanistan, etc., one can say that the basis of most economic, social and political
problems in many ethnically polarized nations like Guyana is ethnic conflict that is often
accompanied, as is also the case in Guyana, with physical violence. Ethnic violence in
any society invariably results in political instability preventing the effective functioning
of the state (government) as well as impacting businesses from conducting normal
operations, scaring away investors, and affecting factories, farmers, construction workers,
and other productive workers from producing at maximum capacity. In short, ethnic
conflict (with its attendant political instability) causes a reduction in economic activities,
productivity and revenues collection with the result that government operations are short
of funding and various activities cannot be fully sustained. As such, development cannot
occur. The economy cannot grow (decline in GDP) and the standard of living will
inevitably fall as it did for Guyana during those periods (1961-92, 1997-2001, 2002-05,
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2008), when there was extreme political instability and ethnic violence.
The political conflict (which in the Guyana context is really ethnic or racial in
nature because two ethnic groups are competing for political power represented by their
respective political parties) impacts on productive capability and capacity of the country.
What has existed in Guyana since colonial times (from the mid 1800s after the abolition
of slavery) is a perpetual state of ethnic jealousy and conflict. Related to this is a desire
among the different groups to be isolated from one another and to maintain an almost
ethnic exclusivity in matters of business, employment, friendship, sports or other forms
of entertainment, as well as in political and religious affiliation (Swan: 1957, Robinson:
1970, Smith: 1962). In short, the different ethnic groups prefer or want to retain their own
culture, to live in separate communities, and engage in segregated activities, and they
have even spoken (to the point of taking actions) of having their own ethnic states
(Young: 1975; Williams: 1991). This ethnic separation and the conflict that arises from
this social schism seem to have had an adverse effect on the economic and political
development of the nation. Whenever there is ethnic conflict, business operations become
limited and workers as well as producers are unable to maximize their output for various
reasons (unable to get to work, sabotage, threat to their safety, transportation issues
relating to movement of goods and workers, etc.) with the result that the economy grinds
to an almost standstill (Richardson: 1996; Hechter: 1974). Guyana has experienced an
extended period of racial strife including race riots since 1955 – a long period of political
instability that has been tied almost exclusively to ethnic conflict and that has brought
destruction to the economy. The two ethnic groups have sought political dominance
through their party preventing the country from achieving its full potential (Tennassee:
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2010; Spinner: 1984, GT Dec 7, 9, 2014). Thus, in order to fully understand why
Guyana's development was (has been) stultified and or its economy unable to take off and
grow, academics must examine how the country’s peculiar race relations (ethnic conflict
with their attendant behavior of groups and government’s policies) impact on economic
matters particularly as they relate to the decline in national growth and standard of living.
There is need for a conclusive sociological (ethnic) explanation on the decline of
Guyana’s economy and standard of living with an accompanied proposal on resolution of
the ethnic conflict can lead to political stability to facilitate national development.

Section B: Rationale, Importance and Relevance of the Study:
The rationale for this study revolves around the need to explain why a resourcerich developing nation like Guyana, which is not afflicted by natural disasters, which had
one of the highest literacy rates among developing nations when it obtained political
independence (1966), and which has had a large pool of educated people since the 1960s,
experienced prolonged years of negative growth rates after independence and was unable
to achieve its economic potential lift standards of living. Racial conflict has been the
obstacle to development and therefore it will have to be addressed by policy makers to
allow for development to proceed in polarized nation states like Guyana. It is my view
that a long-term sustainable improvement in the economy or national development in
Guyana depends on some kind of a solution to the intractable racial problem. The two
variables (ethnic conflict and development) are inextricably linked – development cannot
take place unless the racial conflict is ameliorated or lessened and the racial conflict
cannot be reduced unless there is some kind of peace and understanding between the two
groups. There seems to be a symbiotic relationship between the two variables (conflict
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and development) and both involve a catch 22 situation -- stability is needed for growth
and development (rising standard of living) and in order for there to be stability there
must be growth to generate resources to distribute to the competing groups to appease
them against challenges to upset the status quo. Thus, one of the two variables (ethnic
conflict or development) must give way (preferably by way of a reduction in ethnic
conflict) to the other one. This will allow for social peace and political stability allowing
for investment, economic expansion (and development) that can lead to growth,
economic prosperity and rising standard of living. Any improvement in lifestyle and or
quality of life will go a long way to appease those challenging the status quo (to put down
their ‘arms’) and in so doing help to bring relief to the ethnic conflict.
This case study has historical and contemporary relevance for the study of socioeconomic and political development of Third World nations that are seriously affected by
communal conflict or ethnic discord. Guyana is just one of dozens of nations that has
experienced violent ethnic conflict. It is, therefore, important to understand (to theorize)
the reasons for how and why this ethnic conflict developed, its impact on the
development (as well as democratization) of the state, and what can be done to reduce its
effects on society as well as to reduce ethnic tension to preserve the state and bring about
political stability so as to allow for the nation to maximize its economic potential. A
framework for understanding the emergence of ethnic conflict in Guyana and pragmatic
proposals to resolve the conflict can help scholars and policymakers to understand the
rise of ethnic conflicts and what can be done to reduce conflicts that stunt political and
economic development in so many other states.
This case study on Guyana is important as it helps readers (as well as domestic
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policy makers, international organizations and actors, among other agents) to understand
the nature and effects of ethnic conflict from a practical perspective. This study is also
relevant in that it proposes solutions to ameliorate conflict so as to prevent the kind of
violent clashes that have recently sprung up in so many societies resulting in wanton
economic destruction, economic regression, countless loss of lives, negative development
and lower standard of living. Understanding ethnic conflict and its consequences in
Guyana and proposing measures to solve or ameliorate it can help international
institutions, diplomats and political actors to take measures to prevent or reduce their
recurrence and likelihood of happening in other polarized societies.

Section C: Why a Need to investigate Ethnicity & Economic Decline:
Generally speaking, the poor economic performance of Guyana (a GNP real per
capita of about US $400 for the year 2010 using the value of 1960 purchasing dollars)
(SN Dec 30, 2013, Mar 6, 2013) is ascribed to the constraints that political and economic
institutions have placed on the development process and its legacy of colonial domination
and imperialism. But it is my view that the nature of ethnic conflict in Guyana is
primarily responsible for negative growth and the slow process of development. Ethnic
or racial (in terms of Guyana) conflict negatively impact on economic development in
terms of its effect on investment, GDP per capita, growth, unemployment, level of
literacy, production units of agricultural and manufacturing sectors, immigration, infant
mortality rate, racial composition of the armed forces and bureaucracy, and other socioeconomic indicators. A keen researcher needs to explain why economic development
has failed to occur in the state and assess how "race" (ethnicity) impacts on
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economic indicators (or the economy as a whole) and – to determine the extent (if any)
to which the negative growth rates and poor economic progress that followed
independence are related to the said ethnic conflict and or to other (political, social,
economic) issues that impacted on national development.
A major theoretical contention among many social scientists in seeking to explain
the socio-economic and political problems experienced by Third World nations and their
contemporary subordinate status vis-à-vis the advanced nations is to blame almost every
development problem on their colonial past (imperialist economic exploitation). There is
no disputing that the current socio-economic position of most Third World nations is
largely the making of their colonial economic history during which time they were
exploited to enrich the imperial metropolitan nations (Jagan: 1972, Thomas: 1984, Daly:
1975). As explained by Thomas (1984), Jagan (1972), Galtung (1971), and other writers,
the colonies became impoverished and structurally dependent on the metropolitan
countries for almost everything while the empires developed expansively. A legacy of
dependency was established from which the societies, even after independence, have
found it difficult to break off. Colonies, like British Guiana and others in the Caribbean
or Latin America, became dependent appendages to the rich imperialist nations supplying
the latter with cheap primary commodities and purchasing from the wealthy countries
expensive manufactured goods (made from primary resources that the colonies supplied)
(Thomas: 1984, Frank: 1978, 1974). Even after acquiring their independence, the new
nations have remained dependent on the wealthy imperial countries and are still mired in
poverty and underdevelopment lacking technology to manufacture basic goods and even
finding it difficult to raise enough revenues to finance imports or pursue lofty
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development goals (Erriah: 2011, Frank: 1974). But are nagging effects of colonial
exploitation, dependency, policy mismanagement, adverse terms of trade and other
economics related issues and politics the only or the dominant reasons for the
impoverishment or lack of development of Third World countries? Could (other) social
issues like ethnic conflict and discrimination been factors in the still development or
negative growth or unrealized potential of Guyana?
Many developing nations have experienced similar problems to those of Guyana's
especially in regards to political and economic development (Dacosta: 2007, 2005). But
virtually none underwent the drastic economic decline that Guyana experienced after
independence. The question that social scientists may ask, rhetorically, is what caused
this resource-rich nation to experience such a drastic decline in its standard of living so as
to become the poorest country in the Western hemisphere even behind Haiti (during the
1980s) or "a basket-case" in the words of a World Bank report? Is there a direct
relationship between the state of race relations and Gross National (Domestic) Product
per capita or standard of living? The answer to these questions cannot simply be found in
restricting one’s investigation to the subject of economics alone. One has to try to find
answers utilizing other academic disciplines (like sociology, politics, etc.) of research as
well. A simplistic answer to the questions lie in the country’s peculiar combative race
relations (a sociological explanation) among the two major groups, as represented by their
race-based parties and their competition for control of the state. The government has been
(PNC government in particular was) ethnically structured with its policies and programs
(beholden to its ethnic supporters having been elected largely by supporters of that
group). It has attended to the needs of its supporters and has been guided in its exercise
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of power and distribution of resources as well as in its implementation of policies –
directing resources towards members of its ethnic group. The data suggests that whenever
the ethnic groups cooperated with the government or the regime treated them well and there
are (were) no outbursts of conflict (period of calm, peace and stability), the economy grew.
But whenever the groups engaged in violence, in reaction to policies perceived as
unfavorable towards them, the economy suffered (Gafar: 2003, Hintzen: 1989, Premdas:
1973, Glasgow: 1970, Stavenhagen: 1991). The two ethnic groups have prevented
cooperation (through their representative political parties) in policymaking and have
sabotaged each other’s policies when either one was (is) in the political opposition as neither
party wants the other to succeed in government and each seeks to replace the other in office
and as such undermines each other. Also, each ethnic administration’s development
strategies and or its ethnically biased public policies shutting out the opposition group (s)
from resources can also exacerbate ethnic tensions leading to worsening conflict further
adversely impacting on development and (by extension) standard of living.
One can also cite many factors that contributed to declining growth in Guyana
such as mass nationalization, poor management, failed and useless government projects
(Sanata Textile, Mahaicony Mahaica Abary agricultural scheme, the Guyana Marketing
Corporation, among others), international economic climate, adverse terms of trade,
farcical elections, shortage of foreign currency, price controls, and the unavailability of
basic and critical transportation, among others (GT Oct 15, 2013; Guyana Journal Oct
2007; www.guyana.org/). While not discounting the effects of each of these and other
factors as well, the fact is ethnic conflict (ethnic favoritism) in Guyana was tied to
virtually all of these policies, programs and projects, and they have shown to impact on
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development. It is noted that ethnic conflict has resulted in perennial disruptions (work
stoppages) in economic activities of Guyana (Doherty 2012: 121; Horowitz: 72-79).
Such disruptions have curtailed investment opportunities and affected productivity, and
ultimately have impacted development, growth and standard of living. And this trend of
ethnic conflict accompanied by economic disruptions has been occurring since the mid
1950s when the conflict became more pronounced over competition for political power.
Once the colonial rulers decided during the 1950s that they would grant self-rule
and independence to the colony, it became a free for all among the leaders of the ethnic
groups vying over control of the state on behalf of their ethnic group. From 1955
onwards, race became deeply embedded in virtually all affairs of the state including
politics, economics and social relations in Guyanese society (Spinner: 1984; Tennassee:
2010) impacting development. There was serious racial rivalry and tensions between
1957 and 1961 when politics descended into a racial contest. The country experienced a
traumatic racial civil war between 1961 and 1964 and near civil war like situations at
sporadic intervals right before and after this period and continuing during the entire
period of Afro ethnic PNC authoritarian rule that ended in 1992. Ethnic tensions, strikes,
sporadic violence and threats of racial violence continued after 1992 when democratic
rule was restored under Indian backed PPP rule (SN Jan 9, 2010). The ethnic tensions,
violent social events and ethnically driven policies in Guyana after 1955 that led to
stalled or negative growth has illustrated how racial conflict is integrally related to the
prospects for development.
Researchers need to look at the country’s social (racial) relations and what the
government was doing politically and otherwise in terms of the handling of the racial
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conflict that had/has hurt the economy. For example, given a history of ethnic tensions
from early colonial times, one would wish to study how the PNC government handled
sensitive race relations, especially with regards to its allocation of scarce resources
among the different groups to promote development and lessen feelings of alienation and
discrimination and encourage economic participation from all groups. An explanation is
warranted on how and why people continue to view each other as well as state policies in
terms of ethnicity four and a half decades after political independence. It is found that
racial conflict and competition for control of the state have prevented the social cohesion of
the nation and has rendered nearly impossible the two dominant races co-operating with
each other towards the goal of national development. The ethnic conflict influences and
shapes how people view government development policies depending on whether they
are supportive of (affiliated with) the government or the opposition. Such political
support based on strong ethnic affiliation leads to heightened ethnic competition between
the groups (parties) to the point where combatants sabotage development when in
opposition (Dew: 1994, 1989). As such, there is a need for scholars, researchers and
academics in sociology and other social science disciplines to investigate and explore the
relationship (theoretical framework) between ethnic (racial) conflict and development in
multi-ethnic societies like Guyana.
Section D: Developing a Theoretical Framework: Ethnic Model & Development:
My contention is that ethnic conflict has impacted negatively on economic
progress and the overall development of a society and unless the racial conflict is
resolved in an amicable solution, growth and or development will be adversely affected.
The impact of ethnic conflict on development has been amply illustrated (with bloody
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experiences of so many societies where infrastructure and industries were destroyed
negating development) and is a very important model that cannot be ignored (Hechter:
1974). But it appears to be neglected (as exemplified by a paucity of case studies) in
academic literature by sociologists and other social science scholars (Hechter: 1987, Bell:
1975, Glazer: 1975). There is a need to develop a framework that links the two variables
– ethnicity and development (Bonacich: 1972). Since ethnicity is tearing apart nations
and disrupting development, there emerges a pressing need for a macro-analysis and
explanation of the relationship between these two phenomena. A case study of a Third
World developing country like Guyana helps to illustrate this relationship. A serious
inquiry is done into the possible connections between ethnic prejudice (discriminatory
practices) and government decision-making impacting on development and changes in
social and economic behavior in multi-ethnic Guyana. Many of these connections can be
explained through empirical observations and these in turn can be tied together into a
theoretical framework.
Social scientists generally tend to attribute problems with economic development
to class conflict (Marxist analysis) (Marx: 1998) or some other economic or political
phenomena rather that on social (ethnic) relations. Not unexpectedly, there has been a
dearth of alternative theoretical models (away from Marxism, class, economics and the
like) to account for the hostile political or social behavior of different races towards each
other in Guyana and other similar ethnically divided societies and their impact on
development. But given the ethnically plural composition of as well as ethnic conflict in
Guyana and so many societies around the globe, class conflict as the major reason for
problematic political (and economic) development of states needs to be modified to take

- 46 -

into account the rise of ethnic consciousness which shape human behavior and that could
lead to actions to negate development. Besides a Marxist perspective of class relations
which may unite people (workers in particular) based on status or poor working condition
so as to improve their depressed living conditions, peoples’ behavior may also be
conditioned by their ethnic identity uniting or dividing them for a variety of reasons
especially in polarized multi-ethnic states (Patterson: 1975, 1983) to gain better access to
resources or power. That is to say, people are loyal to their own ethnic group and their
behavior is so conditioned or influenced vis-à-vis other groups and such loyalty may
transcend working class solidarity (Dennis: 1977, Brass: 1976, Bartels: 1977). They are
united through ethnicity rather than by class (Doherty: 2012). This is particularly so in
Guyana and so many nations including current and former socialist states where ethnicity
has a very strong pull. Such ethnic alignment would disappear in time, according to
Marx’s theory, as these countries experience development. Marx did not put a time frame
when ethnicity would be replaced by unity around working class consciousness (Ibid).
But so far, some 150 years after Marx, ethnicity has not disappeared, and in fact it has
been strengthened even in so called (former) working class socialist states like China and
Soviet Union. The inadequacy of Marxist and other left analyses, for decades the main
paradigm or dominant world-view, to explain the persistence of ethnicity as well as the
slow pace of economic development in many Third World countries has not led to a
corresponding increase in alternative theoretical models to explain lack of development
or negative growth rates in multi-ethnic third world nations. Hence, the development of
this “sociological theoretical model” to buttress the well argued Marxist model to explain
the failure of development in an underdeveloped ethnically divided state.
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It is my contention that in order to fully understand why Guyana's economy has
declined from being among the third most prosperous Caribbean country in 1960 to a
level lower than that of Haiti during the 1980s (and now just barely threading above Haiti
today), or why a resource barren Singapore with a lower GDP per capita than Guyana
during 1950s or slightly above Guyana in 1960 was able to make greater strides by 1980
(KN Jul 18, 2014; dataworldbank.org), one must examine how ethnic conflict influence
government policies and impact development. This necessarily requires taking a look at
the complexity of Guyana's peculiar race relations to investigate (empirically or
otherwise) any relationships (including official policy driven directives based on ethnic
considerations) linking race and economics in Guyana and explore their implications for
development in this society.
This dissertation, therefore, applies a mostly sociological model (racial conflict)
as part of an effort to explain the poor economic performance of Guyana and the wide
disparity in growth compared with other developing countries that are less endowed than
Guyana in resources. The model is linked with other underlying social science factors
including economic, historical, and political. In fact, this kind of study necessarily
requires an inter-disciplinary mode of inquiry in an effort to produce as comprehensive a
treatment as possible of the subject matter. The model suggested here holds that
economic decline in multi-ethnic societies are partly to be explained by ethnic
(racial) conflict existing in these countries. This so called “ethnic model” or
sociological model (as developed from a largely sociological perspective) utilizes a
combined empirical and theoretical approach to diagnose the link between the two
variables (ethnic conflict and development). It explores why there has been such a wide
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divergence in income level and national growth between Guyana and other developing
countries by looking at the impact of racial conflict on economic development. In other
words, it seeks to investigate why there are wide differences in measures of human
development and or national growth for Guyana and other similar developing countries
when Guyana was/is better endowed with natural resources (as compared with Singapore,
for example), and was better placed for take off and development than most other
colonies (Barbados, Jamaica, etc.) at the time of independence (1966) – why a country’s
economic indicators declined precipitously after independence, and the study also
attempts to propose a model of governance that can lead to stability allowing for growth
and development. This topic ought to be a matter of public interest to social science
researchers, think tanks, policy makers in third world nations, policy makers of donor
nations, and supra diplomats of international organizations to address societies facing
similar ethnic problems. The cautious hope is that they may take precautionary measures
to avoid the development pitfalls that plague such a resource rich nation like Guyana and
guide those societies towards economic growth.
To summarize, the central aim of this research is to explain and analyze the role
of racial conflict in the (lack of) economic development of Guyana. From the
investigation, one can develop an appropriate model to explain why this nation has failed
to make significant economic progress since independence (1966). The theoretical
framework should enable social scientists to describe and explain the nature of the
relationship between the two variables (ethnic conflict and development) so as be able to
utilize the framework to probe, assess, and even predict the state of the economy of other
nations with similar ethnic problems as Guyana and or how to reduce the conflict and in
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so doing lessen the impact of ethnic conflict on development and on other aspects of life
in a multi-ethnic conflict ridden society.
The primary goal in the study is to improve on theoretical models that address
issues pertaining to development as well as related to ethnicity by developing a
theoretical model that shows and explains how ethnic conflict affect development. The
theoretical framework constructed is also intended to offer ideas (proposals) to solve
pressing issues involving hostile relations between and among ethnic groups battling for
power in states or sub-states or other defined political units. As a proposed solution, the
model argues for some kind of a grounded theory based on an equitable distribution of
political power as well as economic resources among groups and respect for cultural
pluralism granting groups cultural autonomy. The study’s ultimate theoretical goal is to
suggest how methodologically and analytically, ethnicity can help guide the study of
other issues impacting on multi-ethnic societies with the goal of helping to eliminate
conflict. So, in conjunction with this quest for improved methodology and theory in
studying ethnic relations and development issues, the overarching goal is to elucidate and
pronounce a formula for reducing conflict (such as sharing resources and power) in
multi-ethnic nations so as to avoid or reduce violence that leads to loss of lives and
disrupted development.
Section E: Why a Sociological or Ethnic Model to explain lack of Development:
One of the questions readers or critics of this study may pose is whether this
seminal proposed “sociological” (ethnic) model, as employed here, offers a better
explanation than others (such as those from a purely "political" or "economic" or a
“Marxist” perspective, etc.) that seek to explain negative economic growth or lack of
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development? No one can dispute the claims and theories of Marxist and left leaning
writers that centered around the theme that colonialism witnessed the foreign penetration
of distant lands making them territories under European control and domination to
provide resources to help fuel growth and development of the European empires to the
neglect and underdevelopment of the colonies. The objective is not to discredit those
theories or to determine which model is superior in explaining the lack of growth in
Guyana or in a former colonial society. Rather an attempt is made to examine the role
and impact of non politico-economic explanations like sociological factors (with one of
them being the nature of ethnic relations within the nation) in the lack of economic
development in many of these nations.
But in focusing on the effects of ethnic conflict, it in no way negates the other
(economic or political) arguments (such as the Marxist-Leninist approach or the World
Systems approach) that seek to explain persistent underdevelopment in the Third World.
In fact, it is widely accepted that imperialist forces, as posited by Marxist or left leaning
writers, have had lasting negative effects on development strategies of third world
countries and their role in the persistence of underdevelopment should not be belittled
(Marx: 1998, Bonacich: 1980). Western imperialist or capitalist countries colonized
Guyana and other third world countries launching them into the orbit of dependence and
backwardness rendering them servile agents of the major imperial powers in the world
capitalist system with devastating consequences. But much has already been written on
this so described dominant Marxist explanation of why countries like Guyana have
failed to develop (see Marx nd). Scholars need to look afresh at other so-called "noneconomic", “non-political”, and “non-Marxist” explanations why these countries have not
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prospered since becoming independent from their mother countries (Nagel: 1985, Olzak:
1985). Hence, this is a reason for undertaking this (largely, though not exclusively)
sociological examination (and construction of a theory) of the ethnic conflict to illustrate
its effects on overall national development (limited social change, etc.) in Guyana.
It is accepted that no single factor or theory can fully explain the socio-economic
and political malaise that has befallen Guyana. Many factors are responsible for the state
of economic setbacks, widespread unemployment, abject poverty, the overall lack of
development and all the consequences that these entail. References are made to some of
these factors from a multi-disciplinary approach because it is felt that economic or social
theories alone do not adequately explain the lack of development or underdevelopment in
or the serious economic difficulties faced by many Third World nations. By focusing on
purely economic (policies and theories) or political or social theories alone, one cannot
fully explain why Guyana or other developing economies have failed to develop (Barro:
1997). A variety of factors help to explain the inability of poor countries to develop. No
doubt, factors such as limited domestic technical skills, lack of industries, scarcity of
capital, small size of the economy, imperialism, centuries of colonial domination,
dependency relations, conspiracy among Multinational Corporations or among developed
economies to keep developing countries poor, US and Western or Soviet interference,
cold war, left wing political ideology (Marxism-Leninism), nationalism, and politicoeconomic isolation, etc. have all contributed to Third World nations' perennial problems
associated with negative growth and poor development or a low standard of living
(Alesina: 1994). But economic problems are by no means the only explanations why
several Third World nations, especially multi-ethnic resource-rich countries with
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excellent industrial potential, such as a Guyana, have not been successful at developing
(Collier: 1998). One also needs to examine political and social factors (like racial
conflict) to explain such a problem.
It is this study’s position that lack of development and the economic decline or
growth of the country cannot be explained in a void or vacuum in terms of economics
alone. At any rate, much has already been written on the economic reasons (colonial
exploitation, imperialism, dependency theory, inadequate capital, wrong and misguided
economic policies, etc.) for the lack of growth in Guyana. And economic issues tend to
be conditioned by the political environment including such a factor like ethnic conflict (a
major topic in sociology) impacting on political and social life and on development in
general. Thus, besides economic reasoning, political and sociological analyses become
essential tools in social science studies on issues (like growth and development)
especially in multi-ethnic societies. In Guyana, open violent ethnic conflict had occurred
at various periods in its recent history and inevitably affected the economy. So when
studying the economy of Guyana, one cannot ignore or belittle the importance of ethnic
conflict, a major subject in sociology. As the Guyana case suggests, the effects of ethnic
conflict on political and economic development should not be underestimated or
dismissed by academics or politicians as being irrelevant to development or that it will
disappear over time or with a rising standard of living. In fact, ethnic conflict impacts on
national growth especially in severely divided societies like Guyana affecting rising
standard of living and impacting on quality of life.
So applying an exclusive Marxist or economic explanation to lack of development
does not do justice to the topic. A sociological perspective is also relevant since the
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focus in the study is on ethnic relations (conflict) and its impact on the economy,
including on discrimination against groups based on ethnicity and the withdrawal of
ethnic groups in economic activities. It is important to stress that the sociological
explanation is but one model that explains failure of development in Third World
societies. The theory does not seek to dispute or negate Marxist or left oriented theories
about the effects on development of a dependency status. This sociological model does
not undertake to disprove other models or to prove the “ethnic model” is better than other
models or that the other models are inapplicable in explaining negative growth rates and a
declining standard of living of the nation. Rather, this study offers a supplementary or an
alternative model to dependency theory to explain lack of development. It proposes to
show a strong relationship between ethnic conflict and economic decline and in so doing
breaks new ground for understanding ethnic conflict, social change, and economic
development. The racial or ethnic conflict from a sociological perspective is merely one
factor that is being utilized to explain the economic decline in Guyana. The study also
suggests why it is imperative that pluralist (ethnically polarized) nations manage ethnic
conflicts so that their economic development is not seriously affected by instability.
By no means is this study exhaustive on the causes of racial conflict or of
economic underdevelopment in Guyana or elsewhere. Rather it touches just the tip of the
iceberg on issues pertaining to ethnicity and its effects on development. At any rate, no
one theory (be it economic, Marxist, sociological, World Systems, cultural pluralism,
dependency, political, etc.) or simply addressing one social phenomena can do justice in
explaining the broad subject of ethnic conflict. And no specific theory can explain a lack
of economic development that pervades so many (primarily Third World) countries
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around the globe. What this study attempts to do is to examine and bring together several
related issues tied to ethnic conflict in the construction of a broad theory linking the two
variables (ethnicity and development or its lack thereof). These issues include, but are
not limited to, pre-colonial social norms and forms, stereotyping, racism, different modes
of production, economic exploitation, residential settlements, color, class, social status
and ethnic stratification. The issues are also linked to the struggle for political
independence of the colony as well as to models that facilitate economic development in
other third world societies that were way behind in Guyana at the time of independence.

Section F: Argument of Study and Questions posed:
This study utilizes a variety of explanations by posing several interrelated questions for
the relatively poor growth of a third world nation based on its ethnicity, culture, political
governance and on other aspects of its society. Some relevant questions are: Is
democratic practice and economic and political development too conditioned or
controlled by ethnic conflict to allow for peace and cooperation so economic
development can proceed? Was ethnic violence politically inspired in Guyana? Can
economic development occur under conditions of political turbulence caused by ethnic
conflict? Why is economic (and or political) development so often accompanied by
violent ethnic conflict? How can economic (or political) development in multi-ethnic
nations be better managed, so as to reduce the potential for violent ethnic conflict and
vice versa?
This case study on Guyana attempts to answer the preceding fundamental
questions though not in the order posed. The study will attempt to show: how ethnic
conflict started right after Indians (and other ethnic groups) arrived in the colony in 1838
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(after end of African slavery) and gradually decided to settle down in the 1870s; how
ethnic conflict became institutionalized; how conflict has defined virtually all aspects of
life (politics in particular) in the society and continues to evolve and impact on the
society; how it has become consolidated and exploited by politicians and has been
reinforced by various facets of life; how and why it remains very strong; and what
measures can be taken to address ethnic concerns to reduce conflict.
In attempting to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section, the
study traces the arrival of the ethnic groups in Guyana and the societal divisions that
followed (including the division of labor based on ethnicity, color, class, occupations, and
geography). It explains how a British colonial divide and rule strategy developed and
became institutionalized to exploit the working class to maximize profitability. This
colonial divide and strategy emerged out of a need to keep the groups apart so they would
not unite to demand high wages on the plantations or overthrow the bourgeois exploiters.
Divide and rule was executed with skill and cunningness to depress wages and to
maximize profit. It was a political and social policy of expediency for economic profit.
The research in this study shows that one of the unintended functions of British policy in
Guyana and indeed in other societies was to divert attention away from the capitalist
labor exploitation of the workers by shifting focus towards their racial differences. This
encouraged animosity and conflict to divide the ethnically diverse workers so as to
prevent them from becoming class conscious of their exploitation by the plantation
bourgeoisie and colonial administrators appointed by London at the behest of the planters
(Jayawardena: 1963: Rodney: 1981, Sandhu: 2009, Frieden: nd).
The study argues that hostile relations and mutual animosity between the major
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races, exacerbated during the immediate pre-independence period when the races fought
a civil war over who (which ethnic group) would replace the departing British as masters
of Guyana, have laid the foundation for economic stagnation and disaster and a politically
unstable state that have found it virtually impossible to get its house in order. The study
concludes by arguing that a solution to Guyana's racial problems (resulting in harmonious
social relations) will have a major positive effect on growth and development in the
nation. As it is, the racial groups, directly and or through their leaders, are locked into a
competition over the scarcity of jobs and resources for members of their groups and do
not wish to see the other group prosper. They will do whatever it takes to see that their
group triumphs and the other group fails even if it means destruction of the economy and
failure of the state and its institutions. Thus, there cannot be serious development unless
the racial conflict is solved. This can be done through a fair formula of power sharing
(multi-party/multi-ethnic governance) suggested by University of Guyana Professor Rishi
Thakur (Thakur: nd) – including of resources, wealth and office titles. In addition to
groups potentially flourishing as a result of such a type of power sharing, there may be
social integration that will encourage groups to respect for each other’s differences and
understanding each other’s culture leading to political stability. As a result, investment
can proceed leading to economic growth and higher standards of living for all.
Once the nation finds a reasonable workable solution (some sort of multi-ethnic
governance or multi-ethnic power sharing formula) to its racial problem, there is no
question that the ever-present social (ethnic) issues impeding political stability will be
removed allowing for economic development. This will lead to growth and prosperity
resulting in benefits for all regardless of ethnicity. And as economic growth keeps pace
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with surpasses population growth, and the standard of living increases resulting in social
change, the racial conflict is also likely to further ebb encouraging more investments that
should result in even more growth and prosperity. Any ethnic power sharing formula that
helps to resolve Guyana’s social conflict will resonate well with the dozens of developing
countries that are grappling with their own ethnic problems and underdevelopment.
It should be stressed that an emphasis on analyzing ethnic problems does not in
any way take away from other more traditional modes of analyses for determining
underlying factors in the country’s malignant economy. Thus, this study simply provides
a supplemental paradigm to the broad literature available in economics and politics, using
ethnicity, to look at Guyana's dilemma in the way it has approached national
development. In so doing, this study becomes seminal in that such a hypothesis has
not been previously offered relating to Guyana. The argument advances towards
somewhat virgin territory because no major study has dealt systematically with the
massive economic problems that have been brought about by ethnic conflict in Guyana.
This work has a very important historical and contemporary relevance for the study of
development of Third World nations, which must not only contend against outside
domination (being dependent appendages in a world system controlled by a few major
capitalist powers) but by internal dynamics (such as ethnic conflict) as well. The study
shows not only the contours of communal conflict but points to some of the political and
economic effects that ethnicity tends to generate on the development efforts of Guyana
and similar multi-ethnic states facing perennial conflict.
Section G. Hypotheses:
This dissertation will test the following hypotheses based on information collected (from
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primary and secondary sources) on a case study on Guyana, interpretation of selected
theories on development and ethnicity, and my personal analyses and empirical
observations:
A. Negative (and poor) economic growth rates and relatively low level of development of
Guyana are primarily, though not exclusively, the results of non-economic factors and
policies (based on ethnicity, social relations, and political instability); and
B. Racial competition for political power, leading to ethnic-inspired violence and
political instability, was/is a major cause for economic downturn and the decline of the
standard of living in Guyana.
Section H: General Queries relating to Hypotheses:
The study examines how:
1. The need for cheap labor by British colonizers to exploit the colony of Guiana led
to the establishment of a multi-ethnic colony/state to serve the interests of foreign
imperial interests -- a plural society made up of a mixture of cultures, ethnicities,
and religions that would severely impact on its development.
2. The White planters promoted a Black/Indian interracial conflict, strife, rivalry and
competition that served their economic interests.
3. An ethnic divide and rule strategy was promoted by the British colonial class
through various forms of stereotyping leading to ethnic segregation among the
different groups to facilitate economic exploitation of plantation life.
4. In-group cohesion and social ethnic solidarity emerged among the diverse ethnic
groups that also began to develop feelings of ethnic insecurity from perceived
threats from other ethnic groups leading to the rise of intra-group ethno-
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nationalism and open ethnic hostilities.
5. Racial violence and competition for power developed out of petty jealousies
among the groups and the desire for racial domination.
6. The desire by the exploited ethnic groups for national equality (in a White
controlled and privileged colonial society), self-rule and freedom from foreign
(imported British planter class and their imported staff) domination and
subjugation gave rise to racial consciousness and political solidarity among the
different groups in British Guiana.
7. The British colonial authority and expatriate planter class and bourgeois forces
promoted and encouraged conflict and competition between the two major racial
groups as they competed among themselves to replace the departing British
during the anti-colonial nationalist struggle.
8. The exacerbation of the ethnic conflict allowed the British to postpone
independence and extend their stay and domination of the colony when other
British colonies were obtaining their independence.
9. Racial solidarity transcended what was being (falsely) promoted as a utopian
socialist working class movement for independence.
10. Racial competition resulted in violent conflict between two major races inevitably
delaying the colony’s independence and stultifying political development in the
state years after independence.
11. The country thrived during periods of ethnic calm and stability and contracted
during periods of ethnic tensions, violence and instability.
12. Racial insecurity has prevented the two races (as represented by their respective
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political parties and ethnic leaders) from cooperating with one another preventing
the nation from achieving its full economic potential of its citizens and as such a
rising standard of living and growth.
13. Racial conflict can be managed if the groups are willing to share political space
and resources and cooperate with one another to allow for nation building as well
as economic growth, higher standards of living, and social change. And as a
corollary, unless the conflict is managed and reduced, the country will not achieve
its economic potential and the standard of living will continue to be low lagging
behind other third world countries adding to its list of woes.
14. This study has implications for other ethnically divided societies as a model to
address their conflict so as to allow for peace and political stability and a
willingness to share resources that will facilitate investment leading to growth and
expansion that will drive positive social change.
Section I: Method of Study:
The methodology adopted for this research of study is historical, empirical and
interpretive. Using a descriptive historical methodology, the research draws economic,
social and political data from existing studies, institutional reports, and literature on
Guyana as well as from the mass media. The study is based generally on various primary
(documents, etc.) and secondary sources (books, articles, scholarly publications,
newspapers, magazines, internet websites, etc.).
This study traces the rise, evolution and institutionalization of 1. ethnicity and
ethnic conflict in the colonial Guiana state; 2. the struggle for self rule and national
independence that led to a politically open ethnic conflict between Indians and Africans;
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3. the rise of the authoritarian (one party ethnic) state that emerged out of the ethnic
conflict; and 4. the decline of the economy that occurred as a result of ethnic conflict and
authoritarian rule. Where appropriate, the study uses a historical account to explore the
social, economic and political development of the colony of Guiana. The historical
framework highlights important changes in the development of the state particularly its
politics and economics. The study analyzes the role of the political superstructure – the
state and political struggles – in shaping and influencing the economy.
The study also offers an empirical analysis applying the Guyana case to illustrate
several theories on ethnic conflicts have emerged, developed, and manifested themselves
as well as how ethnic conflict has affected economic development. In addition to using
empirical validation, interpretive analysis of the literature and statistical information, the
study employs content analysis to show how ethnic policies have affected development in
Guyana. And where helpful, the study uses a comparative approach of different time
periods in trying to explain why economic growth and development occurred or failed to
occur during three different time periods – the immediate pre-independence (1955 thru
1966), immediate post independence authoritarian (1966 thru 1975) and the fascist (1976
thru 1992) periods, and thereafter (1993 - now) when democracy was (has been) restored.
The study also utilizes brief comparisons of success development of other
relevant countries with characteristics similar to Guyana’s to illustrate the reasons for
Guyana’s failed development extent of its economic decline. The study points to the
failures of economic policies and the role of the ethnic conflict in those failures. It is
hoped that this study will influence other multi-ethnic countries to undertake a sober
assessment of their own problems. This may guide to steer clear of the perilous abyss
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into which Guyana has found herself as a result of ethnic groups engaging in conflict for
political supremacy that resulted in a downward economic spiral and standard of living.
Section J: Shortcomings of this Research Study:
The study has its analytical limitation especially in acquiring data but it also breaks new
ground in putting forth an innovative approach to studying development by looking at
non-economic factors. One major shortcoming in this study is access to research
materials relevant to the study. There was serious difficulty in obtaining documents
within Guyana as they were not readily available given the shabby condition of academic,
library and government institutions that are repositories of (supposed to be holding)
documents. Guyana was a closed society from 1966 until the collapse of its authoritarian
order in 1992 with the restoration of democracy. It is difficult to get accurate figures on
poverty, inflation, growth, health and other social matters (letter SN Nov 25, 2011) during
that period. Materials were off limits to the public, especially for critics of the regime
during the authoritarian years. Any materials that made the regime looked “bad” or
shameful in the public eye were removed from research shelves. Also, anyone found in
possession of such materials was treated in a hostile manner by state security and
considered as an enemy of the state, hounded, intimidated, beaten, jailed and even
eliminated (GC Feb 7, 2012, Mar 6, 2010).
History (social, political, and economic) under the PNC dictatorship was rarely
recorded or accurately documented. In the post-colonial era, leading up to 1992, the then
PNC government controlled and manipulated the media and inundated the press (the arm
of the state) with lies, fabrications and distortions. All data provided by the regime was
suspect (GC Aug 5, 2014). One has to be careful in using PNC released data when
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analyzing the past, especially the dark, dismal days of the PNC regime that was involved
in several atrocities including eliminating political opponents and critics, even dissident
priests. Recordings of government activities, including of parliamentary meetings and
budgeting, were carried out in accordance with the whims and directions of the ruling
PNC government. The dictatorship did not bother to keep proper records and terrorized
those who queried its illicit expenditures of funds. Government building and their
holdings were badly neglected and official documents were in tatters after being exposed
to rain and sun. Documents frequently went missing when there were queries of
expenditures. Agents of the regime often destroyed and it was not unusual for fires to
suddenly break out in government buildings and important records destroyed (Caribbean
Contact June 1980, GC Jul 22, 2013, Mar 27, 2011). Also, documents held in the
archives often disappeared or became non-available to the public. Therefore one is forced
to fit conjectures, rumors, allegations and assumptions into perspective of events and
conditions that prevailed in the society and lend credence to them with anecdotes. Even
some twenty years after the restoration of democracy, the nation is still in a very painful
transition to freedom with documents from the authoritarian period still very hard to find
and slowly being made available to the public for research purposes. Also, data for
Guyana frequently went missing in international reports. That absence of data from
official reports tell its own story, and one might well ask whether it suits the government
that there is no systematic account of social indicators that would give the world a fuller
picture of the true state of affairs of the nation during the PNC Afro ethnic dictatorship.
The democratic PPP government (post 1992) has also come in for some severe
criticisms from International Lending Institutions for data quality and the format in which
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they were/are released (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK761.pdf). Data has not
been updated and was not available for many years. According to an AID report, the
breadth and quality of economic data available for Guyana are relatively poor and appear
to be steadily worsening. For example, the World Bank gave Guyana an overall score of
50 percent in its 2006 Statistical Capacity Indicator Index, down from 58 percent in 2005
in its preparation of socio-economic data. This is well shy of the present median scores
for Low Middle Income (LMI) countries generally (66.5), and for Latin AmericaCaribbean LMI countries (73) specifically. The report adds: “Of particular concern are
the lack of recent poverty and agricultural survey data and uneven statistical practices
used in the collection of national account, price, and government finance accounting data.
Some statistics on education and health are also lacking or inconsistent. Such data
problems complicate our analysis. Data development in this area could help in planning
and targeting poverty reduction” (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK761.pdf).
Because of data problems and limited access to primary sources, for this study,
most research materials are gathered from secondary sources, lending institutions data,
empirical observations, the internet, and newspaper reports. This study draws its
conclusions more on institutional data, empirical and anecdotal facts relating to ethnic
conflict in Guyana and their attendant effects on development rather than on abstract
theories as a basis of social analysis.

Section K: New Vistas or Findings of this Research:
The argument made in this study is new in that studies on ethnicity (socio-politico and
cultural consciousness of ethnic groups) have not made a compelling case on the negative
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impact of ethnicity or ethnic conflict on development in former (multi-ethnic) colonial
societies that are plagued with developmental problems. Also, studies have not proposed
solutions (policies) on how to manage ethnic conflict or suggest models of governance
that will reduce, if not eliminate, violent conflicts among competing ethnic groups in a
state. Scholars on economic development in third world nations tend to utilize a Marxist
theoretical analysis on class conflict to explain underdevelopment and or the rise of
ethnic conflict. Marxist scholars surmise ethnic conflict will disappear in a short period
after independence. But that has not been the case in most ethnically polarized societies
including Guyana where ethnicity has been solidified and institutionalized instead of
disappearing over the last sixty years during self-rule and political freedom. And with
the end of the Cold War in 1990, ethnic conflict in former socialist countries has become
even more pronounced as people embrace ethnic loyalty rather than class allegiance. At
the same time, a left wing Marxist-Leninist (or socialist) ideology seems to have lost its
lust on working class people as well as on left leaning social scientists seeking to explain
the persistence of ethnic identity. With the collapse of communism, ethnicity has come
to the fore of former communist countries (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, other East bloc,
China, etc.) and even former Marxists themselves have turned inwards appealing to basal
ethnic instincts (as in Serbia, Russia, Czech, Slovak, Bosnia, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.)
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects_of_the_Cold_War; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_conflict).

As this case study on Guyana argues, ethnicity is a primary reason for the failure
of national (economic, social, and political) development of the state with each ethnic
group seeking to capture (and or exploit) the institutions of the state for its own members’
benefit – caring only for the growth and advancement of its own constituents (members
of its group) rather than of the entire state. The study also has another unique feature
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compared to others in that it not only identifies the development problems posed by
ethnic conflict but it proposes a solution (sharing of political power and resources in
some form of equitable disposition a la South Africa, for example) to reducing conflict so
that development can take place leading to a rise in standard of living and or the quality
of life or social change. How Guyana manages and resolves its ethnic conflict could be
very instructive for other countries affected by communal strife (that triggers political
instability) as they seek ways to ease ethnic tensions in their nations so as to make
available the conditions to further development. Thus, the model proposed herein not
only theorizes on the reasons for potential underdevelopment in Guyana and similar
multi-ethnic societies, it proposes what can be done to reduce conflict and enhance
stability that facilitates development. In so doing, it sheds light on causes of and offers
solutions to ethnic conflict and political instability in the nation and many other countries
experiencing problems similar to those of Guyana.
Also, the Guyana case can offer insights into the workings of ethnic conflict
generally and can contribute to the forging of public policy aimed at controlling the
adverse effects of ethnic strife in other countries. The theoretical framework developed
here for understanding ethnic conflict in Guyana and proposals for reducing it can be
applied to similar ethnically bifurcated societies. Also, this effort is undertaken in the
belief that the information, conclusion and data derived from this case study can offer
important building blocks towards constructing a wider theory on the relationship
between ethnicity and other social issues (including economic and political
development). In sum, ethnicity is an extremely decisive topic that cannot be neglected
in analyzing development in ethnically polarized conflict ridden (third world) societies.
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Chapter 3: History of Ethnicity in Guyana:
Section A: Need for Cheap labor & Ethnic Mix of Guiana:
Guyana’s multiethnic composition is a result of colonization and immigration tied
to the need for labor to extract resources or to produce food and or other products for
colonizers. The colony’s ethnic mix is the direct product of the colonial economy –
colonization of the land and bringing in free or cheap foreign labor to extract the
resources for the benefit of the colonizing empire (Daly: 1975, Nath: 1950; Rodney:
1981). The European acquisition of new vast territories necessitated their settlement by
people (colonizers, planters, investors, industrialists, etc.) from the metropolitan centers
and or by other colonized peoples brought from India, Asia and Europe to provide a
cheap source of labor needed to extract resources or grow food to meet the insatiable
appetite of the empires. The colonial rulers brought people of diverse ethnic origin to
these far off colonies to serve their capitalist interests (producing with cheap or free
labor). Where necessary, the colonial rulers manipulated ethnic relations (promote ethnic
tension) to keep the diverse groups in conflict to redirect attention away from their own
exploitation as well as that of the colonies while the rulers carted away the wealth of the
colonies for trade with the metropolitan countries or for their own self enrichment (SN
Sep 23, 2010; Jan 29, 2009; Oct 23, 2008). Guiana, like other colonies, existed to serve
the interests of the metropolitan empires with its resources needed to develop the latter at
the expense of the former (Adamson: 1972, Mandle: 1973). But to extract resources from
or grow food in the colonies required vast supplies of cheap and or free labor. In fact, it
was determined that the colonies could not be profitable for the colonial powers without
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large quantities of cheap or free labor. Thus, labor had to be recruited from elsewhere
because of a domestic shortage (Nath: 1950, Manley: 1984, Daly: 1975, Samaroo: 1987).
The native Amerindian population in Guiana was not in sufficient numbers and
did not prove to be very reliable as a source of cheap labor to do the job of extracting
resources and or growing crops (SN Jun 24, 2010) to sell abroad. At any rate, they were
not found to be dependable for plantation work and were often running away into the
hinterland. They could not be held down on the land by the imperial forces for cultural
and other reasons (Williams: 1991). So workers had to be imported (Galenson: 1984).
Thus, Africans, Portuguese, Indians, Chinese and other ethnic groups were brought to
Guiana and other parts of the Caribbean to meet the needs of cheap labor to grow sugar
cane, cotton, tobacco and other crops for export to work. The immigrants were forced to
work for free or very cheaply on the plantation estates set up by the British plantation
owners (Ruhomon: 1947; Mohabir: 2005) in order for the owners to be profitable and to
maximize profit. This settlement of the diverse ethnic groups first from Africa as slaves
and subsequently from Asia and Europe as indentured laborers, and the racial mixture of
the Africans and Europeans to produce the new Colored or Mixed race (mulatto)
phenotype would establish the social fabric of the colony and the region (Stavenhagen:
1991, 1989; Shibutani: 1965; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afro-Guyanese). Such a social-racial
pattern would also define social (stratification based on ethnicity) and economic relations
on the colony as well as throughout the Caribbean region till this day (Robinson: 1970,
Ramsarran: 2008, Laguerre: 1984; http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-It/Guyana.html).
Section B: Slavery & Indenturedship – of Africans, Portuguese, Indians, Chinese
As historians have asserted, it was the profit motive (acquiring capital for
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economic expansion and creating more wealth) and a total disregard for the humanity of
non-Caucasian people that was behind the move by the United Kingdom and several
other Western European nations to introduce slavery bringing in large numbers of
Africans into Guyana and other colonial plantations in the Caribbean (Rodney: 1981).
Even after emancipation of the slaves (in 1838), a new form of slavery developed which
was euphemistically termed indentured servitude (Erriah: 2011). Academics such as Eric
Williams (1966), Alan Adamson (1972), Walter Rodney (1981) etc. have well
documented how capital (money for investment in Britain and other European empires)
was obtained from the brutality of slavery and indenturedship to fuel their own national
development to the neglect of exploited colonies. And it was the German philosopher &
economist Karl Marx (nd) who determined that "without slavery, North America, the
most progressive of continents, would not have been transformed into a patriarchal
society". Marx (nd & 1998)(socialistworker.org/2011/01/.../race-class-and-marxis) asserted
that if slavery were wiped off the map, there would have been economic anarchy with the
complete decay of 19th century commerce and civilization severely stunting growth in
the imperialist metropolitan countries. The need for slaves (free labor) brought the
Africans to Guiana and to the rest of the region to labor on the plantations.
After the abolition of slavery in 1838, without a very cheap, and slave like source
of reliable labor (based on coercion), the plantations could not be profitable or remain in
production. “Indentured slavery” was introduced on the colonies of virtually all of the
empires after the end of slavery to rescue the plantations from bankruptcy. The British
turned first to the Portuguese, as indentured laborers and when they proved limited for
the task of working on plantations, the planters turned to Indian labor, and later Chinese

- 70 -

when there were restrictions on Indian laborers (SN Jul 24, 2009; Oct 23, 2008). Trading
in indentured labor, similar to trading of slaves, was a profitable business for recruiters,
sailors and others involved in the trade and for growing crops primarily sugar cane. Most
of the indentured laborers imported into Guiana and the other colonies were Indians
(indiaempire.com/v1/2011/January/coverstory6.asp; SN May 9, 2010).
After the abolition of slavery, the British planters in the colonies appealed to the
government in England that “a suitable labor force was needed, one that was cheap,
accessible, replenishable, controllable and acclimatized”, according to University of
Guyana Prof. Tota Mangar (Guyana Chronicle May 6, 2011). In 1835, Britain turned to
its other colony India for a ready supply of the aforementioned cheap docile labor force
to save the unprofitable sugar plantations in the Caribbean. The British were in control of
India as well as the colonies of the West Indies. They ruled with an iron fist and could get
away with any act that served their personal or the empire’s interests. In India, the
majority of poor peasants were laboring for starvation wages literally existing under
extreme and dehumanizing conditions and often close to starvation. Concerned about the
plantations' shrinking labor pool and the potential decline of the sugar sector, including
its unprofitability, British authorities, like their counterparts in Dutch Guiana and French
colonies began to contract for the services of poorly paid indentured workers from India.
This new form of contracted slave like labor was introduced first on an experimental
basis in Guiana, and later fully throughout the British held Caribbean and later the Dutch,
French and Spanish Caribbean. http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyanahealth.html; Adamson: 1972; http://www.cariwave.com/East_Indian_Indentureship.htm)
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The introduction of Indian indentureds into the sugar plantation in 1838 was a
highly successful venture for the white plantation owners as the system turned around
their plantations making them profitable, and it enriched the colonies. The initial group
of indentureds was described by leading colonial officials as “conservative, docile,
simple and able-bodied”. The officials added: “An Indian labour force with such
characteristics was quite naturally considered as sine qua non to the survival and
prosperity of the sugar industry” (Ibid; see also Guyana Chronicle May 6, 2011) and
recruiters, who were paid a lucrative fee per head, were encouraged to send more
indentured laborers. www.cariwave.com/East_Indian_Indentureship.htm).
As Gulcharan Mohabir and other writers have noted (http://gulcharanmohabir.sulekha.com/blog/post/2005/10/indian-indentureship-a-forgotten-episode-ofhistory.htm), what emerged in Guiana and other colonies after emancipation from slavery
was a very complex society that changed the nature of social relations. Africans emerged
as wage earners who would bargain for their salaries and whose economic welfare was no
longer the responsibility of the planters. New indentured immigrants from diverse
cultures and backgrounds (Portuguese in 1835, Indians in 1838, African Indenturers in
1840, and Chinese in 1853, all of whom were influenced to migrate by significant
economic downturn in their home countries) changed the social organization of the
Guianese society. With the settlement of these groups, there was a new social pecking
order that retained the British in control over the society and influencing social relations.
The Africans found themselves competing with the contracted indentured laborers for
jobs and bargaining with the British planters over wages. The indentured laborers had
been openly recruited in their home countries with promises to better their economic
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situation by migrating to other territories while their home countries were suffering from
poverty like conditions. The attraction for Portuguese Madeirans, East Indians and
Chinese as low skilled laborers was the wage levels, which were rejected by the freed
slaves as too low, but which were higher than those in the native lands of the indentureds
(http://www.guyana.org/features/guyanastory/chapter47.html). The attitude of the indentured

was to work as hard as they could to accumulate as much money as possible so as to
return “back home” with a bounty of wealth (to improve their lives) they could not
accumulate in their home countries that was undergoing starvation like conditions
(http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html). However, the
importation of indentured laborers in Guiana would fuel labor discontent and protests as
well as some very violent ethnic clashes on the colony between and among the varied
groups – Africans and Portuguese, Africans and Chinese, Africans and Indians (see
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Guyanese). When slavery was abolished, many former
slaves in the Caribbean were reluctant to work full time or at all on the estates of their
former slave owners as they wanted to break from that bitter experience of human misery
that brought back terrible memories of cruelty and abuse they suffered on the plantations.
Thus, they started their own settlements away from the bonded plantations
(Hookumchand: 2006; Mohabir: 2005; Samarro: 1987). The freed Black slaves
established their own free holdings and began to develop economic independence (started
retail shops) away from farming and towards other line of work and took to education
especially that they were facing eviction from their plantation residences (Prof. Wazir
Mohammed, SN Apr 2, Jan 5, 2009; Jun 13, 2008; and Parbatty Ramsarran (2007)
(http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/ijcst/article/viewFile/18030/16797). Prof. Prem
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Misir of the University of Guyana noted that “planters, such as John Gladstone, father of
the former British Prime Minister, masterminded the creation of the indentured system of
labour, with the strategy being not to replace the entire (freed) labour force, but to
diminish the bargaining power (over wages) of the free slaves” (Chronicle May 17,
2011). In time, more indentured laborers were brought to meet the growing needs of the
plantations abandoned by the Africans (moia.gov.in/pdf/guyana.pdf).
Indenturedship would be described in the United Kingdom Parliament as “slavery
in a new form” (Tinker: 1993) because it had most of the features of slave labor. Lord
John Russell, the then U.K Secretary of State for the British Colonies, so advised the
Governor of British Guiana in an official despatch dated February 15, 1840 that
indenturedship was slavery in a new form (Chronicle May 6, 2011). Indenturedship was
known for its inhumane abuses, many of which practices were not different from slavery.
Prof. Bertrand Ramcharan of the Geneva Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies stated that “the circumstances that led to the importation of
indentured Indian laborers were far from pleasant and they suffered indignities and
humiliations – even if not on the same scale as that of the slaves” (SN Sep 3, 2010).
The indentured system would shape social relations among the competing ethnic
groups in the society (Rodney: 1981; Jagan: 1972; encyclopedia.jrank.org). Prof.
Ramsarran (2007) of the Geneva Institute argued that, “the indentured contract severely
impacted emerging social relationships”. He pointed out that “it legitimized exploitation
of labor, led to ethnic conflict among the imported ethnic groups, divided people by
ethnicity, segregated residential settlements by ethnicity; and it institutionalized
restrictive labor practices like wage rise and labor negotiations, etc.”
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(http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/ijcst/article/viewFile/18030/16797; also adapted
from International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2,
December 2008, 177-188; SN Jun 6, 2009, May 28, 2009, Jan 5, 2009).
Section C: Emergence of Ethnic Division & Racial Stratification
The historical presence of and the relations among the several ethnic groups
within Guiana have been described by commentators as “very tumultuous with each
disparaging the other and the White planter class setting the tone of relations among the
groups – being dominant and in charge of the society exercising power through the
colonial Governor appointed by London” (Seenarine: 2006). People saw and reacted to
each other in terms of their racial or ethnic affiliation. Social commentators asserted that
the colonial power engaged in what can be described as a social engineering of the
society by importing different ethnic (national) groups (from several nations) to serve the
labor interests of the plantations on the colony. A multi-ethnic society was created and a
classic divide and rule scheme was institutionalized to prevent ethnic cooperation
(www.guyananewsday.com/divide and rule).
Right after the indentured laborers arrived on the colony, there emerged rising
ethnic tensions and even physical violence between them and the Africans. From the
time of the arrival of the different groups, there was very little interaction among them
because of the nature of life on the plantation and its social structure as well as the de
facto segregated residential settlement established by the plantation owners to reduce
contact and labor solidarity movement. They were largely geographically divided with
the Afros mainly settling in urban areas to be joined by the Portuguese and Chinese after
indenture, Indians in the rural areas, the Amerindians in the hinterland interior of the
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country, and the Coloreds in the urban areas (Bisnauth: 2000). Each group had its own
settlements, or neighborhood enclaves and social as well as religious institutions. People
were expected to stick to their own ethnic group and communities. Also, there were
social taboos and prejudice regarding inter-ethnic interaction. The cultural development
of the diverse population took on what was described as a distinct character in which
people from each ethnic group socialized and interacted amongst their own group and
establishing their own unique culture (Despres: 1967, Daly: 1975).
There developed a history marred by ongoing racial competition and racial
tensions and at times open violent conflict among the different groups (first between
Africans and Portuguese beginning in 1841 and subsequently between Africans and
Indians and Africans and Chinese) (Ruhomon: 1947). The competition for space and
wealth among the ethnic groups would define the social, cultural, economic and political
landscape of the colony right after emancipation continuing till the present time
(Seenarine: 2006). There were also contradictions rooted in growing inequalities among
the various segments (ethnic groups and the classes among each) of the segregated
society resulting in uneven economic development around the society with preference
given to certain ethnic enclaves or communities. (As for example, Whites and Colored
neighborhoods were privileged with resources during colonial rule and African
communities were favored in the post-colonial period under the PNC). In light of this
kind of segregation and ethnic favoritism, Africans, Indians, Portuguese, Chinese,
Coloreds, etc. constructed distinct and separate identities. Each group also established
ethnic enclaves and residencies that found them in perpetual racial conflict (for resources
and for domination of the state) with each other (KN Jul 29, 2013; Apr 8, 2013; Nov 24,
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2013; Jul 31, 2009); SN May 31, 2010).
The groups were pitted each against the other so that they could be manipulated
all in the interests of capital accumulation. Guyana was divided by race after the new
ethnic groups were brought to the colony to replace the freed slaves (Rodney: 1981;
Jagan: 1972; Despres: 1967). A society was established that was culturally and ethnically
mixed with a medley of groups competing against one another for resources and
economic survival after the end of slavery (late 1830s) and continuing thereafter (SN Feb
14, 2007; May 28, 2009). The plantation owners encouraged ethnic competition and
conflict to keep the groups divided to divert attention away from their miserable lives. By
the mid 1850s, the colony of Guiana was characterized by extreme divisiveness that
impacted on all aspects of life, including ethnic competition for work on plantations that
drove down the price of labor to the great dissatisfaction of newly freed Afro-slaves. The
former slaves blamed their low wages and depressed living conditions on cheap imported
labor and this became a source of (at times violent) conflict between them and the other
racial groups. There developed an uneasy relationship among the groups that only
worsened over time as they competed for jobs, resources and the attention of the colonial
authority (SN Sep 3, Jul 29 & Jun 17, 2010; May 28, 2009).
The British played one against the other in a classic divide and rule strategy.
Cultural differences, inter-ethnic violence, and other factors strengthened features of
separateness among the groups leading to self-constructed social and political boundaries
among the population. Ethnic conflict was instigated by the white planter class that
capitalized on ethnic tensions and jealousies among the groups and their relationship with
the ruling class. The British recognized that ethnic strife pitting one group against
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another (divide and rule), as successfully used in India and elsewhere (Sandhu: 2009),
was an effective way of controlling and continuing the domination of the groups. It must
have been calculated that once they fought among themselves, they would have less time
to focus on their own miserable conditions and exploitation. The British planter class
encouraged such strife and rivalry among the groups to keep them divided.
There emerged intensive conflict between the Africans and the other race groups
often played out in physical violence. For example, because the Portuguese and Chinese
had not developed an affinity to plantation work, they moved into other parts of the
economy, especially retail business and government jobs, after completing their indenture
(SN Jan 12, 2009). They soon found themselves in competition with the emerging AfroGuyanese middle class and this led to repeated clashes and physical violence between the
Africans and Portuguese and Africans and Chinese (SN May 11, 2012; Dec 19, 2011;
Aug 1, Jun 27, 2010; Jul 29, 2009, Oct 23, 2008; www.guyanajournal.com/how_ishm.html).
Aside from job competition, cultural differences, including language, work habits,
traditions, and customs were used to label and define the different groups of people so as
to bring out their differences to encourage conflict among them (SN Feb 18, 2011; Jun
17, 2010). Ethnocentrism and stereotyping by members of each group of the other helped
fuel the conflict (SN Mar 25, 2014; Jun 9, 2012; Aug 6, 2009). Clothing, diet and religion
were also used to further the divide between the Indians and Africans and other groups
(SN Dec 16, 2011; May 9, 2010; Feb 18, 2007) with traditional Indian garb, food habits,
and religious practices being put down by Blacks. Geographical settlements were also
used to add to the ethnic division between Indians and Africans with living in rural areas,
where Indians predominated, being equated with uncivilized behavior (Seenarine: 2006;
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SN Jul 10, 2012; Dec 20, 2009; www.guyana.org/features/conflicts_indiansandblacks.html).
The White planters promoted a Black/Indian interracial conflict to redirect focus
away from their economic exploitation. The racial competition (fighting for economic
turf and special benefits from the colonial authority) served British economic interests;
the British colonial authority and or the local plantocracy (in control of the society’s
wealth) were the referees of who and or which community gets what and when and this
strategy was used effectively to promote jealousy and competition between the groups for
state attention as a means of controlling their behavior (SN Jun 27, 2010).
The British also used racial and color differences to institutionalize division
among the groups ascribing status based on color and ethnicity to create jealousies among
them in their aspirations for “higher status”. To the British, race was the primary social
determinant of society and a hierarchy of racial stratification was institutionalized in the
society. The belief in the superiority of one race (Whites or Europeans) over other races
was practiced and encouraged by the British colonial authority (SN Jun 17, 2010). And
the British colonials (and indeed everyone on the colony) institutionalized this belief that
Whites (and people closest to being Whites) were superior to non-Whites (SN Sep 3,
2008). The British created a ladder of superiority of the groups based on a theory of
racialism that established racial and Color stratification that was also tied to “Britishness”
(Seenarine: 2006). The Anglos and other Europeans (Portuguese) were at the top and
other racial groups below with social ranking based on their proximity as closest to being
European (defined by color as well as by Christian values and English literacy). The
Indians, having retained their culture, unlike the other groups that had absorbed European
culture, were categorized as an ethnic group opposed to every other group and almost at
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the bottom of the social ladder (Seenarine: 2006). The Indian masses were mostly
illiterate (could not communicate in English) and non-Christians. With social status
dependent on English literacy and embracing of Christianity, the Indians found
themselves at the bottom of the social pyramid (Ibid) with the African masses slightly
above them and the Mixed or Colored groups sandwiched between the Chinese and
Portuguese who were just below the British Anglos (SN Sep 26, 2010). The Amerindians,
shut out in the hinterland, were at the bottom (SN Apr 1, 2014; Dec 21, 2010).
The social structure of the society (Despres: 1967; Robinson: 1970, Jagan: 1972;
Encyclopedia.jrank.org), with its ethnic division and social stratification, was a perfect

setting for colonial rule – divide and rule -- with different ethnic groups competing
against each other at first for jobs and livable wages and later for land, resources,
business, social status and political influence (see Sandhu: 2009). In addition, the groups
found themselves in physical conflict with one another over jobs, resources, and
perceived favoritism from the ruling class -- all promoted and abetted by the British
rulers and local planters (KN Nov 11, 2012).
Even after independence, the inherited ethnic structure of social inequality among
the groups largely remained in place as the former colonies found it difficult to shake
them off or to effectuate a new social order based on relative equality among the ethnic
groups (KN Sep 2, 2013; Feb 17, 2013; Dec 1, 2010). The historical structure of the
society made it difficult to dole out rewards and appointments based on merit rather than
on the established past practices of ethnic or party preference (KN Dec 31, 2008). Also,
there continued the lopsided development favoring one geographic region (urban areas)
over another (rural) as well as an inequitable system of distribution of resources based on
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such socially constructed factors as ethnicity, color, class, political connections,
favoritism, party affiliation, and geography – all serving to promote rather than reduce
ethnic conflict. The (dominant) ethnic group in charge of the state decided which region
(or ethnic group) would be developed and or favored and or rewarded with resources. It
was so during colonial rule and remained as such after independence. After the imperial
rulers freed the colony, the ethnic conflict has remained unresolved and the policy of
ethnic preference has persisted (though the benefactors changed hands right after
independence to the Africans). Development is guided and directed by the dominant
ethnic group in control of the government favoring those residential areas where its
supporters are settled or where it obtains political support (Hookumchand: 2006).

Section D: Causes of Ethnic Conflict
There are numerous causes and reasons (Richardson: 1996, Patterson: 1983, 1975;
Hechter: 1995, 1987, 1978) for ethnic conflict as expressed in verbal and or physical
forms in multi-ethnic states. As in the case of Guyana, the chief reason for ethnic conflict
is the desire of the leader of an ethnic group or members of groups to capture the state or
acquire more resources for its members and to correct what it perceives were historic
wrongs committed against the group (Ibid). As gleamed from the literature, generally
speaking, ethnic conflict comes about when ethnicity (identifying with and displaying
loyalty to one’s group) is used to organize and mobilize ethnic groups of people to
compete against one another for resources and or for the attention of the state and or even
to capture the state. Members from an ethnic group rally around each other to give each
other support on an issue impacting on their group or for (more) resources for the group
or for political or economic power (Ibid). The groups are usually organized with the goal
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of influencing or capturing state power and or making demands on the state to address a
perceived (real or imagined) grievance (typically discrimination based on uneven
distribution of resources or obtaining greater state recognition of their culture or equitable
participation in the government, etc.). Ethnic conflict (verbal or physical clashes and the
like) inevitably develops when expressed grievances of the group are not satisfactorily
addressed in multi-ethnic societies or where the state ignores the groups (Richardson:
1996, Patterson: 1983, 1975; Nagel: 1985).
Theorists have identified some of the proximate causes of ethnic conflict
including allegations of discrimination against and neglect and or marginalization of the
group by the (leaders of the) ruling (dominant) group and or a demand for equitable
distribution of resources and or proportional representation in the composition of the
government of the state (Ibid; www.gsdrc.org/go/conflict/...1...conflict). Also, conflict
ensues when ethnically divisive strategies are invoked by political actors to mobilize
political support to capture power and or to make demands on the state and or to gain
control of the state (Hechter: 2000, Horowitz: 1985) as happened in Guyana after 1957
and in so many other ethnically divided countries (Bartels: 1978). In multi-ethnic
conflict ridden societies, often, the state is dominated by an ethnic group and other ethnic
groups become subordinated feeling left out of decision making and or left behind
believing they are not getting a fair (or “their”) share of resources leading to all kinds of
complaints based on ethnic discrimination (persecution) accompanied by demands for
restitution. These complaints can be (and often are) used as a basis for open conflict or
political mobilization based on ethnicity (SN Feb 28, 2007). Long-standing beliefs and
attitudes held by members of the ethnic group are used to support the claim of
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discrimination against the group and the accompanied militant response (protests,
boycotts, demands, and even violence, etc.) against the state. Among these attitudes and
beliefs are: historical legacies of mistrust (as, for example, between Africans and Indians
in Guyana when Indians first arrived during the late1830s and their subsequent settlement
thru 1917 when indenturedship ended) (SN Jul 2, 2009; Apr 30, 2009; Feb 2, 2008), a
mentality of victimization (as for example the thinking among Africans that Whites
victimized them during and after slavery) (SN Feb 15, 2010), feelings of shared
deprivation (as for example the impressions by Africans that the Indian PPP government
(between 1957 and 1964) neglected them in favor of their own group or expressions
among Indians that the African government abused them (between 1965 and 1992), or
memories of some kind of injustice (as for example during slavery or indenturedship or
PNC misrule against Indians that denied them access to their cultural diets) (KN Jun 11,
2011, SN Aug 24, 2010; May 14, 2009; Aug 8, 2008; Oct 31, 2007).
Researchers have asserted that ethnic conflict could be peaceful (rallies, protests,
marches, petitions, picketing, etc.) or violent (insurrection, arson, physical attacks against
property and people, etc.). Violent conflicts between rival ethnic groups sometimes break
out spontaneously or at times are planned and pre-meditated (Richardson: 1996,
Patterson: 1983). Also, members across ethnic groups are known to form alliances in
conflict against other groups (as the Africans, Portuguese, Amerindians, Mixed, etc. did
in Guiana during the 1960s against the PPP and Indians) (Ibid). When peace is restored,
conflict between former alliance members can take place as happened in Guyana between
Africans and Amerindians and Africans and Portuguese once the Indian threat was
removed (Bartels: 1978, Glasgow: 1970). Generally speaking, once there is political
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peace, the groups get along. But conflicts between or among groups can easily resume for
the least provocation or misunderstanding as happened between Africans and Portuguese
in 1967 when the Portuguese leader protested against acts of corruption involving its
senior partner, the PNC. Conflict is often encouraged and or induced by de facto leaders
(ethnic entrepreneurs) of the group to maintain the legitimacy of their leadership over
followers (KN Aug 29, 2010). Once the conflict ends, their leadership could be
challenged and or they could lose their status as leaders of the group. Ethnic conflict in
polarized societies like Guyana, Trinidad, and Surinam has been ongoing to serve the
selfish interests of ethnic leaders to retain their status as leader of the group (Dew: 1989).
It does not take much to trigger ethnic conflict as was experienced in Guyana during the
1840s, 1850s, 1880s, 1950s, 1960s, and during election campaigns ever since. The losing
party and their ethnic supporters had refused to accept the outcome of democratic
elections and appealed to their kinship supporters to attack the supporters of the winning
party (as happened in 1992, 1997, 2001, 2006, 2011) (KN Sep 22, 2011).
Sociological research on Guyana has revealed that ethnic leaders have been
known to mobilize and manipulate gullible followers to support issues based on ethnicity
playing on old feelings of prejudice. It has been found that some of those (like Burnham
in Guyana) who organize or mobilize the members of an ethnic group for conflict or to
challenge the state may have their own personal political or economic agenda and
motives (as for example to serve political ambitions like acquiring power). However, they
may not make their personal agenda quite obvious to supporters. Group members are
found to be receptive to appeals from ethnic leaders or other co-ethnics who level charges
that group members are victims of discrimination. This in turn encourages leaders to
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make such appeals (whether real or imagined) creating an ongoing symbiotic relationship
between leaders and group members for ethnic mobilization (KN Apr 13, 2014; Jun 4,
2013). The gullible masses of the group tend to fall victim to the claim (whether real or
perceived) of ethnic discrimination allowing themselves to be manipulated by ethnic
leaders (or ethnic entrepreneurs) to intensify the conflict (Richardson: 1996, Patterson:
1983, 1975; Hechter: 2000) – as was the case of Forbes Burnham during the 1950s and
1960s in Guyana (KN Jan 6, 2013; Apr 26, 2011; Sep 26, 2010; Bartels: 1978).
The ethnic conflict could be peaceful (rallies, protests, marches, petitions, etc.) or
violent (insurrection, physical attacks against property and people, etc.) and it is often
encouraged or induced by leaders of the group to maintain the legitimacy of the leaders
over their followers. It is known that violent conflict between rival ethnic groups
sometimes breaks out spontaneously. It does not take much to trigger ethnic violence as
was experienced in Guyana during the 1960s and during every election campaign ever
since. This is true especially when ethnic losers refuse to accept the outcome of elections
or if an ethnic group loses a court case as happened in Guyana in 1998 and in 2001.
Those who organize or mobilize the members of the group may have their own personal
political or economic agenda, but they may not make their personal agenda quite evident
to supporters telling them their group survival is under threat if they don’t support him
(KN Oct 28, 2012). For example, Forbes Burnham, who mobilized Africans against
Indians in Guyana after 1956, wanted power for power sake (and self enrichment),
according to his sister Jesse Burnham who told Guyanese to “beware of the political
ambitions of his brother Forbes” (Jagan: 1972; KN Nov 14, 2012). Africans fell for his
racial appeal of a perceived threat from Indians. Burnham was not seriously committed to
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developing the state for the welfare of the country or even for his own ethnic group but
for political self-aggrandizement and acquisition of power (KN Aug 23, 2014; Jan 21,
2010). Burnham encouraged inter-ethnic violence and animosity to serve his own purpose
(www.guyananewsday.com/divide and rule). Burnham was hardly an altruistic leader or a
benevolent dictator with a primary interest in development of Africans or others. He had
no genuine concern for the welfare of the nation as reflected in his actions of murdering
political opponents and denying the country access to basic foods and treating them like
his imperial subjects. He was obsessed with power and self-enrichment (KN Feb 3, 2013).
For him, as his sister, Jesse Burnham, wrote, “the ends justified the means” (Jagan:
1972). He even used violence against members of his own racial group when they
rebelled against his tyranny or threatened his hold on power (KN Jan 5, 2010).
As history has shown, once ethnic conflict has started, there is usually no end. It
degenerates into a vicious cycle of endless violence. Groups seek to do to others what
was done to them with the once oppressed group becoming the oppressor when it
captures power. When the leaders of an ethnic group or the group itself gain office and
become the dominant political force, they tend to use state institutions to distribute
economic and political benefits preferentially to their ethnic brethren while neglecting
and oppressing the other groups. Such actions serve to exacerbate the conflict and affect
development (Alahar: 1996). It inevitably leads to discrimination against those from the
subordinate group who themselves may have previously been the dominant group and
now seek to return to its position as the dominant group. Often repressive force is used to
impose discriminatory practices and or to quell resistance of subordinate groups as
exemplified in the case of Guyana between 1968 and 1992. As Prof Cynthia Enloe (1980)
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noted, force is generally exercised by police officers and soldiers recruited almost
exclusively from the dominant group (Africans in the case of Guyana). These recruits
often view themselves as "ethnic soldiers" to protect their group or what they view as
their government against the other group that is seen as a threat to the governing group or
the government acting on behalf of their group (Ravi Dev in KN May 18, 2008).
When a dominant group is from a minority ethnicity, as was the case in Guyana or
South Africa or Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) before the racist governments fell, the government
typically imposes discriminatory policies and uses repression to maintain political order
as it is the only way for the dominant group to hold power and keep the other groups in
check. Cosmetic democratic institutions may legitimize discrimination as happened in
post independent Guyana until 1992 or during apartheid in South Africa and White
minority rule in Rhodesia. From 1992 to the present, democracy alone has not been able
to ensure ethnic harmony in Guyana because the minority race has refused to accept
governance by a majority Indian government. Analogously, suppressing free expression
or imposing authoritarian rule does not guarantee the end of ethnic hostility as
experienced under the PNC dictatorship from 1966 till 1992. In fact, the opposite has
happened in multi-ethnic authoritarian states (like USSR, Yugoslavia, Guyana, etc.)
where the ruling regimes suppressed the rights of ethnic groups only to find an
intensification of ethnic conflict once the countries became free from authoritarian rule.
The survival of ethnic nationalism (whether Soviet or Russian or Serbian or Croat or Afro
Guyanese or Bosnian or Indo-Guyanese) in the face of repression (by the state which is
controlled by a dominant group) against other national groups illustrates the tenacity with
which ethnic groups cling to their identities (ethno nationalism) in solidarity against
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ethnic abuses from the ruling or other groups. As Richardson (1996) points out, when
subordinate group members endure discrimination, a sense of shared deprivation
strengthens identification with their group leading to a nationalistic fervor. This ethnic
identification and nationalist feeling provides a basis for solidarity and political
mobilization along ethnic lines with the hope of overcoming their hardships and to one
day avenging their abuses (Patterson: 1983). In Guyana, for example, ethnic identity has
been strengthened with every change in government. With all the persecution and
genocidal policies of the PNC regime, Indians became more immersed in their identity
after democracy was restored and are fearful of the PNC to government. Also, ethnic
animosity has worsened since the restoration of democracy in 1992 consolidating group
solidarity – Africans against Indians and vice versa with the groups clinging to their
ethnic parties for protection against the other ethnic parties and their representative
stronghold in government (Seenarine: 2006; KN Oct 5, 2013; SN Apr 7, 2010).
In polarized societies, ethnic insecurity, distrust and victimhood (perceived or
real) also promote group solidarity and pit groups against one another (Jayawardena:
1963). Members and leaders of contending ethnic groups, whether they are presently
discriminating against a subordinate group or are themselves objects of discrimination,
often portray themselves as victims of state policy to gain sympathy. A "victim"
mentality helps unite group members behind their leaders or within their ethnic
organization and justifies the sacrifices they make for their group to improve its status or
position and gain benefits (Ibid). Members of a previously victimized group often feel
justified in victimizing others outside of their group when they become the dominant
group or capture political power; they tend to judge and treat others (seeking revenge)
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based on their own victimization (Horowitz: 1985, Patterson: 1983, 1975).
The literature on Guyana shows that very often, ethnic political (and religious)
leaders play a divisive role in multi-ethnic society, appealing to ethnic-nationalist
sentiments and promoting scapegoats of rival ethnic groups in order to enhance personal
standing within their group (and by extension political power) and or to gain political
office (through democratic or undemocratic means using their followers in that goal)
(Despres: 1967). "Ethnic-bashing", as this leadership strategy is sometimes labeled,
serves to reinforce in-group identity by emphasizing the common ties that bind group
members to each other while stressing the differences that distinguish the group as a
whole and its individual members from other groups and their members. The members of
the other group are described as enemies. The social cleavages that result from such
tactics to unite members of a group and in expressing detest of members of the other
group as well as measures to prevent another group from winning office only add to
ethnic tension (Patterson: 1983). Burnham appealed to African nationalism and prejudice
against the Indians conjuring up images of Indian dominance of the society and spreading
fear of Indians among the Africans (KN Jun 11, 2011). Burnham told the Africans that
the Indians want to take over the country to the detriment of the Africans whose
economic survival has been increasingly tied to state control (with government jobs, etc.)
(SN Feb 18, 2011, Sep 4, 2010, May 12, 2007). Such an ethno-nationalist and racially
divisive campaign by Burnham was/is not unusual or restricted only to a poor society like
Guyana but present in virtually all ethnically polarized states, including Trinidad and
Surinam, even such developed ones as the US, Canada and England.
As the preceding examples demonstrate, ethnicity is often consolidated when

- 89 -

members of a group are exhorted to support their group through emotional pleas or
because of a perceived ethnic threat from the state or from another group (Horowitz:
1985; Rothchild: 1996). To bolster their pleas and pressure potential supporters to back
them, members of ethnic groups are often reminded of experiences of abuses and
discrimination they or their people had (have) suffered, whether real or imagined, based
on their ethnic background. For example, during the late 1950s, Burnham repeatedly told
Africans the PPP was developing rural Indian areas at the expense of urban African areas
and the PPP was pouring money into growing rice to benefit the Indians at the expense of
the Africans (GC March 11, 2014). Analogously, Indians are constantly reminded of how
the PNC ill-treated them (KN Mar 6, 2014) neglecting agriculture and encouraging goons
to attack them during the period of “kick down door banditry” in the 1980s (GT Jan 24,
20150; SN Apr 29, 2008; Apr 7, 2008; Feb 8, 2008). These "recollections" of (the) past
injustices are stressed and repeated time and again by ethnic entrepreneurs or race baiters.
The objective is to sow fear among members of the group to support co-ethnics or the
group as well as to consolidate ethnic identity and cohesiveness in order to right historic
wrongs (Patterson: 1975). Such emotional appeals have had the potential of eventually
leading to ethnic conflict among contending groups as the case of Guyana has illustrated.
Section E: Role of Minorities in Ethnic Conflict:
The minority ethnic groups (Portuguese and other Europeans, Chinese, Mixed and
Amerindians) had largely excluded themselves from the ongoing Indo-Afro racial
(political) conflict that began in 1955 except briefly when the minorities, through their
party the United Force (UF), sided with the capitalist PNC against the communist PPP
between 1957 and 1966 (SN Jul 29, Jan 21, Apr 29, 2010). Prior to and after
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independence, there was limited social integration among the groups. Each had limited
connection with the other group so much so that Guyana was hardly one nation but
several nations (a reference to the six ethnic groups living in their own secluded
communities). This was not new as Guyanese have been divided by ethnicity since the
1840s right after indentured groups were imported into the colony.
Since the 1840s, Guyanese have historically been supportive of their own race
and tied to their own ethnic communities and lived among their own ethnic kin. People of
different ethnic groups may live next to one another but hardly got (get) along or
socialized together (except with those of their own group) even in church (SN Dec 29, 30
2014). The racial groups have lived in largely de facto segregated communities, similar to
those in the US, that were initially established by the British planters’ class since the mid
1800s. The segregated settlements have been reinforced during the immediate pre and
post independence periods as a result of race riots. The minority groups were supportive
of the PNC against the PPP during the riot torn years although they did not partake in the
murderous rampage against Indians. The minorities were not attacked during the 1960s
race riots and they retained their residencies among members of the larger groups.
However, Indians and Africans who were minorities in various neighborhoods were
displaced after being brutalized in the worse forms of violence imaginable between
members of the two groups – rape, robbery, chopped, burnt alive – forcing the living to
seek shelter and security among their own ethnic communities (kith and kin) in other
communities (Rampertab: 2001). People abandoned homes and other properties to seek
shelter and protection among their own kith and kin (of their ethnic group).
Since the 1960s race riots, members of the groups have stuck to their own
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community preferring to live among and be supportive of their own group for physical
security, and they competed with other groups for resources and political dominance of
the state. They also formed organizations among their own ethnic group. It was (is) not
common for people of different ethnicities to belong to organizations or worship at
churches comprising multi-ethnic groups, and when they did, they rarely got (get) along
(SN Dec 30 2014). Virtually all sports, cultural, social, religious, labor and political
organizations tend to be constituted of or are overwhelmingly dominated by members of
one race. People even established and worshipped in separate ethnic churches that
subscribe to the same faith and don’t mix when they worship at the same church (SN Dec
29, 30, 2014). For example, there were separate Black, Portuguese, Chinese, and Mixed
Catholic Churches and the same held true or Anglican churches, etc. not much different
from the segregated communities or ethnic enclaves in the U.S with separate Black,
Hispanic, Korean, and White Churches. And as in the U.S, as happened regularly
between Whites and Blacks, and Blacks and Asians, there were (are) also inter-ethnic
violence in Guiana between Africans and other groups in frequent scuffles (SN May 6,
2011, Glasgow: 1970; www.guyana.org/.../conflicts_i...).
However, while there were several incidents of racial confrontations (including
violence) between Africans and each of the other minority racial groups (first with the
Portuguese and later with Chinese) (www.stabroeknews.com Jul 29, 2010; May 4, 2010;
May 28, 2009; Oct 23, 2008; Sep 3, 2008) from the 1840s right through the 1960s, it was
the conflict between Africans and Indians during the 1950s and thereafter that had the
most devastating and telling impact on the economy and politics of the nation and on
social change. Almost from the time of the first arrival of Indians in Guyana (1838) until
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now, there have been conflicts and rivalry between them and Africans with the latter
viewing Indian indentured servants as cheap coolie labor and as being responsible for the
Africans being paid low wages for their labor and their depressing condition. As one
article put it (http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-It/Guyana.html#ixzz1DzDYgOvA), “in
spite of (violent) conflicts in the 1860s between the Africans and the Portuguese and
Africans and Chinese immigrants, it was the Indians with whom the Africans had the
biggest quarrel” because of their larger number and the threat for power.
For years, the minority groups lived, socialized and worshipped within their own
communities staying away from the rivalry between the Indians and Africans for ethnic
control of the state. The Chinese, (SN May 10, 2013; Feb 5, 2013; Aug 5, 2010; Jul 3,
2008) for example, had their own Anglican and Catholic Churches and sports clubs and
political organization, and they did not mix with the Africans or other groups. Politically,
they supported the U.F out of ideological consideration and also because they did not
have enough numbers to launch their own party though they had their own political
organization, Chinese Association. The Mixed, Portuguese and Amerindian groups also
had their own organizations and Churches and supported the UF that represented the
status quo (SN May 4, 2010; Dec 10, 2008; Dec 5, 2007). Because of their small
composition in the population, the minority ethnic groups did not pose any grave political
threat to the Africans and Indians. As such, the minorities were not involved in any
significant violent racial conflict with the two larger groups during the immediate pre and
post independence periods although they were involved in repeated violent clashes with
Africans in the immediate post-slavery period. That violence was attributed largely to
competition for British influence and for scarce jobs with the Africans viewing the
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Portuguese and Chinese as competitors who were favored by the British. The Indians
were never involved in direct violent conflict with Portuguese, Chinese or Mixed as the
Indians were not competitors for state jobs or posed any serious economic threats to them
(SN May 28 2009; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_Guyanese).
Since the 1950s onwards, the small minority groups have not been serious
contenders for political power, and as such they were not targeted for violence. However,
members of the larger groups resented the minorities, and they competed for jobs and
resources. The major groups largely ignored the minorities with the British directing the
minorities to support the European controlled capitalist party (United Force) that
advocated for their interests (SN Feb 24, 2009). Thus, the minor ethnic groups were not
very active participants in the struggle for control of the post-colonial state although they
(Whites, Chinese and Amerindians) supported the UF, and they did back the PNC against
the PPP based on economic ideology (SN Aug 21, 2008). Indeed, the PPP was a socialist
party intent on controlling large businesses and the Whites and Chinese were probusiness. Since they could not bring themselves into supporting a Black PNC party, they
rallied with the bourgeois Portuguese UF against the PPP (SN Feb 27, 2014). The White
Christian missionaries indoctrinated the Amerindians that the PPP was a communist
outfit that would outlaw religion, and they were successful in winning them over to
support the European (Portuguese) based U.F in elections in 1961 and 1964 (SN Apr 29,
2010; www.guyanajournal.com/race1_pt.html; www.guyana.org/.../guyanastor...)
The minority-backed U.F supported the PNC in a coalition government in
December 1964. But right after the PNC consolidated its power, the minorities were
excluded from power and marginalized economically following the dumping of the UF;
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the minorities also became victims of PNC misrule (Ibid). The UF and the minorities
informally sided with the PPP to oppose the PNC ethnic dictatorship (SN Dec 10, Oct 22,
2009). After the rise of the dictatorship, those minorities (the small numbers who did not
migrate) informally joined the opposition PPP struggle (though not becoming supporters
of the PPP) for free and fair elections and respect for human rights. Unlike during the
colonial era, they saw the PPP as the lesser of the threat to their physical survival, and as
such they were not unduly concerned if a socialist PPP were to replace the fascist PNC.
On the whole, the ethnic minorities largely kept to themselves. However, in recent years,
they have become more closely interlinked with the two larger racial groups seeking to
make deals for their groups for greater access to state resources, handouts, and political
patronage jobs in the large state sector. For example, the native Amerindians, since 1993,
have been trading their support and cutting deals with the PPP for greater amounts of
handouts, representations and other resources for their communities in the hinterland (SN
Sep 7, Feb 5 2011; Aug 9, 2010). And there are very few Whites and Chinese in the
society today with most of them been driven away by the PNC dictatorship following the
break-up of the UF-PNC coalition (GT Jan 24, 2015; SN May 29, 2008). The Mixed races
have divided up their support among the competing parties with the PNC receiving the
bulk of that support through ethnic ties. The “Mixed” or Colored races, who historically
worked in banks, the civil service, and prestigious position in the private sector, and who
supported the UF, gravitated towards the PNC where they feel they have greater racial
affinity (www.guyanajournal.com/race1_pt.html). At any rate, the Coloreds were never attracted
to the Indian-based PPP and the UF had shed its character as the representatived of Europeans
and Coloreds (www.inthesetimes.com/article/6309/guyanas_post-colonial_plight).
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Chapter 4: Review of the Literature:
Section A. General Overview of Ethnicity & Development:
Ethnicity and social division have defined and shaped relations in Guyana since
the end of slavery. It is well established that race-based policies of a government (like
that of apartheid South Africa or minority ruled Rhodesia or Guyana) do have critical
effects on development (Wilson: 2012, Louw: 2004, Winant: 1994, Wolpe: 1984). Yet, a
general review of the literature does not reveal significant studies directly linking
economic development or its lack thereof with ethnic conflict in Third World developing
societies. A vast amount of studies on the subject of ethnicity, not only on Guyana, but in
other heterogeneous societies as well, show that ethnic groups have been (are) defining
their interests in mutually exclusive terms (practicing or advocating racial hegemony and
domination over other groups) with reference to control over the state and allocation of
its economic resources. The leaders of the groups tend to pursue policies that would
benefit their “own group” and often the group tends to act like a state (within a state)
among its members by addressing their concerns. Instead of pursuing actions that would
enhance the interests of the entire state, leaders pursue group interests much to the
neglect of the state. In such a context, inter-ethnic cooperation is not a priority and in fact
leaders tend to appeal directly to group interests in order to retain their support. This,
inevitably lead to ethnic competition and rivalry because other groups echo similar
interests that put them in conflict with each other. And that has been the hallmark of
ethnic relations in Guyana – each group makes demands for resources that put them in
competition and conflict. Such conflict, in Guyana (and many other nations), has become
a serious impediment towards nation building, cultural integration, and economic
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development. This has had a negative impact on national cohesion, social progress and
standard of living. The ethnic conflict in Guyana has made it extremely difficult for the
society to develop and for the standard of living to rise because political instability tied to
ethnicity has made investors wary about committing capital that is necessary for
economic expansion and growth and by extension development of the society. Yet, the
literature on Guyana’s economy does not tie economic stagnation and decline to racially
biased government policies and racial conflict.
The general literature on ethnicity and social change as well as the effects of
ethnic conflict on economic development on Guyana is very sparse. A review of the
literature does find numerous general studies and commentaries on ethnicity, ethnic
conflict, politics, culture, and ethno nationalism as well as on the economy. The
emphasis in most of the literature on Guyana’s economy has been on the institution of
colonialism and the capitalist mode of production as the root causes of lack of
development and as obstacles to economic progress and growth. A focus on social
aspects of the colonial legacy (especially aspects of life in colonial society, social
relations and ethnic conflict) is essential in constructing any theoretical framework that
links ethnicity and economics (national development) because ethnic division was
introduced by the colonists, reinforced in official policy, and institutionalized during the
colonial period. It is noted in the literature that during the early colonial period, different
ethnic groups were brought to Guiana and settled in segregated communities with each
group having little contact and social relationship with each other, thus setting the stage
for ethnic division and conflict. The literature points to occurrences of violent ethnic
conflict throughout the colony’s history and the British planter’s role in the conflict.
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Also, the literature notes that a colonial social order was established based on a
structural hierarchical order that was based on race (ethnicity) and a strategy of divide
and rule that pits groups against one another. British Whites were at the top of the
hierarchy and dominant over all other groups with ethnic Portuguese second in the
pecking order; color and a group’s ‘Britishness’ (speaking English and subscribing to
Christianity) defined the status of the other groups. Mixed and Africans followed next in
line with Indians below. The ethnic conflict defined social relations in the colony and
subsequently after it gained independence. The conflict was used a divide and rule
strategy to exercise control in the new social order (SN Jun 17, 2010), much as class
exploitation and class conflict became fundamental to social relations in capitalist
societies as illustrated by Karl Marx (1998), Frank (1985), and other Marxist analysts.
The literature and mass media reveals that ethnic-based conflicts are very
common in former colonial pluralist societies like Guyana. Thus, ethnic conflict simply
cannot be ignored when explaining any aspect of political, social or economic life in
multi-ethnic developing societies like Guyana. But a perusal of the literature reveals there
is virtually no scholarship on ethnic conflict and development with regards to Guyana or
other third world societies. There is virtually no direct discussion on ethnicity and
economics nor is there any serious attempt to show how Guyana’s poor economy is
influenced by the terrible race relations among the diverse groups. There are ample
studies on ethnicity and political development but there are virtually no (political)
proposals to ameliorate ethnic (party) conflict so development can occur without
impediments. Also, studies have not sufficiently examined the impact of ethnic or race
conflict on development although it is well established that race-based policies of a
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government (like that of apartheid South Africa or Guyana) do have critical effects on
development like limiting investment, trade, growth, national participation in the
economy, etc. Numerous studies confirm that ethnicity has become an increasingly
relevant focus for peoples' socio-political attitudes and behavior in nation after nation.
Even nations that have not had ethnic issues (conflict) suddenly find themselves having
to confront protests for all kinds of ethnic demands (Horowitz: 1985). And there is
hardly any effort to link the lack of economic growth and development with ethnicity or
racialist policy of a government.
Section B. Section Review of Literature on Ethnicity & Guyana
Ethnicity, as gleamed from the literature, refers to a sense of collective
consciousness with a shared sense of identification with a larger group that see
themselves as having a deep commonality (kinship, religion, language, caste, race,
nationality, etc.). The ethnic group consists of those who see themselves as being alike by
virtue of their common ancestry (Indians or Africans or Portuguese or Chinese, etc. in the
Guyana context) and are so regarded by others (Shibutani and Kwan, 1965: 47). For
example, all non-Indians view and define who is an Indian who in turn accepts that
description of himself or herself as belonging to that ascribed group. The same holds true
for members of other ethnic groups who define themselves or as viewed by those not
from the group. An ethnic group includes such categories as tribe, nationality, race, and
other identity). The group is generally defined in terms of language, religion, region,
tradition, customs, or other cultural aspects or a multiple coincidence of several social
traits which together or even separately have contributed to deep divisions in a state by
group categorization with each making demands on the state (Ibid). Geertz (1969)
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described the preceding several factors or social traits as primordial (p 109) (or tribal as
an easier understood term) pointing out that they facilitate a collective consciousness that
will not disappear (forever identify members of that group). Primordialism holds that
group attachment and identity, especially in traditional societies (like Guyana or Africa or
China’s control of Tibet) are natural traits that are imbibed from a very young age and
difficult to eliminate even with a process of repression. The strength of these bonds is
subjective and varies with person, time, place, and modernity. They lead to what the
German sociologist Max Weber described as a sentiment of “oneness” or a consciousness
of a kind (1978: 387) that stems from sharing a common geographical space or common
ancestors or some other common linkage like that of being a Portuguese or Chinese or
Indian. And they result in what Frederick Barth (1969) describes as ethnic boundaries
that are socially constructed and reproduced in relation to how the group members see
themselves and are also seen by others. Barth (1969) points out that these boundaries tend
to be subjectively held categories of ascription and identification by the group members.
The boundaries merely serve to differentiate members in terms of "we versus them". So
there are Africans against Indians and vice versa or Africans versus Portuguese and vice
versa. As Prof. Donald Rothchild (1981) posits, people want to belong within and
identify with their group because membership confers symbolic ethnic solidarity as well
as material advantages especially if the group captures or dominates the state. So, for
example, Indians in Guyana rallied around their group when their ethnic leadership (Dr.
Jagan and the PPP) captured political power in 1957 and they benefited from the
dispensation of resources disbursed by the state in farming (KN May 14, 2011).
Similarly, Africans in Guyana rallied to the defense of their group (represented by the
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PNC) when it captured power from 1964 thru 1992 in spite of the many wrongs their
leadership committed (such as the assassination of political opponents, priests, journalists
and others, stifling of dissenting voices, and the establishment of an ethnic apartheid like
dictatorship). The Africans identify with their party and expressed support for it because
of the many rewards and benefits they received from their political ethnic leadership who
were in charge of the affairs of the state (KN Oct 25, 2012).
Generally speaking, ethnic identification becomes a politically charged
phenomenon in ethnically polarized states as it is primarily used to mobilize political
support for leaders when seeking office. Prof. Drummond (1974) finds that “ethnicity is
the ideological focus of Guyanese life and the mainspring of Guyanese thought" with
political leaders relying on it for power. As the Guyana case exemplifies, ethnic political
mobilization is amplified by inter-group competition, by decolonization struggles in a
pluralistic divided society, by efforts of the state to eradicate or marginalize a group’s
(Indian) culture, by an uneven pace of modernization and of urbanization of (Indian and
Amerindian) communities, by discriminatory policy choices from the state (against non
supporters), and by ethnic marginalization (of groups non-supportive of the PNC) (Ibid).
This in turn precipitates groups without power to mount defensive quests for survival and
or counter measures to protect the group from attacks as well as to make demands for
material gains for its members (Ibid). Such offensive and defensive measures could
descend into a cycle of ethnic violence and counter violence for dominance or for
equality as illustrated in the Guyana case. As Drummond (1974) notes, once there is
ethnic favoritism, as practiced by the PNC, there will be a political battle for ethnic
equality and or ethnic supremacy and or counter-predominance over the state inevitably
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leading to ethnic tensions that may degenerate into violence. This makes peace very
fragile as ethnic groups in these nations can easily succumb to the least provocation
throwing the societies into serious conflict and turmoil and impeding development (Ibid;
Geertz: 1969). It leads to the practice of politics on a primordial (or group tribal) level as
opposed to an individual level (of self-interest) as addressed by Geertz (1969). Geertz
(1973) advises that states must not wish away primordial (loyalty) attachments or belittle
them or even deny their reality. He argues that states “must reconcile primordial
attachments with the emerging civil order by divesting them of their legitimizing force ...
by neutralizing the apparatus of the state in relationship to them, and by challenging
discontent out of their dislocation into properly political rather than para-political forms
of expression" (Geertz: 1973: 277). In other words, the state must engage all groups and
attempt to reach a solution to ethnic grievances to avoid conflict by addressing their
legitimate concerns. The state must pursue policies that are neutral – that do not favor any
particular ethnic group but offer rewards to individuals (not groups) based on merit,
skills, ability, qualification, and achievements and their contributions to the state. When
diversity is celebrated and groups are not persecuted, social and economic growth and the
reduction of poverty can follow as more resources can be committed to productive and
social welfare sectors of the economy rather than on security apparatuses. Failure to
respect diversity and treat all groups equitably lead to ethnic tension and violence, which
becomes an impediment to social stability and by extension, economic growth, especially
when particular groups are given preferential treatment by a government or a national
leader, a situation that has been endemic in virtually all multi-ethnic countries,
particularly in Africa. And it has been amply illustrated in Guyana where the PNC gave

- 102 -

preference to its African supporters over all other groups resulting in the other groups
withholding their productivity and leading to a decline in growth.
As the Guyana case study has shown, primordialism (loyalty to the group) is
inescapable and parties tend to address group needs by articulating their concerns and
demands. People generally want to see their own race "on top" even if they themselves
(individually) don’t rise in status or to “the top” position of their group or make economic
advancement. As such, they take measures to promote the interests of their race or of
those whom they see as their own (belonging to their group) against outsiders, a concept
that Van den Berghe (1981) refers to as "ethnic nepotism". And they do so because they
believe ultimately everyone in the group, including themselves, will rise in status and or
receive a fair amount of benefits as long as they are in control of the state. They may
support their group or party even when such support may result in the loss of their own
democratic rights as happened in Guyana (with Africans supporting the PNC) with the
rise of the ethnic dictatorship from 1966 until its demise in 1992, even when Africans
themselves had their individual rights violated along with those of others.
Such ethnic support, according to Van den Berghe (Ibid), appears to be natural or
inherent in human interaction as observed in Guyana and other ethnically bi-furcated
nations. In Guyana, for example, Africans gave tacit support to the PNC dictatorship
(1966 to 1992) because their failure to do so would mean the inevitable rise to power of
the Indian-based PPP, a possibility Afro-Guyanese abhor. Africans supported the PNC
even though the Black dictatorship oppressed not only Indo-Guyanese but also Africans
who faced similar difficulties as Indians in obtaining basic necessities for survival. The
regime violated the dignity and self-respect of the entire nation and almost everyone's
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standard of living declined precipitously. Most Africans, like Indians and people of other
ethnicities, faced a most difficult time in making a living, getting food, and providing for
the well being of their households under a depressed economy faced with shortages of
basic necessities. Yet the Africans supported the oppressive PNC in government and in
opposition just to keep the Indians out of government. Analogously, Indians are not
pleased with the governance of their party and claim that the government has neglected
and discriminated against them since it came to power in 1992. Yet the Indians remain
supportive of the PPP giving it over 90% of its votes. Over this period of time as well as
between 1957 and 1964, African Guyanese never saw (and still do not view the PPP) as
acting in their interests, and they responded negatively to almost every policy of the PPP
that they perceive does not directly favor them including “non-ethnic policies” that
were/are geared towards national development. And when the PNC was in office,
Indians never saw the party as legitimately elected (as it rigged elections) and or serving
their or national interests and as such was not supportive of it and in fact pursued actions
to undermine the PNC regime.
Clearly, political behavior in Guyana lends credence to the “ethnic nepotism
theory” propounded by Prof. Van den Berghe (1981) above in which people support a
government that is of its own kind (however that is defined) and the government in turn is
biased towards its supporters. In Guyana, there was the near total absence of a cohesive
nation building process ever since self-rule was granted in March 1953, suspended
because of a perceived communist threat in October 1953, and restored in 1957. The
Marxist Indian-backed PPP government was sabotaged by the PNC and its African
supporters from 1957 thru 1964 and again from 1992 till now. And the Western-
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imposed, African-backed PNC government was undermined by Indians between 1965
and 1992 thru economic and politically inspired labor strikes and sabotage (arson) of
production in export crops and destruction of government properties (SN Apr 29, 2010;
SN Oct 8, 2009; motherearthtravel.com/history/guyana/history-8.htm). From 1993 thru the
present, the Africans took measures (occupying Georgetown, blocking roads, violent
protests, engaging in labor strikes, etc.) that have disrupted economic activities
preventing the country from realizing its economic potential (Ibid).
The PNC government (1965 thru 1992) neglected and left to decline the
productive sectors (agriculture, in particular which had accounted for over half of the
GDP all throughout colonial rule and till this day) (GT Dec 29, 2014) of the economy that
were dominated by Indians and other ethnic groups not supportive of the PNC (GT Nov
14, 2014; GC March 14, 2014). Forced collectivization of farm produce discouraged
Indians from working the land. Private enterprises (almost all in the hands of Whites and
Chinese) were squeezed out of existence. Agriculture and the business sectors collapsed.
With nationalization of major private owned economic enterprises, some 80% of the
economy fell under government hands. But the state enterprises became very inefficient
unprofitable. Guyana’s products, including bauxite, rice and sugar, which at one time
were marketed in western countries on a preferential basis because of Burnham’s initial
opposition to communism, began to lose its status for preferential prices abroad (during
late 1970s) or were often sold at very low prices to punish Guiana for its nationalization
of foreign owned industries. Unable to find markets for surplus agricultural produce or
primary resources, the government engaged in a system of bartering with the Socialist
bloc countries and even applied to become a member of the Moscow established Eastern
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Trading bloc (SN May 21, 2009). But the products from the Socialist bloc did not find
much favor in Guyana. People sought other illegal (underground) means of acquiring
basic goods to satisfy their tastes thus leading to a flourishing black market trade with
neighboring countries (SN Jan 13, 2008; www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.htm).
When the PPP took charge of the government (1957 thru 1964 and again since
1992), those sectors of the economy (agriculture in particular) that were dominated by
Indians received favorable treatment to resuscitate a collapsing economy that needed life
support and the economy saw a dramatic turnaround. But the Africans and their party, the
PNC, continuously complained that the PPP was just assisting its own supporters instead
of developing the society at large. While it was true that the Indian government directed
resources (such as building infrastructure to assist with rice and sugar production) to
those sectors of the economy where Indians dominated, it did so for pragmatic, and not
ethnic reasons -- those sectors of the economy happened to be the most productive
contributing the largest chunk of the GDP and that were not a drain on the treasury. They
were the main foreign exchange earners providing employment for most Indians and
contributing tens of millions of dollars in tax revenues to the state to meet the huge salary
payments for African workers employed in the public service. The infrastructure for
farm production needed rehabilitation (from their collapsed state) because they were
neglected by the Black government and the PPP administration made the wise decision to
rescue it and save thousands of jobs not only for Indians but for Africans as well – over
half the population dependent on farming for their livelihood (GC March 15, 204; GT
Mar 15, 2014). However, the African opponents of the Indian government vehemently
complained that the PPP government (1957-64 & 1992- present) was aiding their own
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supporters and neglecting the Africans (KN Jul 27, 2014; Sep 2, 2013; Nov 6, May 19,
2011; www.kaiteurnews.com) not dissimilar to when Indians complained that the African
PNC government was servicing its own supporters and neglecting them during its 28
years rule (KN Apr 21, 2013; Jun 16, 2011; Apr 3, 2009; GC May 20, 2014; May 1,
2012; Nov 3, 2011; May 17, 2010; www.guyanachronicle.com). The African labor
unions complained that the PPP aided their Indian affiliated workers and neglected
African union workers when the PPP was (is) in office (KN April 18, 2013). The Indian
affiliated unions complained that the PNC assisted African affiliated workers at the
expense of Indian workers when the PNC was in office (GC, Apr 6, 2014; SN Feb 5,
2013). Analogously, the African union of the bauxite workers accused the PPP of aiding
Indian sugar workers during the PPP’s two stints in office and Indian unions accused the
PNC of financially aiding and servicing bauxite workers and the government bureaucracy
(over 90% Africans) during its 28 years in office (KN May 6, Apr 30, 2013; Aug 15,
2010; SN Jul 21, 2010; GC Apr 5, 2004).
As the preceding examples reveal, people view government policies not in terms
of their merit of what is in the best interests of the nation or how a given policy will aid
development, or is in the national interest, and or will even benefit themselves (the
complainants) (KN Aug 26, 2012). But rather people view policies through an ethnic lens
regarding whether a given policy is good (provides resources) for their larger group or
disadvantageous to them or how a policy can be exploited to build support for an ethnic
cause or of building political support for a party or leader who advocates for their
interests. In conflict ridden societies, people tend to feel (real or imagined) that their
ethnic group that is out of power (out group) is made to suffer by the ruling group in
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power (in group) and is at a disadvantage for resources, jobs, etc. while claiming that the
group favored by the government tends to receive a disproportionate amount of benefits
dispensed by the state at the expense of the out group which has been made “to suffer”
because of the (alleged) biased policies of the regime. Very often, this charge cannot be
substantiated with factual data. But members of out groups hold on to it like the gospel
truth (GC Jun 6, 2012; Aug 24, 2011). Members of in groups and out groups constantly
make charges and counter charges of neglect, marginalization, abuse, and the like. That
has been the nature of ethnic relations and responses to policy making in Guyana since
1957 with the introduction of self-rule.
Section C. Review of Literature on Economy & Guyana:
The literature has concentrated on economic factors in explaining lack of
development. As the literature noted, the British controlled and dominated the colonial
economy as well as its political system throughout the colonial era and shaped its
development or lack thereof to the benefit of England. The economy of the Guianese
colony historically (has) centered on the production of primary products with the mode of
production being largely primitive (mostly manual labor with hardly any mechanization)
during most of the period of colonial control and thru this time. The productive forces
(mode of production) were also not advanced in the colonial era and the colonial
authority determined the relations of production without input from the workers. The
working class entered into relations with the colonial state and the plantation owners
independent of their will. The laborers were completely dependent and subservient to
their colonial masters and were in no position to influence wages in their demands. The
totality of the mode of production and the forces and relations of production constitutes
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the economic structure of the society – that of being a society geared towards producing
wealth for the plantation owners and the empire that controlled the colony (Frank: 1978).
Very little effort was made by Britain and other empires to modernize their colonial
possessions although they did build railroads, roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, some
factories and communication systems that benefited the colonies – but they were
established with the general objective of facilitating their profitable exploitation
(extraction of resources) of the colonies (and creating plum jobs for Europeans) (Galtung:
1971) and not necessarily to develop the colonies which benefited little from these
investments. The colonies remained underdeveloped. In spite of large amounts of foreign
aid, and indeed all the efforts of existing institutions and structures, the former colonies
have remained largely underdeveloped.
As the literature reveals, the modus operandi of the rulers of the colonial powers
and their planter class was profits flowing from the exploitation of the colonies (Mandle:
1973; Rodney: 1981). Thus, they colonized territories and brought different peoples to
exploit the resources of the colonies for the benefit of the empire. The colonists did not
give a hoot about whom (different ethnic groups) they brought to toil the fields or about
the welfare of the imported slaves or indentured laborers, or about the well being of
native people who were displaced, or about those who were kept in bondage, or about the
colony that was being exploited. They were only concerned about the welfare of their
metropolitan center (Frank: 1978, 1966). Colonial possessions were highly prized as they
added to the empire’s wealth. The colonies were a source of important raw materials that
helped to drive development in the empire. The empires, located in Europe, made
virtually no effort to develop or industrialize their colonies to improve the living standard
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of the locals (Galtung: 1971). Developing and enriching the European motherland took
precedence over investment and economic progress in the colonies (Mandle: 1973). They
took almost everything, but primarily raw materials, from the distant colonies that would
be beneficial to and aid the development of the mother country. In addition, the empires
needed the colonies to grow food and other crops to feed their burgeoning population in
Europe where climatic conditions restricted food production. The colonies also provided
a source of employment for the metropolitan empires’ large pool of unemployed (in
England, Spain, France, Holland, etc.). Colonization helped to create employment for the
swollen population in the metropolitan country sending many of them to work in the
colonies. Also, the mother countries benefited with employment of their nationals for the
construction of ships and hiring of sailors and crew and for the bureaucracy and security
personnel needed to administer the colonies. The colonies also helped to feed the
population in the mother country where land was in short supply by growing food that
could be shipped back to Europe (Ibid, Frank: 1978, Rodney: 1981 b).
The colonial masters dominated and exploited the colonies often destroying the
original socio-economic and political structure that they found especially in Caribbean
and Latin American societies (Galtung: 1971). Over a long period of time, the colonists
transformed the colonies into subordinate partners or dependent appendages of what
came to be described by left economists as a new backward looking capitalist structure
and as satellites of the capitalist metropolis to advance the development of the mother
countries at the expense of the poor local societies (Erriah: 2011). A center-periphery
type of relationship was developed and became a model to explain lack of development
in poor countries (Galtung: 1971). This model states that colonies were deprived of
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technology and locally educated personnel leading to a dependency situation in which the
mother country always had to provide succor to them – referred to as center-periphery
dependence (Ibid, Frank 1978, 1966, Beckford: 1972).
As the so-called dependency theorists have argued, the colonies existed for the
benefits of the metropolitan centers (European countries that owned the colonies) and the
colonies were deliberately kept on the periphery of development. The center-periphery
relationship is unequal because the developed nations control prices and terms of trade.
The colonies merely existed as suppliers of raw materials and as markets of finished
products from the developed European centers and long after independence, this source
of dependency remained (Galtung: 1971) and has not changed significantly since the
1970s. Guyana, for example, exported raw materials, though on a preferential basis to
England and the European countries, while importing industrial goods from the
metropolis. In general, developing nations export raw materials and commodities to the
developed nations and import capital and technology (Mandle: 1973, Rodney (1981 a, b).
While the developing countries would have liked to build industries, they were
limited in their financial and technological capacity. It was found that many of the newly
independent countries were forced to borrow capital from the rich countries to finance
local development often at high usury interests which they could ill afford and would
never be able to repay and very often the poor countries pursued inappropriate
development strategies. Over time, they acquired huge debts making them even more
dependent on the rich countries for more borrowing and handouts (Ibid, Erriah: 2011).
These poor countries often pursued wrong headed development objectives and in many
instances, they were instructed or advised by the metropolitan countries to pursue
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development policies (with borrowed capital from the rich) that were inappropriate for
their new nations neglecting their comparative advantages such as agriculture and small
industries that utilize low skill labor to create employment for the large pool of
unemployed. The structure of the colonies became severely distorted so much so that
they began to import food and other basic products that they could have grown or at one
time produced themselves. Thus, the former colonies became even more dependent
appendages to the North countries, shaking off any economic self-sufficiency they once
had or aspired to achieve (Galtung: 1971, Mandle: 1973, Erriah: 2011). Also, in several
newly independent countries, with Guyana being an example, the new (ethnic PNC)
rulers worked in association with the imperialist exploiters they replaced to oppress
(exploit) their own people or to pursue self-enrichment for a selected few while
encouraging their supporters to engage in conflict (Ibid) (SN Oct 13, 2012).
On the above dependency paradigm, some economists felt, especially after
Guyana’s independence, the country, externally, has been at the mercy of the
international capitalist system on trade and foreign aid that has not been favorable (low
prices for exports and higher prices for imports) to Guyana or other poor countries. But
independence barely changed such a condition as the newly independent countries
continue to depend on the former mother country for trade and handouts (Beckford:
1972). Also, Guyana’s underdeveloped internal capitalist structure was (is) continuously
being reinforced by the nature of Guyana's external relations, namely her dependence on
the world economy, particularly the Western economies with which it conducted the bulk
of its trade. Instead of being economically independent that should have resulted from a
break from the mother country, political independence has resulted in an increase in
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political and economic dominance of the former colonies like Guyana by the
metropolitan imperialist nations. No one can dispute that current problems had their
origins in colonial rule with a certain mindset and exploitative economic institutions.
Guyana's external relations and internal conditions, like those of so many other third
world countries, as many economists argue, combine to keep the nation within a cycle of
dependence on the capitalist countries and persistent underdevelopment. So dependency
theorists argue that both colonial practices and economic policies (poorly thought out)
have affected development. Economists (Dacosta, Beckford, Galtung, Grenade, Gafar,
Erriah, Thomas) have noted that the economies of the region have been under the control
of a small dominant (petit bourgeois) class with a dependency on the larger external
markets for survival. The late Lloyd Best referred to the Caribbean as “plantation
economies” that depend on the economic system lay down by the colonial rulers and
unable to transform their economies from the dependency of their former colonial rulers
to attain development (Erriah: 2011). He claimed that Caribbean leaders for the most part
have been myopic and unable to liberate themselves from a mindset attached to their
former colonial masters. Like the colonial rulers, they have perpetuated exploitation of
the societies instead of pursuing radical policies to break their new nation’s cycle of
dependence and exploitation on the European nations (Ibid).
However, Guyana, like most former colonies, found it difficult to break out of the
dependency relationship even some 45 years after independence from England and has
remained poor and backward prompting economist George Beckford (1972) to describe it
and similar societies as being in persistent poverty. Beckford’s study on Caribbean
Economies, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies (1972)
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described Guyana and the other plantation economies of the region as agents of
“persistent underdevelopment” because of their inability to obtain a reasonable level of
development to meet the basic needs of their population. Prof Beckford posits that
Guyana and other governments of the Caribbean region have denied their people a
meaningful role in managing their economy, have created a dependence of decision
making on outside forces in the metropolitan centers rather than accept domestic talent or
train local talent, and have not motivated people to pursue self-sufficiency by producing
to meet local needs or realize developmental goals. Beckford states that the social and
political obstacles of the societies (party competition and race and class
institutionalization) as inherited from the plantation social structure do not make it easy
for development to take place. He notes that the rigid class structure (defined largely by
one’s race and color that may also be tied to occupations and that largely define social
hierarchy) had inhibited social mobility. Beckford also chastises the powerful central
government for not allowing for popular lower level participation in the developmental
processor decision-making. Beckford asserts that there is a strong correlation between
race and class (with the Whites and Mixed/Colored ethnic group controlling most of the
wealth) that creates a kind of caste system (in which people are born into wealth or into
poverty or through inheritance unable to extricate themselves from it) that puts serious
constraints on development. Beckford said that the dependency syndrome, political
issues, social structure (ethnic stratification) and the denial of people of a meaningful role
in governance, when added to the ethnic conflict, have made it even more cumbersome
for a poor country like Guyana to achieve development (see also Grenade: 2011, Dacosta:
2007, 2005, Spinner: 1982).
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On the difficulties of development in newly independent countries, Prof. Walter
Rodney in his classic, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (1981 b), exposed the
insidious nature of European rule in its colonies of establishing a dependency structure to
render them “underdeveloped” and making it very difficult for them to attain
development even when they broke off from the empire and pursued socialist
development. He argued that the European empires, through their capitalist agents,
extracted wealth from the colonies and enriched the metropolitan countries leaving the
newly independent countries impoverished and dependent on the former European
empires with virtually no local capital to pursue development. Other academics before
Rodney also discussed the debilitating role of colonialism and imperialism on
development (Frank: 1978, Galtung: 1971; Williams: 1966). But Rodney went further
than others in making the claim that the empires so exploited their colonies that they left
the societies in an “underdeveloped state” (an institutionalized structure) from which the
colonies found it almost impossible to extricate themselves from dependency and
underdevelopment (Pierce: 1984; Rodney: 1980; GT Jan 7, 2014; Jun 12, 2013).
Rodney and other left wing economists (like Frank, Galtung, Thomas) who have
shared this viewpoint claim that there was a deliberate strategic decision by the empires
to bypass the colonies as sites for adding value (an early process of industrialization) to
the primary products they were producing – necessary for industrialization and expansion
of the capitalist mode of development. Instead value was added to the products (raw
materials) after they were shipped to the metropolitan centers where they were processed
and sold (sometimes back to the colonies in the form of new products). Rodney argued
that through this strategic maneuver of the rulers of the empires, the colonies could not

- 115 -

and would not be in a position to compete in trade with the colonial power for
generations, even long after the colonies were granted “independence”. Thus, they remain
underdeveloped. Also, he pointed out, the structure and position of the former colonies
rendered them dependent on the metropolitan centers for trade, and at any rate, they
lacked the necessary capital to finance development of local industries and the
technology to manufacture products at prices that would enable them to compete with
multinational companies in the metropolitan centers (Erriah: 2011). Thus, the colonies
would remain in an “underdeveloped” state (GT Feb 12, 2014). Some of the constraints
of underdevelopment identified by Rodney, extant in Africa, however, were overcome by
several countries. The economic success stories in Africa like Kenya, Ivory Coast,
Senegal, Gambia, Botswana, among others, and the development of what were once
backward places like Singapore, Malaysia, Barbados, Trinidad, Brunei, Taiwan, etc.
expose some flaws of this Rodneyite theory. All of these countries produced goods and
or services cheaper than and successfully competed against counterparts in the former
empires. Also, while Guyana has remained largely underdeveloped, as have Trinidad,
Senegal, Ghana, among others, some of their industries, under private multinational
control, were (and still are) relatively competitive globally. They were successful at job
creation under colonial rule and remain so today. And under MNCs, the economy grew
and industrial production expanded. Guyana, and indeed most of Africa, has remained
largely underdeveloped though it is questionable whether this was so because of the
thesis put forth by Rodney or because of other factors (Manley: 1982; Mandle: 1973).
No doubt, colonial rule impacted on Guyana’s lack of development as Rodney
and other (labeled the colonial) theorists posited. The economic problems of sluggish or
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negative growth are linked to the inherent nature of the capitalist system that tends to
favor the wealthier countries to the disadvantage of the poorer countries. The poor
countries help the wealthy countries by supplying them with cheap raw materials to
manufacture higher valued products that benefit the economies of the wealthy countries –
the very essence of colonialism. Stagnant development resulted from the capitalist
productive and distributive processes that characterized Guyana internally as a producer
of raw materials and that was supported externally by the imperialist countries (US and
Britain) (Thomas: 1983). These imperial powers foisted the PNC government (December
1964) upon the nation to keep it within the imperialist orbit and out of the hands of the
eastern bloc although the PNC government had proclaimed the nation as “socialist” (KN
Mar 14, 2014). As anti-PNC critics pointed out mere words don’t make one a socialist.
As Pierce (1984) pointed out; the PNC facilitated capitalist (mis) adventures within
Guyana that led to a severe distortion in trade and greater dependency on the imperialist
countries and their banking and international institutions. In fact, Burnham and the PNC
became dependent on the US (CIA) for funding and frequent financial bailouts in order to
keep the Jagan socialists out of power (Ibid; Manley: 1982; Mandle: 1973).
The country’s trade deficits during the 1970s and 1980s were tied to international
prices for commodities, etc. which are imposed from outside by the former colonists and
or by market forces. Declining demand for Guyana’s primary products resulted in low
prices and helped to explain the acute trade imbalance for Guyana (as well as other third
world countries). There had been no lack of explanation for the collapsing state of the
Guyanese economy, especially during the 1970s and 80s, with commentaries coming
from all sides of the political spectrum in the country and the Caribbean region. Such a
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plethora of reaction and commentary is not surprising given how fed up people were of
the regime and their declining quality of life (Erriah: 2011). Commentaries also focused
on how bad government policies led to the country’s economic collapse. That goes
without saying but it does not go into the reasons that caused the government to pursue
wrong-headed policies that impacted on development.
Dependent type industrialization or industrialization by invitation has not brought
about social transformation to societies like Guyana. They largely have remained poor.
Overall, Guyana and other poor countries of Africa did not experience any noticeable
change in their economic situation, and in fact, in the case of Guyana the economy
actually deteriorated. So countries like Guyana and a few in Africa decided to experiment
with non-capitalist path development (NCPD) confident it would transform their society.
The Guyana government pursued a non-capitalist to development (or what was
essentially state sponsored capitalism) that was a complete failure. There is a relative
dearth in research on non-capitalist development in Guyana and its failure. Pierce’s
(1984) work on non-capitalist development in Guyana is a major contribution to the
theory and practice of socialist transformation. Non-capitalist development, or
nationalization of major privately owned industries resulting in government ownership of
the means of production, was a growing trend in the Third World during the 1970s as the
way to experience social revolution. The assumption behind non-capitalist path to
development is it would lead to economic and social liberation and that there would be
only one class (emulating Marxism) – the working class in charge of the society.
Non-capitalist development was an effort in the long struggle against imperialism
and the dependence of poor developing countries on the wealthy countries for economic
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liberation and for the socialist transformation of the underdeveloped countries. These
countries were not in a position to undergo the various stages of development, as
propounded by Marx (1998), to attain communism or socialism (equality, utopia, class
society) because they lacked a developed bourgeois class and a true working class like
the developed countries of Europe to carry out the revolution. In Third World countries
like Guyana, there is little social consciousness among the working class about their
conditions. Thus, they could not be counted upon to make revolution as envisioned by
Marx and they lacked an advanced capitalist class to promote development. They need an
intervening force a la the state to assume control of the economy. It is, therefore, left to
the state to carry out development. But since the state lacks capital, it is forced to purse a
non-capitalist path of development and towards a socialist construction of the society.
Under this theory, there is no need for the bourgeoisie or capitalist development of the
society because the state is playing the role of the bourgeoisie and is pursuing capitalist
development in transition to socialism. As Pierce explained, nationalization of foreign
owned industries is a manifestation of the non-capitalist path to development that will
help to usher in the revolution and the classless society. The theory is based on the
potential that a successful transformation of nationalized industries will serve as an
engine to growth and development for the nation.
Pierce correctly asserts that non-capitalist development, and, a fortiori, socialist
transformation cannot be established without democratic transformation of the society. In
short, non-capitalist development cannot be obtained without democracy. Political
tyranny does not help a country to develop. And if it is an ethnically diverse society,
tyrannical rule would not motivate various groups to support national development
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policies especially non-capitalist development. If democratic practices are not
institutionalized, then the task of constructing a socialist society or pursuing noncapitalist development is almost impossible. There must, therefore, be a consolidation of
the democratic transformation of politics and all aspects of life in the state. Only then will
there be working class gain. Working class participation in all aspect of national life is
key to success of nationalization of any industry. Mass mobilization and mass
involvement in support of the non-capitalist socialist policy are critical for success. Also,
as the Guyana case points out, simply nationalizing industries does not make a ruler or a
regime progressive or socialist. Actions empowering the working class and involving all
progressive forces in decision-making on a socialist model of development actually
determine whether a ruler or government is genuine about building socialism. In such a
society, there should not be class or ethnic inequality or ethnic or political favoritism and
prejudice. Everyone is treated fairly irrespective of race. Unless there is equitable
distribution of resources among the ethnic groups and an end to racial discrimination,
there can be no ethnic harmony and by extension no non-capitalist development;
discriminated personnel will not cooperate in national development plans.
Pierce (1984) examined the nationalization of Guyana’s sugar industry as an
application of the theory of non-capitalist development, dissecting the failure of a noncapitalist path to development. As she concluded, non-capitalist development is very
difficult and virtually no state (Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, etc.) that tried it has achieved
development although some of them had made limited progress and seen slight increases
in the standard of living of the working class. In recent years, all of them, including
Guyana, has denationalized their industries and are achieving higher rates of growth and
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rising standard of living. Pierce noted how ethnic conflict, labor division, lack of
democracy, political persecution, and international forces (conspiracy over pricing of
exports from the third world) led to the failure of the non-capitalist path to development
in Guyana during the 1980s. Guyana was very underdeveloped and lacking basic capital.
It was not ready for non-capitalist development and reeks of many internal
contradictions, not the least of which were authoritarian rule and ethnic conflict. Noncapitalist development has a better chance of success in a homogenous society or one
where there is limited internal contradictions and conflict among groups. Guyana
experimented with non-capitalist development but the chances of success were limited
given that it did not allow for democratic development and widespread participation.
Aside from Prof. Pierce’s study, there are no other works on non-capitalist
development in Guyana. Thus, credit goes to Prof. Pierce for what is an excellent case
study on the objective possibilities of socialist advancement in Guyana or other countries
through nationalization of foreign owned industries. Dr. Pierce’s book illustrates the
typical move of many failed third world countries in their pursuit of socialism with noncapitalist path of development being a transition to attaining national development and
establishment of an equitable classless society.
As Pierce noted, economic development is affected by many factors. Economists
emphasize economic factors. But was it bad economic decision making alone that caused
the economy to collapse or to grow negatively? Don’t’ social and political factors also
affect development and growth. Besides economics, were other factors (like political
policies) also responsible for declining standard of living? One needs to look at noneconomic factors that have an effect on an economy. One such non-economic (social)
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factor is ethnic conflict that is present in almost all multi-ethnic societies. Were ethnicity
(conflict and social discord among the racial groups) and or racially motivated policies
important factors in the relative decline of the economy?

Section D. Review of Literature on Ethnic Conflict & Development
The literature has concentrated on economic factors in explaining lack of
development. But since these economic factors do not appear to significantly hurt the
economy of other countries that have similar characteristics like Guyana, one has to look
at some other non-economic factor (s) that affected development. One such noneconomic factor is ethnic conflict that is present in almost all multi-ethnic societies. But
in the models of economic and political development from which strategies have been
adopted for transformation of third world societies like Guyana, ethnicity has generally
been neglected or underestimated as a factor in development. Scholars are more prone to
examine the lack of capital, entrepreneurial and organizational expertise, infrastructure,
limited potential, etc., all of which have been rightly identified as serious problems
undermining economic development in the third world. Problems associated with
participation in government, democratic governance, power relations, party politics,
mobilization, etc. have been identified as the political problems preventing political and
by extension economic development. The focus on institutional structures, minimum
standards of education, inadequate nutrition, poor maternity care, class conflict, limited
housing, are problems identified as impacting social development. But few scholars or
studies have sought to make a deep, thoughtful, penetrating connection between ethnic
conflict and socio-economic development (Bartels: 1978, Premdas: 1978). Sociologists,
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economists, historians and other social scientists writing on Guyana have not adequately
explored the correlation between ethnicity and economic development in any significant
detail. Some scholars explored ethnicity and political development (Singh: 1988;
Premdas: 1973, 1974, 1978). But most of the scholarly interest on ethnicity as relating to
Guyana has tended to focus overwhelmingly on ethnic discrimination, racism, social
stratification, and social mobility and on the implications of ethnicity on social relations
and domestic politics (Hintzen: 1989). There is a paucity of literature tying economics
(lack of development) with ethnicity although there is a significant amount of literature
on post independence economic policies and on the colonial economy of Guyana and on
the Caribbean region as a whole (societies that have similar economic history and modes
of economies) (Erriah: 2011).
Ethnicity is at the center of politics in divided societies and can lead to serious
economic problems especially when there is ethnic violence. In the literature the study of
ethnic conflict and its effect on the economy has not attracted much attention. Low
investment, low education, lack of resources, scarce capital, lack of technology, and
political instability explain why some countries have problems developing or growing.
But ethnic conflict affects all of the preceding factors. How does ethnicity become
intertwined with or linked to economics and development? According to the so-called
ethnic competition model advanced by Olzak (1982) and Nagel (1984), “ethnic
mobilization is a calculated, rational response to the challenges of modernity to access
economic resources and national attention”. These two scholars argue that life in modern
society revolves around competition for scarce resources (jobs, rising income, credit,
housing, education, market, and other opportunities) that are highly in demand.
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Competition occurs along ethnic lines (because the society is historically divided along
ethnic lines) thereby facilitating the process of ethnic mobilization and open ethnic
conflict. Olzak writes: “To the extent that ethnic populations compete with the majority
or other minority ethnic groups for jobs, the resulting niche overlap leads to ethnic
competition. Under conditions of stable or shrinking resources, this competition leads to
ethnic collective action (an us versus them syndrome)” (1985:76). This description aptly
describes economic and job competition and even the political situation in Guyana where
there is stiff racial competition in all spheres of life (SN Mar 29, 2013).
The recent resurgence of ethnicity (conflict, civil war) around the globe has made
a shambles of development plans and social peace in many third world countries and
even in several countries in the so labeled second world of the former socialist countries
in Eastern Europe where “ethnicity” should not even be an issue in those utopias. Ethnic
assertions and ethno-nationalism have devastated all promising plans for social change
and development that are built on various economic models. The ethnic variable,
neglected by development economists and other scholars, has emerged as a very
important force of change in many third world societies and cannot be dismissed as an
unimportant or non-factor in social change (Young: 1993; Stavenhagen: 1991; Smith:
1981). The ethnic variable must now be incorporated in explanations on lack of
development and in the design of new strategies for development (SN Aug 4, 2014).
A general examination of the limited literature on economic development and
ethnic conflict identifies two broad schools of thought about the relationship between
these variables. One school, identified with and attributed to the left, prevalent during the
decolonization struggle of the 1950s and 1960s and immediately after independence, held
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that economic development would inevitably reduce the potential for violent ethnic
conflict – my description of it as ethnic conflict reduction through development. The
argument of this model was based on the belief that colonial rule held back development
and growth, and with independence, economic growth would be rapid with the resulting
benefits diffused throughout all levels of society benefiting everyone regardless of
ethnicity. As quality of life gets better over time, ethnicity would disappear since people
are concerned about their own and their family’s well being rather than their ethnic
background. People would be more interested in raising their standard of living rather
than focusing on issues relating to ethnicity and culture. This school of thought -- ethnic
conflict reduction through development -- argues that the rise in standard of living would
shift focus away from ethnic issues and ethnic consciousness and towards their own
progress to attain a better quality of life (Hope: 1985). Also, economic development and
ever-rising standard of living would cause people to see issues in (country) nationalist
terms (what is best for the nation) and not from a more insular ethnic (ethno-nationalist)
perspective. Proponents of this school of thought (ethnic reduction through development)
included radical Marxist scholars as well as mainstream political thinkers and
developmental economists and even politicians who sought office to replace the
departing British and who did not want to upset the status quo with new ideas to address
ethnic conflict (Hintzen: 1989). However, during the first decade of independence
(1960s thru mid 1970s), empirical observations and economic data reveal that most new
states did not experience a burst in economic activities although they did experience
some growth (SN Aug 20, 2009). In addition, ethnic conflict did not subside as expected
over time and in fact worsened because the group in charge of the states hogged most of
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the resources for its members (Glasgow: 1970). While the new multi-ethnic states did not
immediately explode in ethnic conflicts, as the theoreticians predicted, ethnic tensions did
remain high and the groups made demands for equity and respect (Hope: 1985), Hechter:
1995). Also, in virtually all of the multi-ethnic states, political movements in the postindependence period have remained largely racially polarized with ethnically based
parties and or ethnic organizations placing unreasonable demands on the state. Rising
ethnic tensions in many of the new nations, especially in Guyana, and full-blown ethnic
civil wars in some, raised doubts about the arguments made by advocates of this school
of thought (conflict reduction through development). Since independence, there has not
been adequate development or decline in ethnic rivalry or an end to race based political
mobilization as argued by the so-called radical or Marxist theorists. If anything, the states
have become more ethnically polarized with an even more ethnically intense competition
for power by the political parties that remain almost exclusively ethnic (SN Oct 23, 24,
2013; May 22, 201)(see also www.systemicpeace.org/conflicttrends.html).
A second and more relevant school of thought on ethnic conflict and development
is the opposite of the ethnic reduction model discussed above. It is what is labeled as the
ethnic persistence model constructed by the Guyanese scholar and popular newspaper
columnist Dr. Ravi Dev (www.kaieteurnews.com Apr 21, 2013; Aug 26, Mar 25, Jan 15,
Jan 13 2012; Dec 18, Dec 4, Nov 27, Sep 25, 2011; Nov 23, Jun 25 & May 18, 2008). He
posits that ethnicity would not disappear even if there were economic growth, rising
standard of living and expanded development – what is termed as the ethnic persistence
model. It is noted that when the economy grew, or has grown, competition between the
groups did not (or has not) decrease (d). Rather demands on the state for more resources
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increased and even when the resources were given, through ethnic appeasement or
otherwise, the antagonists (the ethnic group opposed to the government) found excuses to
engage in violence. The advocates of this ethnic persistence school of thought note that
ethnicity provides people with an identity that they are not willing to easily trade for
benefits from the state or for higher standards of living or for selective perks. They are
committed to cultural autonomy and an equitable share of the patrimony of the state. The
model suggests that ethnicity actually transcends other goals and people are not prepared
to lose their identity just for small material benefits. Ethnic or cultural identity is very
important to people and they are not so easily willing to dispense with their ethnic
background that is tied to their history as a people. They are more interested in the well
being of the entire group (in addition to themselves) and not just themselves.
Consequently, they do not feel fulfilled with self-gratification, self-benefits and state
handouts (ethnic tokenisms) unless those benefits are available to the entire group. They
want state policies that allow for self-perpetuation of the group and cultural autonomy
enabling them to hold on to their cultural practices and identity and not just individual
benefits. They live for the overall welfare of their group subscribing to a concept of ‘all
for one and one for all’ not themselves (Rothchild: 1996). People would like to see their
own individual position improve but they also hold a sense of loyalty to their group.
Thus, people will or tend to rally behind political organizations that (or leaders who) they
perceive to be advocating for or representing the interests of members of their own ethnic
group or delivering resources to their group (Richardson: 1996). People support the
“survivability” of their group tying their personal fate with that of the entire group and
thus rally behind ethnic leaders or organizations (ethnic parties like PPP, PNC, UF in
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Guyana) for solidarity and or protection (Hechter: 2000, Gurr: 1994; Patterson: 1975).
The literature on ethnicity shows that the possibility of inter-group conflict is
greater when groups view their position in society in structural (systemic) as opposed to
individual terms – the group is more important than the person. And as this “Ethnic
Persistence” school of thought suggests, the entire ethnic group will have to be appeased
with handouts in order to silence the bulk of the membership of the group and not just a
few of its members (labeled as ethnic tokenism) as politicians learn the hard way by
attempting to buy out a few ethnics to quiet the rest of their kin. And no amount of ethnic
brutalization repression, as the world learn from the experiences of Stalin and Hitler,
regarding the persecution of minorities in the USSR and Germany, can wipe out the
ethnic and cultural persistence of a group (Patterson: 1983). Even fascist Japanese
repression of Koreans and other ethnic groups in Asia could not succeed at getting groups
to abandon their ethnicity. As experiences have illustrated in so many societies, ethnicity
has persisted everywhere through wars, genocide and ethnic cleansing (Hechter: 2000).
Advocates of this ethnic persistence school of thought argue that economic
development policies alone would not pacify an ethnic group or encourage its members
to subsume their ethnicity to the state. The group has to directly benefit from the policy,
accept it as beneficial to them and share in its implementation. The advocates of this
school argue that policies relevant to "maintaining political stability" (democratic and
inclusive governance and not repressive policymaking) must be delicately executed in
multi-ethnic communities especially where one group dominates the society. The other
(subordinated) groups must be treated with special care to appease their members so they
do not feel they have been deliberately hurt (neglected or marginalized) by state policies.
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Efforts to liquidate them or to force an alien culture upon them will not work (Hechter:
1995). Once satisfied that they have not been marginalized or hurt by state policymaking,
members of an ethnic will not partake in or give support to activities that breed ethnic
conflict with other groups (Ibid). Thus, political stability will ensue allowing for
investment that promotes economic development leading to rising standard of living.
This second school of thought (ethnic persistence), as opposed to the first one
(ethnic reduction through development) that suggests that ethnicity will disappear over
time, says ethnicity will not disappear even if peoples’ income and standard of living
rises because of ethnic loyalty. This second school of thought offers a more relevant
explanation of the persistence of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in developing countries like
Guyana, Trinidad, Surinam, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, among others
(www.ethnonet-africa.org/pubs/p95emeka.htm). This phenomenon relates to many other
nations even developed ones such as Belgium, Turkey, Spain, Canada, and former or
current socialist countries like the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Ukraine and China.
Ethnicity has persisted in many of these countries in spite of higher income or rising
standard of living or in spite of repressive measures (like Russification, Chineseization,
Serbianization, Turkishization, Burnhamization, Baathization, Japanization, etc.)
including genocide (wiping other large numbers of people) or to strip entire ethnic groups
of their cultural and ethnic identity (as for example what the Japanese did to Koreans by
seeking to erase the Korean language, names and ethnic identity or attempted to do in
Indonesia and other East Asian societies). As such, ethnicity cannot be lightly dismissed
or be swept under the carpet as if it will disappear on its own over time or with
Burnhamization (repressive, racist genocidal and ethnic cleansing policies of the PNC
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dictatorship particularly under Burnham to suppress dissidence and ethnic groups
opposed to the illegal PNC regime). Instead, ethnicity must be addressed and understood
to find a workable solution so that diverse groups in a society can live and work in
harmony. And in Guyana, although the conflict has been confined largely between the
two major ethnic groups, Indians and Africans, there are several minorities, all of whom
were at one time or another victims of ethnic domination by the ruling dispensation (PNC
or PPP) and at times had to choose sides for their own survival (SN Aug 19, 2009).
Ethnic consciousness has persisted among all the groups and they are clamoring for
(more) resources and a (significant) role in governance. They are even prepared to
sabotage the economy to get a fair share of the resources. Thus, officials cannot pretend
that ethnicity will disappear with time even among small minorities.

Section E. Impact of Ethnic Conflict on Guyana’s Development:
Does ethnic conflict affect Guyana’s (or any other nation’s) ability to develop?
Guyana obtained political independence in 1966 but not before the colony experienced
violent racial conflict between Indians and Africans12 (SN Jun 22, 2013, Dec 10, 2009)
that left thousands dead and wounded, with psychological trauma, and huge amounts of
12 Indians (the majority race) and Africans (the minority race) are the major racial groups in
Guyana. There are also a few ethnic minorities – Whites, (Portuguese, British), Coloreds or
Mixed races, Chinese and Amerindians. Indians constitute approximately 51% of the total
population and tend to support the PPP while Africans who make up about 31% of the population
tend to identify with the PNC (Table p ix). The other races make up the rest of the population of
approximately 750,000. The Indians and Africans have been the primary groups involved in
ethnic conflict over control of the state. They are the main contenders for political power. And
since 1955, the two major ethnic groups, as indeed the others, have supported a political party or
organization or force that they have perceived to represent their interests or ethnic group. Two
major political parties have shaped and dominated Guyana's political development since adult
suffrage was granted in 1953, the People's Progressive Party, founded by Cheddi Jagan (an
Indian who considered himself to be a Marxist), and the People's National Congress (PNC)
founded by Forbes Burnham (an African who viewed himself as a moderate socialist but who was
an ally of Britain and the U.S) (www.inthesetimes.com/article/6309/guyanas_post-colonial_plight).
- 130 -

financial losses due to damage of private and government property, infrastructure and
crops, among other effects. It also triggered capital flight and stifled investment causing
the economy to contract instead of expanding as other nations did. In examining the data
and applying empirical observations, it would seem that ethnic conflict has directly
affected economic development. Consider as an example, a labor union comprised of
members of one particular race like GAWU (an Indian sugar workers union) or BGLU
(An African industrial union) or GPSU (an African Public Service workers union). Such
an ethnic union can and in fact did engage in political strikes designed to bring down (SN
Aug 13, 2010) or embarrasses the government of the day controlled by members of the
other race. Such political or racially motivated labor strikes will inevitably affect
productivity and as such economic growth and standard of living (KN Jun 26, 2013; Sep
26, 2010: Horowitz: 1985; https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0810879883).
Consider as another example, a government (controlled by members of one race)
denies or limits resources to a particular industry (say like sugar or rice or bauxite)
critical to the economy in order to effect political (or racial) retribution because it is
controlled by members from the other race (sugar and rice are controlled by Indians and
bauxite by Africans) or because this industry employs mostly individuals from a race
(Indians do not support the ruling PNC and Africans do not support the PPP) that does
not support the ethnic party in power (KN Jul 7, 2011, Nov 9, 2009). As in the example
above, such an ill-conceived state policy will have a negative impact on productivity as
the ethnic group (Indian) may withdraw their labor and therefore such an act will have
serious effects on growth rates, development and every aspect of the standard of living of
the country (Ibid; SN Jul 29, 2009)( see also en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Guyana).
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Or consider yet a third example of a racially-polarized country like Guyana, in
which a government allocates most of its resources in areas where its supporters
(Africans) live and neglects the infrastructure development of areas (Indian communities)
which tend to support the opposition. Again, as in the preceding two examples, the
affected group will not be motivated to contribute to work hard towards development and
may withhold labor and productivity. This will result in negative impact on revenues,
foreign exchange, growth, development, etc. As another example, consider if the
bureaucracy of a nation is of one ethnic group (African in the case of Guyana) and the
government of another ethnic group (Indian). The bureaucracy may not wish to cooperate
with the perceived Indian government (Lutchman: 1972). The result would be stagnation
and lack of development. All of the preceding examples characterize the direction of
policy making in Guyana over the last five decades (KN Feb 22, 2013; SN Jul 29, 2009).
In Guyana, there has been the near total absence of a cohesive nation building
process. Self-rule was granted briefly in 1953 with the coming together of the races for
national development. But the government was toppled later that year because of a
perceived communist threat to the status quo colonial order, and as such development
was stymied. When the constitution was suspended, the newly installed government was
unable to effect any meaningful economic change or bring rival ethnic groups together to
build a nation of shared prosperity because the dominant British kept them divided to
serve its financial interests. Constitutional rule was restored in 1957, but the society
became more divided. Since 1957, with the British granting self-rule, the groups have
been at each other’s throats ready to cut down each other. Since 1957, policymaking
seems geared (with charges from both major groups) to benefit primarily the ethnic group
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that backs the party in office while the opposing group has been doing everything to
undermine the success of the policies of the government. The Marxist Indian-backed PPP
government was sabotaged by the PNC and its African supporters from 1957 thru the end
of 1964 and again from October 1992 till now. And the Western-imposed, Africanbacked PNC government was undermined by Indians between 1965 and 1992 thru
economic and politically inspired labor strikes and sabotage of production in (primarily)
export crops and destruction of government properties to weaken its hold on office. From
October 1992 thru now, the Africans, led by the PNC, at various times, have undertaken
measures (such as occupying Georgetown, blocking roads, engaging in violent protests,
attacking Indians and others, committing ethnic murders, among other depraved acts) at
various periods that have disrupted economic activities preventing the country from
realizing its economic potential (KN Dec 22, 2013).
The PNC government (1965 thru 1992) neglected and left to decline the
productive (commodified) sectors (agriculture, in particular which had accounted for over
half of the GDP between all through colonial rule and till this day) of the economy that
were dominated by Indians (KN Jun 30, 2010). When the PPP took charge of the
government (1957 thru 1964 and again since 1992), those sectors of the economy
(agriculture in particular) that were dominated by Indians received favorable treatment to
resuscitate a collapsing economy that needed life support and that were vital for the
economic recovery of country. When in opposition, the Africans and their party, the
PNC, complained that the ruling PPP was assisting its own supporters by favoring
agriculture. While it was true that the Indian government directed resources (such as
building infrastructure to assist with rice and sugar production) to those sectors of the
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economy where Indians dominated, it did so for pragmatic, and not ethnic, reasons -those sectors of the economy happened to be the most productive and that were not a
drain on the treasury and they were the sectors where Guyana enjoyed a comparative
advantage. Also, they were the main foreign exchange earners providing employment for
most Indians and contributing tens of millions of dollars in tax revenues to the state to
meet the huge salary payments for African workers employed in the public service. In
effect, Africans were the direct beneficiaries of government intervention to rescue
agriculture. The infrastructure for farm production needed rehabilitation (from their
collapsed state) because they were neglected by the Black government and the PPP
administration pursued a wise policy to rescue it to save thousands of jobs not only for
Indians but for Africans as well because many Africans were employed in the service
sector of the agro industry (GC Mar 16, Mar 12, 2014; KN Aug 8, 2011).
So although Africans were actually beneficiaries of assistance under PPP
governance (1957-64) on farming of low cost food production (SN Oct 1, 2013), the
African opponents of the Indian government vehemently complained that the PPP
government was aiding its own Indian supporters and neglecting the Africans (GC Mar
14, 2014; Feb 11, 2010). This is similar to the instance when Indians complained that the
African PNC government (December 1964 to 1992) was servicing its own supporters and
neglecting the Indians during its 28 years rule (SN Sep 10, 2013). Analogously, leaders
of African labor unions constantly complained (SN Jul 23, 2014; Dec 17, 2009) the PPP
aided their Indian affiliated union workers (sugar industry) and willfully neglected
African union workers (in bauxite industry) when the PPP was (is) in office.
Specifically, the African union of the bauxite workers accused the PPP of aiding Indian
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sugar workers during the PPP’s two stints in office, and analogously, Indian unions
accused the PNC of aiding bauxite workers during its 28 years in office and neglecting
farm workers. Analogously, the Indian affiliated unions of the PPP complained that the
PNC assisted African affiliated workers at the expense of Indian workers when the PNC
was in office (SN Feb 5, 2013; Nov 27, 2009).
As the preceding examples reveal, people view government policies not in terms
of their merit but in terms of ethnicity. Groups don’t view policies according to what is
in the best interests of the nation or that a given policy will aid national development, is
in the national interest, and will even benefit them (the complainants). But rather the
ethnic groups view every policy through ethnic lens – members of a group are convinced
that a given policy is disadvantageous to them and beneficial to their ethnic nemesis. In
these conflict ridden plural societies (Rabushka: 1972; Cross: 1971), people feel their
ethnic group (out group) is made to suffer by the group in power (in group) and is at a
disadvantage for resources while claiming that the group favored by the government
tends to receive a disproportionate amount of benefits dispensed by the state at the
expense of the other groups (Bonacich (1980, 1972; SN May 22, 2010).
Ethnic conflict in Guyana has become a political dinosaur that has been difficult
to tame much less to defeat or lay to rest because of outrageous (far-fetched and at times
unsubstantiated) ethnic claims. As many writers on Guyana have noted, virtually every
Guyanese is involved in the vortex of race – that is, they are living, breathing and
thinking race with many crying racism and racialism for almost everything they feel is
against them even when, objectively speaking, no racism or racialism exists or is
intended (SN Oct 8, 2013; Sep 10, 2013). Empirical observations reveal that many
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individuals and some ethnic organizations and the two major political parties, the PNC
and PPP, have been engaged in racism (racialist practices) because of their hatred for
members of other ethnic groups who are supportive of another party than theirs (SN Oct
1, 2013). They have engaged in these practices even when these are against the interests
of themselves or their groups or organizations or party (SN Aug 10, 2010; Nov 22, 2007).
The PNC, for example, practiced racism between 1965 and 1992) even when it
recognized such policy would negatively impact on the economy and severely hurt its
supporters. But the PNC was obsessed with punishing and repressing Indians regardless
of the consequences (SN Oct 25, 2007).
So embroiled and conscious is the population in race matters that people see
nothing but “a racial tint” in virtually every endeavor and they often make incredulous
claims and statements about matters they feel affect themselves or their group (SN Oct 8,
2013, Oct 1, 2013; KN Jan 18, 2012; SN Sep 24, 2010) (see also SN Sep 10, Apr 20,
2013). Even the issuance of a parking ticket, a police detainment or an arrest of a criminal,
simply purchasing goods at a market, a civil servant dispensing service, or some other
routine activity can lead to charges of racial discrimination and prejudice depending on the
background of the persons involved and the event -- the consumer, vendor, traffic officer,
vehicle owner, and police officer, civil servant, among other personnel – whether they are of
different ethnicity. With the attendant and the recipient of service, each being of different
ethnicity, it can and often leads to charges and counter charges of discrimination.
Racial talk is inescapable in Guyana and is often encouraged by ethnic leaders. And
the leadership of every group feels its complaints and demands have merit and are
legitimately made and should be resolved its way with no or little compromise. Relations
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are extremely poisoned with racial divisiveness so much so that people view “the other”
with suspicion and they fail to recognize or acknowledge the decency and humanity of
someone who is of a different ethnicity. The other race is (or their members are) of little
worth in their eyes. People tend to despise and disrespect members of the other races.
This renders the state almost ungovernable as people from one ethnic group do not want
to be governed by members of another ethnic group and take measures to create political
instability until they get their way. This obsession with race and actions relating thereof
have posed a serious impediment for nation building and economic development of Guyana
since the mid 1950s when a multi-racial political movement attempting to unite the working
classes from among the various ethnic groups against British colonial exploitation
colonialism collapsed. Racial problems had always been part of the society ever since
different racial groups were brought in to work on the sugar plantations post slavery (late
1830s). But racial conflict was never as pronounced as it was after the collapse of the multiracial movement of the mid-1950s during the initial struggle for political independence.
Political discord and ethnic turmoil have reigned supreme since the mid 1950s
after the (British-American) toppling of the multi-ethnic government (SN Apr 3, 2008;
Rabe: 2004). From then onwards, the nation has failed miserably to realize its economic
potential as the different ethnic groups have competed to dominate the state rather than to
cooperate with each other for national progress and development. Since the collapse of the
multi-ethnic movement of 1950s, there have been perennial ethnic squabbles often
accompanied by ethnic violence. As a result, growth and development have been stymied
resulting in a relatively low standard of living compared with similar developing countries
that are not plagued with such deep ethnic conflict (SN Apr 21, 2011).
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Ethnic conflict will impact on the ability of almost any society to develop or
transform itself economically or socio-politically. In the Guyana context, and indeed in
many multi-ethnic states, politics and economics are interrelated and indeed revolve
around ethnicity. In these types of societies, economics cannot be divorced from politics
because the two subject matters are intertwined and policy makers are cognizant of how
their economic decisions can impact on political support and vice versa. Politicians in
Guyana (as well as in other heterogeneous societies) are hell bent on pursuing policies
that tend to consolidate their base (directing resources to benefit their followers) and or to
increase their support. At the same time, they may be seeking to weaken support of their
ethnic competitors (other parties) and or to punish members of other ethnic groups so as
to discourage them from supporting a competing party or to attract some members (ethnic
tokens) of the other group (SN Nov 17, 2009). In the Guyana case, ethnic or racial
groups are in conflict over control and dominance of the state with the ruling party
(especially the PNC between 1965 and 1992) penalizing members of the other ethnic
groups who also are members of opposing ethnic parties (GT Mar 14 & 15, 2014).
Burnham failed to recognize that his nationalization policy limited his ability to
keep promises made to his political base to reward them with resources and a higher
standard of living. He wanted to teach the other ethnic groups a lesson for not supporting
him in elections and governance and was unconcerned whether his racist policy would
result in the wrecking of the economy. Productivity and revenues declined after
nationalization and Burnham was not able to provide a higher standard of living to his
supporters beyond what they enjoyed during colonial time or fulfill his promises to
provide higher paying jobs to all of his people. Every White, Indian and Chinese
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(Amerindians did not support Burnham because he used soldiers against them) and some
of the wealthy Coloreds who joined Burnham during the pre-independence era to keep
out Jagan from office expressed regret and abandoned Burnham within his first term in
office (www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.htm). They complained he was a
racist whose policies were designed to benefit only his supporters and calculated to hurt
others by taking over their properties and marginalizing their culture. And as the nonPNC supporters withdrew their participation in economic activities, productivity and
revenues needed to sustain jobs for PNC supporters declined. Burnham and the PNC
failed to understand that business is the “engine of growth” and one has to create wealth
before you can redistribute it. Government owned corporations were not creating wealth
and in fact were sucking wealth out of the country hurting PNC supporters as well. In
Economics, it is well established that as wealth is created, the business tide would help to
lift the boats of the working class and poor, government supporters included, to a higher
level thus spreading prosperity not realized under the PNC’s nationalization policy.
Economic statistics (World Bank Annual Tables) (SN Jun 25, 2009; Aug 19, 2010)
revealed huge losses under government ownership of businesses (mid-1970s thru 1992)
in contrast to what occurred to the same corporations under private ownership prior to
their nationalization. The PNC policy of ethnic favoritism had a significant impact on the
economy in which groups withdrew their labor when discriminated. As the Guyana case
has illustrated, politics and economics are intertwined and they need to be explained in
terms of racial conflict (that has been taking place over the struggle for political control
of the state) (SN Aug 9, 2013; Dec 10, 2009) (www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_economy;
www.safehaven.com; oll.libertyfund.org/quotes/350; KN May 5, 2009; Feb 4, 2013).
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Chapter 5: Ethnic Domination and Decline in Standard of Living:
The leaders and members of the two major racial groups, Indians and Africans,
have advocated for control and domination of the state and attendant economic benefits
that follow for their group – not the sharing of power via an inclusive government and the
distribution of resources in a manner that would benefit all relatively equitably (Spinner:
1980). Politics in Guyana since 1957 has been contested over the capture and control of
the organs of the state. This led to intense political competition between the two major
parties, PPP and PNC, with intermittent violence especially during elections time
between members of the two major ethnic groups. The political battle has had serious
ramifications on the economy. Political competition in Guyana is in reality a competition
for ethnic control of the state irrespective of the consequences of the conflict on the
economy and well being of the society. As such, nation building and development has
been a total failure primarily as a result of the ethnic conflict (SN Aug 31, 2011).
The different ethnic groups have been locked in battle since early colonial times
and have looked at each other on every issue through the prism of race with jaundiced,
prejudiced eyes and with deep feelings of mistrust unwilling to work together for national
development in the united effort to take the nation forward (SN Nov 9, 2013; Sep 3,
2010; Jan 20, 2010). And in many instances, the groups pursued measures that would
hold back development such as sabotaging industries or engaging in strikes or remaining
unproductive at state agencies because they did not want the “ethnic” government to
succeed in its economic policy which might benefit the opposing ethnic group (Hintzen:
1989; KN Jan 9, 2013).
Just before independence, when Indians were in control of the state (1957-64),

- 140 -

Indians were committed to and worked productively for the development of the nation to
help their hero Dr. Jagan succeed in his socio-economic and political goals. In contrast,
Africans undertook actions to disrupt and undermine the economy staging strikes and
violent protests and engaging in arson to sabotage industries and bring down the PPP
government (Seenarine: 2006). After independence, in opposition, Indians (and the other
ethnic groups that were marginalized by the PNC) gradually withdrew their full
participation in economic activities at the urging of their political parties and leaders. The
Indians did not want to assist a Black PNC regime especially since Blacks conspired with
external powers to force their Jagan government out of office in 1964 (Ibid, KN Jan 4,
2010). As the PNC government consolidated its power through electoral fraud in 1968, it
no longer needed the support of the ethnic minorities aligned with the United Force party
to govern. The PNC jettisoned the Whites, Chinese and Amerindians with whom the
PNC had formed an alliance (through the UF) to topple the Indian communist PPP from
office. Upset with election rigging that denied them political representation, and dumped
by the PNC, the minorities (Chinese, Portuguese and Amerindians) turned against the
PNC regime. The Amerindians rebelled in the hinterland (Rupununi region) in an effort
to form their own nation but were crushed by the Black army (GC Sep 24, 2009; Sep 30,
2011; SN Feb 15, Jan 18, 2009).
The PNC, supported by the military and police, and the PPP (though in less
oppressive ways) with its ethnic majority ruled like medieval dictators undoing many of
the gains made during colonial rule. The PNC took away the peoples’ voting rights
reversing ballot gains made earlier from the colonial masters. The PPP had an in built
majority of parliament by virtue of the racial arithmetic of an Indian majority, and as
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such, it did not need to engage in election chicanery to retain power as the PNC did. The
PNC usurped the peoples’ right to vote forcing them to sign a proxy authorizing party
agents to vote for them; when the people refused to authorize a proxy, the PNC voted for
them anyway (KN Sep 10, 2012). The working class was treated like medieval peons
while the governing Afro-Saxon PNC elite behaved like medieval European overlords.
The PNC used the security forces to deal harshly against those who advocated political
demands for gender and ethnic equality, cultural autonomy, and freedom of the press.
The PNC crushed all efforts at reform. Reformers were harassed and intimidated and
some like Prof. Walter Rodney and Father Bernard Darke (SN May 2, 6, & 7, 2014) were
even killed; dissidents were frequently picked up by police and kept in dungeons or
beaten by goons to accept the government line. Many Guyanese migrated to escape
extreme hardship and turmoil at home and to benefit from better economic opportunities
in other societies. The country became almost depleted of skilled personnel to work in
industries or to service the population. And not surprisingly, there was very little or
negative economic growth whereas those countries where Guyanese migrated grew (KN
Jul 28, 2014; Jul 7, 2011; SN Jan 20, 2010)
The Portuguese and Chinese contributed significantly to growth in Guyana. But
the PNC decided to hit the Chinese and Whites where it would hurt them the most – their
business operations as they had controlled the bulk of the economy (GC Nov 14, Mar 15,
2014; KN Nov 4, 2014, GT Nov 14, 2014) and dominated trade (imports as well as
exports) as well as the distribution of goods within the country. The PNC decimated the
private sector (KN Jan 7, 2015). The PNC decided to take over foreign owned businesses
as well as to regulate and control virtually all aspects of the economy including trade and
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foreign currency transactions, bringing almost the entire economy under state ownership.
The Chinese and Whites, who had historically dominated most of the manufacturing, big
mining operations, trading and local business activities, became powerless as their
economic power withered under the PNC which they had trusted to protect them against
the threat of a communist PPP takeover (KN Sep 26, 2010). Gradually, the Chinese and
Whites reduced productivity output and business operations resulting in retrenchment of
workers and inevitably a decline in revenues to the state. Most of the wealthy Chinese
and Whites would eventually pack up during the 1970s and migrate with their capital,
thus depriving the country of their management skills and money for investment. Not
long after the Chinese and Whites emigrated, the Indians (who had dominated the retail
and other small business activities and agriculture) would follow suit. The Indians cut
back on their farming and economic activities and began emigrating in large numbers
during the 1970s resulting in a reduction in food availability, investments and
management staff crippling the state controlled economy (KN Dec 22, 2013). The state
sector had become top heavy and inefficient and was a debilitating drain on the economy.
The state sector was such a monstrosity that it never inspired profitability (Mandle: 1978;
KN Apr 17, 2011). The business and managerial (professional and educated) classes felt
they could not stay in the country because they could no longer profit from their
traditional skills and were forced to compromise their integrity to serve political masters
so they can remain in business (KN Dec 10, 2013; Dec 1, 2013). Those who were at one
time contributing productively to the economy migrated taking their capital and skills
with them (KN Jun 18, 2009). This has hurt the entire economy as jobs could not be
created and wages fell drastically leading to a dip in GDP. This resulted in a sharp
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decline in capable managerial staff to run the economy and there were not sufficient
government supporters to fill the void. The middle and working classes, feeling the pinch
of lower salaries, and having to compromise on professionalism, also began to migrate in
the late 1970s to be followed later on by even the lower class (1980s) to escape a life of
poverty thus drastically reducing the pool of labor for economic activities to engender
growth and development (KN Aug 2, 2013; Aug 6, 2009; Jun 13, 2009).
On the issue of migration, almost everyone with some kind of productive skill
gave up on the country and migrated – teachers, lawyers, nurses, doctors, engineers,
electricians, masons, plumbers, & other professionals (KN Apr 15, 2014; Jul 7, 2011).
For example, during the early 1970s, out of a population of less than 800,000, some 5,000
were migrating annually (KN Aug 31, 2011). But in the late 1970s, the number doubled
to some 10,000 migrating a year. During the 1980s, the number zoomed past 20,000 a
year and the 1990s saw 30,000 migrating annually. The new century has seen a further
35,000 migrated annually (KN Feb 12, 13, 2013). That means the country was losing
about 3% of its population annually and helps to explain why Guyana’s population
growth was negative or constant during the 1980s till the present at about 800,000. Prof.
Simona Vezzoli, a Research Officer attached to the University of Oxford, found that in
1960 Guyana had a meager migration rate of six per cent – 6% of the population born in
Guyana lived overseas mostly in England. But by 2010, a whopping 56 per cent of people
born in Guyana lived overseas, mostly in North America (KN Apr 15, 2014). This trend
was not surprising. The US Embassy reported that during the 1980s thru 2000s, Guyana
used up its maximum of 20,000 resident visas a year that did not include visitors, students
and back trackers (migrating illegally). Large numbers estimated at over 10,000 annually
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also migrated to Canada where many (particularly Indians) applied for and received
refugee status during the 1980s. These numbers in the family reunification or
professional class categories did not include the thousands of illegals who made their way
to North America every year or those thousands who escaped to neighboring countries
(Venezuela, Brazil, Surinam, French Guiana) and the Caribbean islands annually. (St.
Lucia, St. Kitts, Antigua, St. Martin, Aruba, etc. are reported to have over 12,000
Guyanese. And Trinidad has over 40,000 Guyanese). The CIA Fact Book (2009) stated
that net emigration (leaving Guyana) in 1998 was estimated to be about 1.4 percent of the
population, and in 1999, this figure totaled 1.2 percent – a brain drain with the best talent
seeking foreign shores contributing to the development of those countries (see Table p
ix). The World Bank statistics in 2010 revealed that 84 percent of Guyanese with tertiary
education migrated (KN Feb 12, 13, 2013). It also noted that birth rates have not been
keeping pace and with rising death rates, the population has been growing negatively
since the 1980s. Due to heavy emigration, Guyana’s population is barely growing (or is
growing negatively). With heavy emigration of Guyanese tertiary graduates (89 percent
of who work in OECD countries, not the home economy) technology development is
lagging”. (Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators and computation using
IMF Public Notice no. 07/53 CAS Code: 11S2) (KN Jul 9, 2013).
In Guyana, the ethnic groups showed that they were not and have not been
prepared to work collaboratively to help develop a country under the control of an ethnic
group that political opponents have felt discriminated against them. Members who
claimed to be victims of discrimination during PNC rule between 1966 and 1992 chose to
migrate rather than subject themselves to the humiliation of constant persecution by a
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racist regime. In Guyana, clearly, the ethnic groups (in opposition) or their leaders have
not shown much interest to support activities or policies that would benefit the overall
nation unless their members are direct beneficiaries of such activities; instead, they
pursue measures to undermine the group in control of the state to improve their chances
of capturing the state whenever they exposed the ruling group as unfit to hold office.
Ethnic leaders are not concerned about the possibility that their actions could impact not
only the economy but also their own support base that is affected by economic
contraction. Rather, they seem hell-bent on bringing the economy to a standstill, and then
conjure up all manner of excuses to blame the ruling dispensation to score points in their
desire to capture political power. Also, the opposing groups are reluctant to accept any
arguments or advocacy of policies that show benefits would accrue (trickle down) to
them (and all groups indirectly if not directly) through benevolent government programs.
Rather, they are more interested in direct benefits for their groups crying ethnic cleansing
and discrimination when they don’t get their way even when government is pursuing
(neutral) policy that is in the best interests of (all groups in) the state and even they get
special benefits from the state (KN May 8, 2010).
The members of ethnic groups have shown partisanship towards their group
interests being overly supportive of any policy or program that they felt would benefit
members of their groups other and opposed policies benefiting members of other groups.
The two major ethnic groups did not want to be governed by the other group or to jointly
share political power refusing to yield a political inch to the other side. Studies by
anthropologists (Jayawardena, M.G Smith, R.T Smith, Despres) revealed the negative
attitudes of both groups towards each other. Africans repeatedly stated they don’t want to
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be governed by Indians -- “Meh na want to be governed by Coolie”, in Guyanese
parlance – don’t wish to be ruled by an Indian party (KN Jul 15, 2012). And with regards
to political office, one group does not want to share power with other groups or parties
(except briefly when Africans, Portuguese, Mixed, Chinese and Amerindians between
December 1964 and 1967 collaborated to topple a left wing Indian-based government.
This is not to say, the ethnic group in control of the state does not have members of other
groups in its administration, but they are mere token appointments (who have no standing
in their own group and who accept jobs in order to live) to give a deceptive appearance of
a multi-ethnic government (KN Jan 8, 2014; May 29, 2011). One group (Africans) had no
qualms about supporting fraudulent elections to capture and retain political power (to
secure jobs, resources, and other benefits) for members of its group while the other
groups tirelessly toiled against undemocratic institutions and launched a campaign for the
restoration of democratic rule (KN Jan 23, 2014). In winning a democratic election, the
dominant group refused to form a coalition with the group that rigged elections for 28
years (KN Apr 29, 2008). The ethnic antagonisms that resulted from electoral frauds and
the refusal of one group to back democratic election would lead to the rise of an ethnic
dictatorship right after independence (1966) during which everyone (including ethnic
supporters of the dictatorship) suffered by losing basic freedoms and experiencing
declining standards of living. But the minority ethnic group did not want to yield state
power to the majority ethnic group fearing its loss of perks and privileges that come with
being in control of the state (KN Jun 6, 2009). Thus, the members of the minority African
group backed the ethnic dictatorship that remained in office till 1992 (KN Oct 5, 2012).
The establishment of an ethnic dictatorship impacted on the political and
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economic development of the country resulting in a serious decline in standard of living
(KN Apr 4, 2013). The PNC ethnic dictatorship pursued policies (like nationalization of
businesses and controlling all trade as well as imposing price controls, and withholding
business licenses making it virtually impossible for members of other ethnic groups to
conduct business) that geared to benefit their supporters at the expense of the other ethnic
groups (KN Sep 6, 2009). Non-supporting ethnic groups (Indians, Portuguese, Chinese
and Amerindians) were precluded from participation in political affairs. They were made
victims of racially discriminatory policies and suffered from economic squeeze of their
businesses and agricultural farms. These groups largely withdrew from involvement in
national development and the business and professional classes began to migrate. This
had a telling effect on the economy (KN Jul 7, 2011).
During the late 1980s and early 1990s in the aftermath of the collapse of socialist
rule, democratic movements began to sweep the world providing hope that there would
be a restoration of democratic rule and an opportunity to remove the ethnic dictatorship.
But the racially polarized nature of Guyanese society made it difficult for a democratic
transition as the dominant (African) minority ethnic group was opposed to the restoration
of democracy sensing that democratic rule would end their control of Guyana losing the
perks and opportunities that come with such control (KN Oct 23, 2013). Unlike other
Socialist societies that gave their population freedom, Guyana underwent a painfully slow
process to restore democratic rule because the ruling party and its supporters were
opposed to a change in the status quo and free and fair elections. And when democratic
elections were introduced in October 1992, the defeated African group refused to accept
the concept of free and fair elections challenging the legitimacy of the other major
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(Indian) ethnic group to govern the country (Ibid; KN Jun 3, 2012). Members of the
defeated ethnic group pursued violent confrontations. The ethnic violence that arose out
of Guyana’s transition to democratic rule during the early 1990s and thereafter seriously
affected growth and other aspects of the economy as growth rate declined (KN Oct 22,
2010). Ethnic violence and political instability frightened away new businesses towards
investments in the economy or expansions of those already involved in operations.
Investors withheld their hands waiting for the political climate to stabilize and for the
new government to guarantee their right to export their profits. When it comes to
investments and entrepreneurial activities, in general, businesses tend to look for stability
to carry out their operations unimpeded in order to maximize profits. Once there is
political (ethnic) violence, businesses guard their investment options cautiously. Investors
have been wary of pouring money into Guyana. And every time there was political
(ethnic) violence in Guyana, investors adopted a wait and see attitude (and even cut back
on production and planned investment or expansion) and the economy suffered with
declining growth (KN Oct 22, 2010). Race conflict has hampered Guyana’s progress.
One can observe a trend that after every period of violence in Guyana – such as late
1950s, early 1960s, early 1970s, mid 1970s, most of 1980s, early 1990s, mid 1990s, early
2000s, etc. – growth was affected, GDP/per capita impacted and the standard of living
declined (countrystudies.us/guyana/55.htm; countrystudies.us/guyana/53.htm
Guyana’s economy was stagnant during the late 1950s during the ethnic
competition for power and when the Indian party was in charge. Growth went down from
1960 thru 64 when there were rising animosity and race riots, looting, damages to
infrastructure as well as to properties and crops, and when factories were unable to
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produce because of sabotage and non-reporting of workers (KN Jan 9, 2011). Guyana’s
economy started a downward trend under the Indian-supported PPP government with the
institutionalization of the race conflict in 1960 that impacted on Jagan’s socialist
development plans. Economic demise continued under the African PNC that took power
in December 1964. As any winning party does, the PNC rewarded its supporters (with
the spoils of office) after winning elections removing Indian professionals from top
positions in the army, police and bureaucracy and shifting resources away from those
sectors of the economy where Indians historically predominated (KN Jan 8, 2014)
towards areas where Africans resided and dominated. The result was Indian and
Amerindian (rural) areas became increasingly neglected and destitute while African areas
were built up and modernized (Gafar: 2003; SN Jul 25, 2011).
During the period between 1965 and 1990, the economy declined substantively
because of the PNC’s establishment of an ethnic state. The beneficiaries of almost all
jobs, services, facilities, loans and housing were the African masses who supported the
ruling PNC party, not very different from what was obtained in apartheid South Africa
with almost all the state benefits going to members of one race. This policy discouraged
Indians and members of other ethnic groups from being a willing participant in
developmental activity. Under the PNC dictatorship, the bureaucracy and the armed and
police forces were almost 95% Africans. Some 80% of the economy was under
government control and it was used to institutionalize what academics described as an
African dependency syndrome (client-patron relationship between an African party and
its supporters) on the state employing some 80% of working Africans. In this way, more
than half of the entire African population became dependent on the state – 95% of the

- 150 -

armed forces, 90% of the police and the security services, 95% of the bureaucracy, 98%
of the National Service, 95% of the para-military wings, among other service sectors,
were African party supporters (Ibid; GT Jan 25, 2015; KN Dec 16, 2010; May 15, 2011;
Jun 12, 2011; SN May 15, 2012; see also Gafar: 2003; Rabe: 2005). (See also
www.fao.org/docrep/007/ae392e/ae392e00.htm). As another example of racially inspired
policy, the PNC regime seized lands on the outskirts of Georgetown that Indians had used
to grow rice and vegetables and rear sheep, goats and cattle (GC Nov 30, 2013) resulting
in a decline in cultivation and animal husbandry – affecting the lives of everyone in the
process because of reduced food output that led to higher prices. This led to charges of
racism by Indians exacerbating ethnic conflict resulting in the gradual withdrawal of
Indians and other non-Africans from economic activities triggering an economic collapse.
So in response to the questions posed earlier on whether race conflict affects
development, the evidence proves such a correlation. Going back to the early 1960s,
Guyana was described as the breadbasket or the jewel of the Caribbean because of its
economic potential and middle-income status. Periods of relative ethnic peace and
political stability, as for example, between 1966 and 1968 and between 1975 and 1978
were enjoined with moderate growth and prosperity and so were the period between 1993
and 1997 and between 2006 and 2011. The period around independence in 1966 saw
growth when there was ethnic peace for the year preceding it. But Guyana would become
a basket case in just a decade after decolonization (SN Aug 28, 2008) with its economic
decline attributed largely to ethnic and political conflict in addition to government maladministration (journals.sta.uwi.edu/cd/index.asp?action=downloadArticle...60...).
As analysts have commented, one cannot simply brush aside the role of racial
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conflict in the economic decline of a nation, or dismiss its potential economic effects, or
disregard its importance in impacting development, or simply pretend that it does not
exist as many politicians often tend to do (SN Dec 30 & 31, 2014; GC Feb 12, 2013;). In
fact, researcher Mark Dacosta (2005) suggested racial conflict, among others, as one
reason for Guyana’s economic regression after independence. In a cross-country analysis
of Guyana’s economic performance with fellow Caricom country Barbados (SN Aug 31,
2011), both of which became independent in 1966, DaCosta (2005) stated that ethnic
conflict affected economic growth of Guyana. While Guyana regressed after
independence, Barbados made tremendous economic progress (SN Apr 21, 2011). In
contrast, Guyana struggled to take off and in fact its economy regressed – because of
political instability and ethnic conflict. During the 1950s, for example, there was some
convergence of per capita GDP in both colonies (between US$180–$190) with Guyana’s
slightly higher. Also, during the early 1960s, the GDP per capita for both colonies was
about the same (slightly under $300). However, by the mid-1960s the figure for Barbados
had risen to US$469 while that for Guyana remained stuck at US$295. It happened that
Guyana was plagued by racial conflict and this affected investment and growth whereas
Barbados was very stable politically as overseas capital poured in expanding the
economy and creating jobs that added to revenues and fueled growth. Comparable GDP
per capita figures in 2004 showed a similar trend as in the late 1960s with Barbados’s
GDP per capita rising rapidly while Guyana failing to make progress. The GDP per
capita for Barbados in 2004 was US$10,000 but less than US$1,000 for Guyana during
the same period, a tenfold difference in a mere 40 years. Dacosta (2005) pointed out that
based on a UN Report, Barbados was ranked 30 out of a total of 177 countries in the
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UNDP’s measure of human development whereas Guyana’s ranking was 107 – a
substantial decline when forty years earlier both nations’ standard of living was at par.
Dacosta (2005) suggested that policies related to identity politics (resulting in
ethnic conflict, instability, labor issues, and lack of democracy) impacted on development
in Guyana whereas traditional political issues (competition between political parties and
absence of ethnic conflict) were not an impediment to developmental goals and
objectives in Barbados (Dacosta: 2005). In contrast to Guyana, Barbados did not
experience any serious racial conflict and international political conspiracy (as happened
in Guyana during the 1960s and early 1950s) to topple a legitimately elected government
(SN Feb 20, 2014). Also, Guyana experienced race riots with the result that businesses
were afraid to invest in Guyana because of political instability. Barbados, on the other
hand, experienced peace and calm with no major ethnic issues and had all the
institutional qualities (democracy, press freedom, political competition, opportunities to
invest, etc.) to promote growth whereas Guyana did not. Barbados did not have major
ethnic and party bitterness. In addition, in Barbados political parties were not ethnic
based, and there was not any serious lack of cooperation among parties towards
development whereas these differences were very pronounced in Guyana (SN Oct 31,
2012) (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbados–Guyana_relations; see also competecaribbean.org/.../1Measuring-the-Competitiveness-of-Selected-...).

A US government report, (http://countrystudies.us/guyana/), Library of Congress
website, 2003, stated that Guyana’s economy was in dire condition from 1966 thru the
early 1990s. It noted: “When the country gained independence in 1966, it was among the
least developed areas in the Western Hemisphere. In looking at economic stats on
Guyana (see appendix), there was little (if any) improvement in productivity and social
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change after the British departed in 1966 from where they left off the economy”. As a
sociologist, in looking at the country’s aggregate economic data, it is shown that Guyana
was not experiencing development and positive social change during the two decades
after independence in 1966. Both hard statistical numbers and on-the-ground
observations suggest that in terms of social and economic development, the standard of
living in Guyana was down and below that of most poor countries in just one decade after
independence and worsened thereafter to trail other developing countries that were
behind Guyana during the 1960s (KN Feb 25, 2011; Oct 5, 13). As economic reports
asserted, while most of the third world countries were developing post independence
(1966) and progressing, Guyana was regressing. This sprawling country with unlimited
resources had seen limited development from 1966 (year of independence) for the kind of
resources it possesses and the small size of its population of just three quarter million. It
had not been able to generate successful economic activities during the 1970s and 1980s
from its own natural resources to provide jobs for the large pool of unemployed or
substantially raise the standard of living from the colonial era that remained stagnant or
declined significantly. Every aspect of Guyana’s economy was in shambles and every
measurable index declined just a few years after independence in 1966. There was hardly
any social or economic progress after independence.
In terms of commodified productivity, for example, during the 1970s, rice, sugar
and bauxite production, the three export pillars of the economy, declined significantly
right after the British granted independence. For most people, including Afros who were
in control of the government, and Indos who were in opposition to the regime, life did not
improve after independence. Real income declined (for example, police earned around
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US $45 monthly in 1965 but by 1990 it dropped to around US$25 because of the fall in
exchange rate and not mentioning the decline of purchasing power due to inflationary
pressures. Teachers’ salary also went down from US $50 monthly in 1965 to $30 a
month) (SN Aug 21, 2011; Feb 5, 2011). Inflation ballooned from single digits in the
1960s to triple digit during the 1980s. Overall, standard of living deteriorated impacting
on social change with women in particular seeing little improvement in their lifestyle.
Conditions for women also deteriorated and they were still treated in a secondary
subservient role under the PNC. Poverty rate increased to around 75% of the population
by 1990 (SN Dec 4, 2011). Amerindians, for example, lived in absolute desperate
grinding poverty as most rural people (SN Apr 21, 2014). Social divisions continued to
separate the wealthy from the poor and the urbanites from the rural dwellers in much the
same way life was during British colonial times (SN Jul7, 2011). Also, much of the
wealth remained in the hands of a few (the elite, party henchmen, and hierarchy of
security organizations) who were connected to the PNC government (SN Apr 18, 2011).
In 1966 (year of independence), about 70 per cent of Guyana’s population
subsisted on less than a US dollar a day, and that percentage did not decline substantially
by 1990 or even by 2010 using the constant 1970 dollar (in terms of purchasing power) as
a measuring tool for one’s income. In 1992, for example, the nominal monthly wage (not
adjusted for inflation or purchasing power) for a public servant was a mere US $170
which worked out to less than $6 dollar a day (SN Apr 21, 2011) and when measured
against the purchasing power of a dollar in 1970, with inflation running at over 600%
from then to now, a public servant wage worked out to less than a dollar a day in constant
value. As a 1990 US Country Report on Guyana noted, “conditions were harsh for the
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roughly 764,000 people living in the country, much of whom lived in poverty. In 1990,
an estimated 40 percent of workers earned the minimum wage, equivalent to only
US$0.50 per day. Three factors -- the flourishing illegal economy, the cash remittances
that Guyanese citizens received from relatives living abroad, and the country's near selfsufficiency in food production in 1990 -- were all that kept the economic decline from
becoming a disaster” (US Library of Congress Website 2003; www.factmonster.com;
http://countrystudies.us/guyana/).
Guyana’s economy deteriorated after the government nationalized foreign-owned
companies and took control of almost all economic activities in the country – 80% of the
economy fell into government hands. Output of bauxite, sugar, and rice -- the country's
three main products -- fell sharply from when they were under private ownership.
Guyana's gross domestic product (GDP) reflected the decline in national output (Ibid).
(Real GDP fell by an average of 2% a year during the early and late 1970s, and it
decreased by an estimated 6% per year during the 1980s with the overall growth rate
being negative since 1960.) The fall in GDP in terms of U.S dollars was even more
dramatic because of repeated devaluations of the Guyanese dollar. (The value of Guyana
dollar slumped from G$1.60 in 1966 to the US dollar to G$2 to US$1 in 1976 to G$120
to US $1 by 1990 and G$200 to US$1 by the year 2000). With regards to national
income, in 1990, for example, the GDP was a mere US$275 million. Per capita GDP in
1990, not adjusted for inflation, amounted to less than US$369 (a marginal improvement
in the per capita income of less than $100 from that of 1965 not factoring in inflation and
purchasing power of a 1965 dollar), making Guyana one of the poorest countries in the
hemisphere” (Ibid) (see also SN Sep 27, 2012; World Bank Global Tables).
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The real GDP for the 1990s was substantially less than what it was in the 1960s
when using the value of Guyana or American dollar of 1960 as the comparative base year
in terms of its purchasing power amidst double-digit annual inflation (Indo Carib World
Sep 19, 2012). This led to the description of Guyana as “an economic basket case” in the
region. The US report (Ibid) added: “Declining GDP was but one symptom of the malaise
that had overcome Guyana's economy in the 1980s. Other indications were the nation's
crumbling infrastructure, especially the electrical power supply; the high level of external
debt (one of the highest per capita debt in the world) and payments arrears; and the
emigration of professionals and skilled workers”. (US Library of Congress Website 2003)
see also SN Feb 13, 2009; Aug 18, 2008 & (http://countrystudies.us/guyana/).
On further evidence of economic decline, reports show that Guyana has regressed
on many fronts. For example, Guyana’s ranking in terms of the Human Development
Index (HDI) has remained very low for decades with Guyana’s ranking slipping behind
poor African countries and not showing signs of improving. In fact, HDI declined from
the 1950s thru the 1990s (40th in 1960 to 133rd in 1990) while poorer countries than
Guyana improved during the 1960s went past Guyana by 1990 (Ibid; SN Mar 15, 2013;
Nov 2, 2011; Nov 5, 2010; Dec 5, 2007). Also, while Guyana ranked third in 1960
within the Anglophone Caribbean societies (just behind Trinidad and Jamaica of 13 poor
nations) on most yardsticks such as life expectancy, GDP/capita, debt/capita, female and
overall literacy, infant mortality, maternal mortality ratio, improved sanitation, child
immunization, and mean years of schooling, Guyana was ranked last on these very same
yardsticks during the 1980s and thereafter. Ironically, a country like Haiti did better than
Guyana during the 1980s on several yardsticks and in terms of translating its limited
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resources into growth and improving the quality of life for its poor, seniors and youth.
Also, on many of the above yardsticks and other economic indicators, poor sub-Saharan
African countries now outperform Guyana as revealed by annual World Bank Reports.
(see also SN Aug 31, 2011)(see also countrystudies.us/guyana/53.htm).
Independence hardly resulted positively on social change (KN Dec 28, 2014) with
workers, women and children suffering tremendously as a result of poor health condition
(SN Jan 1, 2015). Since independence, Guyana has had the highest suicide rate in the
region and in the world in recent years (https://www.youtube.com/user/ab10460/feed).
Malnutrition among children and infants was abnormally high for a country with so much
agricultural land to feed the entire Caribbean region. Infant mortality and the number of
mothers dying during childbirth were on the rise and were the highest in the Caribbean
(SN Jun 7, 2012; Aug 13, 2010). Some 60 to 70 women died during child birth every
year in the 1985 to 1990 period – numbers that were much higher than similar countries
like Guyana (Chronicle May 17, 2011). Infant mortality was also the highest in the
Caribbean region and higher than countries with similar features like Guyana during the
1980s. Also, the infant mortality and maternal deaths for Guyana were much higher in
earlier years of the 1970s and significantly higher than those countries that are similar to
Guyana (GC Jan 28 & Feb 1 2014). It is noted that between 1985 to 1990, more than
2,500 babies (infant mortality numbers resembling those of sub-Sahara Africa) under five
years old used to die each year compared to just over 200 per year in 2010. It was noted
that hospitals lacked drugs and doctors were in shortage (most left for overseas) resulting
in a serious rise in neo-natal and maternal deaths. For example, maternal mortality ratio
was a high 80 per 100,000 in 1991 and much higher in the preceding years – and higher
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than all countries in the region. In 2013, there were 18 maternal deaths and 25 in 2012.
Under 5 years old mortality rate was also a high 75 per 1000 in 1990 – with the numbers
much higher for preceding years and the highest in the region for all nations. Infant
mortality rate was 45 per 1000 in 1990. The preceding years saw much higher infant
mortality rates that just barely beating out Haiti (GC Jan 28, 2014; see Tables section p x;
www.inewsguyana.com; SN May 10, 22, 2014). In the year 2000, it was estimated that
170 Guyanese mothers died per 100,000 live births. It is much higher than rates for all
comparative countries like Guyana, which ranged from 110 maternal deaths for Suriname
to the average of 150 maternal deaths for Lower Middle Income (LMI) and Latin
American (LAC) countries (LMI-LAC) (Ibid). In 2000, it was estimated that 13.6 percent
of children were underweight for their age and significantly higher in earlier years. This
rate is much worse than the average for LMI-LAC countries (7.6 percent) during that
period. In every health measure, Guyana was performing below that of all other countries
in the western hemisphere or the Americas or countries with similar characteristics.
(http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK761.pdf; US Aid Guyana Economic
Performance Assessment 2007). See also (SN Jun 21, 2010; Dec 9, 2008); & (www.pppcivic.org/wpo/14thcongresswpo.htm).
A serious bout of malnutrition in Guyana during the 1980s was not surprising as
there was a severe shortage of food with children foraging dump heaps or begging for a
meal (SN Sep 19, 2008). There was a serious reduction in the intake of food over the
banning of importation of basic items after independence resulting in malnutrition, scurvy
and rickets (GT Jan 3, 2015). Food was simply unavailable. The banning of basic goods
created shortages and higher demands triggering higher prices that resulted in higher
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profits (SN Apr 17, 2014; Jan 10, 2008). Since people could not do without the goods,
like flour, potatoes, lentil, canned milk, split peas, toilet paper, oil, onion, garlic, and
other essentials that were banned (SN Jul 25, 2008), these goods were brought in through
the underground (black market) economy (SN Mar 6, 2007). The macroeconomic
aspects of the underground (parallel) black market economy (SN Mar 22, 2009) resulted
in inefficiencies and higher than market prices putting a strain on the family’s budget
causing them to consume less and affecting consumption habits. It also led to poor
quality of goods and services and higher costs to consumers because of the added costs of
transporting goods and paying bribes to the food police to close their eyes to the sale of
illegal goods (https://www.imf.org/external/.../longres.cfm...). It caused wastage and loss of
labor hours. Since so much time was spent trying to secure basic goods for consumption
or to acquire the goods for sale, many labor hours were wasted. This reduces productivity
and by extension the rate of growth of the economy much below its potential, leading to
missed or negative development (SN Nov 14, 2010; Apr 6, 2003).
Children were also educationally neglected by a terrible state-driven policy tied to
the ethnic conflict (SN Apr 9, 2013). The state of education in Guyana suffered severely
after independence. Guyana was ranked the lowest in the region in educational
achievements during the 1980s as compared with the 1960s, when it had one of highest
ratings in passes in secondary school exams. Prior to the mid 1970s, private educational
institutions, almost all of them owned by Whites and Indians, flourished; they often
bettered performances at government schools. The government nationalized all private
educational institutions in 1976 but lacked resources to adequately maintain them or to
pay staff and provide materials for basic education (SN Apr 9, 2013). Burnham outlawed
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private educational institutions. When private schools were allowed to operate during
colonial era and right after independence, Guyanese students did competitively well
against nationals of other Anglophone countries winning scholarships at elite British
universities (SN Feb 5, 2011); Burnham himself was a recipient of a British scholarship.
After government asserted control of all schools, educational achievements rapidly
declined. Textbooks books and teaching resources as well as notebooks were virtually
unavailable in classrooms or in bookstores. The government controlled the sale of
virtually all books that had to be imported through government-controlled agencies.
Trained (university educated) teachers left for other shores that paid higher salaries
resulting in largely unqualified educators instructing classes resulting in declining
education passes at British (Cambridge, Oxford, London University) or regional (CXC)
exams (SN Aug 10, 2012). Unlike under private ownership of schools, in the
government-controlled schools, students were short changed in obtaining basic skills to
lead a productive life. Much of the educational training focused on political propaganda
praising the political leader and the ruling party rather than on useful skills (SN Oct 28,
2007). It was noted that during the 1980s, half of the school age children was not in
school. In fact, these absentees were peddling goods in the streets or foraging garbage
heaps when they should have been in school. They were away from schooling in order to
help secure food and a future for themselves and their families (GC Mar 11, 2013).
Although students were and still are getting free education, performance at state schools
were/are worse off than those of private schools. Private schools over the last two
decades since they were granted licenses to operate have been turning the best exam
results in the country far surpassing public schools (SN Mar 30, 2014).
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So when during the 1960s, life should have improved in Guyana by 1990 with
each passing year following attainment of nationhood, it simply got worse. When during
the 1960s, Guyana was much better off than most Latin nations (as, for example on
measurements relating to maternal deaths, infant and child mortality, education, GDP,
and several other indices), by early 1990s, it was worse off than every country in the
region (SN Apr 21, 2013; May 27, 2012; Sep 22, 2008). It was not until the last decade
(2000s under democratic rule) that Guyana was able to recover and achieve the standard
of living and quality of life of the 1960s (GT Jan 1, 2015).
Some 47 years of independence has left Guyana competing with Haiti and the
poorest countries of Africa to get out of the lowest places of the world tables on GDP and
in terms of social indicators like relative poverty (some 40%), malnourished children
(around 35%), and infant mortality (30%) (SN Jun 21, 2010)(Table p x; World Bank
Tables) – What a sad socio-economic state of this country after gaining freedom from
England? Around 1960, Guyana’s GDP per capita was ranked very high as a middleincome country. For example, its GDP was US$299.41 for 43rd place in the world. By
comparison, Jamaica’s was US$429.14 (31st), Trinidad’s was US$635.43 (25th) and
Barbados’ was US$378.84 (37th). By 1964, at the end of PPP rule, Guyana’s per capita
GDP grew to US$308, a shocking US$10 in four years at US$2.45 per year and its world
ranking slipped to 50th position. The other countries’ GDP per capita and global ranking
steadily improved while Guyana’s steadily dropped. One factor that may have led to this
contrasting situation is the presence of ethnic conflict in Guyana and its absence in the
other countries. This conflict impacted on any favorable investment climate affecting any
potential economic gains. Between 1960 and 1964, for example, an ethnic civil war
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devastated infrastructure and uprooted settlements affecting Guyana’s productivity and
by extension its development and growth. Jamaica saw her GDP increased by almost
US$89 between 1960 and 1964 to US$518 (36th place in global ranking), Trinidad’s by
almost US$170 to US$805 (28th place) and Barbados by US$84 to US$463 (41st place)
(SN Jan 26, 2013) (IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, Washington D.C).
The economic situation steadily declined as ethnic relations worsened after 1964.
When the PNC took office in December 1964, Guyana was struggling economically but it
still enjoyed a relatively high standard of living compared with the rest of the region or
other developing nations. But the economy began a rapid descent. The newly installed
Afro-dominated PNC regime (with its 42% support comprising mostly of Africans and
Mixed race descent) did not take enlightened measures to grow the economy to lift
standard of living or to ameliorate conflict (SN Aug 12, 2011; Apr 21, 2011). Instead, the
PNC focused on ethnic and political consolidation of its supporters and victimization of
non-supporters (from the other groups that made up some 60% of the population) leading
to the establishment of an ethnic dictatorship that was accompanied by maladministration (SN May 10, 2013). The regime preyed on ethnic rivalry that pit the
Africans against Indians (vice versa) further aggravating historically tense relations
between the two groups and between Africans and other races (KN Feb 17, 2014; Nov 14,
2012). The PNC played the ethnic groups against each other exacerbating animosity and
racial hatred between Africans and all the other ethnic groups. The PNC was more
interested in consolidating its power and ethnic base of supporters rather than in winning
over Indians with sound policies that would build the economy (KN May 29, 2011; Oct
20, 2012; Jul 1, 2010). Such a destructive policy severely weakened the social fabric as
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distrust spread among the populace (KN Jan 18, 2012). This had a telling effect on
economic performance (KN Dec 21, 2013; Aug 10, 2012).
Under PNC rule, the rate of economic decline accelerated (KN Apr 12, 2014; SN
Sep 9, 2011). As an example, the country’s GDP per capita went from US$308 in 1964
(50th ranking), when the PNC came to political office, to US$506 ($250 when adjusted
for inflation) in 1992 (133rd ranking), when the PNC left office. The GDP per capita in
1992 was smaller than it was in 1970 or in 1964. Clearly, Guyana’s economy shrunk
between 1964 and 1992. In fact, it was the only country in the Caribbean with a zero or
negative growth for that period. Between 1964 and 1992, there was an increase of
US$198 in per capita in some 28 years that worked out an average of less than US$4 per
annum, but when factoring in inflation, the growth was negative (SN Jan 26, 13 & Apr
21, 2011). This compares with a growth of about US$50 for the period between 1957 and
1964 or about US $7 per annum. Real income was declining as the years passed by. So
Guyana experienced negative growth. In contrast, the GDP grew in Barbados by 1,100%,
Trinidad 400%, Jamaica 260% and even poor Haiti 400% (KN Aug 30, 2011).
An examination of other indicators also showed an economy in deep trouble. For
example, interest rate in 1965 was around 7%. But by 1992, the lending interest rate had
reached an incredible 30% for businesses or individuals making it virtually impossible to
fund businesses (expansion or new investments) or home improvement on borrowed
funds. The significant economic indicator, inflation, also showed an economy in bad
shape. Inflation during the 1950s and 1960s was in the single digits but during the 1980s
inflation was running at triple digits although by 1991 it had dropped to 70% (GC Sep 27,
2011). As a result, people were unable to satisfy basic needs because their salaries
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remained stagnant, prices went up, and the dollar had lost its value as the government
kept printing more money fueling even higher inflation. Another economic indicator,
poverty, was at 70% of the population in 1992, down from a third of the population in
1965. Official unemployment was 33% (in reality over 50% given that many adults were
assisting their parents on the farms) way above the single digits of the 1960s; many
(married) adults relied on parents for an income on farms. Foreign reserves were nonexistent as compared with several million dollars that were left in the reserve in 1965 (SN
Jan 26, 13 & Apr 21, 2011) to support imports. Black marketing, virtually non-existent
during the 1950s and 1960s, became pervasive from the 1970s through 1990s (when
government banned imports of basic goods) and the underground economy was the only
means to obtain necessities like toilet paper or soap or milk (KN Oct 11, 2014). With a
miniscule debt during the 1960s, by 1985, Guyana became a highly indebted poor
country (unable to make payments on its loans). By 1990, the debt reached a staggering
US $2.2 billion (seven times its GDP or national budget) for a population of only 700,000
for an average debt of about around US $30K per capita as compared with less than $100
per capita in 1965. Guyana’s 1990 debt per capita contrasted sharply with about US$2000
per capita for the rest of the Caribbean region in 1990 (some one fifteenth of Guyana’s
per capita debt) (KN Jul 26, 2013; Apr 13, 2012). Using the standard public debt/GDP
measure (see Table p x), the debt/GDP ratio was some 600 percent in 1992 (see also KN
Nov 13, 2011). The GDP was only US$371 million in 1992 (KN Aug 30, 2011).
Revenues was only US$141 million in 1992, substantially less in real value from the
1960s and 1970s though somewhat more than it was in 1980s when the country was in
dire financial straits unable to pay public service workers or meet debt obligations (KN
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Mar 2, 2011; Apr 15, 2009). See also (www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/.../GuyanaOVERVIEW-OF- ECONOMY.html); countrystudies.us/guyana/55.htm; SN May 13, 2009;
(www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubCSI-156.pdf; World Bank Annual Tables).

As the data has revealed, economic indicators and the overall performance of the
economy since the 1970s showed a country in serious economic difficulty resorting to
deficit spending. Guyana continued to suffer from economic trauma and was in the midst
of its worst financial crisis during the 1980s. An IMF report on economic management
during the PNC period in office stated: “Following the 1973–74 crisis and throughout the
late-1970s and early-1980s, Guyana’s political climate was marked by continued
instability, the absence of dialogue and consensus-seeking, and a further weakening of
key institutions, such as the rule of law. Production of all the major commodities declined
sharply; public utilities and social services barely functioned; and real wages fell sharply
(by 40 percent between 1976 and 1986). During the period 1976–88, real GDP per head
fell by 31 percent, inflation soared eightfold, foreign exchange reserves dwindled, and
government debt rose from 31 percent of GDP to 475 percent. In1984, real GDP fell to its
lowest level since 1955, and the size of the informal economy was estimated at 40
percent of the formal economy” (GC Sept 27, 2011).
As noted by many academics and commentators, the PNC centrally managed and
directed economy (under their leaders Forbes Burnham and Desmond Hoyte) had
completely collapsed by 1988. This was a direct result of the gross mismanagement (a
policy of ethnic clientelism and patronage appointment of supporters many of whom were
unqualified and incompetent) and racially inspired policies of the PNC designed to hurt
Indians, Whites, and Chinese who had dominated the economy prior to 1975. Such
discriminatory policies backfired by damaging the entire economy affecting the Africans
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as well (GC Feb 11 2012; Mar 22, 2012). Under PNC’s misrule, there were missteps after
missteps or square pegs in round holes in a woeful series of political and economic
management. Rampant corruption, nepotism, racism, and ethnic patronage demoralized
workers in the productive sectors (agriculture and factories) and in government sectors
(state agencies and the bureaucracy) of the economy. Many workers in privately owned
factories and on the farm preferred to stay home or just do the basic for survival rather
than engage in productive work that benefited a regime that oppressed them and with
little financial benefits accruing to them (GC Sep 15, 2011; KN Mar 15, 2014).
The 1980s became a hard grind for survival. There were numerous examples to
illustrate this point. Basic food (including of bread) was scarce and had to be smuggled
into the country because of the ban on the consumption of flour made from wheat; the
government ordered that people eat rice and cassava. Farm production declined
substantially. There were long lines of people at government owned food (KSI) stores to
purchase basic goods including of rice for which there was a shortage (KN Oct 26, 2012;
Apr 2, 2010; Erriah: 2011). During the 1980s, homeless people were rising in numbers all
over the country. Also, there were mysterious murders (SN Jul 31, 2009) and reports of
human corpses being found at abandoned locations – victims of runaway crimes or
political terror (GT Aug 28, 2014; Jul 5, 2014; Jul 3, 2014; Jun 30, 2014; GC October 22,
2013; SN Jun 3, 2013). People were disappearing after being picked up by security agents
never to be heard from again because of their political dissent or public criticism of the
regime and opponents were savagely beaten and terrorized (GT Jun 4, 2014; GC Sep 24,
2013; Jul 14, 2013; Caribbean Contact March, April, September 1984 and editions in
1979). (see also http://www.guyana.org/features/postindependence/chapter23.html;
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www.en.wikipedia.org wiki Forbes Burnham; SN Jun 5, 2014; May 24, 2009; Nov 11,

2007; guyana.org/govt/declassified_documents_1969_1976.html; KN Jul 1, 2013).
There were many other social problems. Jobs were difficult to get with over half
the population unemployed under a tottering economy forcing people to pursue any
activity for survival (SN Feb 21, 2010; Oct 28, 2009). The dispossessed and needy got no
help to overcome their financial decline. Prostitution was on the rise. Suicide had also
increased with Guyana having the highest suicide rates in the region (GC Mar 2, 2014).
Many homes were placed in jeopardy as people lacked money for repairs or payment of
mortgages. Large areas of the country, including urban areas, were neglected and squalid
during the 1980s. Government buildings including schools and hospitals were ramshackle
and dilapidated. Self help commissions foisted on the nation during the late 1960s as a
means to socialize production were no longer in a position to help people during the
1980s as people just looked after themselves and their families; it became a battle for
self-survival by beating out the other person – a new definition of socialism and
collectivization (KN Apr 2, 2014; Oct 1, 2013; Oct 19, 2012; Nov 14, 2008). Also,
infrastructure had collapsed -- water, sewage, drainage, road and transport facilities were
in a pathetic state. Roads and bridges were in shambles with no money for repairs.
Drainage was even worse as drains were filled up with all kinds of garbage and silt
leading to flooding of residential areas even after brief periods of rainfalls and is still so
today (KN Jan 13, 2014). Crops were frequently lost because of occasional flooding or
from drought (in a country whose name means land of many waters) and with no
assistance forthcoming to farmers from government thereby discouraging farming.
During the 1980s, one could see garbage, dead animals and miasma on the streets and
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major roadways or in waterways. Waterways were not routinely desilted (dug) for years
were (and many still are not) and became clogged with the slightest rainfall leading to
flooding of large swaths of the city and an eerie fecal stench (KN Jan 15, 2013). The
garbage pathology was so ubiquitous that people cover their noses when walking in
certain areas of the country. Even today, newspapers carry numerous reports of garbage
dumping and about pollutants in the waterways and mounds of garbage in the capital city
of Georgetown and environs (KN Nov 8, 2011; Jul 9, 2011; Dec 31, 2008). The poor state
of the environment caught the attention of foreigners visiting the country. A visitor from
Mauritius in July 2012 asked me “Why is the capital city so dirty” for which there was no
response (SN Jan 23, 2013; KN Nov 16, 2014; Feb 20, 13, 2009).
As the data revealed, since the 1960s, the government did not undertake any
serious effort to promote national development that will lead to a better environment,
rising standard of living and social change. Instead, the government focused on acquiring
control over the economy and political institutions. The sweeping changes in government
finances, banking systems, manufacturing and nationalization of the economy and
collectivization during the 1970s were designed for government control of the
commanding heights of the economy. Prof. Paulette Pierce (1984) studied Guyana’s
attempt to acquire control of the economy from foreign owners through a process of
nationalization describing it as a struggle towards a non-capitalist path to development. It
failed primarily because of the way it was carried out and because of the (ethnic) division
in the country among the working class as well as among the political forces. The PNC’s
nationalist and discriminatory economic policies led to serious structural reforms that
would ultimately bankrupt the entire economy. As a result of the new policies that
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stressed state and PNC party control and domination of the economy, local businesses
were curtailed discouraging investment. At the same time, foreign businesses pulled out
of the country proving that global capital markets, a powerful economic force, can
function independently of politics or of government’s attempt to control the market or of
government’s ability to control such large multi-nationals like Reynolds Aluminum,
Bookers (Sugar) and Royal Bank of Canada or Bookers (Pierce: 1984). Clearly, in the
Guyana case, capital markets (MNCs) showed that they can effect changes beyond the
capacity of political processes or of a government to enforce controlling regulations (to
rein it in) (Ibid). The MNCs simply moved their operations elsewhere and the country is
left high and dry with limited opportunities to sell its resources or fetch “good” prices. As
economists assert, capital chases after markets where profit is highest and risks lowest;
investors are not in business to lose money. Once government interferes with the flow of
capital or its ability to earn profits (the lifeblood of corporations), businesses leave with
their scarce capital with the results that societies suffer with loss of jobs, declining
revenues, and terrible reputation to attract new investors and the entire economy suffers.
With MNCs gone, Guyana was facing a serious capital shortage to pump up the economy
with new or expanding investments. Its only hope was agriculture that had also
experienced serious decline under the PNC (KN Dec 14, 2009; Oct 17, 2008).
Agriculture had always been the locomotive for economic growth in Guyana all
throughout its history but the PNC government could not bring itself to support farming
simply because it would benefit Indians, who the PNC had viewed as its enemy because
of their link with the opposition PPP; understandably, one cannot support or empower
one’s enemy and as such agriculture was neglected to teach the Indians a lesson for their
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unswerving loyalty to the PPP. The Agriculture sector was in a total mess during the
1980s as every effort was made to miniaturize it as a way to marginalize the role of
Indians in the economy. The budget allocation for food production (Agriculture) was
miniscule compared to the budget for the service sector and of other Ministries, none of
which was contributing as much to the growth of the economy when compared with
agriculture. In fact, agriculture was the only positive aspect of the economy contributing
over 50% of GDP and employing over 50% of the population (GC Aug 26, 2009; Oct 27,
2010; Mar 12, 2014). The neglect of agriculture and the racial abuses of Indians who
comprised the bulk of the farming sector pushed the Indians off the land resulting in food
shortages (Ibid, GC Apr 6, 2013).
When a government assumes legitimate power, it should seek to take care of all
the people, not only its supporters and it should not discriminate against people based on
ethnicity or political affiliation. As the Guyana case illustrates, the PNC government’s
goal was to punish the Indian farm belt because of its support for the opposition PPP with
the hope of getting Indians to abandon the PPP. The PNC’s aim was to destroy the PPP
political base by destroying the communities that formed that base (Rampertab: 2001).
Indian investments in agriculture and other sectors of the economy created jobs and
helped to lift standard of living for all including Africans. The PNC calculated that once
it destroyed the PPP stronghold, the sugar and rice belt from where the PPP derived the
bulk of its support, and forced Indians to migrate, the PPP will be doomed politically as it
would not be able to win a majority of seats in elections (GC Oct 27, 2010; Jan 28, 2011;
Feb 22, 2011; Rampertab: 2001). The PNC did not care if women and children starved to
death or if the economy collapsed. The PNC’s political agenda was to uproot and destroy
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all opponents regardless of the effects. Such a nihilistic policy even punished their own
members who often depended on Indians for economic opportunities. Despite its
totalitarian drive, the PNC could not break the Indian support for the PPP as the Indians
remained loyal to its founder Dr Jagan until his death in 1997 (Ibid) and they have
remained loyal with the PPP till now (Tennassee: 2010; Rampertab: 2001).
As the PNC was trying to break the Indians in business and in farming, at the
same time, it directed funds to Africans in various facets of life as well as in farming (KN
May 19 2013; May 6, 2013). But the Africans indicated they wanted nothing to do with
tilling the land which they largely abandoned after their emancipation from slavery and
sought public service jobs (KN Oct 9, 2012). The Africans took the government funds
and land but did not invest heavily in farming. Instead, most rented the farms to Indian
farmers and sold their government subsidies of seeds, equipments (tractors, combines,
bulldozers, plows, transport vehicles, etc.) and fertilizers to enterprising Indians (GC Oct
27, 2010 who were more willing to till the land. Governmental neglect of agriculture and
its anti-Indian bias led to palpable suffering not only of Indians but Africans as well (KN
Mar 25, 2012; GC May 26, 2010). Both these groups as well as others could not get
adequate food supplies because the Indians opted to reduce their output leaving land
fallow in retaliation against the government for their ill-treatment (KN Oct 5, 2008).
Reduced production in agriculture (especially rice, sugar and cash crops) (KN Aug 21,
2012) meant a reduction in revenues for the government which in turn meant inadequate
revenues to meet the payroll demands for African workers employed by the state or to
acquire materials. The PNC also could not acquire materials to give as handouts to
appease its base. This depressed syndrome led to a cycle of bad policies and ever
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increasing political and racial oppression (GC May 26, 2013; Aug 9, 2009; Oct 27, 2010).
It should be noted that the large state labor force had become a drag on the
economy burdening taxpayers – the state sectors provided jobs for government supporters
with one of every two Africans employed by the state (KN Oct 5, 2011; GC Oct 7, 2011).
But revenues were not coming in to sustain such an unproductive labor force or to give
them a decent livable wage (between US$20 and $30 monthly) (GC Mar 20, 2014). And
when revenue was short to meet budgetary allocations to appease its supporters, the
government simply printed more Guyana dollars fueling inflation and further reducing
the standard of living for all (GC Aug 14, 2010). So in seeking to victimize Indians and
other ethnic groups (not supportive of the regime) by damaging their entrepreneurial
spirit and their livelihoods and productivity, the government’s support base of African
workers was also hurt because the contributions of other groups to the tax coffers had
declined creating a shortfall to pay the state workers (95% of whom were Africans) or
funding activities that would benefit them. The PNC Government’s policies were
socially corrosive as they further damaged race relations when the PNC turned the screws
on Indians and other racial groups. The Indians decided not to cooperate with the PNC
and listened to (followed directives of) the PPP that advocated a boycott of government
programs and withholding of their labor. Fearing a rebellion by Indians regarding its
policy of ethnic victimization, the PNC turned to a policy of racially inspired violence
directed and financed by the state. The government turned to violence to force Indians to
toe the line destroying what little ethnic harmony had remained in the society when the
Indian-based PPP was ousted from office. The PNC policy of ethnic persecution of nonsupporters served to accentuate the economic crisis as Indians and Whites decided they
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would not work towards raising revenues for an oppressive racist ethnic regime (GT Jan
3, 2015; GC Apr 15, 2012; Aug 27, 2011; Aug 29, 2010).
A reduction in state revenues resulted in the poor, farmers, working class and
businesses being bombarded with a heavy burden of taxation to raise revenues to fund the
state’s many unaffordable programs and pay the huge foreign debt. In addition, people
were forced to endure extended periods of power outages that lasted weeks or longer.
The scarcity of basic goods was apparent everywhere as stores had empty shelves even
for basic needs. In addition, workers were subjected to poverty wages and high rates of
crime with some even directed by the state (GC Feb 14, 2014). Corruption was rampant
and crime was out of control as people were robbed in the presence of police who turned
the away when crimes were committed. People lived in fear even during daylight hours
(GC Dec 14, 2013). Also, by the decade of the 1980s, the government, which took over
all private schools in 1976, failed to do enough to nurture good schools. Schools had
virtually no supplies (not even paper and stores were restricted with paper supplies
because the government feared it would fall in the hands of political opponents to print
news letters). Also, schools lacked books. Educational standards declined with Guyana
receiving the lowest pass ratings among Caribbean countries in the regional standardized
tests as well as in the high school entrance exams (SN Aug 15, 2011; KN Oct 28, 2013).
The health system was also a victim of misrule and ethnic conflict. As an
illustration, in 1950, the life expectancy for a Guyanese citizen at birth was 47 years. This
increased significantly to 60 by 1964, a gain of 13 years. The increase in life expectancy
between 1950s and up to 1964 stagnated. In 1970, the life expectancy was 60 years but
stagnated through 1990 (KN Aug 30, 2011). Guyana made no gains in life expectancy for
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the period 1964 to 1990 when the PNC was in power. This was not surprising because of
the collapsing nature of the health sector and the shortage of basic medical personnel and
supplies to attend to the sick and disabled. The PNC government pursued ethnic
discriminatory policies (GC May 26, 2013; KN Aug 26, 2012, Aug 11, 2011). Medical
personnel, most of whom were Whites, Chinese and Indians, were denied basic supplies
and many migrated to practice their profession in other societies where they were
welcomed. Hospitals were in decrepit conditions with no funds for maintenance; also,
drugs and basic medical supplies (including of bandages and plasters) were largely
unavailable because of foreign currency shortage to purchase them from abroad. Also,
medical personnel at government health (as well as other state) institutions were not
motivated to attend to peoples’ needs because of the declining purchasing power of their
low salary (due to high inflation and currency devaluation) (GC Mar 20, 2014). The
Guyana dollar that stood at about G$1.75 to US$1 in 1964 declining in value to G$2 to
US$1 in 1970 to G$3 in 1985 and declined rapidly to $G125 to by 1992 -- over 3,000
percent depreciation during his time period. Also, real wages during this time was
reduced and in 1992, real wages (in $US) for public servants (average $25 monthly) was
lower than they were in 1964 (US $40) (KN Aug 20, 2011).
Overall, the PNC government could not point to any clear, identifiable
achievements (KN Nov 11, 2012). Surely, there was hardly an improvement in race
relations as Indians and Africans drifted further apart with Indians accusing Africans of
supporting an oppressive PNC regime (GC Oct 25, 2013; Dec 14, 2013). The overall
political, economic and social conditions in the country led to a feeling of hopelessness
and despair with many turning to migration as the last hope for survival. Their
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preference was to North America and or Europe. People were and still are overjoyed to
leave the country because of better lifestyle and quality of life abroad. They migrated to
any Caribbean Island or across the border to Brazil, Venezuela, Suriname and French
Guiana that would take them if they could not make it to North America or Europe, their
desired destinations. (The economic situation was so bad that by the mid 1980s, more
Guyanese lived abroad than within Guyana) (GC Oct 18, 2011).
As the local Guyana media noted, after independence, the country had (has)
become an international embarrassment because of the poor state of its economy,
sluggish growth, and dependence on foreign aid so much so that the Prime Minister of
Jamaica, Mr. Bruce Golding, described Guyana as “a begging country” in a public spat
with the leader of Guyana President Bharrat Jagdeo (KN Mar 5, 2011). Also, the Prime
Minister of Barbados, Mr. David Thompson, was critical of Guyana’s economic
problems especially high unemployment, its poor standard of living, and its inability to
address its development problems that have forced many Guyanese to seek economic
fortunes in Barbados and other countries thus taking away jobs from nationals of those
countries. Prime Minister Thompson said that Barbados “was too small for Guyanese to
keep running to his nation to seek jobs and good living standards”. He felt the situation
should have been the other way around given Guyana’s huge size and vast supplies of
natural resources (SN June 2, 2011). In fact, the other Caribbean territories had expected
Guyana to bail them out with its huge resources and economic potential. Instead it has
been the other way around. Barbados and all of the smaller (less resource rich) countries
of the Anglophone Caribbean have been more economically stable. They have not
experienced the same kind of socio-economic problems as Guyana, and have had better
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growth rates, lower unemployment, and a higher standard of living than Guyana since its
independence (www.google.com/search?q=Comparing+Guyana+with+other+caricom).
As Caribbean social commentator and diplomat Sir Ron Sanders noted, “few
would dispute that the two decades between 1976 and 1996 were ‘lost’ years for Guyana
– a period when, despite its vast natural resources, the country experienced high debt,
collapse of social and physical infrastructure and large-scale migration of its best
educated people – most of whom now settle in North America, the Caribbean and Europe
sending remittances home to feed their family” (KN May 29, 2011). Guyanese were
denied full opportunities to contribute to the development of their country when living in
Guyana but once settled abroad they contributed meaningfully sending cash and materials
to loved ones. Since the 1970s, without foreign cash remittances and clothing and food
sent from overseas, Guyanese may very well have starved and remain naked as virtually
everything was in short supply in Guyana. Cash remittances sent by relatives mostly from
North America provided sustenance to most of the population and kept the economy
going. Almost every Guyanese has had at least one relative abroad since the 1980s
sending them cash or other handouts (in barrels and boxes or in suitcases when they
visited Guyana). Guyana has been the second largest recipient of remittances (behind
Jamaica) among Caricom nations and the largest recipient of remittances (leaving out
material goods) in terms of a proportion to its gross domestic product (anywhere from
10% to 50% depending on the year and amount) or even of its national budget (Ibid). The
government received tons of money in fees and duties of goods sent from abroad and for
financial transactions all helping to boost revenues for government operation (KN Jul 12,
2011) ( https://sta.uwi.edu/.../Roberts%20D.pdf; www.jstor.org/stable/27866601).
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With regards to cash transfers, Sanders (KN May 29, 2011) penned: “Foreign
remittances averaged over half of the country’s budget since the early 1980s and was
very significant in the composition of the country’s GDP (over 40%). Therefore, without
foreign remittances, Guyana’s GDP growth would have declined even more since the
1970s. It is noteworthy that Guyana’s budget during the 1970s and 1980s averaged about
US $300 M (millions) and during the 1990s it reached US $400 M with remittances
averaging US$200 M annually. For the first eight years of this century, the national
budget averaged U.S $400 M and the last four years saw it hit $500 M with remittances
averaging US $350 M annually” (Ibid). So remittances averaged between fifty percent
and two-thirds of the country’s national budget and as Sanders posited “would have
accounted for almost half of the Guyana’s GDP revealing the extent of the country’s
dependence on overseas funding and its inability to generate enough domestic revenues
to lift standard of living or significantly raise GDP – a far cry from the 1950s and 1960s
when overseas funds, foreign aid and deficits were not as significant in the colony’s
national budget and in their contributions to the GDP” (KN May 29, 2011). As Sanders
noted, “since the 1970’s, the economy of Guyana has been described as the sick man of
the Caribbean … as the poorest country in the region” (KN May 29, 2011). But the
economic decline of Guyana started well before the 1970s, even before independence,
during the early 1960s with the overt rise of ethnic conflict. The decline accelerated
during the 1970s with the PNC government’s racially discriminatory policies and wrongheaded economic policies such as the state nationalization of the main productive sectors
of the economy (GC Apr 4, 2004). The 1970s saw such industries as sugar, bauxite and
banking come under state ownership. The government pursued etatist (state) policies,
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state control of marketing, pricing, and controlled production of the agro sectors of the
economy. It also neglected the farming sector that was dominated by Indians, and
practiced racial victimization of Indians who supported the PPP opposition party, who
constituted the majority of the population and who also controlled large amounts of
wealth in the country (GC Apr 22, 2009). For its nationalization policies, the country
was severely punished by the industrialized nations that cut off aid and restricted trading
with Guyana. Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (and its affiliate InterAmerican Development Bank), which were also controlled by the industrialized
imperialist nations, as well as private banks and foreign governments tightened the noose
around Guyana’s neck, reducing loans (justifiably so because Guyana was unable to meet
interest payments) and demanding outstanding interests on which Guyana had defaulted
(GC Oct 17, 2010) (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/.../hilaire.htm).
During the 1980s, the economy imploded. Borrowing was closed off to Guyana
afflicting the entire economy that was dependent on deficit financing. GDP was
shrinking annually. US AID had closed its office in Georgetown during the 1980s
because of harsh conditions imposed by the regime on its work. US Aid was forced to cut
off its handouts to the population with the poor and working class feeling the pain the
most. Also, around this time, two foreign banks, Barclays (England) and the Royal Bank
(Canada) (SN Dec 23, 2012), with large amounts of deposits, handed over their demand
deposits (customers’ money) and sold their buildings to the government for G$1. They
were forced to lend money to the government at government offered rate and at the same
time the government was not allowing the bank’s foreign currency to leave the country
(SN Sep 2, 2009). The banks were also heavily taxed and regulated making banking
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extremely difficult (SN Jul 19, 2009) (see www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/.../wp0073.pd...).
The 1980s also revealed that revenues were unavailable to pay state workers or to
buy basic supplies for government use. The country was really insolvent. Private
companies were forced to loan the government money to pay state workers. And when
private companies stopped lending, the government resorted to intimidating tactics
threatening to take over their businesses and sent thugs to harass and intimidate them.
When all other measures failed to raise money for government operations, the
government resorted to the wholesale printing of money to pay workers shrinking the
value of the Guyana dollar even more. Government offices had become largely
dysfunctional with people just showing up for work and then leaving after spending a
brief period at the office and not performing any meaningful tasks. Many had second jobs
to boost their low income and they left the state office to perform their other job (GC
May 14, 2011). As one government worker put it to this researcher during a visit to
Guyana in July 1986, “We pretend to work and the government pretend to pay us”.
Government workers, supporters of the regime, received full pay for virtually no work
(GC Dec 14, 2010; Jul 6, 2013, Sep 26, 2013). But their salaries were virtually worthless
unable to cover basic groceries for a month as skyrocketed inflation ate away the value of
the local currency. The Guyana dollar had become worthless and no country wanted it in
exchange for goods or services. From US$1= G$1.80 (convertible abroad) in 1972 to G
$4 (1980) to US$1= $115 (1992) and unacceptable outside of the country since 1980 (GC
Aug 18, 2011; Nov 16, 2012). At one time, even local businesses did not want to accept
the Guyana currency and in fact, at one time during the 1980s, the government had
opened a store selling foreign goods in hard currency similar to those in China and the
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eastern bloc countries in order to generate foreign currency to pay for imported
government supplies. Access to foreign currency was so bad that by 1980, the
government had restricted the amount of money anyone could take out of the country to
G $50 which no one wanted anyway because it amounted to only about US $6 and one
had to file cumbersome paper work and wait for a lengthy time for government approval
in order to get the US $6. The cost of filing the application was more than the actual
foreign currency (US $6) granted by the government and thus not worth peoples’ time,
effort, energy and all the frustration and angst that come with it. People lost hope in the
government as the economy steadily worsened (SN Sep 2, 2009).
The economy continued to face strong head winds in the early and mid 1980s
growing negatively. But the PNC did not expect its Western sponsors to pull the
economic from rug under its feet given the history of the PNC serving as a bulwark
against the establishment of any communist government in Guyana. And the economy
began to decline rapidly during the mid 1980s. After its fall out with western countries
over its nationalist economic policies (Pierce: 1984), there was a sharp reduction in aid
from western countries and a severe imbalance in trade that triggered shortages in basic
goods and mass starvation. The reduction in revenues led to a severe economic decline
by an average of 5% a year for most of the 1980s. The PNC’s “tightening of the belt”
policies placed severe economic pressure on the working class, the middle class and the
poor (KN Feb 8, 2009). They did not earn enough to meet basic needs and prices were
rising rapidly as a result of scarcity of goods. Every item within the country was scarce
and expensive as goods had first to be purchased with foreign currency overseas and then
shipped (for some goods through an underground network) to Guyana where it was
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almost impossible to obtain foreign money through official government channels. Hard
currency was bought on the black market at extremely high rates and it meant therefore
that goods had to be sold at exorbitant prices in order to recover costs and profits of
selling goods (GC Feb 16, 2013). Not surprisingly, many basic goods (for housing,
laundry, etc.) needed in a modern society were unavailable.
In addition, the government had instituted a list of banned items including basic
foods (like bread, beans, potatoes, cooking oil, canned goods, etc.) leading to mass
starvation and a vibrant smuggling of goods across the porous border to meet basic needs
(GT Jan 5, 2015). Not only were foods in short supply, basic construction materials like
nails, cement and paint were unavailable. Houses were not repainted for many years and
looked awful with fading exteriors and peeled paints. Steel was rusting without paint. The
construction sector was dormant for years without basic supplies putting carpenters,
masons and painters out of work. Also, petrol was scarce and insufficient to run factories
or vehicles or electrical generating plants or for shipping. Blackouts were a fact of life
and lasted for extended periods – weeks and months. People returned to hand, bottle and
gas lamps as used in earlier times (GC Jun 11, 2011). No foreign institution would lend a
dollar to Guyana to purchase imports of petrol or spare parts or electrical turbines to
address the blackout or other problems the country faced because the country defaulted
on repayments to every local or foreign borrower.
Under the PNC of the 1980s, life had frozen in time or regressed by several
decades in terms of goods and other basic needs and services. The country turned to
bartering with neighbors and socialist bloc countries for basic goods. Hucksters or small
traders sustained the economy in black marketing. Suitcase traders plied the market

- 182 -

traveling to Trinidad and other Caribbean islands and returned with goods that were
traded at high prices to keep the economy alive (SN Jan 26, 2013). Although it was
against the law to trade in certain goods like bread, canned goods, potatoes, cheese,
onions, cooking oil, etc. the government closed its eyes to the illegal trade to allow
people to simply eat and survive. Food was virtually unavailable leading to the foraging
of garbage dumps as seen on TV in Latin American favelas or in destitute countries of
Africa as well as to mass starvation similar to the situations in North Korea, Cambodia,
Somalia, Ethiopia, etc. as occurred during the 1980s (KN Jun 21, 2014; SN Oct 4, 2009;
(http://humanscience.wikia.com/wiki/Food_Scarcity_in_Africa; GC Feb 14, 2013; Jun 5,
2011; Apr 24, 2011; www.wfp.org/countries/cambodia overview) GT Jun 3, 2015;
http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/guyana-the-land-of-shortages/;
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korean_famine).
Guyana’s future development when looked at or evaluated during the period of
the 1980s appeared uncertain. Recovery and development seemed almost impossible
without some kind of quick reform and restructuring in order to avoid further economic
calamity. The regime was forced into implementing austerity measures by international
institutions to stave off collapse and mass starvation. The dictator Desmond Hoyte
subjected the country to IMF conditionality as a requirement for a temporary economic
bailout (SN Sep 17, 2009). In the face of economic collapse, Hoyte had agreed to
abandon the PNC strategy of Guyanization (government control) and “cooperative
socialism”, modeled after Tanzania’s ujaama socialism (state control based on its own
cultural and economic conditions), in which the ruling party becomes the state and acted
as a cooperative owning over 80% of the economy (KN Jan 7, 205; Aug 23, 2014; Oct 1,
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2013). Hoyte rebuked cooperativism and turned to the IMF for a bailout that was
conditioned with restructuring of the economy that included selling out state owned
corporations. The economy was essentially handed over to the IMF during the late 1980s
and early 1990s with policies directed, guided, and controlled by the IMF and World
Bank and supporting agencies (SN Feb 27, 2011). Guyana’s economic policies
(cutbacks, laying off state workers, denationalization, etc) converged with those generally
required by the IMF to obtain financial loans (Erriah: 2011). The conditionalities placed
more pressure on the working class and the poor to pay higher taxes with some 94% of
gross revenues (during late 1980s and early 1990s) being required to pay just the interest
of the debt of US $2.2 billion (SN Feb 11, 2013; Aug 21 and Jul 23, 2011; May 20,
2010). (see also www.guyanajournal.com/economic_decline_1985-91.html).
Under the IMF program, tail winds began to blow in Guyana’s economic
direction resulting in a turn around of business fortunes with modest gains in growth
during the late 1980s continuing into the early 90s. With a lull in the ethnic violence,
Hoyte’s concessions to Indians, and the gradual economic opening up to the outside
world, the economy began to recover in late 1988 but the economic gains were quickly
wiped out with renewed racial violence in 1992-93 resulting in a dip in economic
fortunes and a return to negative growth. Racial violence caused much of the country’s
economy to shut down in 1992/93 and for extended periods of time thereafter especially
during 1997, 2001, and from 2003 thru 2005 resulting in economic regression (SN Jan 20,
2010; Nov 29, 2009). In 2011 or during this decade, and indeed since 1992, Guyana’s
economy has performed much better than say during previous decades. But it still has
not been realized full potential. It has not improved substantially from 1992 when
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democracy was restored (KN Mar 21, 2014). As an illustration, in 2011, Guyana was
ranked 115th in GDP per capita, an improvement from 133rd in 1992 but still a far way
off 40th in the 1950s, the 43rd ranking in 1960 and 50th in 1965. Guyana is still ranked as
the second poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere behind Haiti (SN Apr 21, 2011, KN
Jan 5, 2014) and the poorest in the Anglophone Caribbean of 13 nations. This contrasts
sharply with the early 1960s when Guyana was ranked number three in the Caricom
region and way above Haiti (SN Feb 19, 2014; KN Sep 15, 2013).
As the preceding chapter illustrated, the precipitous decline in the economy was
attributed primarily to economic policies that were are related to the nation’s ethnic
conflict. Ethnic violence, discrimination and persecution as well as when one’s party is
not in control of the government tend to preclude and or de-motivate people from
producing to their full ability. This inevitably results in economic decline. For example,
between 1957 and 1965, racial conflict (including race riots) affected productivity
preventing the country from attaining significant economic growth. Between 1966 and
1992, the rise of the one party (one race) ethnic state, (GT Nov 17, 2014, KN Jun 23,
2014; Thomas: 1980) when there was intense racial conflict, the economy contracted by a
fifth in 25 years. For a short period, between 1988 and 1992 when the regime eased up on
ethnic discrimination, the economy began a turn around. Between 1992 and 2005, there
were ups and downs in growth depending on the state of ethnic relations – growth during
relatively peaceful period (1993 and 1997) and decline when there was instability (1997
to 2005). Since 2006, there has been relative ethnic peace and the economy has seen
sustained growth and rising standard of living (KN Dec 23 and 25, 2013).
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Chapter 6: Guyana’s Political Development
Guyana did not experience any meaningful political development until after WW II when
most former colonies acquired self-rule. Political development occurred in a piecemeal
manner with some sections of the population allowed to engage in political activities
based on wealth, status, recognition and appointment from London. The colony was
governed directly by the British Colonial Office in London all through the establishment
during the 1700s of plantations based upon slavery, the system of indentured labor after
emancipation in 1838, and the development of a peasantry that proceeded during and
after the indenturedship period (1838-1917). London appointed (White, British born)
Governors to manage the political affairs of the colony. The political forces in the early
period prior to the two world wars were largely pro-capitalist and were controlled by
London. Radical labor movements were not successful or were sidelined and the labor
movement was badly fractured by race that was an important component of labor,
religious and cultural organization. The subjects were hardly consulted on how they
would be governed and rarely did policies benefit the subjects leading to rising dissension
during the 1900s. However, just prior to, during and after WWII, the colonies became
restless with rebellions and protest movements for an improvement in their quality of life
and for a greater say in the affairs of their colony. In short, the subjects wanted selfgovernance. Also, after the war, the US pressured the former empires to grant self-rule
and to prepare their colonies for independence. Britain, in exchange for support from
ethnic leaders for the war effort, allowed the subjects in Guiana and her other colonies to
engage in political activities leading to a political movement and the formation of
political organizations.
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Section A: Rise of Parties & Indian-African Political Rivalry (Competition):
Party politics did not come to Guyana and the Caribbean until the 1950s when the
British allowed self-governance with veto exercised by the Colonial Governor. Party
formation was experienced in Guyana in 1950, and the two parties political system did
not materialize in Guiana until 1955 after the racial split (Indian versus African) in the
PPP that led to the formation of two parties. Political parties did not emerge in Guiana
prior to 1950 because the British authority had placed restrictions on political
mobilization, political participation and the rise of parties throughout the colonial era.
There were also restrictions on voting rights based on property and income qualifications
making the rise of parties unnecessary since only a handful of people could exercise the
franchise. Only those of the elite class (primarily Whites and Coloreds and a handful
among the Africans, Indians and Chinese) were qualified to contest positions (KN Jun 7,
2014). The bourgeoisie had historically monopolized the colonial legislature since voting
rights were restricted by property and income requirements. Also, most Indians were not
focused on political issues as they had planned to return to their native India and were
more directed towards acquiring money that they could take back to their homeland. And
politics was not a major concern of the lower class as they were busy eking out a living
for survival or trying to have some savings to acquire a basic shelter and or to acquire
land for self- farming (Seenarine: 2006; Ramsarran: 2008; Adamson: 1972). The labor
movement was very fragmented along ethnic lines. The labor movement was left open for
the rise of a middle class figure like Jagan to unite them. The poor masses had no interest
in politics until they their interest was peeked by Jagan and other nationalist and working
class leaders discussing their distressed economic and social conditions and educating
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them that life could be better if they were to unite against the British (Seenarine: 2006).
Dr. Cheddi Jagan, who studied in the U.S, returned to Guiana (virtually deported
for refusing to fight in WWII on the side of the US) in 1943 and allied himself with the
working class movement. He joined the British Guiana East Indian Association (BGEIA)
and also became an advocate of an Indian labor union (Man Power Citizens Association).
He also became President of the Indian saw millers union. Having observed the
conditions of the working class, he felt a calling of a need to unite all the different forces
struggling on behalf of the working class into one movement. Having been schooled
about Marxism, Jagan used his knowledge of working class struggle in America and
other societies to educate the Guianese working class masses about their economic
deprivations and class exploitation making them politically and economically conscious
of their miserable conditions and poor quality of life (Ibid). He implored them to unite
and take actions to improve their working and social conditions and wages (Jagan: 1972).
Jagan felt the labor unions acted irresponsibly in not making demands on management
for better working conditions. He was critical of unions that failed to provide effective
labor representation to their members or those leaders that betrayed the working class and
were in bed with the bourgeois class. He organized Indian sugar workers and mounted a
challenge for the leadership of the MPCA that represented the sugar workers. He urged
African leaders to effectively organize bauxite workers, and he called upon Black
employees of the state sectors to demand higher livable wages (Pierce: 1978). Jagan’s
activities in helping to organize workers into effective unions, his political activism
within Guiana, and the post WW II movements of decolonization in other colonies led to
an awakening among working class Guyanese of all ethnic groups to seek self-rule,

- 188 -

higher pay and a better quality of life. Although people were divided by ethnicity with
each labor union and organization comprising of members of one ethnicity, a successful
effort was made by Jagan to bring together prominent leaders of the ethnic groups and
labor movements in the formation of a multi-ethnic Political Affairs Committee (PAC) in
1946. This organization became the vehicle to advocate for self-rule and universal adult
suffrage that Jagan felt would lead to an improvement in peoples’ standard of living and
politically unite the working class The working class (of all ethnicities) sounded their
willingness to be led by Jagan; they wanted to give him a chance to improve their lives
under his leadership (Hookumchand: 2006; Tennassee: 2010; Glasgow: 1970).
By this time, the decolonization process had started with India, other parts of
Asia, and expanded into Africa. The US had urged Britain and the other empires to free
their colonies after their contributions in the war effort to defeat the axis powers (Erriah:
2011). The British had recognized that they had to grant concessions for home rule in
Guiana and her Caribbean colonies or they would face violent protests. Besides, they had
promised the nationalist political figures a greater say in governance if they would
support the war effort in Europe. And the ethnic nationalist leaders were demanding a
role in the governance of the colony forming organizations, building alliances with each
other and even launching political parties. The British allowed mass based political
movements in Guiana and across the Caribbean (Erriah: 2011).
The early phase of Guiana’s political development saw Dr. Jagan and left leaning
ethno-nationalists and labor leaders launching the Political Affairs Committee (PAC) in
1946 to raise political consciousness among the working class (Jagan: 1972). Jagan
became its chairman. This group, as opposed to the upper class elite of each ethnic
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group, was interested in the general welfare of the entire population and pursued mass
political mobilization activities irrespective of ethnicity in contrast to narrow ethnic
mobilization of each group by their elitist ethnic leaders. This PAC group helped Dr.
Jagan when he contested a seat to the colonial legislature in 1947 in the Central Demerara
Constituency just outside of Georgetown. Although each labor organization was largely
of one ethnic group, a result of the dominance of the labor activity by one ethnic group
(sugar by Indians or bauxite by Blacks, for example), the leaders of the unions came
together to support the PAC in the struggle for self rule and subsequently the first mass
based political party, PPP (US Army Area Handbook Program, adapted from The U.S
Library of Congress, Washington D.C; 2004). Virtually all of the union leaders,
regardless of ethnicity, appealed to their members to support the PAC. This was the first
time in the colony’s history that working class leaders were united in a goal to benefit
everyone. Jagan and the PAC advocated for the expansion of welfare benefits for the
poor and the working class and free education for all and was successful in winning cross
racial support. The bourgeois class, however, resisted those demands from Jagan and the
PAC (and later PPP) fearing the burden to fund increased welfare for the population
would fall on them through higher taxes (Premdas: 1973, Spinner: 1982). Jagan won the
seat comfortably with voter support from all races but primarily from support among the
working classes in contrast with the upper classes among the ethnic groups that voted for
the other ethnic candidates. In 1950, Forbes Burnham, a prominent African barrister,
also contested elections winning the Mayoralty of Georgetown with support from the
African voters who dominated the city’s population (Ibid; Seenarine: 2006).
Using his new status as a parliamentary legislator, Dr. Jagan joined with union
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leaders and the leadership of the Political Affairs Committee (PAC) to agitate for
universal adult suffrage and the removal of income and property qualifications as a
requirement for the vote. The leaders of the PAC took on the task of educating the masses
about the importance of universal adult suffrage so they would be prepared and ready to
exercise their franchise to advance their own interests by voting for the nationalist leaders
who championed their cause and independence for Guyana. On Jan 1, 1950, the PAC was
transformed into the first mass based multi-racial political party in the form of the PPP,
led by Jagan with Burnham as Chairman (KN Jan 1, 105; GT 1, 2015). The combined
Afro-Indo leadership of the party and Jagan’s championing of unity brought the divided
races together for the first time in the history of the colony. Its multiracial and multi-class
character had a mass appeal (Seenarine: 2006). The PPP was organized along the lines of
a left working class party that transcended ethnic cleavage; the party’s towering
personalities included Indians, Africans, Mixed, Amerindians, Chinese and Whites. The
political figures of this new political movement campaigned for radical change to
dismantle the colonial structure that granted privileges to the planter class and the
colonial elite (Erriah: 2011). The PPP espoused a program of social welfare measures,
collective bargaining for workers, secularization of the denominationally (Christian)
controlled schools that were funded by taxpayers, replacement of the foreign controlled
civil service with locals, land reform for the poor, and housing settlements for the
working class, etc. These programs were very appealing to the poor masses among the
Indians and Africans who lived in wretched conditions. The PPP received mass support at
its public meetings (Burrowes: 1984; Glasgow: 1970; Tennassee: 2010).
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Chapter 6, Section B. PPP Victory in 1953 & Challenging the Status Quo
At the first election held under universal suffrage in 1953, the masses voted
overwhelmingly for the PPP. The PPP received near unanimous support from the various
ethnic labor unions – some fourteen of sixteen trade unions were affiliated with the PPP.
The party won by a wide margin taking 18 out of 24 seats up for grabs. The ethnic
profile of the 18 winners showed six Indians, five Africans, three Mixed, two Chinese,
one Anglo White, and one Portuguese. Amerindians were not elected from among the
PPP candidates because the Amerindian voters, confined largely to the interior regions,
had remained loyal to the Catholic Church and voted for the European oriented party and
candidates who were tied to the colonial establishment. (Erriah: 78; Seenarine: 2006) (see
also en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forbes_Burnham) (www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/guyana.htm).
Dr. Jagan was appointed as Chief Minister and he proceeded to appoint a multiracial cabinet comprising all of the ethnic groups drawing heavily from individuals tied to
the labor movement. He committed to govern in the interest of the working class as
opposed to the previous regime that governed in the interest of the ruling and the
bourgeois classes. The new administration set about to radically change social and
political relations and the ethnic and class status in the colony, passing sweeping laws to
end ethnic exclusivity and exclusion of certain groups from facets of social and economic
life. New laws provided for free education, recognition of Indian owned and managed
schools as a counterbalance to government owned schools managed by the Christian
churches, old age pensions for the poor, workers right to form and vote for their own
trade unions, affordable housing, land reform, raising levels of social consciousness,
building a national ethos that encouraged a sense of community; agrarian reform to
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benefit small farmers and farm workers, promoting literacy and adult education, fostering
child and youth development, enacting social justice; establishing low income housing,
improving physical infrastructure, among other progressive acts. Jagan wanted to break
the church’s monopoly on education by bringing schools under government control but
the church viewed his proposal as a move to provide Indians with state funded education
and resisted the changes. Heretofore, Indians were forced into attending Christian
schools or private schools owned by Indians; only those who could afford to pay fees
went to school. Africans, Mixed and Whites attended state funded Christian schools.
Since many Indians could not afford the tuition for a private education or were fearful of
the proselytizing in Christian schools, they did not get a formal education. Jagan aimed to
change that policy to provide for universal education. The British clearly did not expect
the PPP would plan for such a massive restructuring of governance and of labor, ethnic
and social relations and universal education. The radical program of the PPP frightened
the British-favored elite and the upper class of the various ethnic groups that felt
threatened by the proposed radical changes and called on the colonial authority to take
actions against the PPP to stop the impending changes that would impact on their
exclusive lifestyle (Hookumchand: 2006).
Foreign companies operating in Guiana and around the region also feared the
radical policies of the new government and pressured the authority to take action against
Jagan’s administration. Foreign investment generally yielded enormous profits for
American and British companies throughout the history of Guyana and they did not want
to alter the status quo (of a lucrative arrangement of earning high returns) or be made to
pay higher taxes. Foreign investors and the local British elite pressured their imperialist
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governments to take actions whenever political events or reform movements threatened
their financial interests (Erriah: 2011). This would happen very often in Guyana during
the 1950s and 1960s (Jagan: 1972). Jagan was moving too fast in seeking to bring about
social change in the society after becoming Chief Minister. And he made a tactical
mistake in seeking assistance from the Soviet Union that drew the attention of the US that
would play a role in the toppling of his government. He began praising Stalin and the
Soviet Union and pledged solidarity with the Soviet bloc countries, which in return
expressed support for the PPP at international forums calling on the British to grant the
colony of Guiana independence. This worried the British government as well as the
Eisenhower Administration as the cold war was taking root (Erriah: 2011). The British
and the Americans considered the PPP policies too radical and accused the government
of wanting to transform Guyana into a communist outpost for the Soviet Union that had
backed the PPP nationalist movement. According to the British appointed Governor, Sir.
Alfred Savage, “the Jagan-led PPP government had a continuous program of
strengthening links with the communist countries, with a view to making Guiana a servile
state” (Erriah: 78; Rabe: 2005) and that was untenable to the U.S and U.K. (See also GT
Jan 20, 2015; https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0807899615).
Section C. Toppling of the elected PPP Government
The British did everything possible to unseat the democratically and popularly
elected Jagan and PPP from office because he and the party empowered the working class
and threatened the exclusive privileges enjoyed by the elite as documents recently
released by MI5 revealed (Indo-Caribbean World Apr 4, 2012). Jagan’s government
began to shift resources from the wealthy elite towards the lower and working class. The
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PPP movement’s advocacy on behalf of the working class was inconsistent with the
status quo in a third world society where nationalist leaders generally supported the
imperial rulers and didn’t take actions to frighten the dominant elite. Thus, the British,
with American blessings, suspended the Jagan government. Political commentator Hyder
Ally pointed out that the 1953 PPP victory put an otherwise insignificant colony on the
political map of the world (GC Jun 2, 2009; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forbes_Burnham;
home.uchicago.edu/~rts1/guyanese.htm). Ally noted that British Guiana became the first
colony in the Western Hemisphere where a Marxist government gained political office
through constitutional means. “The historic suspension of the constitution and the
forcible ejection of the popularly elected government put the colony at center-stage in
terms of international focus” (Ibid). Because of her subservient political status as a
colony to England, British Guiana was hardly known beyond the shores of the South
American continent. It was not until the British toppled Jagan from office that the colony
began to attract world attention. The Soviet Union condemned the British action to topple
Jagan’s elected government, but Jagan’s government did not get much support from the
Labor Party in England (Ibid; KN Aug 30, 2011; www.guyana.org/govt/leaders_i,
www.guyana.org/.../guyanastor). British troops were rushed in to Guyana to quell any
disturbances over the overthrow of the PPP government (Ibid; KN Mar 10, 2013;
www.theguardian.com›World›Guyana). A state of emergency was imposed with all
political meetings and public gatherings banned. A nominated government, which was in
charge of Guyana’s affairs throughout most of its history, was restored (KN Oct 14,
2014). The nominated government historically favored the White plantocracy, the
dominant elite and the continuation of the status quo. Several of the leaders of the PPP

- 195 -

including Dr. Jagan and his wife Janet were jailed for various periods of time for
violating emergency laws. And the British also began a policy of partisanship and
favoritism granting privileges to selected leaders (like Burnham) of the ethnic groups
during 1954 and 1955. Jagan accused the British of engaging in divide and rule tactics to
break up the PPP (Jagan: 1972; Seenarine: 2006).
As many historians and journalists have observed, the PPP regime became one of
the earliest (if not first) victims of the Cold War as the US took an active role in the
decolonization process. The US government expressed serious concerns to British Prime
Minister Harold MacMillan of a Guiana under British control that had friendly relations
with the Soviet Union, which had advocated for independence for Guyana at the UN and
other forums (Hookumchand: 2006; Erriah: 2011; Jagan: 1972). Jagan had expressed a
romanticism regarding the USSR and praised the leadership of Joseph Stalin during the
cold war (KN Nov 8, 2014). President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration began to take
a keen interest in Guyana at a time when the cold war between East and West had just
started for influence in the third world in places like Guiana (Jagan: 1972). Although the
US publicly supported independence for the colonies, it was adamant that the newly
independent countries, especially those in the American backyard, tow the U.S line.
Jagan defied American hegemony pursuing closer relations with the Socialist bloc
countries (Erriah: 2011; Hookumchand: 2006; Jagan: 1972). Secret documents recently
declassified by MI5 (www.guardian.co.uk - British Guiana; also Indo-Caribbean World
Apr 4, 2012) reveal in detail how in 1953 and subsequently the UK under then Prime
Minister Winston Churchill overthrew Jagan’s elected government because he feared
“Jagan and his American wife would lead the British colony into the arms of the Soviet
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Union”. (KN Nov 27, 2009; https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0807876968; Rabe:
2005) (see also www.guyana.org/features/guyanastory/chapter133.html).

Section D. Collapse of United Working Class Movement: Jagan-Burnham Fallout
Although the outcome of the 1953 elections saw a multi-racial coalition winning a
landslide victory, it would have tragic socio-politico and economic consequences for the
society. Inter-ethnic working class solidarity collapsed as the ethnic groups drifted apart
and became embroiled in violent ethnic clashes. Instead of a consolidation of racial
unity, there emerged a widening of the country's racial divide and deterioration of race
relations that negatively affected the working class movement. This in turn affected
governance impacting economic development (with the economy beginning to slide) (KN
Jul 31, 2014; Apr 13, 2010; http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/guyana.htm)
After the suspension of the constitution, leading members of the PPP were either
imprisoned or had their freedom of movement restricted. Among those imprisoned were
Dr. Cheddi Jagan and his American born Jewish wife Janet Rosenberg, both of who were
jailed for six months on separate charges and kept under house arrest for three years (KN
Aug 30, 2011). Jagan and a few other radical politicians were jailed for defying curfew
laws and for being found in possession of radical literature that was also banned.
Burnham was spared prison because the British had an important role for him to play in
dividing the working class and multi-racial movement. Burnham was not viewed as a
genuine working class proponent and the British viewed him as an opportunist who could
do the British bidding. The British and the Americans He was referred to as a political
opportunist who can do the bidding of the Anglo-American alliance (Jagan: 1972). The
British felt they could work with him to undermine the self-rule movement by granting
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him certain privileges and allowing him to move around to build political support by
keeping him out of jail (Ibid). So Burnham was not put behind bars and was encouraged
to pursue a course of action independent of Jagan that would undermine the
independence movement. Burnham would pursue measures to emasculate the militant
PPP thus destroying the working class movement and removing any chances of the
working class replacing the upper class as the rulers of Guyana. (KN Mar 14, 2014;
www.guyana.org ... declassified… ; www.guyana.org/.../robertson_… ;
www.theguardian.com › World › Guyana; https: books.google.com books?isbn=1134264909)

The British colonial authority made it known that Burnham was more amenable to
them because he was not pro-Soviet and pro-communist. Had Jagan not been pro-Soviet,
the British would not have removed him and the PPP from office (KN Jun 29, 2014; May
19, 2013. They stated that if Burnham were to become leader of the PPP, the British
would be inclined to restore self-rule and even grant Guiana independence. They
considered Jagan as too far to the left to be acceptable to the British and viewed Burnham
as less dangerous than Jagan in protecting their own interests. They encouraged
Burnham to break with Jagan and to seek control of the party (Jagan: 1971). The British
and Americans played on the ethnic divide and on ideological divisions within the PPP.
Although Burnham and Jagan came together to form the PPP in 1950, the two had
conflicting economic policy views with Jagan being a doctrinaire hard line Marxist loyal
to the USSR and Burnham a moderate “socialist” with no Soviet ties but leaning towards
the capitalist US and England. The British, recognizing Burnham was not driven by
communist ideology, encouraged and supported him to challenge Jagan for the PPP
leadership. This strategy would lead to the end of cooperation among the races and the
racially diverse working class and their unions that began in 1946 with the formation of
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the multi-racial PAC and subsequently the PPP on January 1, 1950 (Ibid, KN May 26,
2013; Sep 26, 2010: GT Jan 1, 2015). The British rulers felt less pressure that the
working class movement was broken up into racial components. The ruling class was
more comfortable with separate ethnic entities competing for political power than having
to confront a multi-racial united working class movement.
Section E. Racial Division and Rise of Mass Based Racial Parties
In 1955, while Jagan was in jail, Burnham made an effort at a party meeting to
seize the leadership of the PPP. The effort failed with most of the Africans in the
executive sticking with Jagan as the party leader. But a racial faction led by Burnham
left the party and formed a rival faction of the PPP (Seenarine: 2006). In effect, this led
to the presence of two political parties (Jagan PPP and Burnham PPP) and destroyed the
multi-racial composition of the original party. The PPP shed its multiracial solidarity and
each of the races went its own way. Two mass based parties resulted – one Indian and the
other African. The split proved a major setback in the nationalist struggle for selfgovernment and ultimate political independence. But even more damaging was the
polarization of Blacks and the Indians along racial lines (GC June 5, 2009).
As historians noted, this racial split would leave a permanent ‘scar’ on the
Guyanese social fabric in the pattern of voting in the 1957, 1961, 1964 and subsequent
elections (KN May 6, 2013). In these elections, Indians supported Dr. Jagan’s PPP and
Blacks supported Burnham’s PPP that was later renamed PNC (Ibid, Erriah: 2011).
Following the split in 1955, there developed in the colony increasing separation in all
national or local activities (including labor) along racial lines and a high degree of racial
conflict in all endeavors up to this day rendering the country’s motto of "One People,
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One Nation, One Destiny" a sham (KN May 9, 2014). Both Jagan and Burnham
strengthened their influence over their particular ethnic groups as racial affiliation
became the preeminent factor in organizing in virtually all spheres of life. By this time,
Burnham had become President of the African British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU) to
compete with Jagan who had become head of the Indian sugar and sawmill unions. The
African labor leaders supported Burnham when the nationalist movement split along
racial lines in 1955 and the Indian working class backed Jagan. After the racial split, the
poor underclass and working class among the Africans were easily manipulated by
Burnham and his cronies into opposition for Jagan and the Indians (Seenarine: 2006).
Jagan was not able to ever unite the labor movement again as labor relations among the
different ethnic groups became strained and never able to mend again. Till this day, this
racial conflict has prevented labor solidarity and stymied economic development.
With a commitment from the British regarding impending elections, Burnham
began to build popular support for his faction of the PPP while Jagan was still in jail. The
colony was still under emergency rule but Burnham was allowed to campaign freely and
hold meetings to win over popular support for his faction of the PPP – a clear political
endorsement of Burnham by the colonial authority. Believing that Burnham, who was
viewed as less “socialistic oriented” than Jagan and less of a threat to the bourgeois elite
than Jagan, could win general elections and govern the colony to the liking of the
imperialist British-American axis, the British ended the suspension of the constitution,
restored democratic rule, freed Jagan from jail and announced new elections in 1957
(Jagan: 1972). In addition, the British proclaimed a new constitution allowing for a two
Chamber legislature – an elected assembly and an appointed Senate. The British were
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confident the new parliamentary system and the re-drafting of electoral boundaries would
lead to Jagan’s electoral defeat, put Burnham in control of the government, and reduce if
not eliminate threats to British control over the colony (Ibid). Since the masses wanted
self-rule, political independence and riddance of the British, they looked forward for a
new date for elections and internal rule and the British responded approvingly.
Constitutional rule was restored and elections were announced in 1957 leading to
much excitement among the population. There emerged a sense of nationalist pride
amongst Guianese viewing it as an opportunity to govern themselves, elect a government
of their choice, and ultimately to achieve independence (KN Jan 5, 2012). In fact, both
the Jagan and Burnham factions of the PPP demanded and the British agreed that the
victorious party would take the colony to independence. This nationalist position gained
general support from among supporters of all parties. As Jagan (1972) noted, the British
action of throwing the PPP government out of office in 1953 sensitized the masses about
the importance of involvement in politics and gaining self-rule and independence. He had
educated them about political issues and they became deeply involved in politics.
Unfortunately, a shift away from “inter ethnic solidarity” towards inter-racial politicking
became institutionalized when it became apparent that a winning party will take the
colony to independence and exercise control of the state with the winning leader
becoming Premier (Ibid; KN Sep 5, 2010; Jun 20, 2009). The races rallied around their
political leaders to elect their ethnic party into the corridors of power (KN Apr 13, 2014;
Dec 12, 2009; Seenarine: 2006; Glasgow: 1970).
The dynamics of mass-based politics was now formed along racial lines (ethno
nationalism) as opposed to working class lines or nationalist feelings that existed prior to
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1953. People rallied behind their parties primarily along race to get out the votes. The
campaign was held in earnest with the Burnham and Jagan factions attacking each other
(Seenarine: 2006). The campaign descended into a racial contest to capture office and
govern the colony (KN Nov 13, 2011). Public meetings were composed of mostly one
race as opposed to their multi-racial hue in 1953. The labor movement also split along
race with African unions (from the bauxite and civil service) from the urban sectors
backing Burnham while the Indian unions from among agro rural workers supported
Jagan. As Prof. Erriah (2011: 78-82) commented, in the mad rush for race votes,
development of the colony merited just a passing reference in political speeches. Jagan
described Burnham as an agent of American and British imperialism while Burnham and
his supporters described Jagan as a stooge of the communists. Unlike the campaign in
1953, the focus was no longer on why Guyana was backward and what needed to be done
to move it forward or to gain independence and end exploitation and raise the standard of
living. Instead, the appeal was on why “the other side could not be trusted to govern over
your race” and why you should support your race and not the other group. As social
scientists commented, the parties were eager to net maximum gains through their own
method of racial appeals. They appealed to racial instincts instead of confronting the
economic woes facing the colony and the poor quality of life for the masses (Ibid;
Hookumchand: 2006; KN Sep 20, 2010).
Political campaigning for the elections reached a feverish level but it had
descended largely to racial mobilization for votes (KN Mar 14, 2010). “Apan Jhaat” (a
Hindi term) or vote for your own race was invoked during the 1957 election campaign
with the result that both factions essentially became racial parties (KN Jul 29, Jun 13,
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2009). Jagan’s PPP was supported by the Indian agricultural workers and rural peasantry
and Burnham’s PPP was supported by the Mixed races and the African working class in
the civil service and bauxite and urban mining areas as well as rural Africans and
unemployed Africans. The racial polarization would permanently damage any chance of
further interracial cooperation to acquire political independence or govern the country
with multi-racial support (Seenarine: 2005; KN Apr 8, 2013).
Section F. Restoration of Self-Rule, Ethnic Voting, and Formation of PNC:
As writers noted, this struggle for political ascendancy between Burnham and
Jagan would leave a legacy of racially polarized politics that would remain in place till
this day thus making cooperation for economic, social or political progress virtually
impossible (KN Feb 19, 2012; Dec 12, 2009). The two political leaders of their factions
used race appeal to garner support in every election from 1957 in order to hold their base
and win seats to parliament and capture the executive branch of the government. Once in
power, the ruling party governed for the benefits of its own ethnic supporters because
they were responsible for the party in office (Ibid, Jan 16, 2010; Glasgow: 1970;
Seenarine: 2000; Tennassee: 2010). The 1957 campaign was on racial solidarity and
loyalty to one’s ethnic party to win the government. As other writers have noted, the
parties and their leaders appealed to race and to vote apan jhaat (your own kind).
Clearly, an ethno nationalism driven by racial identification superseded any ideological
or working class-consciousness. And ideology or class played virtually no role on how
they voted in 1957 or thereafter – it was a vote based simply on racial solidarity (Ibid; KN
Jul 18, 2012; Jul 2, 2009; Erriah: 2011).
Ideology in the colony only assumed importance because of the Cold War
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atmosphere in which the Americans were fearful of a Marxist Jagan establishing a Soviet
presence in Guyana and developed an interest in Guyana in a conspiracy to keep Jagan
out of government (KN Mar 1, 2011; Sep 26, 2010). The ordinary workers were not
schooled in Marxist thought or on ways to assume control over the society or to replace
the petit bourgeoisie rulers in the form of a Marxist class struggle (Premdas: 1973, 1978).
Professor Percy Hintzen (1989) supported this viewpoint arguing that “ideological
appeals to class solidarity during the early 1950s served more as an adhesive bonding the
diverse groups together, rather than as a basis for a confederated mass movement to truly
unite the races” and govern the colony. He stated that the leaders of the original PPP
mass movement seemed more interested in taking the colony to independence and
replacing the British as the masters of the peoples’ destiny rather than taking actions to
build a genuine working class movement and or to narrow the differences among the
racial groups and build a united society. The 1957 elections started the pattern of ethnic
politics that exists till this day as Jagan (PPP) won virtually no African support and
Burnham (PNC) no Indian support. Up till this day, the races still distrust each other and
their representative parties. As Prof Hintzen (1989) commented about the 1955 split and
the 1957 election campaign, “ethnic affiliation determined party preference, and a
bifurcated African-Indian policy thus emerged, lacking unity and surviving on sectional
legitimacy”. (see http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/guyana.htm)
The outcome of the 1957 elections saw Jagan winning nine of the contested
fourteen seats with Burnham capturing three seats. The White/Colored based United
Democratic Party (UDP) won one seat (John Carter who had broken with Jagan) and an
Amerindian, Steven Campbell, won the other seat on behalf of the conservative middle
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class National Labor Front (NLF) in the hinterland region among the Amerindian voters
who were under the control of the Christian church (Nath: 1950, p 193). The NLF was
not very successful in the urban or rural areas because it lacked an ethnic base akin to that
of the PNC and PPP to capture seats. Middle class Africans, Coloreds and Whites were
not willing to trust their vote for a party with an Indian leader. The results showed the
PPP won all the rural seats where Indians predominated while the other parties won the
urban seats (where Africans, Mixeds dominated) -- Burnham won his 3 seats in G/Town
and UDP won the New Amsterdam seat -- and the NLF the lone hinterland Amerindian
seat. In addition to the ethnic alignment of the voters, another problem with the voting
was voter turnout. In 1957, turnout slipped to 55%, a steep drop of 20% from 1953 when
turnout was 75% - an indication that people had lost confidence in the leadership and the
direction and division of the anti-colonial struggle that would have repercussions for the
political future (Seenarine: 2006; Hintzen: 1989).
With the PPP victory, British Guiana became the first and perhaps the only
country in the western hemisphere where a leftist regime had gained political power and
re-elected through constitutional means (that is, winning an election in 1953 only to be
overthrown and getting re-elected in 1957). Unfortunately for the PPP, this period
coincided with the heightened state of the Cold war when both the Soviet Union and the
U.S.A were actively competing for “spheres of influence” around the globe to out do the
other (Ibid). The Jagan government developed fraternal relations with Moscow issuing
statements praising Stalin and the USSR which sent aid to Guiana and backed the
demands of the local PPP nationalists for Guiana’s independence (KN Nov 11, 2014; see
also www.guyana.org/.../declassified...). This prompted the Americans to take an active

- 205 -

interest in Guiana’s affairs coming as it did after the rise of the Marxist Jacobo Arbenz
government (1954) in Guatemala, in the American backyard. (SN Dec 20, 2011; Rabe:
2005) (see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Guatemalan_coup_d'état).
Jagan was made Chief Minister after the PPP won the 1957 elections setting the
stage for a permanent polarization of the society based on race as half of the population
were now excluded from the governance of the state (Seenarine: 2006). Burnham
proceeded to join forces with the conservative League of Colored People (LCP that
represented the interests of Mixed races and the African elite) and the African United
Democratic Party (UDP) comprising of middle class Africans to form the People's
National Congress (PNC) in 1958 to distinguish his PPP faction from Jagan’s PPP
(guyanacaribbeanpolitics.com/commentary/dalgety.html). The NLF, under the prominent
Indian Sir Lionel Luckhoo’s leadership disintegrated failing to win a seat as it could not
compete with Jagan’s PPP for the Indian votes. Luckhoo, one of the leading Indian
lawyers, linked up with Burnham’s PNC as a way to get back at Jagan for pulling the
Indian support away from him and for attacking him as a bourgeois in bed with the
oppressive colonialists (KN Aug 14, 2010; Daily Chronicle 01/08/57). An African
nationalist, Sydney King, nee Eusi Kwayana, who broke with Jagan during the 1957
elections, also later joined the PNC to become its General Secretary (Ibid). Kwayana
failed to win Indian votes when he ran as an independent candidate in 1957 hoping
Indians would support him (SN Apr 3, 2013; Jan 21, 2010; KN May 14, 2010). Kwayana
was subsequently expelled from the PNC in 1961 when he issued a call for power sharing
between the PPP (Indians) and PNC (Africans) and the division of the country into three
ethnic states – one for Indians, one for Africans, and one for mixed communities and
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other groups (Ibid; KN May 29, 2013) (https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0739104489)
Section G. Jagan’s Agro Policy & African Charges of Ethnic Discrimination:
After Jagan was installed as Chief Minister following his victory at the 1957
polls, his government began to develop the rice and sugar industries, controlled by
Indians, which provided the highest earnings, most hard currency exchange, and critical
revenues to develop other parts of the economy and which accounted for 50% of national
revenue and employment (http://countrystudies.us/guyana/53.htm). Rattle-snaked
infested swamps were transformed into some of most flourishing agricultural schemes
that the colony had seen and that the Caribbean had never experienced (Seenarine: 2006).
Jagan had to fight Burnham and the colonial authorities tooth and nail to develop those
lands (Ibid; KN Mar 31, 2009; GC Nov 25, 2013). The investment in and development of
agriculture not only increased food production, but also created employment and
stimulated the development of parallel commercial and other entities (KN Jun 10, 2013;
GC May 26, 2012; Aug 14, 2010). But Burnham and PNC leaders accused Jagan of
favoring his ethnic supporters with his agro-focused policy; Indians dominated the sugar
and rice industries. The fact is Jagan distributed significant amounts of lands to Africans
to pursue farming but they were not attracted to farming and the land was not farmed.
Sugar and rice were the backbone of the economy providing over 60% of revenues to the
state and agriculture accounted for over 50% of the GDP as well as over half of all
employment. Even in 2006 and up till now, Guyana’s GDP originating in agriculture
remains remarkably large for a Lower Middle Income country and it has been that way
for decades. It doubled (over 33%) the expected value of 16.6 percent for a country with
Guyana’s economic characteristics, and more than double her Caricom sister state
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Belize’s share (14.1 percent) and almost tripled its neighbor Suriname’s share (10.8
percent). http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK761.pdf As late as 1992, after acquiring
ownership in 1976 and diversification, the state owned sugar company, Guysuco,
provided employment for 24,000 workers remaining the largest industry in the nation. It
produced 40% of export earnings, 87% of the profits of all state corporations (that made
up 80% of the economy) combined and was the biggest contributor to government
revenues (Stabroek News August 22, 1993). In 2007, the sugar industry remained the
largest employer in the nation and contributing as much as 16% of government revenues
(Chronicle May 11, 2011). Bauxite production (under the dominance of Africans
workers) was for several years the second largest contributor to the economy in terms of
revenues although rice production employed more workers. But the bauxite industry
encountered serious management problems and almost collapsed. Rice became the
second largest earner of foreign exchange, source of employment and contributor of
government revenues during the 1980s and thru 2010. And altogether, historically,
agriculture provided over half of the revenues for the state and employment for almost
50% of the workers (over 80% of Indians) of the society and contributed the bulk of the
GDP in the country during the anti-colonial struggle and the two decades right after
independence (GC Oct 15, 2012; May 14, 2011).
The fact that the base of his supporters came from the farming sector may have
played a role in the Jagan administration pouring significant resources into farming.
After all politics is about rewarding supporters and looking after their interests. But for
Burnham and the PNC to claim that Jagan’s agro policies were racially motivated was
without merit as Guyana was a primary agro-producing economy without an industrial
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base. The government had no choice but to invest its limited resources in agriculture as
that was the base of its economy and where it enjoyed comparative advantage and where
it had the greatest factors of production and sure ways to earn revenues. Income from
agriculture was used to fund development and a budding industrial base. Unfortunately,
Guyanese society was (is) so divided that any policy or action, even if non-racial in its
objective, was (is) seen as racially motivated and Burnham was playing up to its base by
accusing Jagan of discriminating against Africans when no evidence supported such
charges (GC Mar 13, 2012; KN Mar 4, 2010)(www.landofsixpeoples.com/gypppciv.htm).
Burnham and Afro leaders stirred up their followers telling them that Jagan was
pursuing policies benefiting Indians at the expense of Africans (GC Jul 5, 2011; Feb 2,
2011). Indeed, Jagan did try to promote opportunities for all regardless of race in small
business enterprises as well as in farming but inevitably Indians benefited more than
Africans. This was because so few Africans were in business enterprises and in such
farming sector as growing rice or sugar. In an article in Guyana Chronicle (March 31,
2011), an African, Oscar James, noted “how Jagan’s government helped many people of
all races to start their small businesses. Jagan did not view people based on their race and
instead saw good in people and helped them accordingly”. Jagan’s perspective on
development was shaded by his personal ideology and his desire to bring change to the
colonial order (SN May 25, 2011) to better peoples’ lives and not by ethnicity, as
Burnham charged. However, Jagan did try to hire Indo-Guyanese to balance the racial
composition in government positions (some 90% African in composition) and in the
security services (forming a new Tactical Services Unit (KN Jan 8, 2014) which were
overwhelmingly Afro Guyanese remaining so up until this time. This aggravated tensions
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with the African community and many began to feel alienated from the Jagan
government providing a source of anger that was exploited by the PNC leadership and the
colonial officials to destabilize Jagan’s government. Burnham succeeded in convincing
his supporters that Jagan was anti-African bent on discriminating against them. He also
told Christian community that Jagan would install pernicious anti-religious communism
in Guyana. Burnham’s PNC forces were determined to provoke confrontation with the
Jagan government and his supporters to destabilize him from office. Burnham vowed to
take actions to topple the Indian-based PPP government, and he instigated Africans into
anti-PPP actions (Seenarine: 2006). He and the PNC threatened the peace and stability of
the society with ethnic violence. This only served to widen the racial schism between the
two major races (GC Feb 2, 2011; KN May 16, Mar 19, 2013)(Paul N. Tennassee in
http://www.guyanajournal.com/race1_pt.html).
Section H. Cold War & Jagan’s Left Politics; Launch of Liberal UF party
While Jagan was in office as Premier of Guyana, the cold war was intensifying
between the East and West and Guyana would become a pawn in the dispute as the USSR
backed Jagan’s quest for independence from Britain, much to the chagrin of the US and
Britain. Jagan had belonged to and supported various left wing movements. In addition,
he allied with the Eastern bloc and his rhetoric was strongly anti-West and pro-Soviet
thus angering the Western powers. In 1959, the Cuban revolution occurred. The Jagan
government quickly recognized the Fidel Castro regime defending it in various local and
international forums. This complicated political matters for Jagan and his quest for
Guyana’s independence and the establishment of a socialist society (KN Aug 30, 2011).
The rise of left wing governments in Guatemala and Guiana and the setting up of a
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communist regime in Cuba in a region that the US perceived to be its “backyard”
heightened U.S security sensitivity (www.h-net.org/.../showre...). Washington felt it
could not take any chances in Guyana with the rise of left wing governments even if these
were democratically elected. “This rendered the US even more responsive to, as it were,
‘nip in the bud’ any attempts at setting up communist governments in the region”
(www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.html) (Rabe: 2005).
Granting independence to Guiana was considered untenable although the parties and
the colonial authority agreed that the victorious party at the 1957 general elections would
take the colony from self-rule to independence. The US and Britain did not want to give
independence to Guyana under a Marxist-led Jagan government fearing Jagan’s turn to
the left and the rise of another Cuba. Instead, Britain suggested that independence be
delayed to prepare the colony for nationhood and recommended another election be held
to address the issue of which party would take the colony to freedom. The British and the
US felt this would give them time to exploit the division in Guianese society to put “their
man” in office. They noted the ideological differences between Jagan and Burnham and
played on them to prevent any alliance between the two leaders as well as to further the
racial division within the society given the serious racial tensions between 1957 and 1961
with the colony ready to explode in violence. Convinced they could not get Jagan to mend
his doctrinaire Marxist way, the two western powers moved to co-opt Burnham offering
him financing for his party’s election campaign. The US felt it could work with Burnham
as he did not share Jagan’s radical vision on global socialism and a utopian socialist
Guiana. With regards to their ideological positions, as Hookumchand (2006) pointed out,
Jagan saw economic exploitation of the working class and of the colony’s natural
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resources as the main obstacles to development and progress in Guyana, and he
committed himself to expelling the colonialists. Jagan wanted to radically alter the sociopolitico and economic structure of the colony to benefit the poorer classes. In contrast,
Burnham had no qualms with foreign exploitation of Guianese resources as he felt such
exploitation was necessary for development, and unlike Jagan, he recognized Guyana
was in no position to challenge British-American hegemonic control of Guyana or the
region. Jagan was convinced socialism would triumph over capitalism in the world
including over the Americas and British, and he worked towards that goal. In contrast,
Burnham was a pragmatist recognizing the dominance of capitalism in the Western
hemisphere and biding his time until the right time when the British would put him in
office. Jagan was naïve about geo-politics whereas Burnham understood geo-political
interests (Hookumchand: 2006; GC Jul 21, 2013; KN 16, 2014; March 14, 2014; SN Mar
15 & Jan 8, 2009) (see also www.guyana.org/.../declassified...; www.lse.ac.uk/.../fiel...).
The British and the Americans were not pleased with Jagan’s socialist rhetoric
and made no secret of their desire to oust him because they could not trust him with
power and control over a state in the Caribbean region that could ally with Cuba (SN Sep
4, 2010). At the same time also, Burnham’s African supporters were not comfortable with
and were opposed to PPP rule that they labeled as “Indian” rule and wanted to replace it
with their own African rule with their hero Burnham at the helm of the government (SN
Sep 2, 2010; Seenarine: 2006). The Africans were committed to and rallied behind their
local hero (SN Oct 16 & 8, 2013). And Burnham opportunistically jumped on the
Western bandwagon to fight communism (SN Dec 28, 2014). He was not concerned
about perceptions of his stance as pro-imperialist or that he was allowing himself to be
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manipulated by the British and the Americans based on his self promoted moderate
ideological position (Jagan: 1972). The US and Britain began to conspire with Burnham
and his opposition PNC party as well as with labor unions to undermine Jagan’s
government while backing Burnham without showing any concern for the racial
consequences that would result from their actions in supporting one party over the other
(Seenarine: 2006; GC Mar 10, 2014; KN Oct 7, 2012; Oct 29, 2010, Sep 27, 2010)
The colonial governor dissolved the National Assembly in 1961 and scheduled
elections with a promise for full internal self-government to be followed by
independence. The year was significant in that the Portuguese based party United Force
was formed under Peter D’Aguiar’s (a business tycoon) leadership that would also appeal
to Amerindian and the so called Colored or Mixed race voters (GC May 31, 2011). The
UF represented the ethnic interests of the Portuguese, Chinese, Amerindian and the
wealthy lighter skinned Mixed races. Peter D’Aguiar, a Guyanese-was a beverage tycoon
who advocated for close ties with the capitalist powers and a continuation of British rule
in the colony. D’Aguiar was avowedly anti-communist and favored the status quo
governance of Guiana as well as continued colonial control of Guiana. However,
Burnham and Jagan agreed that whichever party won the elections would take the colony
to independence and got the approval of the colonial authority for that position that was
opposed by D’Aguiar. The British Government expanded the legislature to 35 seats and
gerrymandered the constituency boundaries in order to give the opposition parties an
electoral advantage. The British were confident Burnham, with split voting (of the Indian
votes) from the formation of the UF, and with D’Aguiar’s help, would win the election
and solve the communist “Jagan problem” rendering him insignificant in the politics.
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However, the boundary manipulation did not prevent the PPP from winning the 1961
elections by a substantial margin. Jagan’s party won 20 of the 35 seats (with 43% of the
votes) with the PNC winning 41% of the votes and 11 seats and the UF four seats with
16% of the vote. The support for the parties pretty much corresponded with the
geographical (ethnic) demographics of the constituencies. The PPP won the rural seats
where the Indian voters predominated. The PNC won the urban seats where African
voters predominated. And the UF won in Georgetown (wealthy areas) and the hinterland
seats among Whites, Mixed and the Amerindian voters who were under the control of the
White Christian missionaries; the latter supported and campaigned for the Portuguese
dominated UF (KN Oct 10, 2012).
Section I. US Intervention & Second Overthrowing of Jagan
Although Jagan won the 1961 elections convincingly, the British and Americans decided
to break their promise of granting Guiana independence. It wanted to make life difficult
for his left wing PPP government that persisted with its implementation of a radical proworking class program that would alter power relations between the bourgeois forces and
working classes. The PPP was unable to govern the colony as both the British and
Americans, opposed to the party's declared communist ideology, carried out clandestine
activities to destabilize the government. Opposition motivated violence, supported by
external actors (British Intelligence, CIA, AFLCIO, etc.), led to acts of arson and looting
that were carried out by supporters of the UF and PNC against supporters of the PPP
(Erriah: 72). The two factions (parties) mobilized along racial lines to contest elections in
1961 amidst serious racial tension and animosity. This was followed by violent race riots in
1962 and 1963. After law and order was restored by British troops in late 1963, strong racial
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tensions and sporadic race violence continued through December 1964 (KN Jan 6, 2013;
May 13, 2012; Feb 21, 2010)(www.itnsource.com/shotlist/BHC_ITN/.../X10076301-0).
Jagan defied western hegemony at a time when (during the 1960s) superpower
rivalry between the United States and the U.S.S.R. for spheres of influence was gaining
momentum. Many third world leaders were either overthrown or forced to vacate office
for pursuing policies that were considered inimical to the interests of the United States.
Jagan received no sympathy when in October 1961 he met President John F. Kennedy at
the White House asking for US aid for what was expected to be his new independent
nation (KN Aug 28, 2009). Jagan described himself as a Fabian socialist who was only
intersted in income equality and improving the lot of the working class. But he made the
mistake of praising socialist rule thus sealing his fate with JFK who concluded Jagan
could not be trusted to keep Guyana from being an ally of the USSR. The US was very
concerned that Guyana could become a beachhead for the Soviet Union in South
America. Jagan failed to assuage JFK’s concern. Arthur Schlesinger in his book, One
Thousand Days (1965), as well as declassified US documents released by the State
Department in the mid-1990s, reveal that following Jagan's visit to the White House,
Kennedy gave the CIA orders to destabilize and topple Jagan's government. Burnham
was felt to be a safer bet. Kennedy said he could not trust Jagan (because of his
doctrinaire leftist position) leading an independent Guyana in the Western hemisphere to
the detriment of US sphere of influence. Burnham, on the other hand won the US
confidence, and he was described as “stoutly anti-communist” (Schlesinger 1965: 778-9;
KN Jun 5, 2010; Nov 27 & Aug 28, 2009; Rabe: 2005).
President Kennedy’s assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, using reports from the CIA for
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his analysis of the Guyana situation, advised President Kennedy “an independent Guyana
under Burnham would cause the US fewer problems than one under Jagan” (Ibid).
Kennedy urged Britain to withhold independence from Guyana until Jagan was removed
from power and that Britain and US skilfully used Burnham, the PNC, labor unions, the
Christian churches to make the country ungovernable (Jagan:1972). This was a strategy
that PNC would use again and again during the last 21 years in Guyana under PPP rule
(KN Aug 28, 2009). In a country where the racial divisions between African and Indian
tended to coincide with the geographical divisions of urban-coastal (Georgetown) and
rural-interior, respectively, as well as with the agricultural and industrial/service sectors
(including control of the docks) of the economy, Burnham's political base in Georgetown
and urban areas and in the strategic centers of government (bureaucracy and police force)
gave him great strength to bring Jagan and the PPP to their knees. In short, he could
wreck the economy. It is pertinent to note that Burnham was elected mayor of
Georgetown in 1959 and again in 1964 and served as president of the Guyana Bar
Association in 1959 – so he had enormous powers at his disposal to cripple the Indian
government through his supporters. It was against a background of the Cold War between
the USSR and U.S that internal political processes in Guyana assumed meaning and
significance, particularly from the American perspective (KN Oct 20, Jun 30, 2012). The
United States has long regarded the Caribbean as its natural and legitimate sphere of
influence that has its genesis the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, but it assumed greater
meaning and significance following the end of the World War II when Communism
emerged as a world system threatening American hegemony (Seenarine: 2006). Guyana
got caught up in the battle of the hemisphere between the Soviet and Western alliances
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for ideological domination and hegemonic control of countries. The Cuban Missile crisis
further complicated Guyana’s situation (KN Jan 16, 2014). Harold Wilson had also
described Guyana’s communist situation as posing serious difficulties for him and
relations with the US. President Johnson, in response to the Cuban Revolution and with
specific reference to Guyana, stated explicitly: “The American nation cannot, should not,
and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the western
hemisphere” (Chronicle June 2, 2009; Erriah: 86-87). It was because of the Cold War and
Jagan’s rabid communist, anti USA, pro USSR position, that the US and UK decided to
conspire against him to remove him from office and install Burnham and the PNC
(Seenarine: 2006)(home.uchicago.edu/~rts1/guyanese.htm).
The communist bogey would hurt the PPP causing fear among the local business
community, the Western powers, and the Christian forces. The US and Britain were
determined to destabilize the left wing Jagan regime. The British-American axis played
the races against each other using Burnham and other ethnic leaders (of business,
churches, and labor) as puppets on a string. Burnham was willing to collaborate with the
British-American axis to destabilize the Jagan government in exchange for their support
to make him leader of the country. As Jagan and others noted, Burnham used his African
support base in tactical violent racial skirmishes creating instability that devastated the
economy while simultaneously undermining the ability of Jagan’s government to impose
law and order. There were politically driven strikes, demonstrations, arson and sabotage
of factories and state offices by Africans, Whites and Coloreds against the PPP
government (Ibid). As President of the African workers union (BGLU), Burnham led the
public servants, dominated by Africans and Coloreds, in crippling strikes against Jagan’s
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working class friendly budget and a Labour Relations Bill that would empower trade
unions (KN Mar 30, 2014). Burnham took to the streets, telling the nation Jagan wanted
to make Guyana a communist state (with no truth to the claim) with this bill
(www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.html.) urging them to join him in
opposing it. The US CIA and the AFLCIO provided active, clandestine and covert
support, as the N.Y Times reported (GC Jan 30, 13; KN Aug 28, 2009; Rabe: 2005), to
fund the labor strikes and to help plan and execute the arson attacks (KN Dec 21, Feb 26,
2009). The Christian churches also played a role to destabilize the government. The
objective was to cripple the Indians and bring down Jagan’s government.
Striking workers were paid from funds provided by the American CIA through
the national labor union AFL-CIO. Right wing Guyanese labor leaders and anti-Jagan
opponents were flown to Panama and trained in destablization tactics to bring down
Jagan. The powerful AFL-CIO was funded to stir up anti Jagan violence (Jagan: 1972).
As president of the BGLU, Burnham did not object to CIA involvement in local union
activities (financing strikes and striking workers’ wages as well as racial violence), which
helped to undermine Jagan’s pro working class government (Ibid, KN Sep 26, 2010; Aug
29, 2010) www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.html.) The strikes took on
racial aspects when vandalism and arson were directed against Indian owned businesses
and Indians were beaten while businesses of other ethnic groups were spared of attacks.
The Christian churches were also used in anti-government activities suporting the strikes
and fanning the racial strife. The Christian Church, with funding from their American
counterparts, played a critical role in dividing the population between Christians and nonChristians (almost all the Indians around 1955 were Hindus and Muslims and even those
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Indians who were Christians were viewed as Hindus or Muslims and targeted for
attacks)(http://indiafacts.co.in/religious-crusades-cia/). Africans had feared Indian
domination of the country -- that Guyana being controlled by Indians (under a PPP
administration) would become part of India that had recently obtained its independence.
The Africans wanted to stop the PPP from taking Guyana to independence at all costs.
The colonial authority exploited the various fissures and social dynamics in the society to
topple the PPP from office (Ibid; KN Nov 30, 2014; SN Jan 21, 2007; Rabe: 2005).
According to the well known and respected American journalist, Drew Pearson,
“President Kennedy was to visit only Rome and Bonn in the summer of 1963 but London
was added to the itinerary because of Kennedy’s haunting worry that British Guiana
would get its independence from England in July 1963 and set up another communist
government under the guidance of Fidel Castro” (Ibid; Jagan: 1972). Pearson continued:
“It wasn’t in the communiqué issued by the United States and England after the
Kennedy–Macmillan meeting but the main thing they agreed on was that the British
would refuse to grant independence to Guiana because of the general strike against procommunist Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan.” (Ibid; KN Jul 25, 2010; Aug 23, 2013; Jagan:
1972)(news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1817&dat...id...).
Also, Neil Sheehan, writing in the New York Times of February 21, 1967 in an
article headed “CIA linked to strikes that helped oust Jagan” accused the CIA of working
under cover of an American Labour Union to organize strikes in British Guiana in 1962
and 1963 against the Jagan government. A similar charge was made out by the Insight
Team, which in an article published in the Sunday Times (London) April 1967 wrote: “As
coups go, it was not expensive; over five years the CIA paid out something like
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£250,000. For the colony of British Guiana, the result was about 170 dead, thousands
wounded, 1000 homes destroyed, roughly £10 million worth in damages to the economy
and a legacy of racial bitterness.” (Chronicle June 5, 2009). Much of Georgetown’s
commercial areas were gutted by fire during race rioting as Indian businesses were
targeted by PNC affiliated mobs. Other areas (mixed villages) also erupted into racial
violence Dispossession led tens of thousands to move to neighborhoods populated by
their own race. Because of the charged and volatile atmosphere and the fear generated
thereof, entire families were forced to abandon their homes to seek refuge in ‘ethnic
enclaves’. These race riots led to the purging of mixed villages (KN Sep 26, 2010; Jul 6,
2009). Indian minorities were displaced from African dominated villages and African
minorities were displaced from Indian dominated villages. The Chinese, Whites,
Amerindians and Mixed races were left unscathed during the riots. After decades of
living together, Indians and Africans became sworn enemies although they has been an
increase in co-mingling since the 1960s (KN Aug 24 & Jun 6, 2013; Jan 1, 2011;
www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.html.)
Section J. Burnham’s Racial Campaign:
Burnham was roundly condemned for his racist campaign. In one speech,
Burnham challenged his supporters through racial fears, reinforcing their sense of power
to cripple the country, telling Africans “you do not realise your power in bringing the
PPP government to its knees” (Ibid). Burnham appealed to his constituents focusing on
“disgusting remarks pertaining to race” telling them “a Jagan government meant an
“Indian” government (and ‘Indian racial victory’) and the destined subjugation of
Blacks” (Ibid). Burnham’s racial campaign also included coded words to describe Indians
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for his supporters describing the PPP as “a coolie” or “rice government” (Ibid). At a
public meeting in May 1963, Burnham threatened the PPP government to shift his
agitation from Georgetown where Africans predominated to “the places where they grow
rice” (meaning the rural areas). Rice is loaded with racial overtones as it symbolized
Indian-populated districts (Ibid). PNC supporters used to describe the Indian PPP
administration as a “rice government” because of its support for agriculture that resulted
in less funds and resources being made available for the Black urban areas. Dr. D.J.
Taitt, a founding member of the PNC was horrified with Burnham’s racial campaign
accusing Burnham of “leading its members into a blind alley of improvised tribalism at
variance with the economic and social realities of the two major ethnic groups of our
country” (Ibid) and disassociated himself from Burnham. Also, an Indian stalwart, Jai
Narine Singh, who served with Jagan in the 1950s but fell out with Jagan because he was
opposed to Jagan’s Marxism and who had served as a very close ally of Burnham in the
PNC, and even supported Burnham during the 1950s resigned from the PNC after
criticizing the party’s “Africanisation”. Singh wrote, “Burnham, had become a man
whose head has grown too big for his hat.” (Ibid; Jagan: 1972). Also, the London
Commonwealth Office accused Burnham of engaging in racial propaganda and violence
to win political support (Ibid). The British and Americans, who were his sponsors, were
also turned off by Burnham’s extremist racial appeal and subsequently rebuked his racist
approach (Ibid) (see www.gxsellit.com/.../forbes-burnham-and-the-making-of-modern-guyan...).
Although political violence and ethnic confrontation were not new, as they were
institutionalized in Guyana and had their roots in the indenturedship era, it really became
more pronounced when the two groups became competitors for political power failing to
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work as a united multi-ethnic group towards self-rule. Indisputably, the violence of the
1960s was part of a covert operation sponsored by the US to prevent the rise in the
Caribbean of an independent nation under a left wing Jagan that was seen as a threat to
American security and business interests in a region viewed by the US as its backyard.
The New York Times (NYT) reported that the perpetrators of racial violence were trained
by the CIA and had on its payroll several anti-Jagan political leaders including Forbes
Burnham. The NYT reported that Black American leaders (including businessman Percy
Sutton of Manhattan) from the US bankrolled Burnham’s political campaign to unseat the
Indian Jagan from office (KN Jan 16, 2014; Feb Aug 10, 2012).
Burnham justified his violent undertaking against Indians and the PPP forces
saying “it was an offensive precautionary measure in defense against PPP planned
violence”. He accused the PPP of planning violence against the PNC and its supporters
and so justified PNC’s preparations to target the PPP with the statement that the “party
must be in a position to apply the remedy against the PPP (meaning race violence)”
(Ibid). The police broke up an X-13 plan by the PNC to undertake violent actions that
would have wiped out the leadership of the PPP and large numbers of the party’s
supporters and Indian businesses. But no action was taken against the X-13 planners or
Burnham to stop racially inspired violence. And when asked by the Governor to help end
the racial disturbances, Burnham responded that he “did not have petrol to travel around
to tell his supporters to stop the violence” (Ibid). But he had petrol to set buildings ablaze.
He also stated that, “those who called off the dogs (violent attackers) own the dogs”. It
was well known and established that Burnham had let loose the dogs of war against the
PPP administration (Ibid; KN Jun 12, 2013; Oct 26 2012; Aug 15, 2011; Nov 5 & May
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22, 2009; see also www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.html.)
The race riots rendered the colony ungovernable not to mention that the economy
was brought to a standstill. Troops were rushed in from England to bring social stability
but taking an anti-Jagan position as ordered by the Governor to destabilize the
government so as to help the opposition capture power. Local police were not taking
orders from the PPP Home Affairs Minister. There was a civil war like situation where
Blacks burnt homes and businesses of Indians and Indians drove out Africans from their
villages. Africans were driven out of villages where Indians were the majority and
Indians were driven out of villages where Africans predominated. During the ensuing
melee, hundreds lost their lives. Also, homes worth millions of dollars were ravaged.
Many people abandoned their homes for safety in other areas never to recover them. The
British troops restored order and remained on the colony for years, but the situation did
not calm down until July 1963. Racial violence swept the colony again in 1964 and a
state of emergency was restored (KN Dec 31, 2011). “In May 1964, the Negroes at
Wismar formed themselves into gangs and went to the business places and homes of the
Indians and demanded the keys of the safety boxes and drawers in which they kept their
cash, jewelry and other valuable articles. Shortly afterwards, a house at Third Alley was
set on fire and soon the whole area became an inferno as the gangs roamed looting,
burning and terrorizing the 1,600 Indians as they tried to escape. Every man, woman and
child was attacked. The men were brutally beaten and the clothes of the women and even
girls of tender ages were ripped away. The women and girls were raped in full public
view by gangs of men.”— (Dwarka Nath, A History of Indians in Guyana, 1950;
http://www.guyanaundersiege.com/History/wismar/wismar%20page.htm).
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Rakesh Rampertab (2001) wrote that “the racial and political instability and
violence, resulting in the loss of many lives and millions of dollars of damage, all
financed by the US, gave the British the excuse they wanted to deny independence under
Jagan’s rule”. As Rampertab (www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.html)
explained, “it was the convergence of Jagan’s left wing policies, his dalliance with the
Cubans and Russians and American backed anti-communist destabilization that mainly
led to Indian-African racial violence between 1961 and 1964 and that would lead to the
ultimate removal of the PPP from the office in December 1964”.
Rampertab (Ibid) noted the political unity between the two dominant races in the
early 1950s that brought them together to fight against the exploiting British business
interests could no longer hold to moderate their behavior of “live and let live” (see also
Seenarine: 2006). Thereafter, Burnham intensified his campaign, as encouraged by the
British, to change the voting system from first past the post to Proportional
Representation appealing to the British and Americans to remove the “communist” Jagan
from power (SN Oct 1, 2008). The British and the CIA had recognized that Jagan’s PPP
won a majority of seats with a minority of votes. They reasoned that if the electoral
system were to be changed to Proportional Representation (PR), Jagan would be defeated
with the combined votes of the PNC and UF that totaled more than the PPP’s – it was a
sure way to defeat the left wing Jagan (KN Feb 21, 2014); in 1961, PPP got 43%
(plurality of votes with a majority of seats), PNC 41% and UF 16% (SN Dec 16, 2014).
Prof. Henrey Jeffrey of UG noted how Jagan (Chief Minister in 1953, 1957 to
1961 and Premier from 1961 to 64) organized protests and rallied his supporters against
the British electoral plan (of P.R) for Guiana. “In February 1964, a sugar strike was
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called and work on all the sugar plantations ceased” (Ibid; also Jagan 1970: 305) to
protest the new electoral system. The sugar workers were almost all Indians and they
supported Jagan in the conflict with the British and the African PNC. The ruling PPP
supporters shouted: “Cheated not defeated” and urged its members to resist the change in
the electoral system (SN May 30, 2011; Oct 5, 2007).
Dr. Jeffrey, who served as Jagan’s cabinet Minister between 1992 and 1997,
wrote: “it was this salutary experience that brought home to Dr. Jagan the cost of
struggling against international capital” (KN May 6, 2011). Jeffrey quotes British Prof.
Peter Simms who had this to say of Dr. Jagan: “Perhaps his greatest achievement was to
found a party that was above racial strife, but when he was forced to resign power in
1964, hundreds of people had died, been wounded or lost their property in three years of
ever worsening civil strife. He was by that time so far from reality that his government
had ceased to care whether those who voted it into power lived or died (Peter Simms
Trouble in Guyana, p186; also cited in KN May 6, 2011).
Prof. Jeffrey blames “Jagan’s attempt to establish communism in Guyana, as
being responsible for making the country a superpower playground and more
disastrously, for confronting international capital when obstacles were placed in his way”
Ibid). This indeed would lead to the undoing of the communist Jagan. The Indians
objected to the changing of the electoral system that was not carried out in any other
colony (like Trinidad or Fiji, for example) facing similar ethnic conflict. The imposition
of proportional representation was described by former British Prime Minister Harold
Wilson as a “fiddled constitutional arrangement” aimed at removing the popular and
democratically elected PPP from office (Jagan: 1972). Parliament was dissolved
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prematurely and new elections scheduled for December 1964 under the new electoral
system. Jagan mustered only 47% of the votes while the PNC got 42% and the UF 11%.
The British appointed governor, breaking tradition of asking the largest party after an
election to attempt to form a government, directed Burnham and D’Aguiar instead to
form a coalition government with Burnham as Premier. At first, Jagan approached
Burnham to form a coalition government with Burnham as the Premier but Burnham
declined Jagan’s offer and his African Mixed supporters sided with him to keep the PPP
and the Indians out of office. Burnham was sworn in as Premier and D’Aguiar (as the
leader of the Portuguese, Amerindians and Chinese) as the Finance Minister. With that
move, Jagan’s fate was sealed. The US had achieved its goal of removing the communist
threat. The coalition did not reflect the wishes of the electorate as both the PPP and PNC
were left oriented while the UF was an anti-Socialist, pro-business bourgeois party. In
response to the coalition arrangement, Jagan stated: “I cannot understand the logic which
accepts the principle of a coalition yet permits the foundation of a government which
excludes the largest popular movement – his 47% of the votes (Jagan 1972: 327; Erriah:
84-85). It can be argued, not without justification, that “the introduction of PR, as
opposed to the previous first past the post constituency model, reinforced ethnic
cleavages in the society rather than solved the ethnic dilemma or reduced ethnic tension”
– forcing people to stick to ethnic voting. This was borne out in the elections of 1964,
according to an article in Guyana Chronicle (Mar 20, 2011), which saw party support
bearing a striking resemblance to the ethnic makeup of the society. This came about
largely, notes the article, “because of the incessant attacks on the PPP by the opposition
parties and calculated and contrived maneuvers on the part of opposition elements to
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project the PPP as an ‘Indian’ party” (Ibid; see Table section).
It was because Burnham was not a communist, not anti US and not pro USSR that
he was put in power by the US to keep Guyana in the American axis (KN Jan 16, 2014;
Mar 19, 2011). Jagan was pig headed and went against the wishes of his Indian advisors
to abandon communism so that the Americans would not conspire against him and or
would not take actions that would hurt his Indian supporters (KN Mar 3, 2013; Oct 14,
2013). Jagan failed to read the geopolitical constraints he faced in allying with the
Soviets in the backyard of the imperialist US that had already toppled him once before in
1953, repeatedly broke promises (in 1957 and 1961) of granting Guiana independence
under him because of his radical views, and overthrew or destabilized leftwing
governments in the region (KN Mar 1, 2011). He defiantly declared the PPP to be a
disciplined Marxist Leninist Party that was aligned with the Communist Party of the
USSR (KN Mar 19, 2011; Feb 8, 2011; Tennassee: 2010) and he would not be allowed
back in power in the Cold War environment because of his communist beliefs. With
Burnham leading Guiana, the US and Britain felt a sense of relief that communism was
defeated in Guiana. Prof. Arthur Schlesinger wrote “With much unhappiness and
turbulence, Guiana seemed to have passed safely out of the communist orbit” (Erriah: 87;
Schlesinger: 1965; Rabe: 2005; www.home.uchicago.edu/~rts1/guyanese.htm).
Section K. Burnham’s Rise to Power: Ethnic Marginalization & Independence:
The manner in which Burnham rose to power led to a hardening of ethnic
sentiments against him and the PNC especially amongst Indians. And it worsened later on
when he took measures to marginalize other ethnic groups (Portuguese, Amerindians,
Chinese) not wholly supportive of him (KN Dec 23, 2014; Nov SN Mar 1, 2008). Indians,
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in particular, were peeved that they lost power through an underhanded manner and the
conspiracy between Blacks and other groups working in cahoots to keep the Indians out
of office. The Indians were angry that the colony's democratically elected Indian
supported PPP government was manipulated out of power through racial riots and a
conspiracy involving Britain and the US. Burnham collaborated with the US to keep him
in power and guard the ethno interests of his supporters. The largest ethnic group,
Indians, in effect, had no representation in the coalition government.
Racial tensions and disunity persisted through 1965 (SN Oct 11, Aug 28, 2010) as
the PNC-UF coalition government quickly began to consolidate power and to assert
political control while marginalizing Indians. Ethnic violence was tamed and political
stability restored through the use of the coercive apparatus of the state. The opposition
PPP and its supporters were demobilized through repressive force and thus preventing
them from creating trouble for the Burnham-D’Aguiar government. Simultaneously,
Burnham succeeded in consolidating his power putting his supporters in key positions of
the state. Burnham’s PNC entrenched itself in office shoring up the security forces with
party supporters and expunging Indians from key positions in all aspects of governance
(GT Jan 15, 2015, Nov 14, 2014).
With regards to his racial appeals, as Rampertab (2001) pointed out, it is
noteworthy that Burnham made an overture to Indians in his first radio broadcast after
assuming office with the following message: “We wish to let our Indian citizens know
that they can depend on the Black PNC government as they could not upon the previous
Indian administration for peace and security”, an admission he was deeply involved in the
anti-Indian violence (Ibid). However, as Rampertab (2001) stated, “whatever confidence
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existed amongst Indians for Burnham from the early days of the PPP was completely
dissolved by the racial violence he unleashed against them. … Take, for example, the
Wismar massacre, in which a majority Black population engaged in an orgy of violence,
including rape and murder, against the small Indian community there” wiping them out of
the area. The Indians never could return to their homes and the economy of that region
was almost completely devastated with some of the highest forms of unemployment and
depressed price of goods. Wismar (an African urban community) became economically
cursed never to recover till this day. Before the racial massacre, the small Indian
community was involved in commercial activities, lending money to poor Africans, and
in farming activities creating jobs for many Africans as well as for poor Indians. The
standard of living in the greater Wismar area before the race riot was relatively high
compared with the rest of the country because it was the center of mining activities.
Workers in the mining industry received among the highest wages of all industries and
Wismar-McKenzie (Linden) enjoyed perhaps the highest standard of living of any
community in the country with access to various types of goods. From being one of the
more prosperous regions in the country before the ethnic civil war in the 1960s, WismarMcKenzie became blighted during the early 1970s unable to recover; not even unlimited
government subsidies under the PNC or PPP governments could rescue the region, and
even today politicians complain about its declining quality of life (Rampertab: 2001; GT
Jan 29, 30 2014). The greater Wismar area still has among the highest unemployment of
all regions in Guyana (Ibid) and Black politicians constantly complain it is neglected
without delving into the reasons (GC Jan 27, 28, 2014). The same can be said of Buxton
(now an exclusive urban area) and several other multi-racial areas where Africans and
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Indians lived in harmony. However, Wismar-Linden (McKenzie) does receive almost
free electricity from the government and a host of other subsidies but it is still not
progressing like other parts of the country (KN Jan 23, 2014).
Commenting on the 1960s racial disturbances, Dr. Henry Jeffrey, a PNC
ideologue who crossed over to serve as a Minister in Jagan’s and the PPP cabinet (19922008), said Jagan was not without fault in the racial disturbances that occurred during the
1960s. He blamed the political and racial instability of the 1960s on Jagan’s insistence on
communist rule for Guyana (KN May 6, 2011). Jeffrey feels the Americans would not
have intervened in Guyana’s political affairs if Jagan were not a communist, and there
would not have been any racial disturbances that devastated the economy. He penned:
“Jagan came back to Guyana and spearheaded the formation of the PPP, in so doing, he
happened to convince major international and national forces that he was a communist
who would change the geopolitical balance on the South American continent and
imprison his people in a Soviet type regime. ... Jagan was very instrumental in his own
demise. Given the ethnic nature of the society, if Jagan had not been a communist
(posing a threat to the West), the Americans … would not have intervened in Guyana …
and there would have been no Burnham regime of the sort we knew (a reference to
Burnham’s tyrannical rule that devastated the nation)” (Ibid).
The threat of Guyana becoming a communist state had passed with Jagan’s
demise but with a heavy political price – worsening race relations. Burnham would lead
the colony into independence in May 1966 amidst Indian opposition in May 1966 under
Burnham’s leadership. The PNC government inherited the immense constitutional powers
of the colonial state, with the Prime Minister having powers comparable to the former
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governor before independence. The foreign support from the US and UK of the Burnham
regime merely facilitated the consolidation of power by the PNC. Independence to
Guyana was imposed from outside in the name of western hemispheric cold war interests.
This coerced Burnham to remain beholden to the imperialists seeking to keep Guyana as
a western ally in the cold war struggle (SN Sep 3, 2008).
The political policy developed under Burnham oppressed the nation, marginalized
non-supporters, and murdered many political opponents (SN May 16, 2013, KN Apr 8,
2009). Soon after Independence in 1966, a National Security Act was passed that was
very repressive giving the government sweeping powers to search homes and seize
materials as well as to suspend the right of habeas corpus and to restrict and detain
anyone at will without trial for an indefinite period. The law was strengthened to provide
for preventive detention and restriction of movement of persons, control of firearms and
ammunition, powers of search without warrants, and increased police powers. Under this
law, the PNC Government was given the power to impose censorship and the control and
suppression of publications, writings, communications and means of communication, and
to confiscate property. The PNC Government used the protection of this law to subvert
the army, police and judiciary, to crush political opponents. Opposition supporters were
targeted to keep them in line so as not to oppose the regime or to undertake protest
activities that would make the country unstable (KN Apr 30, 2014, Jun 20, 2013).
Immediately after independence, there began a systematic campaign of human
rights violations against opponents, the establishment of a fascist ethnic state and an end
to democratic governance. Institutionalized racism against Indians and other ethnic
groups became the de facto policy after political independence (SN Jul 25, 2008).
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Burnham became an ethno-fascist leader after independence (Thomas: 1984). British
Guiana was one of the most liberal societies prior to independence in 1966 when
advocates of all political ideologies could be found. But with political independence,
Burnham transformed a democratic system into a fascist dictatorship, and the freedom
and equality that Guyanese struggled for (against British imperialism) were never
realized. Ethnic relations were further undermined and ethnic animosity worsened with
the notion that politics consists of the allocation of the spoils of power to members of the
ruling ethnic group to the exclusion of others (SN Mar 25, 2013). Soon, the policies of
ethnic rule changed from one that was based on meritocracy to one based on ethnic
preference to one that would be based on ethnic dominance of one race over the other
races. This occurred as Burnham began to remove Indians and members of other ethnic
groups from government positions and replaced them with Africans (KN Sep 1, 2013).
And by the end of 1967, Burnham had jettisoned its junior partner in coalition -- the U.F
that had opposed his racist policies. Peter D’Aguiar resigned as Finance Minister and
pulled his supporters (Portuguese, Amerindians, Chinese and Coloreds) from the
coalition (SN Dec 16, 19, 2013; Feb 28, 2014; Mar 16, 2014).
As the day for new elections approached, Burnham said, “only a foolish Prime
Minister would lose an election” – a statement that became well known throughout the
Caribbean and that signaled his intention to do whatever was necessary to retain office
(KN Aug 30, 2011). Burnham recognized that the fertility rate in the post-World War II
period resulted in a change in the ethnic composition of the society. The numbers have
been changing since that time as a result of migration (SN Jan 1, 2008; Jul 31, 2009).
Indians grew from 43 percent of the total population in 1946 to a near majority of 50% in
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1968, 51% by 1970, 53% by 1973 and 55% by 1980. During the same period, Africans
and Mixed (or Coloreds) combined decreased from 49 percent in 1946 to around 40
percent between 1968 and 1980. By 1990, Africans were only 30% of the population.
Although the small European (mostly Portuguese) and Chinese population continued to
grow in absolute numbers after World War II, they represented a decreasing proportion of
the population with other groups also increasing in numbers. Many Portuguese began
migrating because of the PNC’s racist policies and by 1968 had declined to less than 5%
of the population and by 1980 had constituted just around 1% – an almost complete
exodus. Constituting the real estate and entrepreneurial class, the Portuguese migrated
because of restrictions placed on their businesses to earn profit (SN Sep 3, 2010). The
Chinese, mostly an entrepreneurial group, also migrated because of the government’s
anti-business and racist policies (Ibid; GT Nov 17, 2014). The increase in the size of
Indians in the population favored the PPP to win the 1968 election (KN May 5, 2014; Apr
6, 2011). The country had remained racially polarized and the Portuguese (and other
Europeans), Chinese and Amerindians had abandoned the PNC describing it as corrupt
and racist and even flirted with the PPP because of their fear of Burnham’s racist
positions. The PPP was assured of a victory in 1968 based on the racial arithmetic. But
Burnham manipulated the racial conflict to rally Blacks around his corrupt rule telling
Africans that Indians would seek revenge (from Africans) of PNC’s mistreatment of
Indians if they (PPP) were to win the elections. Burnham openly appealed for support
based on race solidifying racial identification the single most important determinant of
political behavior (Seenarine: 2006). A racially based "us" versus "them" motif became
very predominant in the hustings in elections in 1968 and thereafter (Glasgow: 1970). "If
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we don't band together, de coolie (Indians) will take over the country", Burnham told his
rallies (KN Sep 11, 2010; SN Jan 3, Aug 19, 2010). And it worked as Africans rallied
around Burnham giving him confidence to take all the necessary measures to guarantee a
victory. Burnham used electoral fraud to safeguard his and African reign over the country
(SN Aug 8, 2013). Burnham rigged the 1968 election in order to address the problem of
his party and his ethnic group being a minority that could not win a free and fair election.
(Guyana: Fraudulent Rev: 1984). It was akin to minority apartheid rule (Trinidad
Guardian Apr 30, 2013; GT Apr 25, 2013). A famous calypso described the rigging as
follows: "The elections in Guyana will be something to remember as an example of the
way one individual is determined to cling to power" (Rampertab: 2007). The magic
majority allowed his PNC party to govern alone. D’Aguiar condemning the massive
fraud perpetrated on voters. The Portuguese-based UF, that unwisely formed a coalition
with the PNC in December 1964, paid a heavy price to its supporters for teeming up with
an untrustworthy political partner (GC June 12, 2012, SN May 4, 2010;
(http://www.guyana.org/features/postindependence/chapter3.html). Burnham proceeded
to rope in a handful of opportunistic Whites and members of the Mixed races who
abandoned their U.F party. This helped Burnham to quell potential dissent and to blunt
any American reaction for breaking relations with his erstwhile UF capitalist coalition
ally (Ibid), KN Sep 26, 2012, Jan 27, 2014; May 5, 2010; May 16, 2010; SN Jul 24, 2010;
see also http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110305110954AARTGw4;
http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=4202&tmpl=printpage).
Section L. Establishment of an Ethnic Dictatorship
The warning of Jesse Burnham, sister of Forbes Burnham, about the ambition of his
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brother saying he would create a dictatorship if he gained power (Jagan: 1972) she turned
out to be correct as Burnham was true to form. After the 1968 election rigging, Burnham
used his two-thirds magic majority to illegally revoke the right to appeal to the
independent British Privy Council (London) to guarantee that no challenges could be
mounted against his rule and against electoral frauds. Burnham consolidated his power
and began to transform the state from a progressive democracy into a de facto one party
totalitarian (fascist) one ethnic group dictatorship. Coercion and control (militarisation of
the state) and clientelism and racial patronage (rewarding people of one's own race
irrespective of competence and merit) were the key instruments in the transformative
process of the state from a democracy to an authoritarian polity (GT Feb 22, 2014). The
result was that a Black-controlled government denied Indians and other ethnic groups any
meaningful participation in the political or socio-economic life of the nation decimating
the private sector under the control of Portuguese and Chinese (KN Jan 7, 2015).
Burnham saw nothing wrong in sending an exclusively African delegation overseas to
represent Guyana at an Expo in 1969 when Indians made up some 55% of the population
and Africans just about 32% at that time. A system of ethnic domination and
subordination (de facto apartheid system) between the minority African race (less than
40%) and majority Indians and other races was institutionalized by the ruling PNC party
which "triumphed in the racial competition" for political domination
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forbes_Burnham).
Burnham began dismantling the democratic pillars of the state that were an
obstacle to authoritarian rule. One of his earliest acts was to undermine the labor
movement by creating a new underclass or lumpen class that became dependent on his
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patronage (a patron-cliente relationship) for economic survival and that would respond to
his requests to engage in political thuggery against the opposition and its supporters
whenever summoned. In establishing this lumpen proletariat, Burnham undermined the
African working class movement by denying them discipline and an ethos that success
comes from hard work (Ibid). He gave them handouts when the Africans used to proudly
toil for their wages during colonial rule developing a strong and disciplined work ethic.
He was successful at acquiring complete control over the independent Trades Union
Congress which became a group subservient to him and against the interests of the
working class (SN Jul 25, 2008). The Black workers followed the directives of Burnham
who himself was honorary leader of the Public Service Union. Burnham saw the need to
establish patronage and a client-patron relationship between himself and his supporters to
keep him and the PNC in power forever (KN Mar 23, 2014). Burnham created the new
underclass to use against the political opposition and union leaders as well as to do his
racial bidding for their bread and butter thus destroying a once amiable relationship that
existed among the races while also negating the radicalism that once existed among the
militant Black unions (KN May 16, 2010). The African underclass was conditioned by
what came to be known as Burnhamism -- a fascist oppressive form of rule accompanied
by racist lunacy that targeted White human rights activists or Indian workers who
demanded higher wages and fringe benefits from state corporations. Burnham used his
goons to attack opponents and he himself punished Indians without any concerns for
what the international community would think and even when his policy meant the
destruction of the country’s economy. He was interested in holding on to power at all
costs and by any means necessary through the systematic use of Machiavellian tactics, as
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sister Jesse warned (www.guyanacaribbeanpolitics.com/wpa/rodney_wazirmohamed.html) (see
also Jagan: 1972; KN Jun 3 2011; guyanajournal.com/ss_lfsb.html).

The PNC transformed the liberal colonial state into a neo colonial authoritarian
state and later into a fascist state that practiced state sponsored terror and ethnonationalism. The PNC used several techniques such as nationalization, militarization of
its supporters, and control of the judiciary. This unstable government built military and
paramilitary forces (national service, Peoples Militia, Riot Squad, Special Squad, Peoples
Intelligence, etc.) at the expense of other sectors to secure its rule over the nation rather
than pursue policies that would lead to economic growth. The military forces were used
to threaten civil society and democratic institutions. They paraded around the country in
armored vehicles and heavy guns intimidating and harassing people and engaging in
sexual molestations. Naked force was often used, including the killing of opponents
(Walter Rodney, Minister Vincent Teekah, Fr. Bernard Darke, etc.) and the attempted
murder of Prof. Josh Ramsammy and the attempted kidnapping of Prof. Clive Thomas
and eminent journalist Dr. Rickey Singh (who packed up and left) to get people and
political opponents to conform to government dictates (GC Apr 24, 2014). He drove fear
in people to tow the line. Burnham announced the doctrine of the "paramountcy of the
party" whereby the PNC and the state became indistinguishable and the party flag flew at
government and military offices. He set out to inculcate an authoritarian nationalistsocialist ideology into the Black population targeting the youths with make shift
economic programs to create jobs. It was a hodgepodge of ambitious unrealistic goals.
And he carried out development projects appealing only to the African segment of the
population, which constituted a minority. He said he would create a united and “truly
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Guyanese society” which he defined as a society that would be subsumed under African
Creole culture and the miscegenation of the races (GC May 11, 2013).
As so many wrote about Burnham’s Machiavellian ways, including his sister
Jesse Burnham, “the ends justified the means” (Jagan: 1972). Police harassment was
common, and thugs associated with the PNC and its youth arm, the Young Socialist
Movement (YSM), violently broke up public meetings of opposition political parties.
Burnham’s vision of Guyana was “raw undiluted power at all or any cost even it meant
killing brilliant minds like Marxist Walter Rodney, the historian” (KN Oct 2, 2013; SN
Aug 18, 2008), or a Jesuit Priest like Father Bernard Darke or his own friend like Vincent
Teekah. Political control was of paramount importance to Burnham. During Burnham’s
tenure, there occurred the politicization and criminalization of the state (KN Aug 7,
2009). Burnham encouraged radical American Blacks, including some who were
fugitives from American justice, to settle in Guyana providing them with resources and
protection. He then used them to organize and train local PNC forces to unleash a wave
of terror on political opponents and on Indians in particular during the 1970s and 80s – it
was referred to as “kick down door banditry” when armed thugs would prey upon Indian
homes kicking down doors and then robbing them (KN Oct 2, 2013; May 1, 2011; SN
Apr 29, 2008). In addition to ethnic robberies, other atrocities during the PNC era
included rape and murder. Ethnically sanctioned rapes were prevalent at the mandated
National Service for students (KN Jul 4, Jun 20, 2011; see Ravi Dev
www.kaieteurnews.com; Rampertab: 2001). Guyanese also lost their right to freedom of
expression under PNC rule. The PNC government controlled the importation of news
print, book binding machinery, and printing equipment. The regime muzzled any

- 238 -

opposition to the regime (see Harry Gill in KN May 17, 2011).
Election rigging perpetuated the PNC in office and the security forces were used
to keep people in line as well as to rig elections to make it possible for PNC to remain in
office. The command of the security forces (GDF, GPF, GNS, Peoples Militia, etc.) fell
directly under Burnham and they helped to guarantee the rule of the African PNC against
the other ethnic groups using intimidation and violence. Anyone who disobeyed orders
was fired and anyone who challenged Burnham’s order or was seen fraternizing with the
opposition forces disappeared never to be heard from again. After Burnham acquired
power, he recruited supporters into the police and armed forces to protect his rule. He
expanded the armed forces adding various units after the country was granted
independence (GT Jan 1, 2015). Defense allocation increased from $8.76 million in 1973
to $48.72 million in 1976 (500% increase). The Guyana National Service (GNS) (1974)
and the Guyana People’s Militia (1976) and other para-military groups were started.
Thousands were hired for the police force and the brutal para military anti-Riot Squad
(http://www.answers.com/topic/forbes-burnham#ixzz1tBtJfT15) all designed to ensure
that no group would dare challenge him or the PNC in its ethnic domination a la
apartheid South Africa. Burnham had asserted unchallenged control over the nation. He
used the security forces to shore up his power. Prof. Ivelaw Griffith of York College
wrote: “Military personnel were transported around cities to provide audiences at mass
rallies, where Burnham and other top PNC leaders spoke. This allowed the ruling party to
pursue its political and doctrinal socialization of members of the military. In this context,
loyalty by the military was no longer to the constitution, the office of president, and to the
ideals of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Rather it was to the paramount PNC party

- 239 -

and the predominant leader, Forbes Burnham” (GT Jan 23, 2014).
Professionalism in every government sector was completely compromised and all
those in the government bureaucracy as well as in the police and armed forces were
required to swear loyalty to Burnham and the PNC. Anyone who refused to swear
loyalty to Burnham or to attend his rallies was removed from the forces. Anyone whose
loyalty was suspect was also removed or transferred to a far off location to remove any
threat or the person was demoted and some were even executed. The PNC government
relied on the large African security forces (police, army, para military, anti-riot squad,
Peoples Militia, National Service and intelligence apparatus) to protect and
institutionalize its illegal rule. As Lord Avesbury (1981) wrote, the security forces were
used to rig elections that were described as “crooked as barbed wire” (GT Jan 23, 14; SN
Jan 21, 2010). The security forces were also used to cart people around to rallies and to
voting booths to secure the support for the comrade leader. The security forces increased
tenfold in size from 1965 to 1975 (GT Dec 30, 2014) and the budget to maintain the
forces more than doubled during that period increasing to 15.4% of the national budget in
1975 (as compared with a four percent during the 1960s) leaving less funds for economic
development (Erriah: 90). During the 1980s, one in eleven persons in the country was a
member of the security forces (as compared with one in 200 in 1965) making Guyana the
most militarized country in the world on a per capita basis. And as a result, fewer adults
were available for productive work to foster development and economic growth. There
was no way that a government can afford to sustain employment or wages for a lengthy
period for such a large number of non-productive personnel for a country not facing a
threat. Actually, the country could not defend against an outside threat, and it could not
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sustain such a large force with such a limited base of revenues (SN Jul 6, 2010).
The security forces exercised their power randomly and at will and at the slightest
hint or act of dissension. Such repression drew the ire of the population especially those
who questioned the legitimacy of the regime following routine election riggings. The
forces were known for beating and robbing people and demanding goods from small
vendors and shopkeepers. Not surprisingly, the human rights of virtually everyone, and
particularly political activists affiliated with opposition parties, were routinely violated.
Amnesty International repeatedly rated the PNC government during the 1980s as having
one of the lowest ratings of respect for human rights (Guyana: Fraudulent Revolution,
1984). The US State Department in its annual reports throughout the 1970s and 1980s on
Guyana repeatedly identified abuses and irregular police practices against civilians (KN
Dec 25, 2013; Apr 8, 2011; Apr 6, 2009). Among rights violations identified by NGOs,
Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA), Amnesty International and the State
Department were “disappearance of dissidents, killings, torture, abuse of suspects by the
security forces and detainees, poor prison and jail conditions, lengthy pretrial detention,
control of the judiciary and harassment and intimidation of opponents” (Erriah: 90; see
also SN Nov 30, 2009; Aug 14, 2009; Mar 15, 2011; Dann: 1984).
The militarized police-state dictatorship created by Burnham precluded any
means of peaceful regime change as election rigging was institutionalized and the
security forces (ethnic soldiers as described by Prof. Cynthia Enloe) sworn loyalty to
Burnham propping up the dictatorship (www.guyanajournal.com/1968electionfraud.html).
His massive rigging of the 1968 elections gave him a two-thirds magic majority that he
used to quickly revoke the right to appeal to the independent London-based British Privy
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Council. He controlled the judges in Guyana and thereafter no challenges could be mounted
against election rigging and his illegal rule. Then Burnham pursued policies that would
transform the new liberal progressive nation, bequeathed unto him by the British, into an
oppressive dictatorship. He did this by seizing control of the two radio stations and
independent newspapers, declaring Guyana a republic, banning essential foods (flour,
grains, potatoes, onions, ghee, etc.) that form the basic consumption habits of Indians and
other groups, and forbidding paraphernalia utilized by Indians in their religious practices,
among other outrageous acts (GT Jan 5, 2015). In February 1970, Burnham also used his
invulnerable two-third parliamentary majority to end ties to the British Crown declaring
Guyana a republic, and replacing the Queen, through the Governor General, as head of
state with a ceremonial President, a measure that did not receive support among Indians,
Whites and Amerindians (Erriah: 2011; see also SN Sep 19, 2012; Jan 21, 2010). By 1970,
the dictatorship was fully entrenched with Burnham in control of all institutions of the state
(KN Oct 5, 2013; Aug 30, 2011). (www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/.../june-–-a-significantmonth-in-guyana’s- political-calendar; guyanachronicle.com/comparing-jagdeo-regime-andburnham-dictators..; cf. also www.youtube.com/watch?v=NaKCy-pWcXo; GC Aug 5, 2014
https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/rodney-walter/works/peoplespowernodictator.htm;
www.jamaicaobserver.com/.../Guyana-headed-for-dictatorship_1792737...;
www.guyanajournal.com/rigged-election.html; Guyana Times June 4, Feb 20, 2014;
www.encyclopedia.com › People › History › Guyana History: Biographies;
http://www.guyana.org/features/postindependence/chapter23.html;
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guyana; www.guyana.org/.../chapter13....).
countrystudies.us/guyana/17.htm; http://www.factmonster.com/country/guyana.html)
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Chapter 7: Threats to the Unity of the State:
A. Crises in Governance & Elusive Multi-Racial Governance:
The racial strife in Guyana resulted in several crises of governance that threatened
to tear apart the state. For example, during the early 1960s when Indians were in control
of the state, there was a proposal from an African leader (Eusi Kwayana who served
briefly as Burnham’s right hand man) for separate homelands for the ethnic groups (KN
Mar 29, 2013). Also, during the 1960s, race riots degenerated into a civil war and racial
segregation in which mixed (multi-racial) communities were replaced with segregated
communities comprised of just one race. And from 1961 to the present, every election
campaign has been accompanied by racial violence. In elections from 1964 onwards, the
members of the dominant race have unleashed violence against individuals of the
subordinate races. The violence has grown worse since the 1992 election when the
“losing race” (or ethnic party) refused to accept electoral outcomes rendering the country
ungovernable for extended periods; the PNC repeatedly threatened the PPP government
over the last 21 years with ethnic violence to demand concessions (GT Jan 8, 2014). And
at various times during the 1970s and 1980s when Africans were in control of the state,
there was a demand from Indian nationalists for a separate (Indesh) nation (in county of
Berbice) for Indians (Trinidad Guardian Jun 23, 2011; www.guyana.org/.../guyanastor...;
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=923103359X ). The Amerindians also rebelled
against African rule during the late 1960s demanding a state for themselves in the
hinterland appealing for Venezuelan intervention to protect them. The Amerindians were
crushed by African troops sent in by the PNC dictatorship to retake possession of the land
(GT Jan 8, 2014). And during the early 1980s when Venezuela threatened to take over
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two-thirds of Guyana, sections of Amerindian and Indian communities, but not Africans,
sided with the Venezuelan government in the conflict, opting to call themselves
Venezuelans. Because of their abuse, neglect and mistreatment and persecution on
account of their ethnicities (GC Sep 24, 2013), they opposed the racist PNC dictatorship
and sought (and obtained) Venezuelan passports. During the 1980s, thousands of
Guyanese migrated from territories (that have been under Guyana’s control) claimed by
Venezuela and settled into non-disputed Venezuelan territory where they still make their
home unwilling to return to Guyana because of the higher standard of living that they
enjoy in Venezuela. Those Indians and Amerindians who accepted Venezuelan
citizenship were viewed by Afro-Guyanese as unpatriotic for not supporting the racist
PNC government in the territorial dispute.
Multi-racial support eluded PNC’s governance because of its prejudicial policies.
This is not to suggest the PPP has attracted multi-racial support though it is more multiracial in character and in its policies than the PNC. Also, the PPP government distributed
resources equitably among the races (in fact giving more to PNC supporters) and did not
favor party supporters whereas the PNC government discriminated against nonsupporters. Some sixty years after universal suffrage, politics in Guyana is still fought
along racial lines with virtually no success in obtaining cross-racial appeal. This is the
case no matter how many individuals from the other races that the parties put up as
candidates to contest elections or placed in top positions of the parties. Neither of the two
major parties, the Indian-based PPP nor the African based PNC, has been able to attract any
significant following from the other race since 1957 when they emerged as separate entities
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after being one party in 1953.13 And racial conflict is still very strong today some 47 years
after the country’s break from Mother England as the two major groups competed for
control of the state and its resources. And although many other parties have been formed
with the specific aim of being multi-racial, and have claimed as such, they have failed to
garner multi-ethnic support with support largely confined to the ethnicity of the leader of
the party. Despite the presence of other minor parties going back to 1950s and the recent
rise of new political parties (including, among others, the United Force, Working People's
Alliance, Democratic Labor Movement, United Republican Party, Guyana Labor Party,
Guyana Democratic Party, Rise Organize And Rebuild (ROAR), Justice for All, Alliance
for Change, etc.) and civic organizations, the PNC and PPP continue to dominate the
political landscape up until this day winning around 90% of the votes combined. For
example, in the four democratic elections held in October 1992, December 1997, March
2001, August 2006, and November 2011 the two parties combined won between 90% and
94% of the votes. And again in elections held in November 2011, the two parties won
almost 90% of the votes (SN Dec 2, 2011). Genuine multi-racial governance has eluded
Guyana in spite of what the politicians claim in their rosy national pronouncements (KN
Mar 24, 2014). (See also www.guyanajournal.com/race_evolution_behavior_2.html).
Although the two dominant parties have ruled Guyana since self-rule in 1957,
13 Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham formed a multi-racial alliance in the form of the PPP in
1950 that was led by Jagan with Burnham as Chairman but by 1955, it had descended into two
rival racially based PPP factions which contested elections separately in 1957 under Burnham and
Jagan’s leadership. Burnham renamed his faction the PNC after the general election that was
won by Jagan’s faction. Other minor parties also exist deriving their support from the other mini
ethnic groups. The United Force was (and still is largely) supported by Amerindians, Whites and
people of Mixed (European-African-Amerindian) descent. The Working Peoples Alliance WPA)
is backed by Africans and Mixed races but is no longer represented in parliament. The Alliance
for Change is backed by Mixed races and some Africans. ROAR, no longer represented in
parliament, has declared itself as an Indian party. The Guyana Amerindian Party (GAP) is
backed by and advocates on behalf of Amerindians.
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neither one has been successful in attracting significant multi-racial support, except that
the PPP (since 1992) seem to have made some inroads at capturing a majority of the
hinterland native Amerindian votes which previously went to the UF during elections in
the 1950s and 1960s. The Whites and Chinese emigrated and the Amerindians have
distrusted the PNC because of the abuses they suffered under PNC rule from 1966 to
1992. It has been noted that the percentage of votes the two major parties obtained at the
polls reflected the ethnic census or roughly the racial composition of the nation from
1957 (when ethnic voting began) thru today – PPP gets around 53% and PNC around
40% with the Amerindian UF and other mini-parties getting the remainder.
Each of the main political parties and its supporters view the other party and its
followers very suspiciously and each has refused to co-operate with the other towards a
minimum program of economic development when in opposition or when the other party
was/is in office. And in fact, each party takes a position while in opposition to undermine
the other’s governance even to the detriment of the general welfare. There has been deep
mistrust and suspicion among people for those of another race with little positive
interaction among them and ill-speaking the other race. At election times, in the
competition for political power, the goal of supporters of the PNC and or PPP is to
prevent the other party (race) from winning office and after election to undermine the
government. Such communal conflict inevitably means that one of the races will be
victorious at the expense of the others (SN Nov 21, 2012). The deep-seated division of
the society leads to a campaign in which one ethnic group has captured the coercive
apparatus of the state, and after acquiring the power and control of resources, it proceeds
to exclude the other race from the benefits of its rule (SN Jun 29, 2010; Nov 17, 2007).
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In general, once a party (a race) wins an election, it manages to exclude the other races in
the governance of the state and neglect communities (geographic areas) where the other
races predominate (SN May 24, 2009). This is essentially what has been obtained
throughout Guyana’s history from the colonial era to now – an exclusionary one race or
one party government has been in charge of the state. The exception is over the last two
decades the Indian dominated government has made efforts to include individuals of
other ethnic groups in its cabinet and legislative arms to carry out development activities
in African and other ethnic communities (geographic areas). Although voted into office
primarily by Indians, half of its M.Ps and cabinet are from other races. This, however,
does not prevent African leaders to make claims that their communities have been
neglected and to pursue actions to undermine the government so it can regain control of
the state or receive additional resources from the PPP government (GC Mar 8, 2014; Oct
22, 2013). (www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Progressive_Party Guyana; KN Jul 11, 2011).
Section B. Racial Zero Sum Game:
In Guyana, every election campaign as well as its aftermath since 1957 have seen
some kind of racial animosity or violence. Although one party (one race) wins an
election and governs the country, the country hardly makes any economic progress. As
such, there are no real winners and the entire country suffers in what is a zero sum game
(no net gain for either side) with the parties preventing each other from developing the
economy and governing successfully. The defeated race refuses to accept the electoral
outcome (whether rigged or free and fair elections) or to willingly cooperate with the
victorious party (race) in mutual nation building. The defeated party (race) sabotages
development or plays an obstructionist role thus preventing the government from
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achieving its developmental goals and the economy its potential. The winning party
(race) is reluctant to include members of other party (race) in strategically important
positions. Thus, the races and the nation at large become major “losers” since the society
is robbed of the talent and contributions of every member of the society in development
projects and in nation building. Protracted ethnic conflict, as the case in Guyana, is more
often than not, a negative sum game in which both dominant (in charge of the state) and
subordinate (groups not in control of the state) groups seek to undermine each other while
promoting their own group. In the end, everyone loses (zero sum) because the nation is
deprived of the talent, resources and productivity of all of its citizens. As reflected in
other countries like Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yugoslavia, Timor, Ukraine, etc., ethnic conflict is
destructive with deep long-term costs. In these and other countries, ethnic conflict and
ethnic mobilization far outweigh any conceivable material benefits from engaging in
conflict. In a racial or ethnic competition for control of the government, there can be no
winners when about half of the nation (as is the case in Guyana with its Indian-African
division) feels excluded or refuses to participate or cooperate with the state in nation
building. The country is denied of the full potential of half of its productive labor force
and those individuals who are excluded or who feel discriminated against will migrate
depriving the country of skills and talent. Also, victims of discrimination may opt to
pursue disruptive actions to undermine the system as have been the case in Guyana since
1955 (SN Mar 12, 2014) (see also www.guyana.org/.../chapter33....; www-rohan.sdsu.edu).
In Guyana, the parties oppose each other just for the sake of opposing and not
necessarily because they have better policy programs. That has been their stratagem to
hold on to their ethnic base with the design to capture power (SN Aug 16, 2013). For
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example, when the PPP was in office from 1957 thru 1964, the PNC and its supporters
were determined to topple it and engaged in violent activities and even conspired with
foreign agents to undermine any PPP control over the nation. And when the PNC was in
office, from 1965 thru 1992, the PPP and its Indian supporters pursued activities
(sabotage of agro production, etc.) to get it out of office and undermine its rule.
Analogously, since 1992, the Africans (and the PNC party) have been calling for the
ouster of the PPP from office and have been pursuing actions (such as strikes staged by
African unions and violent protests as well as racially inspired attacks on Indians) to
achieve their objectives. Ever since the PPP returned to office in 1992, the country has
been on the ethnic edge with periodic violence and threats of ethnic conflagration always
resulting in political instability. Ethnic tensions have been running extremely high with
almost daily reported ethnic robberies, killings, protests and violence, charges of racial
discrimination and ethnic cleansing, and demands on the state for resources based on
ethnic appeals. The PNC and its supporters have consistently used violence to get their
way over the government (in their demands) and or to prevent the other ethnic groups
from governing peacefully and purposefully (GC Mar 10, 2014; Mar 9, 2014).
Since the 1950s, members of one race, through its representative leaders, political
party and party apparatus (machine) do not want to see members of another race (s) “get
ahead”. In opposition, members of one race (through its party) seeks to topple or sabotage
the incumbent or dominant race in control of the state while the incumbent race seeks to
suppress the opposition in an endless battle to remain on top. Jealousy of and opposition
to a race succeeding in its endeavors or in governance has prevented the races from cooperating with each other towards national development, preventing the country from
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realizing its full economic potential with the shared input of all groups. It is a kind of
zero sum game that arose out of jealousy, a result of the collapse and ethnic splitting of
the nationalist multi-ethnic PPP party formed to unite the colony for its independence (SN
Mar 12, 2014; KN Aug 16, 2013; Jun 28, 2011).
Section C. Poverty, Income Inequality & Urban-Rural Divide:
Since the British handed over the reins of power to the locals, not much has
changed socially or economically. The social structure has remained largely the same
characterized by ethnic dominance rather than by ethnic fair play and equality. And there
has been low human development as supported by social and economic indicators (SN
Nov 13, 2010; World Bank Reports). There was some shift in the distribution of wealth
and income from the Whites to Africans during PNC rule when White owned businesses
were nationalized by the state. And there has been a steady but slow rise in income since
the PPP assumed office in October 1992. But by and large, the society has remained
economically skewed between poor and rich without significant reduction in the gap
between the wealthy and lower classes (SN Oct 5, Sep 14 and 7, 2014; Nov 13, 2010) as
was the case under British rule. Ownership of industries (like bauxite, sugar, timber,
gold, etc.) had changed hands from the foreigners and the local Whites, Chinese and
wealthy Indians to the state through nationalization (controlled by one ethnic group as
represented by the Afro PNC from 1966 thru 1992 and Indo PPP from 1993 till now).
But there remained skewed income distribution with a small number of people largely
residing in the urban areas making a lot of money and a large number of people
(especially in rural farming and hinterland region) earning only a meager living (KN Sep
20, 2012; SN Dec 30, 2013). Economic growth and increases in standard of living gets
concentrated at the top echelon of the society and it is the upper and middle classes and
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those who live in or near the towns that benefit the most from growth. The income and
lifestyle of a selected few apparatchiks (from the PNC and PPP) improved during the last
fifty years (SN Jul 30, 2011). But overall, there has not been inclusive growth across the
board for all classes especially any significant improvement of the quality of life of those
at the bottom half of the social pyramid (SN Nov 23, 2014). There is no inclusive growth
among all the classes or groups in the society. Since independence, only a small fraction
at the top of the society have enjoyed the overwhelming wealth of the nation while the
overwhelming majority have seen their income stagnant or shrunk because of inflation.
Burnham’s socialist polcies did not significantly alter income inequality; they merely
replace White control with African control. In Guyana, as a UN report stated, some 40%
of the population live below poverty in 2008 (KN Jul 15, 2012; Oct 14, 2011; Oct 15,
2009). Poverty exceeding 70% has been the highest among rural dwellers especially
among Indians and Amerindians (KN Dec 6, 2013). Since independence, the poor have
become poorer as they experience a declining quality of life. Up until today, Amerindians
are largely confined to the hinterland regions without much infrastructure (KN Nov 5,
2013) although they have achieved much progress under the PPP government. Because of
neglect of rural and hinterland regions, poverty and dreaded communicable diseases are
highest in these rural and hinterland areas where sanitation (garbage pick up unavailable)
is neglected. From the evidence on the incidence of dengue, cholera, measles, typhoid,
diarrhoea and other communicable diseases that can be avoided with cleanliness, one can
infer that the public health system is unable to cope with the health situation.
Section D. Moral Degradation & Corruption after Independence
As some commentators have often noted in the local newspapers, not only has the
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quality of life and national social and economic indicators declined sharply since
independence, so too has the competence, honesty and integrity of people who are in
charge of managing the society’s functions and affairs. Moral degradation set in after
independence so much so the country is approaching moral bankruptcy and a break down
in law and order (SN Sep 11, 2009; Nov 1, 2008). It is noted, for example, that before
independence, Guyanese were morally straight and decent people known for their
kindness, generosity, and hospitality. Also, most of the nationalists or freedom fighters
who led the struggle for independence were decent men and women who cared deeply
about community, humanity and nation with a desire to lift the poor out of poverty (SN
Jun 11, 2014; Oct 1, 2013). Many were largely altruistic and highly principled individuals
who committed themselves to uplifting the lives of others. They had ambitious and lofty
plans for making Guyana a perfect, egalitarian society and of institutionalizing honest
governance with people of integrity in charge of the affairs of the state working for the
benefit for all (KN Apr 3, 2011). In contrast, most of the current crop of politicians (post
Jagan who died in 1997) is highly corrupt and only interested in self-enrichment (SN Oct
3, 2009) with few of them engaged in volunteerism and building a community.
After independence, the PNC became mired in graft and corruption so much so
that the country has become corrupted and sliding towards total immorality (SN Aug 3,
2009). Graft and corruption have permeated almost every office of government from the
issuance of police traffic tickets to birth, marriage and death certificates (SN Aug 20,
2009). Allegations of corruption swirled around those who have governed the nation. The
exception was President Cheddi and his wife Janet Jagan (1957 thru 1964 and 1992 thru
1999), (KN Jul 16, 2008) who governed selflessly donating their income and modest
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possessions to charity and the state. The others have not been overly concerned about
perception or the national good or of the development of the nation but their own selfenrichment. Altruistic and incorruptible individuals such as Cheddi and Janet Jagan are
difficult to find in Guyana. Almost everyone in Guyana has become a kind of a con man
(woman), a schemer, with the goal of succeeding in some scam so as to get on in life (in
order to put food on the table or to enrich them selves at the expense of others). For
many, wealth has been acquired from crookedness and from conning or robbing others or
the state with limited judicial recourse (KN Nov 13, 2013; Jul 27, 2013; Jul 23, 2013);
even the court of justice is perverted with bribes used to buy out court officials including
clerks and judges and lawyers (KN Dec 10, Nov 12, Oct 4, 2014).
Since 1966, when the British put Burnham and his PNC colleagues in charge of
the nation, few of them have developed the indomitable spirit of hard work, honesty,
integrity, charity, compassion for the poor, kindness and goodness to serve the nation
without a primary regard for personal wealth or a handsome return on their investment.
During the PNC era and since then, few politicians have been serving the nation
unselfishly and fewer are promoting racial harmony (SN Nov 28, 2014; Jul 31, 2012; Jan
12, 2010). Few have thought about the need for ethnic tolerance, mutual love and respect
among the diverse population so that people can experience a peaceful collective life. In
fact, the opposite has occurred -- ethnic leaders have cynically encouraged conflict
among the ethnic groups. The leaders have promoted ethnic discord between groups so
as to retain their (leaders) dominance over their own group as well as to maintain support
for their party or leadership aspirations. And while the groups are engaged in conflict,
the leadership and their acolytes have been enriching themselves through corrupt

- 253 -

practices. Corrupt acts have not been confined to those in power; some politicians in the
opposition camp are also involved in nefarious highly corrupt practices (GT Jan 18 2015;
SN Aug 7, 2013; Jan 23, 2014). The groups have engaged in communal violence at the
behest of their leaders because it serves the leaders’ interest to hold their flock. While at
one time, the ethnic conflict served the purpose of the colonial masters and the plantation
owners, since independence it has served the interests of the local political masters.
During colonial rule, domestic and external forces manipulated inter-race relations to
serve imperialist interests as well as exploitative plantocracy bourgeois interests. Social
relations and racial manipulation has not changed much from then to (47 years after
independence) as the politicians continue to prey on ethnic conflict to retain their political
support and power and self-enrichment.
Section E. Decline in Industrial Productivity:
When the country gained independence in 1966, its economy was positioned to
take off and experience rapid development similar to such countries as Malaysia or
Singapore that have similar social features like Guyana (en.wikipedia.org/..). In spite of
the racial conflict that impacted on productivity and investment during the 1960s,
Guyana’s economy was able to hold its own without experiencing a serious decline in
standard of living during the 1960s (GC Mar 10, 2014). This was a result of significant
capital inflows from the US in the form of loans and grants to assist the struggling regime
and solid exports in agricultural produce allowing the new nation to maintain its quality
of life. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, the economy rapidly deteriorated after the
government nationalized foreign-owned companies, took control of almost all economic
activities, pursued a leftward foreign policy and embraced Cuba, develop a shift away
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from Washington and London, and institutionalized a racist policy in its hiring and
promotion practices. By 1980, the government had also taken over the bulk of the
retailing and wholesale distribution systems that were controlled by Whites, Chinese and
Coloreds and a few Indians and established state owned co-operatives and Knowledge
Sharing Institutes (government distribution outlets for goods) operated by party hawks
(GC Mar 20, 2012). Private entrepreneurs (mostly Whites, Chinese, Coloreds, and
Indians) were marginalized and forced to close down operations (GT Jan 25, 2015). The
regime controlled the marketing of all exports, even those few products, such as rice,
cassava, coconuts, and black eye beans, which were still produced privately in large
quantities; the government mandated that all marketable produce be handled by the state
marketing agencies. It also owned virtually all of the financial institutions and tightly
regulated the currency exchange. The government controlled prices for virtually all items
instructing shopkeepers not to sell beyond government dictated prices and even attempted
to dictate patterns of consumption by banning a wide range of consumer imports
including basic foods like channa, lentils, potatoes, peas, flour, canned products, cooking
oil, etc. (www.answers.com/topic/forbes-burnham#ixzz1tBtJfT15; GT Jan 5, 2015).
By the late 1970s, the government controlled over 80 percent of the economy with
only a small number of small business enterprises (mostly farms and home use utensils)
in the hands of the private sector. Burnham pursued the socialist transformation of the
state. The dictatorship stressed autarchic (inward looking) development, a process of
nationalization that saw some 80% of the economy in government hands, and a new
orientation in foreign policy involving closer relations with Cuba and the former Eastern
bloc. It pursued an active participation in the Non-Aligned movement (NAM) and
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supported African freedom fighters, even holding anti-apartheid conferences in Guyana
even though the PNC regime itself was apartheid like in appearance (being an ethnic
minority ruling the country illegally). Control of the economy was carried out largely for
political reasons to give the impression that the regime was socialist oriented (Pierce:
1985). Also, the Burnham government needed to control these industries in order to
extend its base of support in doling out jobs in newly acquired state owned companies to
those who pledged loyalty to the regime (Hintzen: 1989. During the early 1970s, world
prices for primary exports rose, resulting in the government earning significant revenues
allowing it to increase spending on its supporters that stimulated the economy (Ibid; see
also http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html).
However, output of every commodity and export fell sharply after nationalization.
For example, bauxite production, dropped from 3 million tons per year in the 1960s to 2
million tons in 1971 to 1.3 million tons by 1988. Similarly, sugar production declined
from 330,000 tons in 1976 to 245,000 tons in the mid-1980s, and to 168,000 tons by
1988. Rice production also declined and never again reached its 1977 peak of 210,000
tons (in contrast with say 500,000 tons under the PPP regime in 2013) (GC Feb 12,
2014). By 1988, national output of rice was almost 40 percent lower than in 1977. The
lack of PNC party managers capable of running the large agricultural and mining
enterprises, and the lack of investment in those enterprises, as government resources were
depleted, inevitably led to a decline in output. Revenues declined sharply but the
government continued to spend to appease its supporters. Guyana's gross domestic
product began to decline by the mid-1970s. Real GDP fell during the latter half of the
1970s and decreased by an estimated six percent per year during the 1980s (SN Mar 5,

- 256 -

2009; Aug 31, 2008). Guyana’s economy was in dire shape in the late 1980s.
Nonetheless, government spending continued at a high rate, and Guyana was forced to
borrow huge amounts of money from abroad to sustain unaffordable spending that would
trigger a slide in the value of the Guyana dollar (Gafar: 2003).
The huge size of the debt in 1992 was around US $2.2 billion for an economy
whose budget then was only about US $300 million – seven times the national budget
with a per capita debt of US $30K. The decline in the GDP was keeping the external debt
to GDP ratio at very high levels, the highest in the world at more than seven times the
national budget in 1992 with some 94% of national earnings needed just to pay the
interest on the debt (SN Dec 16, 2009). No economy could manage that kind of external
debt and pursue economic development. This increase in the debt service burden
occurred at a time when the demand for imports increased because of declining domestic
food production and because of the reduced demand of Guyana’s primary products.
Exports decreased and imports increased while at the same time there was capital flight
by those businesspersons who could no longer tolerate Burnham’s nationalist policies.
People found clever ways to take money out of the country through informal exchange.
In response, the government enforced restrictions that no one was allowed to leave with
more than US $20 during the 1970s and government approval was required to transfer
money for business transactions with overseas entities. In addition, all imports and
exports had to be approved by the government that managed and controlled all foreign
currency transactions denying currency to businesses that needed to import spare parts to
service machinery or even modernize equipments. Big businesses could not put up with
the state financial restrictions resulting in the reduction of business activities that affected
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the entire economy. This led to a further decline in growth and in the value of the dollar
(GC Feb 14, 2014) (www.guyana.org/.../chapter3.ht...; www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/.../157288.htm)
The country ran huge deficits on its balance of payments and had no choice but to
resort to borrowing. Despite such a crisis, the government made no attempt to change its
economic course. No attempt was made to rein in the rise in external debt or to reduce
dependence on deficit budgeting or to change policies to increase exports or to encourage
Indians to return to the farm to boost agro production. Guyana’s external debt liabilities
had become a millstone around the neck of the economy (SN May 27, 2009). Instead of
reducing the subsidy burden doled out to its supporters in various forms, the government
expanded subsidies to hold on to political support. No incentives (or foreign exchange)
were given to producers and manufacturers of other groups or the private sector to
encourage production. Stats showed that production in every industry declined during
the 1970s and 1980s. The decline in productivity was a serious problem, and the
Burnham government's reaction to the downturn of increasing repression on a nonnoncompliant population aggravated the situation. As export revenues fell, foreign
exchange became scarce. Rather than attacking the root of the problem, that is tackling
low domestic output, the government attempted to ration foreign exchange, which only
further damaged the economic situation. The government regulated all transactions
requiring foreign exchange and severely restricted imports. These controls created their
own inefficiencies; red tapes and shortages of goods with the result that people began to
use clever means of bypassing them (KN Jan 1, 2014; SN Jun 24, 2011; Jan 6, 2008).
More significantly, tight government control of exchange encouraged the growth of the
parallel exchange market. Smugglers brought in illegal imports, and currency traders
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circumvented government controls on foreign exchange to facilitate trading. Although
many citizens began working and trading in the parallel economy, many others were
leaving the country (SN Aug 5, 2012. An estimated 72,000 Guyanese, almost one-tenth of
the population, emigrated between 1976 and 1981 and over 20,000 a year in subsequent
years (SN Feb 26, 2010; Sep 22, 2013). Among those who left the country were many of
the most skilled managers and entrepreneurs. Also, the hostile political orientation of the
Burnham government towards the West and multinational corporations made it almost
impossible for a turn around of the economy or of increased aid from the United States.
However, so as not to trigger the collapse of the PNC regime that would have led to the
rise of the radical PPP, the US did not block loans from lending agencies.
http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html.
Section F. Rise of Underground Black Market Economy:
Because of its attempts to control all aspects of the economy and financial
transactions, and the banning of consumption of basic items, a thriving black market
developed and became institutionalized impacting virtually all aspects of financial
transactions and trade. After the government controlled the outflow of foreign exchange
and banned the imports of basic food items, a huge share of economic activities in
Guyana took place outside of the official economy during the 1970s thru 1990. In fact,
the parallel economy at one time was bigger than the official economy, and it only began
to decrease in significance after the introduction of foreign exchange cambios in 1989,
reversal of the laws banning importations of goods in 1990, and the restoration of
democracy in 1992 (GC Mar 10, 2014; SN Jul 26, 2009; SN Nov 1, 2009; Table section)
(countrystudies.us/guyana/57.htm; www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5422.html).
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As economists have pointed out, the key feature of the illegal economy centered
around banned goods and foreign currency trading which was regulated to retain foreign
exchange to purchase goods necessary to prop up the regime. The government said it
was banning importation of essential items to encourage local production and also began
restricting legal access to foreign exchange to control imports in order to restore
favorable balance payments on foreign trade. The imposition of bans on basic imports
(especially of foods, milk for infants, and medicines for the sick) led to severe hardships.
Drugs and medicines, including aspirin and insulin for diabetics, were scarce. People
began to show signs of illnesses relating to poor diet. Bans on basic items to meet dietary
habits and religious rites of Indians led to a flourishing parallel economy of trading
between the country’s borders and huckster trading with the Caribbean islands.
Malnutrition became widespread. There was a grinding level of poverty. Poverty in
Guyana had approached that seen in places like Ethiopia and Somalia during the 1980s.
Orphanages and poor houses sprang up especially in Georgetown to alleviate sufferings.
Many lives were lost due to basic shortages resulting in malnutrition and starvation. Kids
stopped attending classes. People increasingly depended on handouts from relatives
abroad. Smuggled foods, remittances and handouts from abroad alleviated widespread
suffering and rescued many from certain death caused by poor diet. As commentators
have noted, the term contraband (or banned goods) was invented as a result of the rise of
this parallel economy and it expanded to include almost all items. With remittances, in
the tens of millions of US dollars sent annually during the 1970s and hundreds of
millions sent annually during the 1980s, Guyanese could purchase almost anything from
the underground (illegal) economy (KN Oct 20, 2012). However, if caught with banned
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goods (such as flour or bread or split peas or chick peas, for example), the fine and
imprisonment were very stiff (encyclopedia.com/topic/Guyana.aspx). During the 1980s,
Guyanese living abroad began sending barrels home with food and basic items for their
families, friends and neighbors leading to the development of another term “the barrel
economy” which was seen as a heavenly sent salvation to prevent mass starvation and
death from hunger (Erriah: 91). The government taxed the barrels extracting huge fees
that generated hundreds of millions of US dollars annually during the 1980s and 1990s to
bankroll the state functionaries. The regime even started to require Americans (including
Guyanese-Americans) to apply for a visa and collected fees that amounted to tens of
thousands of US dollars every month that was used to fund government operations.
Also, during the late 1960s and early 1970s Chinese, Portuguese and wealthy
Indian businessmen, because of ethnic discrimination and the government’s anti-business
policies, began taking their money out of the country and investing in Canada, Barbados,
and Australia (GT Nov14, 2014). In response to the capital flight, the government felt it
necessary to stop people from taking money out of the country. Businesses had to find an
alternative means to obtain foreign exchange and turned to the black market that offered a
little more than the official exchange in order to attract foreign currency thereby
expanding black marketing operations (KN Feb 12, 2013; Jun 30, 2013: Jun 14, May 17,
2011; May 18, 2009) (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/.../wp0307.pd...).
As an internet report pointed out, the rise of the parallel or black market economy
has been very harmful to the country (http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyanahealth.html). The report noted, “that the growing black market economy indicated that
the official economy was not providing enough goods and services, and that a norm of
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illegality existed in Guyana”. Also, another effect of the parallel economy was that it
drained talent and initiative from the official economy as people began obtaining work
and higher salaries from the underground economy rather than from state employment.
The black market was more lucrative in profit making than the official economy because
fewer goods were available for sale in the official market. The profit margin was much
higher (100 to 200%) for banned goods than for legitimate items. The black market
deprived the government of tax revenues, and led to inefficient use of resources. In
addition, the illegal economy was considered a major source of inflation (running in triple
digits during the 1980s) because of the high prices people had to pay for basic items (like
flour, potatoes, sardines, etc.) that were prohibited from importation and that could only
be obtained from the black market at very high prices (Ibid; KN Nov 17, 2013).
The underground economy also affected currency transaction because of the high
demand for and scarcity of foreign currency needed to sustain cross border trade. Traders
offered higher than normal rates for foreign exchange rendering the Guyana currency
very unstable (http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html). The
government felt the need to restrict access to foreign currency in order to maintain an
overvalued exchange rate The government reasoned that if Guyanese citizens had
unlimited access to foreign currency, many of them would have bought US dollars,
depleting Guyana's foreign exchange reserves, because of their anticipation of
devaluations in the Guyanese dollar (which was trading two to one US dollar in 1975)
(KN Jul 7, 2009). As the report pointed out, “when it introduced foreign exchange
controls during the late 1970s, the government was trying to keep Guyana's balance of
payments from worsening by controlling the flow of money and goods to and from the

- 262 -

country. The restriction on foreign exchange helped maintain the fixed exchange rate but
it also created a shortage of foreign currency, making it nearly impossible for individuals
and businesses to import essential items (as foreign merchants would not accept
Guyanese dollars). Official and unofficial street traders filled the gap by supplying muchneeded foreign currency to businesses, importers and travelers at higher than the official
rate. The traders made a huge profit by selling foreign currencies at a very high price. By
1989, the black market exchange rate doubled per United States dollar trading at G$60
compared with the official rate of G$33. This fueled inflation that was running at triple
digits during the 1980s. The Economist Magazine reported in mid-1990 that brick-sized
stacks of G$100 bills were trading for US$100 on Georgetown's America Street, dubbed
the Guyana "Wall Street." (http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyanahealth.html) (see also new.ccmfuwi.org/files/.../2009/.../13_1-Thomas_Jourdain_Pasha-p.pdf;
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Americas/Guyana-ECONOMY.html)

The size of Guyana's parallel economy during the 1980s was difficult to estimate.
Illegal traders and businessmen kept a low profile to avoid both foreign currency
regulations, taxation, and laws that make it illegal to be in possession of too much foreign
money and banned items (that included bread, potatoes, beans, among other basic foods.).
The parallel market was at times as big as the official market because almost all basic
foods and toilet paper were purchased in the underground economy. Economist and
University of Guyana Professor Clive Thomas argued in various studies that the parallel
economy ranged from one-half to roughly the same size as the official economy (Ibid).
The Financial Times newspaper and the Economist magazine both estimated in 1989 that
the parallel market carried out between US$50 million and US$100 million worth of
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business annually and that was going on for some 15 years already. Even by the lower
estimate, the parallel economy was about one-fifth the size of the official economy (Ibid).
As Prof. Thomas and other economists have pointed out, the government
responded ambivalently to the parallel market. To many people in Guyana, as well as in
the international financial community, “the existing parallel market was the epitome of a
private sector initiative under difficult conditions” (Ibid). Black marketing was carried
out by small family traders smuggling the banned goods across the borders or brought
them in through the lone airport. Although official policy restricted illegal economic
activity and importation of banned food items, in practice, the government officials often
turned a blind eye to the well-developed parallel economy recognizing its importance.
Custom officers accepted bribes and allowed the banned goods into the country with
many people becoming super wealthy from the parallel economy. In the markets or
shops, the ban on goods was enforced but traders, retailers, and consumers simply bribed
their way out of situations. As http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyanahealth.html reported, Guyana's borders were long, porous and un-patrolled making
smuggling of currency and banned goods relatively easy. In addition, cash remittances
from abroad were common as virtually everyone had a relative abroad who was sending
money to loved ones and so many people in Guyana had frequent access to foreign
currency that could easily trade on the parallel market for higher than government rates.
When government cracked down on the currency transactions that occurred outside of
official banking operations, currency exchange occurred informally where people gave
US or Canadian dollars in North America and relatives collected Guyana dollars at home
evading government control. When caught marketing banned goods or engaging in
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currency exchange, shop retailers and traders paid bribes to the police to avoid
prosecution (KN Nov 14, 2013) The alternative was hefty fines in court or spending time
in jail for violating laws against peddling banned goods or unofficial currency
transaction. But the huge profits obtained from black marketing operations were well
worth the risk. So government attempts to repress the black market were generally
unsuccessful. Also, many observers noted that the government loosely tolerated (closed
its eyes and at times did not rigidly enforce the laws against) the parallel market because
it provided goods that were restricted (or scarce) but essential for survival and which
government supporters also demanded (KN Jun 19, 2011). The government did not want
to run the risk of incurring the wrath of its own supporters who demanded many of the
scarce or banned goods. Preventing access to essential supplies could have led to a
violent revolution as the country was already close to starvation during the mid 1980s,
and it would not have taken much more to trigger an uprising as soldiers and police were
already showing dissent at the terrible state of affairs brought on by widespread food
shortages. As http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html reported,
even state-owned companies traded on the parallel market for foreign currency and sold
banned goods to generate revenues to keep their workers employed ignoring directives
from the state not to trade in banned goods. Members of the police co-op, army co-op,
public service co-ops, and other co-ops operated by the PNC also sold illegal goods that
its members demanded for their survival (KN Nov 25, 2013). Government supporters
were defecting to purchase goods at shops operated by supporters of the PPP selling
banned food items. So the government co-ops were forced to offer some banned goods in
order to retain or re-attract their PNC supporters and the government did not crack down
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on the co-ops or fined them for selling goods prohibited by law. Shopkeepers of other
ethnic backgrounds such as Indians and Portuguese, on the other hand, were issued
summons and faced heavy fines and jail time for selling banned goods that were also
confiscated (see KN Jan 27, 2014; Jan 25, 2013; Oct 30, 2013; Aug 27, 2013; Aug 8, Jun
11, 2011; Aug 19, 2009; Aug 12, 2009; Aug 13, 2011; GT Jan 3, 2015).
A fundamental shift in policy toward the parallel or black market illegal economy
occurred in the late 1980s amidst street protests. People took to the streets demanding
food that were virtually non-existent. Under pressure from local business community,
foreign and local creditors and the US government, the Hoyte government began
stressing the need for a revitalized private sector and an opening of the economy. The
Hoyte government in 1989 legalized and regulated the parallel foreign currency market
allowing cambios to operate as currency traders with the aim being to eliminate the
illegal economy by absorbing it into the legal economy (SN Sep 24, 2010;
http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html)(Gafar: 2003)
Section G. Educational Neglect & Deterioration of Standards:
When the PNC took power in 1965, Guyana had one of the most successful
educational systems in the region. Government and public educational systems existed
side by side with students in private secondary schools performing better than those in
government schools in national exams administered by universities in England. Guyana
had one of the highest standards of education in the Caribbean region (SN Aug 16, 2014).
Year after year, during the immediate pre and post-colonial eras, the country’s high
school graduates beat out competitors from other parts of the region for scholarships in
English and Canadian universities. Also, Guyanese candidates used to beat out their
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regional counterparts in the semi-annual British GCE exams (out of Oxford, Cambridge
and London Universities) (SN Aug 25, 2013; Feb 28, 2007). But the government decided
it would acquire total control of all aspects of education (SN May 5, 2013) as well as all
schools; the fact that almost all of the private educational institutions were owned by non
supporters of the PNC should not be dismissed as a reason why Burnham opted to seize
control of all private schools while denying the owners fair compensation. All privately
owned schools were nationalized in 1976 and Burnham announced that all books would
be distributed or sold through government agencies – not a coincidence since almost all
of the retail book shops were owned by non-supporters of the PNC. Shortages of
educational supplies, syllabus and of books quickly ensued. And teachers’ salaries were
not paid on time. Books to study for the syllabus to pass exams were unavailable. All
school essentials, including chalk, pens, pencils, teaching aids and other supplies were
limited or non-existent. Even notebooks and paper were in short supply and most
frequently unavailable. Students scavenged for writing paper at garbage dumps using the
blank side of waste paper to record notes and submit assignments. Frequent electricity
blackouts and transportation woes just added to the problems that young minds faced in
trying to get a basic education to learn skills to become productive in the society.
The educational system began to collapse immediately after the government took
control of all private schools in 1976 (KN Nov 1, 2013; SN Nov 12, 2009). Many students
could not cope with the pressure of finding books or getting to and from school under a
failing transport system. With government already controlling bus transport that was
collapsing, students were not able to travel to and back from school. In addition, family
financial woes and inadequate nutrition did not help the situation. Since many students
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obtained family sponsorship to migrate to North America or England, going to school or
obtaining an education was not a priority to them. Many students just dropped out of
school. There was a high dropout rate among students during the 1980s as compared with
earlier periods or later periods (KN Aug 31, 2013). Children were kept out of school to
look after their younger siblings while parents joined food lines that stretched for blocks.
A culture of children selling cigarettes and sweets or begging on the streets evolved.
Increasingly, the young were begging in the streets for money to support their families.
Education was distant from their minds. Children were often forced to fetch water from
long distances because of shortages in their communities and thus could not attend school
on a regular basis and when they did, they were often not punctual. Power black outs
were a daily feature preventing children from studying. Fuel was in short supply to light
hand lamps that enabled students to study or for families to prepare daily meals. The
physical infrastructure of the schools was in total disrepair. Virtually all the schools were
in a dilapidated state, posing grave dangers to children. Furniture and books were in
short supply. Political and racial affiliation, rather than common needs, determined the
shipment of supplies to schools with rural and hinterland schools the most neglected.
Schools located in communities not supportive of the PNC were neglected. Also, teacher
shortage was common and more noticeable during the 1980s and 1990s than at any time
in this country as teachers immigrated to other Caribbean territories (KN Jun 13, 2009).
Equipment for technical and vocational education was almost non-existent. Low salaries
for teachers (less than US $50 monthly during the 1970s and 1980s and less than US
$100 a month during the 1990s) were the order of the day. And today the monthly
teacher’s salary is around US $150. Because of all these problems and the reign of terror
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that existed during the 1970s and 1980s, the country’s education system became a
regional disgrace. The general depression in the education sector was translated into
dismal results at the Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate (CSEC) examinations.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Guyanese students performed the worst among all
Caribbean students taking the regional examinations. Guyana trailed exam pass rates in
all Caribbean countries when twenty years earlier its pass rate was among the highest in
the region (GC May 31, 2011 Aug 23, 2010; SN Feb 5, 2011; GT Jan 19, 2015).
Section H. Failure of Farming, Clothing and Housing Policy
Another harebrained idea of Burnham was a national program to Feed, Clothe and
House (FCH) the nation (http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html)
that also turned into another costly failure to the state. Tens of millions of dollars were
invested to promote this idea of self-help that would supposedly lead to national selfsufficiency in many aspects of life relating to this idea. Burnham told the people to eat
less, sleep less, work harder and grow more and he offered financial incentives to his
supporters to undertake the policy initiative. What resulted were less productivity and
less food production and the rise of several shantytowns and ghettos among PNC
supporters. Burnham announced with much fanfare that the state would take the lead in
farming through a Guyana National Service (GNS) program in which students in all
schools were taught farming and were required to produce crops in school compounds as
a practicum. Burnham also required all high school and university students to serve one
year in GNS where they would to be trained in farming skills and obtain military training
(SN Dec 10, 2008). High school students were warned that unless they served in such
after school national service programs, they would not receive high school diplomas.
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Students at the university level had to serve an extended tour of duty at an isolated camp
in the interior of the country where there were reported atrocities of rape (KN Jul 24,
2011). Burnham also mandated that public sector workers serve a period of time in GNS
and to volunteer time on weekend to clean farms. Some were mandated to clean
Burnham’s personal farm. While Africans signed up, Indians refused (fearing abuses and
in fact many Indian girls were raped) and protested the policy. Protesters were jailed and
or terrorized. University of Guyana students were beaten. Those who refused to go to
GNS were denied diplomas from the university. The ambitious agricultural program in
GNS to produce cotton, pigeon peas, onion, potatoes, corn, soya, etc. and pig rearing
flopped as climatic conditions did not allow for successful production of certain produce
resulting in losses of millions of dollars annually. Besides, the African youths and public
employees had no interest in agriculture. They were more interested in state employment
where one simply shows up at the office and hardly performs yet still collects a check at
the end of the month or engaged in acts of corruption (KN Apr 18, 2011). Burnham
mandated that all schools grow crops and that all private farms turn over productions to
the government to be paid less than cost price. Students simply went through the exercise
to get passing grades, gain access to books and fulfill requirements to get their diplomas;
but little was produced on such school compounds that would make the country self
sufficient. The entire program and its bias toward the government controlled public
servants and party supporters was politicized and was bound to fail without support from
other groups or parties (KN Mar 20, 2014; May 28, 2012). Yet, the country’s dictator
continued its national service system claiming it would provide job skills, create
employment, make Guyana self sufficient, and transform the country into a developed
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state (KN Jan 29, 2012). The opposite resulted with people virtually starving. People
simply abandoned their farms or grew just enough for sustenance and secretly harvested
their produce and sold them in the growing underground economy which had become the
only avenue to find basic foods (including locally produced staples like rice and sugar) or
toilet paper, toothpaste, and milk. (KN Jun 19, 2011; Dec 13, 2013; Feb 23, 2014).
The housing plan was put into effect at a considerable loss to farmland and as
such the production of food. Government houses were built on arable farmlands that
were used for decades by Indians to grow food and from which many Indians earned a
living (KN Oct 27, 2012). This further reduced food output providing less with which to
feed the expanding population. The houses were distributed to soldiers, police,
government bureaucrats and other supporters of the regime enraging opponents of the
government; non-Africans used the measures biased measures undertaken by government
as justification not to cooperate with the government. The housing program benefited the
government’s African supporters earning the ire of the other ethnic groups that felt that
their hard earned money was used to fund the construction of the houses that were
allotted to government supporters (KN Nov 22, 2011). It was noted that the PNC
supporters were also given loans to purchase houses and vehicles through the newly
created Guyana National Cooperative Bank (GNCB) and the Guyana Agricultural and
Industrial Bank. Most of these loans were never paid back and the government lending
institutions like GNCB, Gaibank, etc. eventually became bankrupt with depositors losing
their savings (KN Oct 7, 2013). Supporters of the PNC and officers of the police, army,
paramilitary, and national service were also given loans to furnish their houses with many
of the loans never repaid. The ethnic discriminatory policy pursued by the PNC regime
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in its loan scheme created a disincentive for Indians and other ethnic groups to work and
pay taxes since they were not the beneficiaries of government welfare programs, housing,
generous soft loans, and related handouts. Indians and other non-ethnic supporters of the
regime did not want to prop up a regime that oppressed them. In terms of any work ethic,
almost everyone did the bare minimum required for a wage as there was no incentive to
work hard or to implement policies and programs that would strengthen the government.
And besides, many were waiting for immigration papers to settle abroad or looking
forward to migrate in search of a better future elsewhere rather than continue living PNC
humiliation under the humiliating conditions enforced by the PNC (Rampertab: 2001).
With regards to clothing policy, the government constructed a textile factory, near
the capital of Georgetown, far from available farmland to grow raw materials, to clothe
the nation but apparently it forgot it needed cotton and electricity to run it in order to
produce thread that would be transformed into cloth and stitched into clothing. And
when it acquired a power generator, there was a shortage of diesel to run it. Cotton was to
be obtained from the national service program, located far away, but productivity was too
low to sustain operation. In addition, the cotton plantations in the interior were soon
abandoned as National Service, which was designed to engage young Africans in
agriculture, failed to produce enough cotton to spin into thread and cloth (KN Jun 29,
May 28, 2012). The young Africans did not want to labor on the land to grow cotton or
other farm produce preferring instead the urban life where they could obtain a
government office job or service in the security forces where they could obtain a salary
without having to produce anything. Not surprisingly, the textile factory never got off the
ground and became a white elephant covered with tall bushes and the government failed
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in its drive to clothe the armed services much less the general population (KN Oct 4, Jun
8, 2011; May 20, 2008; Rampertab: 2001; SN Nov 12, 2010)(GC Jun 28, 2011; see also
http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html).
There was no way government directed production at state enterprises would
succeed because workers’ commitment and motivation was lacking – a result of low pay,
corruption and cultural reasons. The PNC party supporters were not interested in
agriculture and they did not demonstrate the kind of discipline (punctuality), efficiency or
commitment needed for a textile factory. They were more interested in security or civil
service office jobs that were promised to them in exchange for supporting the regime (SN
Aug 21, 2014). Burnham was forced to generate employment for his supporters who
were looking to him for jobs since they supported and defended his illegal regime. They
were not committed to any development strategies. They were not keen supporters of
Burnham’s slogans like “making the small man the real man”, “Feed, Clothe and House
the nation”, and “National Service” (KN Apr 2, 2010). These ideas became empty
rhetoric since they were absorbing scarce state resources without producing anything of
value or bringing in revenues to boost the economy or sustain jobs (Ibid). At the rate the
PNC was spending money without revenues coming in, government policy was bound to
collapse as there was no way for the regime to sustain huge expenditures to feed, clothe,
and house its supporters and provide them national service training and employ them in
make shift jobs (KN Sep 27, 2010). And the government was spending money on these
projects at the expense of other groups who were fuming that they were not beneficiaries
while their tax dollars were funding such projects. Non- supporters of the PNC were not
even consulted about the elaborate programs or on how their taxes were being spent with
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little plowed back in their communities. And with the business class and farmers already
marginalized, they reduced their economic activities resulting in a further reduction of
funds into government coffers through taxation (KN Aug 16, 2012).
In fact, most of the entrepreneurial class was pulverized and forced out of the
country and compelled to invest their money in Canada and Barbados. It was noted that
the private sector was seriously marginalized at a time when there was no flourishing
activity in any of the state-commanded companies; almost all of the government
companies, except sugar and rice, ran at a loss and these were also discriminated against
because of the ethnicity of the employees (KN Dec 22, 2009). “The state restricted private
sector activities that made it impossible to compete with the government owned
companies. The state was everything and there was limited space even for a beholden
private sector. Such a system can hardly be described as capitalist” (Ibid). The PPP
claimed that “The economic system Guyana had under the PNC was state capitalism,
with a government espousing socialism but practicing capitalism (Pierce: 1984). Under
the PNC, “the state wielded economic and political power but it was a small band of
businesses (that catered to supporters of the PNC)” (KN May 14, 2011). The state
concentrated on national production with a small private sector filling whatever voids
remained. What existed was a feudal type system, a backward model suited to 18th
century Europe rather than for a 20th century Guyana. In this system, the state
commanded authority and obedience, and a small band of businesses competed to grab
whatever the state left over to them (KN Dec 1, 2013; Apr 2, 2010; SN Sep 4, 2009) see
also (http://www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.htm).
Ever since he acquired power, Burnham’s national development strategies and
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policymaking were shaped by PNC supporters and the Afro intelligentsia; there was
hardly any meaningful consultation and input from the business elite or leaders of other
ethnic groups or parties or even from the general population. The development strategies
were crafted by a handful among the PNC elite and imposed from above. It was top down
directives. Without peoples’ input and support, such strategies were bound to fail and
could not successfully guide the economy. Non-supporters of the PNC or members of
other ethnic groups could not continue to toil in the sun or run factories to produce
revenues for a government that persisted in its discrimination against and persecution of
them. With poor governance, bad management, endemic corruption, shady business
deals, and embedded racism against non-supporters, the economy grounded to a halt. The
government controlled agriculture, housing, and manufacturing policies failed. Poverty
spread all over the country including in PNC strongholds (SN Nov 6, 2010; Dec 5, 2008).
Yet, the PNC bosses continued to prosper much to the neglect of the population.
Government policies failed to bring about much needed social change to transform the
nation (SN Aug 21, 2014). As a result of ill-conceived development policy, the economy
floundered with a drastic decline in growth during the PNC’s tenure in office from
December 1964 thru October 1992 (Erriah: 91; SN Aug 18 and Apr 21, 2011).
Section I. Decline in Professional Standards & Make Shift Jobs:
Under the Burnham’s dictatorship, there was a general decline in professional
standards in virtually all spheres of government activities (KN Mar 30, 2010; Jun 9, 2013)
and offices. The PNC government staffed offices based on racial patronage and created
make shift jobs for party supporters. The behavior of the leadership of the nation under
the PNC provided a cue about the behavior of its followers at their jobs. The leadership
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displayed a kind of “I don’t care a damn attitude” that was largely carried over to the rest
of the government workforce. Election rigging, corruption among the top echelons of
party and government, and construction of an authoritarian state provided justification for
workers below to be lackadaisical about their job. Those at the top could not discipline
those below because corruption was pervasive among those at the top. Thus, government
workers did the barest minimum to get by so as to receive an official salary. And like the
top bureaucrats and party henchmen, they also sought self-enrichment through graft and
other forms of corruption when dealing with the public and the private sector.
Burnham’s political agenda was overloaded with much of his own will power to
do whatever he wanted to get back at those who snubbed him, or who felt they were
superior to him, or did not support him. Burnham proceeded to replace a professional
bureaucracy with PNC party supporters who were not adequately trained, qualified or
prepared for their positions (KN Sep 19, 2014; Apr 19, 2009). Those who did not support
his policy or his party and anyone whose loyalty was suspect were removed from
positions (GT Nov 14, 2014). Thus, many able-bodied competent staff were removed
simply based on ethnicity or suspected of supporting another party. Since the PNC had to
reward its supporters with political patronage that normally come with a change in
government, it was only natural that Indians were replaced at sensitive positions within
the state. Indian Judges, for example, were distrusted and as such were terminated from
employment or denied promotion. The senior most Indian Judge was bypassed for the
position of Chief Justice in preference to a Black as the government felt Indians could not
be trusted to provide judgment favorable to the government given the history of
persecution of those not supportive of the PNC. Indians were also removed from the
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armed and police forces because of doubts about their loyalty in protecting the black
regime and they were replaced with PNC supporters. Abdul Sattaur, an Indian, who was
head of the Guyana Defense Force was replaced by an African; Indian deputy heads of
the police force were also replaced with PNC affiliates (GT Jan 25, 2015). Those Indians
who held prominent positions in the bureaucracy were replaced with ethnic loyalists. The
few Indians who remained in the civil service or security forces were denied promotions
and violence was used to intimidate them to leave the force or to accept their secondclass status (GT Nov 14, 2014; GC Nov 10, 2013). A PNC party card became essential
for access to social benefits, recruitment and hiring to civil service positions, government
contracts, and such attractive items or services as business permits. By the mid-1970s, an
estimated 80% of the economy fell under the control of the PNC government whose
workforce had more than doubled since 1964, becoming replete with PNC party members
replacing qualified independent civil servants (KN Apr 2, 2011; Nov 10, 2011;
Rampertab: 2001 http://www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.htm).
Many party supporters felt that since they supported the PNC government, the
state owed them a salary and the party had promised them a job if they supported the
party and attended campaign rallies or showed up at meetings to cheer the “Comrade
Leader” (KN May 3, 2013; Apr 2, 2010) – a la North Korean dictators of the Kim
dynasty. The African supporters of the ruling party felt it was their government in charge
with over half of the African labor force depending on the government for employment
(some 75% of working PNC supporters were employed by the state during PNC rule).
Also, government workers were required to attend PNC rallies to show support for the
regime whenever the dictator held public meetings (KN Aug 30, 2011) and attendance
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was taken. Supporters felt that because they went to the PNC meetings and because of
their support for the illegal regime, that automatically justified their salaries and benefits - not work productivity or office attendance. Also, the PNC had warned that if
government workers did not attend PNC organized rallies, their state payroll would be
docked and they would face termination of employment. So people simply showed up at
the rallies and expected to be paid whether they showed up at work or not or whether
they performed or not at the office. Many simply just showed up at the office, signed for
their attendance and left to attend to their personal chores or other businesses. No one
was disciplined for stolen time or non-productivity.
Burnham went on a mad spree to create (unproductive) make shift jobs for
supporters. Before independence, the state provided employment for less than a twentieth
of the population. After independence, as much as half the work force became employed
by the state as the PNC padded the employment rolls with supporters. During the 1970s,
the government took control over the commanding heights of the economy that it used to
hire party supporters and it increased the size of the police and security forces tenfold
(KN Apr 11, 2011). People were increasingly moved away from once meaningful
agricultural pursuits, which the country had comparative advantage in terms of trade, and
towards the world of make shift non-commodified government service oriented jobs with
hardly any productive work or service to be performed (KN Apr 23, 2012; Mar 14, 2011;
Aug 23, 2009). The government introduced all sorts of social welfare programs to create
employment for its supporters. Government expanded activities in all spheres of the
society creating make shift work for its supporters even for those without significant
skills or productive education. The PNC used employment as a weapon to control the
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population – denying jobs or threatening those already in state service if they oppose the
government (KN Apr 2, 2012). Most government supporters were employed in service
oriented or security jobs in a country that produced little that required a large pool of
service staff (KN Jan 11, 2013). During PNC rule, people simply turned up at government
office and spent the day virtually doing nothing. They might also just attended a PNC
rally (by government diktat) and look forward to their paychecks at the end of each
month (KN Apr 2, 2010; Feb 9, 2009; Dec 27, 2009).
There was a tendency to employ semi-skilled and unskilled labor guaranteeing
every party supporter a job. Some suggest that this kind of state policy was tantamount to
handouts in which the governments used state funds to buy the semi-literate to prop up its
rule. This reduced the incentive for people to acquire much needed skills (KN Feb 5,
2013). In time, there was a shortage of many basic skills (KN Jul 14, 2014; Aug 31,
2012; Sep 4, 2008). The poor work ethic led to: higher costs of delivery of goods,
overburdening of people who were hard working, delays in the delivery of products and
services, complaints and lack of confidence in the government and its staff, unwillingness
to invest in the country, racial animus, etc. There was a case when a foreign road building
company that received a government contract to build roads from an IDB loan was
instructed to employ PNC supporters. The company soon realized that the workers
foisted on them could not perform the job and fired them invoking the ire of the PNC.
http://www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.htm. Money was pouring in from
abroad from foreign aid and loans and so the PNC government could afford the make
shift work for its supporters (KN May 14, 2011). But when foreign aid and loans dried
up, the PNC was unable to sustain the patronage system to its cadres and the economy
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collapsed (KN Feb 17, 2011; Mar 14, 2014 Sep 25, 2012).
Professional standards declined in Guyana not only because unqualified people
were hired in important state sectors, but by compromising the professionalism of staff.
Burnham, through official policy (diktat), “eliminated the neutrality of the public service
sector and ordered government workers to support his party through the Party
Paramountcy Act” (Ibid). He marginalized the professional bureaucracy replacing them
with the PNC party card-carrying members loyal to him and the party. This was called
the ‘Paramountcy of the Party’ Doctrine – a supposed ‘socialist’ theme (in which the
party and the government are unified as in Cuba and communist bloc countries). This act
called for the retraining of workers to subordinate themselves to the PNC. It mandated
government workers implement policies enunciated by the PNC party and not necessarily
the government (Ibid). Burnham stated that the PNC “had paramountcy over the
government” because his party formed the government (Burnham: 1972) and as such the
civil service was duty bound to support and implement all measures of the party. And any
government workers refusing to implement party policy were subject to severe discipline.
Thus, everyone towed the line (KN Nov 10, 2011; Apr 27, 2010; GC Mar 30, 2014).
In contrast with the Burnhamite or PNC era of governance (between 1966 and
1992), during the colonial period (pre-1966), there had been relative political neutrality,
strict discipline and a strong workplace ethic at both government offices and in private
sector jobs. People were hired based on their competence and qualifications and their
ability to get the job done – no make shift jobs as under the PNC rule; meritocracy was at
work. People were disciplined for violating work rules. And government contracts were
given out in strict tendering processes based on merit and competence and an evaluation

- 280 -

of having the ability to get a job done (KN Jun 13, 2012). After the colony attained its
independence, however, work standards declined and ethnic and party loyalty replaced
competence and efficiency. Government contracts were given to friends, family
members and party supporters. Kickbacks were essential in doling out government
contracts. Tendering processes were violated and those who filed complaints were
terrorized (KN Nov 14, 2013). The PNC misgoverned and abused power removing those
who were productive. Loyalty to the PNC governing party, not competence, was a
prerequisite for a government job. People used a graft to secure a government job or to
get something done at a government office; this was practice started under the PNC right
after independence in 1966 and has become common and widely since that time.
Ethnicity was also the main factor in hiring state workers (KN Jul 7, 2011; May 15, 2014)
with PNC supporters being the main beneficiaries. Educators and sociologists alike
suggested that part of the problem of poor work attitudes had to do with the PNC
government discouraging productivity by rewarding laziness and loyalty of supporters
with promotions (KN May 29, 2011) – appointing unqualified people at a post or what
Guyanese called a “square peg in a round hole practice” (KN Dec 4, 2008). Party hawks
and working spies were promoted or got all the plum state positions while competent,
hard working, and conscientious staff were stuck at the bottom (KN Mar 8, 2014).
Government supporters saw no need to produce as they were getting paid whether they
delivered on services or not. The government depended on them for support in staying in
office and not for their productivity (KN Oct 25, 2012). And at any rate, many
government supporters used to say “is awe (ours) own now and we don’t need to perform
to be paid as the white man (colonial master) don’t control we any more” – this
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description characterized the attitude of most government workers and PNC supporters
(KN Apr 4, 2013; Dec 10, 2013). The government could not discipline workers fearing a
loss of support needed to protect the government (KN Feb 5, 2013; GC Apr 13, 2011).
It should be pointed out that prior to independence, there was little or nothing to
complain about with respect to the work attitude of employees within the country (KN
Jun 11, 2012). People were disciplined as the colonial authorities and the foreign
managers of MNCs kept a tight shift on running their businesses for profit. People simply
followed the directives of the colonial masters and foreign managers and anyone who
disobeyed was severely penalized or let go – a case of shape up or ship out. It was not so
right after the country gained its autonomy as government refused to discipline workers.
Under PNC rule, it was a time of conspicuous government consumption and poor work
habits of workers in the state sectors – a period of fete (relaxation and celebration) and a
declining work ethnic. As Rampertab (2001) and other researchers have pointed out,
government supporters were encouraged in this consumption pattern since they were
getting what they themselves described as “free money” (employed by the state and many
with no show jobs) which was guaranteed by the state as long as money was coming into
the coffers but was reduced once business activities were curtailed and revenue
unavailable. Even with the onset of structural adjustment measures in the 1970s and
1980s, that led to a suspension of make shift jobs, as soon as the economy picked up, the
government reintroduced social welfare projects and offered job opportunities that
required little skill or advanced training so as to shore up its political support among its
ethnic base. It was clear that “the PNC policy makers had not learnt the lesson of belt
tightening, (that it advocated during the 1970s and 1980s), or of changing direction to
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guide its supporters towards productive work rather than remaining wards of the state”
(Ibid; see also KN Sep 13, 2011; Jul 8, 2008).
Section J. Political & Ethnic Discrimination Against Individuals & Businesses
The PNC government targeted and discriminated against individuals and private
businesses based on political factors (party affiliation) and ethnicity (Rampertab: 2001).
Ethnic supporters were favored and rewarded. The government threatened expropriation
of private property and seizure of production if private businesses did not support the
party, owners didn’t become party members, businesses did not comply with directives to
hire party supporters, farmers did not sell produce to state agencies; and or if businesses
didn’t give donations for party activities (Ibid). The PNC did not appreciate the
economic rule that businesses have to be managed prudently and efficiently to cut waste
so as to maximize revenues that can be reinvested in productive activities to create
additional wealth and jobs and further adding to the tax coffers that would benefit the
country including PNC supporters. The government failed to recognize that economic
growth comes from business risks, investment and sacrifice – of people putting off instant
gratification for future economic security so that capital could grow. Business investment
is a form of deferred gratification of one’s money so it can lead to additional revenues. It
involves committing resources now into investments rather than using money for
immediate consumption. Basic business sense teaches that sacrifices now will generate a
return in the future for a better standard of living. Also, business confidence in a country
manifests itself in the form of increased levels of investment activity by the private
sector. Investments take place on the basis that the current and future environment is
conducive to generating a level of return that makes the activity worth the risk of
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investing one’s money. Recognizing the damage the government was doing to the
economy and marginalizing the non-government (private) sectors, people were not
motivated to invest in businesses to grow the economy. Thus, the private sector’s
contribution to the economy shrank significantly affecting growth (Ibid) (see also
http://www.guyana.org/govt/From_Autocracy_to_Democracy_in_Guyana.pdf)
Businessmen were looking for confidence from the PNC government to invest
money to aid the economy but the myopic and racist regime provided none. Business
growth and peoples’ confidence in the political and economic environment are the keys
to economic prosperity in a nation. People want confidence in a government to protect
them and to leave them alone to produce and to carry out their activities without
government interference or constant badgering for special favors that divert resources
from the pursuit of profit. They don’t want government to discriminate against them or
instruct them to hire incompetent people just because they were/are party supporters. The
PNC regime was constantly making demands on businesses for economic favors
(donations, hiring party supporters, etc.) (KN Nov 4, 2013). The absence of investor and
consumer confidence implied that people did not want to take risks in Guyana’s future or
in investment. Instead, under PNC rule, people sought consumption for their present well
being or hoarded resources for future consumption instead of investing those resources,
as a savvy businessman would do, in order to generate a gain (that benefited all through
job creation and taxes) and then use the profits for consumption and gratification and
keep on investing the remainder. Virtually little private investment was undertaken or
encouraged by the PNC during the dictatorship (1968 thru 1992) and the economy was
only liberalized (opened for investment) when the lending institutions set guidelines and
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conditions for loans. The PNC had virtually decimated the business class that used to
contribute the bulk of taxes to help the government meet its basic expenses of payroll
(GT Oct 27, 2013; GC Apr 15, 2012; Jun 9, 2011; www.applet-magic.com/guyana.htm ).
The PNC apparently did not learn simple economics that investments in
productive enterprises will inevitably create permanent jobs instead of temporary make
shift jobs for party loyalists at non-productive enterprises. Apparently, none of its
advisors or consultants or intellectuals bothered to inform the PNC regime that
productive work would create meaningful economic activity which could add to the
availability of goods and services, generate tax revenues, boost GNP, create further
employment, and spur the economy onto greater heights that could strengthen the PNC
position in the country (KN Jul 29, 2019). The PNC saw everyone not supporting it as an
enemy and took measures to alienate and marginalize them. The economy was bound to
decline under such governance. By the end of the 1970s, Burnham’s dream of making
Guyana a utopia or a haven for his PNC supporters had became a colossal nightmare as
even such loyalists lost faith in his leadership and ignored his edicts. Jobs for “the boys”
only sapped into the potential of the economy by paying people for doing virtually
nothing just because they reflexively supported the regime out of racial loyalty. During
the 1980s, money ran out to pay state workers (party ethnic supporters) as not enough
taxes were coming in from the once very active private sector. Increasingly, people
turned to crime to fund their lifestyles and even the state had a hand in criminal activities
especially against political opponents and wealthy supporters of the other parties (KN
May 28, 2014; Sep 8, 2011; Jun 5, 2011; May 17, 2011).
At the same time, to meet rising demands from supporters for resources, the PNC
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had to cut the limited resources Indians and other ethnic groups received in their
neighborhoods and redirect them to Black neighborhoods. The Amerindians were
neglected and marginalized (KN Sep 5, 2012). Since politics generally requires that you
take care of your supporters first and foremost, and since African supporters were
becoming restive from their declining standard of living, the PNC simply redirected
resources to appease its supporters. In addition, since the PNC leadership had announced
to its supporters that Indians were their enemies, the PNC government had to deny
resources to the Indians in order to convince Africans that Indians were indeed their
enemies and that the Indians posed a serious threat to them. Also, the PNC government
had to make available positions for the swell of the unemployed among the growing
African population. Thus, Indians and members of other ethnics, including professionals
in the bureaucracy, were removed from government positions to make way for PNC
supporters (Rabe: 2005; Gafar: 2003; GT Jan 25, 2015; KN Jun 6, 2011).
(www.google.com/search?q=Burnham%27s+removal+of+East+Indians+from+the+Guyana+arm
y&espv=2&es_sm=93&biw=946&bih=636&tbm=isch&imgil=6UNQIIXyl4yqHM%253A%253
Bhttps%); (see also www.guyanajournal.com/Guyana at the Crossroads.html).

Burnham used deplorable violence and or the threat of violence to get Indians,
members of other ethnic groups and the overall population to follow his dictates without
dissent. There has been carefully orchestrated violence against Indians since the 1960s
and this has continued for decades (KN May 23, 28, 2014). The following news reports
give a sample of the violence used by Burnham against the population: New York Times:
"East Indians flee race violence in British Guiana mining area." Wednesday, May 27th,
1964. New York Times: "Officials accuse Police in British Guiana of Violence."
Thursday, May 28th, 1964. Time Magazine: "British Guiana race war." June 5th, 1964.
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Newsweek Magazine: "Politics of violence." June 8th, 1964. Facts on File, Volume
XXIV: "British Guiana." June 4, 1964 (Rampertab: 2006).
As some writers noted in the media and in books and journals, Burnham had
established an ethnic state. Burnham took it upon himself to make the state the custodian
of the welfare of the African population while simultaneously Indians and other ethnic
groups were victimized and relegated to second-class status (Erriah: 2011, Mandle:
1978). And in so becoming, or as the Indians and other non-African ethnic groups
perceived the actions of the PNC regime, the state discouraged Indians and other nonAfrican groups from engaging in productive economic activities. Such a racially charged
atmosphere was not conducive to investment and hard work. The non-African groups felt
their economic activities would not fully benefit them and in fact would redound to the
benefit of the PNC government to reward its supporters while furthering the oppression
and immiserisation of Indians and other ethnic groups. So they withdrew their labor that
would severely impact on trade and growth. Although there was a favorable balance of
trade for primary export commodities such as bauxite, timber, rice, and sugar during the
early 1970s, with the latter three industries being dominated by Indians (Guyana
Chronicle, May 22, 2011), the Indians began to withdraw from economic activities (GT
Apr 25, 2013). They would also grow just enough food for personal use or to sell to
neighbors when the government proceeded with a policy of forced collectivization and
price control for their produce. All aspects of the economy under the PNC regime during
the mid 1970s failed to maximize their potential for growth and development –
productivity in every sector declined (www.imf.org).
As political and racial discrimination against Indians worsened during the later
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years of PNC misrule, especially during the late 1970s and 1980s (by this time most
Whites and Chinese had already departed for foreign shores), the Indians increasingly
withdrew their services and labor from the economy (Gafar: 2003). This led to a sharp
reduction in economic activities that resulted in a decline in growth. The race politics
practiced in Guyana, needless to say, was extremely harmful to the country. Burnham
removed (competent and qualified) Indians and Whites from top governmental positions,
causing them to become suspicious of his intentions and begin taking precautionary steps
to protect their finances and well-being (GT Nov 3, 2014; Apr 25, 2013; KN Aug 31,
2011). Not surprisingly, many Indians among the educated class, following the steps
taken by Whites and Chinese, began to emigrate to England and North America. Such a
development started a wave of migration of brain power that helped to transform their
newly adapted homelands; St. Kitts, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Barbados,
Trinidad, St. Martin, Turks, Grenada, Surinam, Fr. Guiana, Aruba, etc., all experienced
growth with Guyanese investment and labor input. (www.guyanausa.org emigration.htm;
KN Aug 5, 2010; Oct 11, 2009; www.tgmag.ca magic mt25.html).
The emigration of highly skilled and educated people leaving the country to work
abroad had become a serious concern for growth and development. As economists
pointed out, the brain drain or what is also termed human capital flight was one of the
salient factors that created the skill gaps in the public and private sector organizations in
Guyana. From the outset, Burnham had excluded competent Indians from government
employment saying he could not trust those who were not supporters of his party in
government management positions or state industrial leadership. Skilled Indians and
trained professionals sought employment in the private sector. But the private sector
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could not absorb the large pool of talented people within the country because of the
nation’s small economy, limited economic opportunities and government repression of
non-supporters and the private sector. Skilled individuals had no choice but to seek
economic fortunes and social fulfillment outside of the country. As economists have
observed, the racist policies of the PNC regime just pushed people out. And when MNCs
were forced out of the country through expropriation of their assets, they took with them
several of their talented Guyanese staff to North America and Europe. The brain drain of
the early 1970s began to have a negative impact on labor availability, economic prospects
and competitiveness reducing the number of dynamic and creative people who could
contribute to the development of Guyana (SN Jun 22, 2013).
According to Prof Erriah (2011), “the Afro-nationalist ideology and intellectual
background of Burnham tinctured and shaped his strategy of control of the state and
national development”. Several African defenders justify Burnham’s policy of
Africanization of the state saying Burnham had no choice but to build “a racist or racial
government because the Marxist PPP instructed Indians to boycott the regime” (SN Aug
18, 2008) and to engage in acts of violence against the PPP leaders and its supporters
who wanted to destabilize the dictatorship or forced it to make concessions to the
opposition. They note that Indians were unwilling to participate in any activity organized
by the PNC – an argument not totally inaccurate. However, they fail to mention the main
reason why Indians shunned the PNC – rigging of elections that denied the Indian PPP
their rightful place as rulers of Guyana under democratic rule. This resulted in a fall in
production and declining exports thereby lowering income for the government during the
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Not surprisingly, GDP collapsed precipitously by
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about 10% a year (GC Oct 15, 2014; Apr 23, 2014; Dec 23, 2010; Jan 5, 2011).
When stability returned and the race riots ended, between 1965 and 1970, the
economy grew 1.5% annually positively (in real terms) as the imperialist nations pumped
aid to prop up the Burnham government and encouraged MNCs to invest in industries so
as to keep the socialist PPP out of office. Then for the period 1970-1977, the economy
grew negatively (retracted or declined at minus) 0.7% annually although for a few years
it grew positively when there was political stability (www.imf.org). This was a period
when the racial conflict resurfaced and racial discrimination against Indians was
institutionalized leading to Indian withdrawal from the economy and increased migration.
The PNC mobilized support based on race and furthered divisions among the different
races in the pluralist society. This sense of division was exacerbated by the PNC
implementing policies that increasingly dis-empowered ethnic groups not supportive of it
especially Indians who were aligned with the PPP; this policy generally relegated Indians
to second-class status. Also, the change from independent to republican status impacted
negatively on the economy. In 1970, Burnham broke all ties with England declaring
Guyana a republic triggering a drop in financial aid and trade with England. The change
to republican status was opposed by Indians who were not consulted and who feared
Burnham’s motives given his other actions like election rigging, ending judicial appeals,
and removing Indians and Whites from major government posts. Indians responded with
labor strikes, and they also began to withdraw from economic activities that benefited the
state coffers. (http://www.guyana.org/govt/From_Autocracy_to_Democracy_in_Guyana.pdf;
See Gafar: 2003; Seenarine: 2006; KN May 16, 2013; Sep 26, 2010; Jul 11, 2010).
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Beginning in 1971, Burnham squeezed the private sector (GT Aug 30, 2014).
Burnham began to nationalize foreign owned bauxite companies and banks while also
bringing in his own supporters to oversee them. Retained workers resented the new
management, especially those who were less qualified than they, and as such they did not
labor enthusiastically for the state. This led to under productivity and even sabotage of
industries. By 1972, several MNCs came under government control with disastrous
consequences for the economy that saw growth rates first stagnated and eventually fell
(issuu.com/washdiplomat/docs/guyana final) (KN Jun 16, 2014; May 26, 2012).
Burnham rigged the election of 1973 prompting Jagan to call a labor strike that
lasted for months. There was also a lack of cooperation from the Indian party in
economic and political policies that saw growth grates dipping sharply in 1973 and 1974.
To appease his political opponent, Burnham entered into discussions with Jagan in 1974
and reached agreements for economic cooperation, including the recognition of the
Jagan-led Guyana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) representing Indian sugar
workers (KN Oct 14, 2013). And in 1976, Burnham answered Jagan’s call to nationalize
the British owned sugar company Bookers that used to employ more than 25% of the
work force. With an end to labor strikes and Jagan’s cooperation in controlling Indian
militancy against the regime, the years 1975 and 1976 were very stable and saw positive
growth rates exceeding 5% -- due to increases in agricultural and bauxite production. But
in 1977, following the nationalization of the sugar industry and the replacement of
foreign management with PNC supporters, the economy began to decline, never to
recover again under PNC rule. Indian sugar workers went on strike demanding higher
wages, a share in the sugar profit, and a reversal of food policies that banned imports of
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food staples that form the basis of the Indian diet. Burnham was unyielding to the
demands. Around this time, the major industrialized countries also turned the screws on
Burnham for his nationalistic economic policies and expropriation of foreign
multinational companies. This period also saw political violence and the arrests of
opposition politicians (particularly those from human rights groups opposed to the
regime) triggering labor strikes. Not surprisingly, a severe economic downturn
characterized 1977 (Ibid; Gafar: 2003; Ishmael: 2012; KN Aug 1, 2014; GC Apr 5, 2014;
www.refworld.org docid 469f38931e.html ; www.guyana.org/.../chapter3.ht...;
motherearthtravel.com/history/guyana history-9.htm; KN Dec 1, 2013; Dec 22, Feb 22, 2009;
www.mongabay.com/reference/country.../guyana ECONOMY.html).

Racial tension began to worsen between 1978 (the year of the illegal referendum
that was designed to expand the powers of the Chief Executive and the government –
creation of an executive Presidency), as Indians launched a nationwide boycott of the
polls, and in 1980 (year of fraudulent election) (KN Nov 20, 2009). In protest against the
rigged referendum and 1980 election, Indians in productive sectors (such as rice and
sugar) of the economy sabotaged sugar production by burning cane fields and refusing to
cultivate farmlands (Ibid). They also continued to migrate in large numbers abandoning
arable lands that became fallow. By withholding their labor, they affected productivity
and by extension gross domestic product (GDP), and real economic growth declined at
about 2% a year between 1978 and 1980 (Ibid; KN Jan 13, 2010; Aug 25, 2013).
The Guyanese economy, not surprisingly, regressed during the PNC’s tenure in
office from 1965 thru 1992; between 1980 and 1988, for example, the economy declined
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2.8% annually14. (KN Feb 7, 2013; SN Aug 12, 2011). For the period between 1989 and
1990, the economy also grew negatively at 4.4% and 3.2% respectively (SN May 27,
2009; Table section). Most private Indian farmers had virtually stopped tilling their land
and were unwilling to sell their crops to state enterprises that offered low prices (SN Oct
27, 2011). Also, Indian sugar workers engaged in strikes demanding the restoration of
democracy and an end to racial discrimination. In response, in 1991, the Black minority
government, at the recommendation of foreign advisors from the World Bank and the
British Commonwealth office in London, began to reverse policies that had
institutionalized persecution of and discrimination against Indians (in particular) and
members of other ethnic groups (KN May 20, 2013; Mar 29, 2010; SN Sep 3, 2010).
Section K. Collapsing Business Environment & Agriculture
Caribbean economists had advised during the 1970s that if the governments of the
region, particularly Guyana, did not allow the private sector to flourish and if they do not
focus on agriculture, it would lead to economic calamity and social inequities among
haves and haves not as well as ethnic polarization negatively affecting development (KN
Jul 28, 2009). Their prognosis would turn out to be correct with respect to Guyana as
Burnham shut out the private sector and neglected agriculture that was crucial for
creating jobs as well as raising scarce capital needed for industrialization and
technological innovation to lift the economy out of abject poverty (Dacosta: 2005; 2003).
By the 1980s, Guyana, which at one time was referred to as the breadbasket of the
Caribbean, began importing basic foods including sugar and rice from other Caribbean
territories to meet domestic demands (SN Aug 31, 2011; Sep 17, 2009; Aug 18, 2008).
14

Guyana: From Economic Recovery To Sustained Growth. Washington: World Bank
Country Study. 1993.
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The economy had bottomed out falling to an all time low during the late 1970s and
worsening thereafter primarily because of policies attributed to government prejudice.
The decline was significant during the 1980s during which period basic foods and
supplies for industrial production were virtually non-existent due to a lack of appropriate
technology, skilled personnel, qualified management and a shortage of foreign currency,
among other factors. This period saw very low per capita income and stagnant or
negative growth (KN Aug 6, Apr 12, 2014; Nov 13, 2011).
Prof John Gafar’s book (2003) extensively discussed the collapsing nature of the
business environment and the nature of economic discrimination in Guyana that led to the
ultimate collapse of the economy. Analogously, Prof. Jay Mandle (1982) pointed out that
the Burnham African government was unable to transform the agricultural (largely
dominated by Indians) and other sectors (business largely dominated by Whites and
Chinese) of the economy in a manner that could enable him and his African PNC party to
control national production of a range of goods and services to distribute to the
population at large (Africans included). And as such, the economy began crumbling
leading to widespread shortage of food and even basic items like toilet paper that led to
much suffering. Mandle (1973) contended that a successful development strategy for the
country depended on the harnessing of the energies of the agricultural work force
(courting of and support from Indians) but the PNC was incapable of making the linkage
(124-25) because of its racist policies. Guyana had comparative advantage in agricultural
production, but out of spiteful policies against Indians, the PNC neglected agriculture
(KN Oct 14, 2014; Dec 9, 2012). And not unexpectedly, the economy slid downwards
into a basket case (SN Oct 16, 2014; Dec 16, 2013; Feb 13, 2009; KN Apr 11, 2010).
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As the Guyana case illustrated, when a regime practices racial discrimination,
people are discouraged from hard work and from contributing to state coffers. The
destructive policies pursued by the Black PNC government in the commercial sector
(trading controlled by the Whites) and in the agricultural and retailing sectors of the
economy (both largely dominated by Indians), had a major bearing on the decline in
economic growth and overall development of Guyana (GT Aug 30, 2104). Between 1965
and 1990, for example, the minority Black government marginalized Whites in
businesses and sought to exclude and or discourage Indians from participating in the most
productive sectors of the economy such as farming, lumbering, and mining (Ibid). The
economy suffered (KN Oct 19, 2012). In its desire to appease and satisfy the needs of its
Black constituents and to punish Whites and Chinese for supporting the UF, the PNC
virtually destroyed their businesses (GT Nov 14, 2014; KN Dec 23, 2014). To punish
Indians for supporting Jagan and his PPP, the PNC shifted resources away from
agriculture and the rural areas where Indians have historically predominated and towards
urban areas where Blacks have concentrated since the end of slavery and especially in
more recent years. Infrastructure in urban areas was built up whereas infrastructure for
food production (such as drainage and irrigation in communities where Indians farmed)
was allowed to collapse so as to weaken an Indian dominance over food production with
the hope it would weaken the PPP voting stranglehold over Indians; rural areas, for
example, had limited access to pipe borne water (KN Oct 23, 2009; Dec 13, 2008; Apr 5,
2014). In the process, food production became the victim (KN Jun 26, 2011; Oct 25,
2009) with the entire country suffering from food shortages.
Agriculture (which historically has been dominated by Indians and historically the
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mainstay of the economy and which has been the primary source of employment of
Indians) was terribly neglected by the government (GT Jan 24, 2015; GC Sep 17, 2014;
Ishmael: 2012). Farming communities suffered as a result of neglect and racial
discrimination (www.guyana.org ... chapter5.ht…). Such neglect resulted in its near
collapse by the early 1980s and a swell of unemployed among Indians most of whom
earned their living working on farms (KN Jun 28, 2013). According to veteran journalist
Hyder Ally, an executive member of the PPP, the sugar and rice industries that served for
centuries as the largest contributor to the economy were destroyed by the PNC to get
back at Indians for not supporting Burnham. Sugar and rice were neglected to teach the
Indians a lesson. “The sugar industry was treated by the Burnham PNC aligned
administration as a political football and was literally kicked around at the whims and
fancies of the PNC regime. The problems encountered by the Corporation had little if
anything to do with the nationalization of the industry and everything to do with
mismanagement and political shortsightedness on the part of the PNC administration
against the opposition and its supporters. Sugar workers were broadly regarded by the
PNC regime as members and supporters of the PPP and every effort was made to squeeze
the last drop of juice out of the industry with very little of the surplus extracted being
utilized to adequately compensate sugar workers and or for re-capitalization of plant and
machinery” (KN May 14, 2011). As Hyder Ally posited, one consequence of PNC’s
vindictiveness towards the sugar industry (and later the rice industry) was an exodus of
labor away from state lands producing sugar and rice resulting in the collapse of both
industries. The PPP had to rescue the sugar and rice industries after it was returned to
office in 1992 as it also did in 1957. The PPP saved sugar, rice and the agricultural sector
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of the economy despite facing enormous problems from the PNC and its Afro supporters
during bother periods of its governance. The PPP was trying to ensure the sugar
industry’s 30,000 workers and the rice industry’s 10,000 workers continued to earn daily
sustenance for themselves and their respective families. The PNC “accused the PPP of
protecting their base by securing the sugar industry and cried that the PPP did not invest
similar resources in bauxite to protect African workers who support the PNC. The PNC
threatened that should it return to office, it would privatize the sugar industry, an action
likely to put thousands of workers on the breadline” (KN May 14, 2011: GT Mar 12,
2014; GC Mar 12, 2014). Despite the enormous challenges facing the industry, the PPP
government has vowed “not to close down the industry or to privatize it” as advocated by
opposition PNC elements (Ibid; GC Mar 13, 2014).
The neglect of agriculture led to reduction in income and decreasing tax
contributions to national revenues for the state and ultimately the GDP (GC Feb 20,
2012). It also led to food shortages and seizure of food production to enhance party
supporters. Indian leaders charged that the PNC government institutionalized racist
policies to hurt the economic status of Indians resulting in their drawing back from the
official agricultural sector and turning to the underground economy for survival (GC Jan
28, 2011). Having felt slighted and discriminated against and forced to sell their produce
to state agencies at below cost prices to the benefit of supporters of the PNC, Indians
increasingly abandoned their prime farmland leaving them fallow (SN Jan 26, 2009).
Such a move led to rising starvation in the country, something unimaginable at the time
of independence as Guyana was considered as the breadbasket of the region (GC Mar 5,
2012; Apr 13, 2012). Rice farmers, for example, were forced to sell rice by decree to a
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state owned Rice Marketing Board (RMB) that set prices below the cost of production – a
disincentive to grow rice. This caused farmers (almost all of whom were Indians as
compared with the RMB comprising almost all non-Indians) to abandon most of their
lands leaving them fallow or growing just enough to eat and sell to neighbors (KN Apr 4,
2009; GC Sep 25, 2011). This deeply hurt consumers and the overall economy. The
government also monitored the production of other farm products (like coconuts,
plantains, pineapples, pumpkin, cassava, yams, other ground provisions, sugar cane,
citrus, etc.) garnishing much of the products and establishing price controls that made it
unprofitable for farmers to remain in farming; the farmers sold goods at black market
prices way above state directed prices risking fines and or peddled their produce illegally
across the border where produce commanded much higher prices than Guyana state
controls allowed (KN Jul 1, 2008; Sep 7, 2008) (http://www.mongabay.com/404.shtml).
(see also www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham1.htm).

When economic conditions dipped for the worse with food shortages, Burnham
forced people to cultivate food around their homes and he required that big farmers turn
over surplus produce to his state agency. It was a disastrous diktat for Burnham to make
every citizen a farmer including those who knew nothing about farming and those who
were university educated in other fields. Farming is not for everyone unless there is some
motivational incentive or a cultural attachment as developed among Indians for
generations in Guyana bringing those cultural values of rice production from India. Not
many people, not even his hardcore supporters, took Burnham seriously on farming but
they went through the motions of engaging in farming (and collecting money, equipment,
etc.) to appease the dictator so they would not be bothered or victimized by him. Large
amounts of money were wasted on this thoughtless, misconceived, and senseless scheme
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of forced farming that produced virtually no food and in fact drove people away from
farming. Socialist farm collectivization was just one area in which Burnham contributed
to the collapse of the economy under PNC rule (Gafar: 2003; KN Jun 6, 2011; SN Jan 26,
2009; Oct 17, 2009)(see www.guyana.org/.../chapter23.... ; www.guyana.org/.../chapter23...).
Another Burnham economic blunder was establishing trade policies that made the
government the sole importer of virtually all goods replacing companies owned by the
Portuguese, British and Chinese who had formerly controlled foreign trade (the import
and export market) and most retailing outlets all during colonial rule and into the early
1970s (GT Jan 25, 2015). The PNC controlled state corporations (co-operatives and
shops called Knowledge Sharing Institutes) also became the primary wholesaler of goods
supplying retail stores and withholding supplies to non-supporters of the government (GT
Jun 21, 2014; KN Sep 2, 2013; Sep 9, 2008). Party affiliated coops also set up retail
outlets throughout the country and were often the only shops supplied with goods (when
available) from government wholesales thus driving small shopkeepers out of businesses
(KN Nov 30, 2011). The government also put in place price controls that were strictly
enforced with retailers having to pay hefty fines when caught selling goods above price
controls. Private businesses were losing money and the Chinese, Portuguese and British
closed up business operations since they were prohibited from importing goods. They
departed for foreign shores especially Barbados, Canada, America and Australia where
they started successful businesses and contributed to the growth of those countries. Not
surprisingly, Barbados began to do much better than Guyana economically as Dacosta
(2005) showed in his comparative study of both countries. Prof. Bertrand Ramcharan of
the Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies lamented the
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abuses and racially inspired attacks inflicted on the different ethnic groups by Burnham’s
Afro dictatorship long after colonialism ended. Prof. Ramcharan noted that after the PNC
took power in 1965, ethnic groups not supportive of the PNC suffered terribly and “most
of the Chinese and Portuguese left the country (settled in Australia, Canada, Barbados,
etc.), and today’s descendants of indentured Indians find themselves in the same quest for
dignity and equality as the descendants of African slaves and of the Guyanese population
at large” (SN Sep 3, 2010; KN Sep 13, 2010). The non-supporters of the regime were
harassed, victimized and hounded out of the country during the tenure of PNC (mis) rule
and Indians were essentially treated as third class citizens (KN Sep 21, 2011).
Burnham also promoted the idea of cooperatives (joint ownership of a business)
in which people would form co-ops (businesses especially in the areas of banking,
agriculture, retail and wholesale trade, etc.) (SN Mar 20, 2014; Jan 13, 2008). Police,
army, teachers, banking and other types of cooperatives were formed among African
supporters of the PNC with active government encouragement and funding (SN Jan 6,
2013). Few Indians partook in coop schemes. Indians and other ethnic groups largely
withheld their participation in such coop ventures because they did not see themselves as
beneficiaries, and they were discouraged from participating in such venture by ethnic and
party leaders opposed to the PNC. At any rate, the Indians were not given funding for
coops and did not want to establish co-ops or partake in activities that would benefit the
regime (SN Jul 12, 2011). The state poured millions of dollars into the cooperatives and
gave out unsecured loans to its supporters with hardly any return from the investment
(KN Dec 18, 2009; Sep 8, 2008). There was no accountability and transparency in the
cooperatives and virtually all of them fell into bankruptcy. Poor Africans who deposited
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money in the African agricultural cooperatives and banks lost their deposits (SN Jan 6,
2010; Oct 7, 2013; Dec 17, 2009). Private wholesalers were shunted aside denied good to
supply retailers. The state agencies controlled the distribution of goods and PNC
affiliated cooperatives received preference for supplies over retailers from other ethnic
groups (GT Aug 31, 2014)(www.franzlee.org.ve/coopguy.html). This naturally increased
resentment among the other groups against the PNC and its African supporters. The state
KSI distribution outlets collapsed because of a lack of accountability and the attitude of
Burnham’s supporters that they were entitled to the goods for free because it was “their
government” that was in control of the nation. Their attitude was, “It’s we government;
we entitled to it”. Critics noted that the PNC created this dependency syndrome among its
supporters in order to control and manipulate them for political objectives, a policy which
led to devastating effects on national development (KN Dec 1, May 19, 2013; Jan 1, Oct
26, 2011; GT May 17, 2014). (see https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1136263160).
Like the Chinese and White entrepreneurs, many of the Indian shopkeepers also
found business to be a losing proposition especially retail shops because of strict price
control (that led to jail term and fines for violations) and shortages of goods to satisfy
consumer demand (SN Apr 21, 2011; Sep 17, 2009). Many simply closed up operations
and migrated like the Portuguese and Chinese to North America and Caribbean territories
(KN Jun 30, 2011; Jan 14, 2014; May 5, 2010). In time, government control of the
economy and foolhardy policies towards the private sector led to a shortage of basic
goods fueling an underground economy. At the same time, the PNC government was
encouraging its supporters to go into business ventures and farm production. The PNC
doled out huge amounts of state lands to its supporters and offered them soft loans to
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engage in farming and shop keeping. But the enterprises never took off even when the
money was made available to them. Most of the government loans were never repaid
resulting in huge losses for the state. The PNC government also offered subsidies and
incentives to lure Africans into farming, but there were few takers. Most Blacks did not
want to return to the farmland (SN Oct 17, 2011). Most of the Africans had abandoned
farm life right after emancipation from slavery and few have returned to the land in spite
of continuous imploring from African leaders that farming was the key to their well being
(SN Feb 14, 2007). Burnham beseeched them to engage in farming but they ignored him
(SN Oct 28, 2007; Set 8, 2012). However, they took advantage of the PNC government’s
incentives (including loans, subsidies, grants, and seedlings) acquiring land and then
sublet the land (for a fee) to Indian farmers. Many who obtained lease lands from the
government rented them to Indian farmers because they did not want to be bothered with
farming. Burnham also doled out subsidies to his supporters by way of near free
materials for housing and services as well as seedlings and fertilizers to farmers. Many
who received freebies or subsidized resources sold them to Indians who were only too
happy to purchase them at bargain prices. Also, they saved time and money by not having
to line up at government outlets begging for essential supplies and or paying bribes for
materials to grow food to feed a nation where food was scarce (SN Jan 26, 2009; Oct 17,
2009). (See also jagan.org/CJ%20Articles/In%20Opposition/Images/2304.pdf).
Under PNC rule, virtually no assistance was rendered to Indian farmers or incentives
offered to encourage food production. Fertilizers, machineries and spare parts for farm
machines were in short supply thereby limiting production in all spheres of economic
activities (SN Feb 3, 2009; Jan 20, 2010). And during periods of drought, flooding and
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other natural calamities, when crops were destroyed (SN Nov 14, 2013) the government
offered no financial assistance to Indian farmers while African communities were
discreetly targeted for helpful assistance. In fact, farmers had to go through a state
agency, Rice Action Committee (RAC), controlled by an African staff, to obtain
fertilizers, seeds and machinery for rice cultivation. In order to control the rice trade,
Burnham established the Rice Marketing Board (RMB) and required all rice producers to
sell their produce to the RMB. He introduced a Rice Pricing Scheme (RPS) under which
the RMB procured stocks at a price below the market price per bag from the farmers (SN
May 19, 2011; Sep 3, 2010; Sep 13, 2010). The government also established a grading
scheme for paddies that was not always based on merit; a bribe raised the grade that
fetches a higher price. Often good paddies received low grade and the government resells
it as a higher grade cheating farmers of their labor. This process obviously discouraged
farm production. (see GC Jan 28, 2011; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Guyana;
www.guyana.org/.../chapter23....; KN Oct 25, 2009; www.guyana.org/.../chapter23....).
During the oil shocks that led to high energy costs in the 1970s and 80s, Indian
farmers were not assisted while African communities were recipients of fuel deliveries.
The prices of natural resources and energy rose steeply thus making it unprofitable to
grow food or out fishing. The prices of manufactured goods rose steeply on the back of
very high input costs especially from higher energy costs. The government offered no oil
subsidies to Indians to encourage farming and agro industries. There developed a stifling
bureaucracy, with red tape to get government clearance on proceeding with farm projects
as well as to obtain scarce foreign currency to purchase equipment and fuel. Also, the
constant demands for bribes by civil servants deeply frustrated Indian farmers who threw

- 303 -

their hands hopelessly in the air as they struggled to feed the nation. Not surprisingly,
erstwhile Indians farmers opted to abandon the land from the late 1970s rather than cave
in to briberies and abuses. They then began to migrate in droves to greener pastures
overseas as laborers (SN Jan 6, 2009; Dec 15, 2008; Dec 11, 2010). Many migrated to
neighboring Surinam and Trinidad where they turned around the dying agricultural
sectors particularly rice and sugar production) of those economies (SN Jan 18, 2014).
Surinam became self-sufficient in food production (producing record amounts of rice) as
a result of the labor of Indo-Guyanese migrants who effectively developed the farmlands
(SN Jul 5, 2009). Some Indo-Guyanese also migrated to French Guiana where they
became successful entrepreneurs and or tended farms, established fishing industries and
worked in mines excavating large quantities of minerals including gold and bauxite (SN
Jun 12, 2009; Sep 12, 2009; Jan 7, 2013). (guyana.hoop.la › ... › Political Discussions ;
www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/guyana.htm).(www.guyanausa.org/emigration.htm)
The departure of Indians from Guyana took a huge toll on farming, investment,
GDP, availability of food for domestic consumption, and the standard of living during the
1970s and 1980s (SN Feb 20, 2009; May 28, 2009). The economy was largely based on
agriculture (KN Jul 28, 2009). Manufacturing contributed only 14% on average to GDP,
and services (which involved exclusively domestic consumption, as Guyana attracts no
tourism) amounted to some 45% of GDP. An IDB study found Guyana had the highest
ratio of agriculture to GDP of countries in the hemisphere. Agriculture as a proportion of
GDP averaged 28% annually during the 1980s and much higher in earlier years. The
study also revealed that bauxite production, at one time second in importance to sugar,
averaged only 5% of the total GDP for the same time period. The bauxite industry was
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the largest employer of PNC supporters outside of the civil service and the government
found it necessary to pour greater resources into the bauxite industry but it was only
sapping up capital with negative returns. Bauxite declined in productivity and became a
drain on the economy. Gradually the government dispensed with related bauxite
operations. In the meanwhile, the government had neglected agriculture that was the
lifeblood of the economy denying itself critical revenues. Agricultural and bauxite
production would recover during the late 1980s as a result of the economic reform
program, and by 1989 their respective contributions were 47% and 11% for that year
alone. http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubr-401.pdf; SN Dec 13, 2013)
Section L. Rising Debt Level, Liberalization & Economic Turn Around:
Guyana faced a serious debt problem running deficits from the 1960s thru the
1980s with the problem coming to a head on collision with lending institutions and banks
that put an end to lending around 1985 (KN Aug 13, 2012; Jul 19, 2009). Since the 1960s,
the government had resorted to borrowing to pay for imports and the debt kept building
up until it reached some $2.2 billion or US $30K per capita by 1992 when it was hardly a
few million dollars when Guyana became independent in 1966 (Dacosta: 2005).
As export revenues fell, the government began borrowing abroad to finance the
purchase of essential imports. External debt ballooned to US$1.7 billion by 1988, almost
six times as large as Guyana's official GDP, and would hit $2.1 b by 1992, some seven
times the GDP. Because the government funneled the borrowed money into consumption
and paying public service workers (its supporters) rather than put the money into
productive investment, Guyana's economy did not ease its debt burden. Instead, the
government became increasingly unable to meet its debt obligations. Guyana was placed
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in the unenviable position of being one of the most highly indebted countries in the
world. (http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html) (SN Jan 22 and 5,
2007; KN Jan 25, 2013; Sep 10, 2011; Jan 14, 2009).
Declining productivity led to a shortage of revenues to fund projects or pay state
workers. Revenue shortfall was further worsened by the high crime rate, especially the
brazen robberies and killing of business people (KN Jan 15, 2014; SN Oct 20, 2012; Aug
14, 2009), food shortages, declining standard of living, and racial discrimination
triggered a massive brain drain and capital fight. This led to lower than expected national
output in all sectors of the economy. Because of the brain drain, competent workers could
not be found to run basic industries and private investment was discouraged through the
nationalization policy. With earnings not coming in and Guyana hardly selling goods
abroad, there developed a prolonged shortage of foreign exchange especially between
1975 and 1992 making it difficult to pay for imports of spare parts to service machinery
or buy new equipments further crippling the economy. The government was forced to
borrow money that kept on increasing to make up for declining revenues and increasing
expenditures. An IDB study on Guyana reported, “the export of each major commodity
declined more than 50% during the 1980s, despite the availability of markets”
(www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubr-401.pdf). This contributed to the rising
debt situation so much so that by 1987, “Guyana’s external debt was 600% of GDP. High
international interest rates added to an already unsustainable burden of debt service
resulting in debt obligations going in arrears and the government unable to even service
the debt with interest payments” (Ibid; Table section). Macroeconomic indicators all
suggested a major disequilibrium. For example, foreign exchange reserves remained zero
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for several years. The country ran huge balance of deficits averaging US$183 million a
year during most of the 1980s. Domestic inflation averaged way above world inflation.
Bank of Guyana credit to government was over 300% of the monetary base and there was
a high rate of cumulative inflation that hit triple digits (Ibid) impacting on standard of
living. The debt was so high that it rendered Guyana the status of a heavily indebted
country, making the country eligible for debt cancellation during the 1990s under the
Paris Club loan forgiveness program for highly indebted poor countries. Almost US $800
M was written off from Guyana’s debt of US $2.2 B (SN Feb 14, 2013).
Hoyte was under pressure from creditor institutions and Western governments to
address, the debt problem. He agreed to privatize most of the sixty state owned
companies (Decaires: 1988) under a policy that was known as the economic recovery
program (ERP) that was prepared by economists from the Commonwealth and
international banking institutions. Hoyte was promised a restoration of loans from
creditor institutions if he denationalized state enterprises. Also, Caribbean leaders
demanded that he pursue reforms and embrace Indians who were heretofore victims of
racial discrimination, in exchange for the recognition of his regime that rigged the
December 1985 elections. Hoyte proceeded to invite Guyanese businessmen who had
migrated to return home telling them that Guyana was reopened for business. Hoyte also
acquiesced to almost all demands from the business community on ending state control of
imports and exports, price controls, collectivization, and the ban on importation of foods
and to open up the economy as had once existed during colonial rule (SN Jun 21, 2014;
KN Jul 4, 2011; Sep 30, 2010). He also decided to do away with the burdensome
cooperative sector and to allow businesses to compete with the state in imports and
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exports (SN Sep 5, 2008). Although these reforms were not of his own doing but foisted
upon the dictator by the IMF, World Bank and the Commonwealth as conditions for bailout
loans, they helped to turn around the economy (KN Dec 4, 2014; May 20, 2013).
It was felt that the reforms would help cut public sector inefficiency and waste
and reduce the size of the bloated bureaucracy and turn around the economy. It was also
felt that economic reforms would provide greater scope to the private sector, attract more
investment, bring in new technology and revive economic growth, improve economic
efficiency, stimulate the private sector to invest in the country, and mobilize more foreign
companies to start new industries. Hoyte agreed to restore economic freedom, resulting in
Indians returning to economic activities. In terms of investment, an American company
was allowed to open a bauxite mine, and two Canadian companies were permitted to
develop what became the largest open-pit gold mine in South America. A Malaysian
company was granted a license and land to make plywood. Sugar was placed in private
management. However, efforts to privatize the two state-owned mining bauxite
companies, Berbice Mining Company (Bermine) and Linden Mining Company (Linmine)
were unsuccessful though they were put in control of private management (SN Feb 6,
2011; Aug 5, 2008). Hoyte also assented to a request from a Caribbean media magnate
Ken Gordon of Trinidad to obtain a license in 1986 for the publication of an independent
newspaper Stabroek News (although newsprint was denied to the publication under the
excuse of limited foreign exchange). The paper received a substantial grant from the US
National Democratic Institute to start its own press and import newsprint and instantly
became popular and the leading paper (SN Dec 10, 2008).
Indians from all sectors of the society cheered the economic opening. Indian

- 308 -

farmers generally welcomed the removal of price controls on their crops and the
collectivization of produce. Importers and exporters were happy they could freely trade
with other countries. Retailers of all ethnicities also cheered the removal of price controls
on goods and allowing shops in the private sector to compete with government stores (KN
Jan 11, 2013). Initially, the ERP was stalled by strikes by the PPP-affiliated labor unions,
particularly in the sugar industry, concerned about privatization of state corporations at
give away prices. But overall, privatization of state enterprises and removal of crippling
restrictions helped to stimulate economic recovery. Similar approaches to privatization
also took place in many other socialist and Latin countries and led to growth and
increases in standard of living. Privatization contributed to the growth registered from
1990 onwards by the Guyanese economy. The economy began to show a turn around in
the late 1980s because of investment in agriculture, the opening up of the economy, and
the sale of government corporations (KN Dec 12, 2010). Previously, Indians were
targeted for robberies. Pressured by the U.S and human rights groups, the PNC
government also decided to improve its human rights record and decrease its abuses of
Indians during the late 1980s (KN Dec 31, 2008). Hoyte actively courted Indians and
committed to providing them with the physical cover of safety and security from bandits
and racist thugs. Hoyte ordered the police to provide protection to the business
community as well as residential areas where Indians were living. Under Hoyte’s liberal
reformist policy, Indians started acquiring government assets and investing in agriculture,
stores, and foreign exchange cambios (SN Jan 26, 2011; KN May 27, 2011). Indian
farmers began tilling the land that resulted in growing export of primary commodities and
food production. Also, businessmen from among all ethnic groups began to invest
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heavily in the economy. This lifted the economy out of its doldrums as it showed signs of
growth (KN May 29, 2011; Dec 12, 2010). (www.nationsencyclopedia.com.Guyana).
The economic progress of the late 1980s supports the contention that the state of
the economy and the nation’s well being are closely tied with the policies of the ethnic
backed regime towards other ethnic groups and ethnic relations. When Indians,
Portuguese, Chinese and other groups were persecuted, as happened between 1968 and
1988, they restricted their economic activities and withdrew their capital with the result
that the economy suffered (declining standard of living and negative growth rates). When
policies were perceived to be non discriminatory and non punitive, Indians and others
were willing to work with the regime, invest in the economy, and engage in productive
activities that led to a turnaround in the economy (with rising growth rate and higher
standard of living. It seems that when everyone is/was at a relatively equal (ethnic or
otherwise) footing and people are/were free to pursue their economic dreams, all groups
feel/felt encouraged and motivated to work to their maximum ability since they can
experience tangible self enrichment. When persecuted and forced to produce for the state
with benefits hardly accruing to them personally or to their groups, people tend to
withhold their labor and the economy suffers. That was amply illustrated in Guyana
during the period from 1990 thru October 1992 under PNC rule and since then under PPP
rule when liberal economic policies replaced state directed policy development (SN Sep
17, 2009; Grenade: 2012; Gafar: 2003; www.centralbank.org.bb/.../FACING_GLOBA..).
Section M. Parties’ Blame Game & Failure of Non-Capitalist Development
In examining Guyana’s negative growth rate and its failure to develop15, it is fair

15 Social scientists view development from their respective disciplinary perspectives and there is
disagreement on what constitutes development – whether it should include life expectancy, infant
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to say as Prof. Paulette Pierce (1984) and other writers asserted, that the country has
faced serious economic problems (SN Nov 7, 20017). The country’s economic problems
worsened when the Forbes Burnham dictatorship embraced the model of a non-capitalist
path to development. It was squeezed on all sides – by international imperialist
determined to make the model fail, as well as domestic forces that felt the government
was not radical enough. The Marxist Dr. Cheddi Jagan who wanted a multi-racial
national unity, multi-party government rather than a government of one race and one
party also pressured the dictatorial regime. Jagan felt he was illegally excluded (through
fraudulent elections) from playing a meaningful role in the development of the country.
As such, Jagan took counter measures to undermine Burnham’s policy whenever Jagan
felt Burnham’s policy was not socialistic or radical enough (SN Oct 6, 2010).
As Pierce and other writers asserted, the two dominant parties, PNC and PPP,
have blamed each other for declining standard of living and failed development, and in
fact, any objective commentator would hold both accountable for failed development -their unwillingness to unite the working class and or to cooperate to fight imperialist
forces. The two dominant parties have blamed each other for failed development. Some
of these problems are from domestic policy blunders, and some are a result of the
international economy. Some of the economic problems in the country owe their origin
to the past practices of imperialist forces, colonialism, shortage of domestic capital, the
nature of global market forces, adverse terms of trade, banking system, and to the
subsequent rise and internationalization of capitalism. But some of the problems are tied
to and sustained by social institutions such as the ongoing racial conflict between Indians
mortality rate, fertility rate, GNP per capita, GDP growth rate, socio-politico role of women,
health, calories intake, political and economic freedom, nutritional intake, etc. Development is
used here in generic terms to include all aspects of human conditions and living.
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and Africans. It has been the failure of both the PNC Black government and the Indian
PPP to successfully address the racial conflict head on and to find an amicable solution
for easing racial tension that would lead to stability enabling economic expansion.
It is indisputable that some of the development problems (poor government
economic policies) are of Guyana’s own making. For example, the dictator Forbes
Burnham pursued racially inspired political and economic policies (nationalization and
socialism) that left people who once enjoyed a comfortable life in dire deprivation and
abject poverty (SN Sep 3, 2010; Jul 8, 2009). Prof. Clive Thomas (1983) asserted that the
process of nationalization served to strengthen the authoritarian state with its control over
the bureaucracy and the military, both almost exclusively in the hands of party
supporters, and the enunciation of a new domestic and foreign policy ideology of party
paramountcy and socialism (embracing the socialist bloc).16 The most important policy
in the authoritarian control of the state was the announcement of the “Burnham doctrine
of paramountcy" in which the governing party was to assume paramountcy over all
aspects of the civic society and institutions of the state including the courts (SN Mar 10,
2007). (For example, the PNC flag, instead of the national flag, flew over the courts and
all national buildings). Party paramountcy reigned supreme during which policy orders
came from the headquarters of the ruling party to bureaucrats, government functionaries,
police, para-military, national service militia, and soldiers. The government pushed a
socialist agenda (that Burnham described as cooperative socialism) nationalizing the
economy and emulating the Soviet collectivization drive. Externally, the regime sought
support and legitimacy among Third World nations by advocating and pursuing an
16

Clive Y. Thomas, "State Capitalism: An Assessment of Burnham's Co-operative Socialist
Republic," in Fitzroy Ambursley and Robin Cohen, Crisis in the Caribbean (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1983), p.33. (see also Stabroek News Jan 21, 2010; May 21, 2009)
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aggressive non-aligned foreign policy.17 The program of "cooperative socialism" was
also an attempt to economically empower the nation's African constituency through a
policy of state expansion and nationalization of the commanding heights of the
economy.18 (KN Dec 1, 2013) By 1977, the government had gained control of 80% of the
economy. It should be noted, however, that during this time, the regime received "critical
support" from its arch rival Marxist-Leninist party, the PPP19 that (unwisely) interpreted
the PNC’s new policy as “progressive” for turning leftward and asserting nationalist
possession over the economy. Burnham’s socialist experiment, without support from
every ethnic group, the working class, and union leaders brought only ruin to the
economy. The socialist or cooperative mode of production was not thoughtfully planned,
and it did not include participation from the leading socialist parties (PPP and WPA) in
the country or other progressive forces (SN Nov 27, 2011; Feb 28, 2007).
Prof. Paulette Pierce (1984) pointed out that despite the transition to public
ownership of foreign owned MNCs and the establishment of state owned corporations,
the maintenance of an ethnically divided society including a racially divided labor force
and lack of democracy worked against the PNC regime’s doctrine of cooperative
socialism or non-capitalist development. There was no cooperation among the workers
and or the leaders of different unions to advance the cause of socialism or non-capitalist
development (SN Jan 21, 2010). In addition, there was not much cooperation among the
17

Festus Brotherson, "The Foreign Policy of Guyana,1970-1985:Forbes Burnham's Search for
Legitimacy," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 31 (Fall 1989),p.9.
18
Percy Hintzen and Ralph Premdas, "Guyana: Coercion and Control in political Change,"
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 24 (August 1982), p.334. See also, Hintzen,
The Costs of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination and Control of the State of
Guyana and Trinidad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
19
In 1975, the PPP changed its position from "non-cooperation and civil resistance" to giving
"critical support" to the PNC's nationalization drive and anti-imperialist actions (SN Aug 27, 2013).
The PPP reoccupied its seats in parliament, which it had boycotted since the 1973 electoral fraud.
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politicians on policymaking. On the contrary, the PNC regime terrorized and brutalized
opposition forces including union leaders, leftists and socialists like Walter Rodney who
was murdered by the regime (SN Aug 26, 2014). The PNC regime’s non-capitalist
development policy solidified the ethnic division of labor instead of bringing workers
together (Pierce: 1984). The regime furthered the racial division of the society by
favoring its supporters over others and in fact punished non-supporters. In addition, the
regime consolidated its authoritarian governance structures that only served to exacerbate
ethnic contestation and conflict affecting development (SN Jan 21, 2010).
In her critique of Burnham’s socialist (non-capitalist path to development or
NCPD) experiment, Prof. Pierce also noted that the socialist oriented redistributive model
implemented by the PNC regime failed to protect the local economy and the working
class from the ravages of a global economic downturn that saw price for Guyanese
exports declined sharply. The standard of living of the working class did not improve
since independence. Working class salaries largely remained stagnant or even declined
including for those workers of the nationalized industries. Any increase in wages was
offset by a higher rate of increase in inflation and by the declining value of the Guyana
dollar vis-à-vis hard currencies. As Prof. Pierce and other scholars pointed out, the
coalition government of Burnham’s PNC (a proclaimed socialist party) and Peter
D’Aguiar’s UF party (capitalist oriented), despite their ideological differences, initially
seemed committed to the private model of accumulation and implemented the model
based on domestic expansion and import substituting industrialization (ISI). This model
was advanced and promoted by the capitalist D’Aguiar and it was endorsed and accepted
by Burnham. While the capitalist accumulation model was not totally embraced by
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Burnham, he accepted it as a policy of pragmatism during the 1960s to win over the
support of the Western powers. After all, Burnham was no anti-imperialist; he was
actively engaged in isolating Cuba during the 1960s (SN Dec 28, 2014) and he opposed
Jagan’s progressive pro-working class policies. Burnham only announced a break from
imperialism after facing a sustained assault from the Marxist politician Jagan and after he
came under pressure from the working class (labor leaders) and international forces allied
against imperialism to improve their quality of life. Burnham’s action seemed more like
an opportunistic move rather than a genuine policy to empower the working class or to
transform the state to bring about social change. After Burnham consolidated political
power, he broke loose from his dependence on his capitalist coalition partner Peter
D’Aguiar and his Western sponsors. According to Pierce (1984:78), the working class
character of PNC supporters and the nation at large prevented Burnham from pursuing
(sticking to) rightward or capitalist policies and or joining the middle classes of the
Portuguese and Mixed races (p 78). To maintain a relationship with reactionary bourgeois
forces would have been out of character with the (PNC African) working class.
With the PNC now in control of the commanding heights of the economy, its
ethnic followers expected political partiality in policy along with patronage. Burnham’s
ethnic supporters effectively controlled key sectors in the nation – the public sector
(bureaucracy), the judiciary and the security forces all of which were dominated (over
90%) by his supporters (Stabroek News Jan 21, 2010). Burnham used his control of the
administrative structure to embark on the practice of rigging elections beginning in 1968,
when he engineered a parliamentary majority for the PNC that was a minority party
between 1957 and 1965 (Pierce: 122). After he rigged elections, he jettisoned D’Aguiar

- 315 -

and reoriented his economic policy towards a socialist thrust (Ibid; Pierce: 102). Hence
the term coined by Prof. Pierce of a non-capitalist path of development. The Burnham
government enunciated the socialist ideology at the beginning of 1970 that transformed
and guided the social philosophy, policies and programs of the Burnham regime. Even
Burnham’s archrival Cheddi Jagan initially validated the socialist thrust of the PNC by
offering critical support for nationalizing foreign multi-nationals. As Pierce pointed out,
Burnham was forced to pursue a radical path in order to show the world it was not in bed
with imperialists (Pierce: 121). The PNC regime broke the capitalist partnership it had
with the right wing United Force party (p 102). And as Pierce commented, in so doing,
Burnham betrayed the implied condition behind the American and British orchestrated
constitutional coup that toppled Jagan in 1964 allowing Burnham to acquire political
power. And the western powers did not take too kindly to Burnham’s new socialist thrust
(Ibid) and would exact revenge denying the regime loans at international lending
institutions (KN Jan 25, 2014; GC Jun 10, 2013).
As Prof. Pierce pointed out, the liberal private sector led development model was
replaced by the cooperative socialist state sector from the early 1970s. But the economy
under the new government controlled structure remained largely export oriented and it
reinforced “the ethnicized labour force” that the regime inherited from the colonial
forces. In short, state capitalism replaced “private capitalism” or economic liberalism.
But University of Guyana Economics Professor Clive Thomas (1980), a Marxist, was
scathing in his critique of the PNC policy of nationalization. He argued that the PNC
simply replaced the European elite that had controlled the economy and the politics of the
colony with the African middle class elite under a state capitalist structure. In short, there
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was racial exchange of control (SN Jan 9, 2015). Others noted that the adoption of the
state driven economic model maintained ethnic contestation through the application of
exclusionary and discriminatory practices. The PPP claimed the PNC engaged in leftward
drive for opportunistic reasons (Thomas: 185) whereas PPP considered itself as
doctrinaire socialist and the true vanguard of the working class (ibid). Under NCPD, and
under PNC rule in general, if you were not a (card carrying) member of the party, you
were deprived of resources, or jobs, or government services, or access to foods in state
owned stores. In short, you literally starved (SN Nov 29, 2014; May 8, 2010).
It was noted that all of the government run corporations under-produced when
contrasted with earlier years under private ownership. In the Guyana case, the noncapitalist path to development (NCPD) failed miserably because it was undermined by
the nature of international capital (capitalist dominance of the international economic
system) and by internal factors (competition for political power by the two opposing
political forces and the rise of an authoritarian dictatorship that led to withdrawal of
support for the NCPD from Indians and others). Had Burnham worked cooperatively or
closely with Jagan, economic conditions might have turned out to be different, as Prof
Erriah (2011) observed (see also SN Aug 21, 2014; Jan 21, 2010; Dec 10, 2008).
As Prof. Pierce (1984) explains, nationalization of industries is a transition to
socialism. As Pierce pointed out, Burnham took an aggressive stance against foreign
capital with large-scale nationalization or foreign owned industries. This type of
expansion of the state sector is inevitable in small economies given that the limited
capital scope of the petty bourgeoisie. As Pierce infers, Guyana has posed immense
challenges for socialist analysis and practice. The PNC’s nationalization of the sugar
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industry, and indeed other industries, is a manifestation of the non-capitalist
development. It was a strategy employed by the PNC with the goal of bringing about
social change in Guyana, a path to social revolution (SN Nov 3, 2013).
Theoretically and operationally, the non-capitalist path was advanced as an
approach to bring about peaceful revolution in Guyana. But it failed. The PNC felt there
was no need for a bourgeois class whose class formation (as a stage towards the goal of
the socialist revolution) was already by-passed with the state assuming its role. But the
state is very underdeveloped and has limited capital and is squeezed from abroad by the
imperialist nations in a variety of ways, not the least being low prices for products that
make non-government industries non-competitive and money losing enterprises. So the
state was/is not in an ideal position to play the role of the bourgeois class to develop the
country. But the state had no choice as the local bourgeoisie and working classes are in
their early phases of formation to bring about any major development or to trigger social
change in the country. The local bourgeoisie was/is underdeveloped in terms of capital
and know how. Thus, they cannot be depended upon to pursue development or expand
their investment. The foreign bourgeois operating in the country could not be counted
upon to pursue national development. It is important to note that much of the national
wealth after independence was in foreign hands, the MNCs, and they controlled the pace
and type of development (SN Oct 6, 2013). They were only interested in their own
enterprise and earning profit, and they had no interest in pursuing national development.
The working class or proletariat was/is underdeveloped and was/is divided by
race and they were involved in an ethno-nationalist struggle. They lacked working class
consciousness to labor in unison for a desired goal. Thus, they could not be counted upon
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to foster national development. The underdevelopment of the working class is reflected
in the fact that the majority of those employed in the country was/is in peasant farming or
primary producing industries (Jagan:1972). There is/was also a very high level of
unemployment. The working class lacked a sufficient level of consciousness to make
revolution and to take control of the industries as envisioned by Marx and Lenin. Thus,
there emerged the need for state intervention in pursuing development – non-capitalist
path by nationalizing the major industries. Hence, this led to what Pierce informs us the
nationalization of the sugar industry as an effort to pursue non-capitalist development.
As Pierce (1984) asserted, Guyana was not favorably placed to experience noncapitalist development. Socialism cannot be constructed without working class
participation. Working class control and unity among the laboring classes are essential
for establishment of a Marxist or classless society. The working class in Guyana was not
in a position to play a vanguard role in the construction of a Marxist society. It was badly
divided by race and supporting different working class parties defined by race. A racist or
ethnic party cannot be the vanguard of a classless society when other ethnic groups are
not involved in the political system or play a role in decision-making. One ethnic group
or one party (when there are other working class parties) cannot be the vanguard of the
working class movement. Any split in the political forces weaken the working class, and
would force counter-revolutionary movements. Alliances are critical for success of
revolutionary movements. A broad alliance of progressive forces would have enhanced
the chances for non-capitalist development. But there was no political compromise by
the PNC with other forces that were more radical than the PNC, many of whom set out to
build a working class society long before Burnham pursued non-capitalist development.
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As Pierce (1984) suggested, the PNC and Burnham were not real progressive
socialist forces. Burnham was in bed with the imperialists; in fact, he was a creature of
the imperialist – set up to destroy the revolutionary movement that developed organically
over time to fight imperialism to alter the social structure of the society. Burnham
vacillated between east and west when it suited his purpose of getting foreign aid and or
whenever he felt threatened by the truly anti-imperialist forces like the PPP, WPA and
labor unions. Burnham adamantly refused to form any alliance of progressive forces.
Burnham failed to pursue agrarian reform and eliminate rural exploitation and
discrimination. He did not pursue effective steps to diversify agriculture, and he made
virtually no effort to provide assistance to struggling farmers; in fact, he undermined
agriculture. He failed to democratize all aspects of social life and to end all unpopular
measures and dictatorial aspects of governance. Burnham wanted complete control and
domination of the society, and as such, his non-capitalist development was bound to fail.
He used non-capitalist development as a weapon against the working class denying
employment to those who criticized his authoritarian ways or his link with imperialist
forces. Non-capitalist development became a primary cause of poverty and the basis for
continued exploitation of the working class. Since there were no other means of earning
an income, workers were forced to tow the PNC line or lose their jobs. (see also SN Nov
17, 2013; Jul 3, 2010; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guyana_Sugar_Corporation).
As Pierce (1984) related, the PNC did not behave like a truly Marxist vanguard
party to direct the social transformation of the society. She pointed out that in the sugar
industry, indeed in all of the government owned corporations, the working class had no
say in its management and or operations. The sugar industry was not under the control of
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the working class and there was no social development for workers. Also, the working
class did not have political control of the society. Nationalization without workers control
or other shift in social relations is insufficient to bring about social development. Under
Burnham’s rule, workers had to struggle for union recognition including sugar workers
who had supported Jagan’s party, PPP. Democracy was completely absent from the
society. Burnham rigged elections for labor leadership. He terrorized political and labor
leaders he considered as enemies of his government. He practiced racism, which is by
nature anti-Marxist. He established an ethnic dictatorship. Lack of political and civil
rights are counterposed to Marxism and by extension non-capitalist path of development.
Curbing freedoms has no place in the building of socialism or a non-capitalist society.
As Pierce asserted, an authoritarian Burnham government could not be successful
in building socialism. The working class needs freedom and the people in charge of the
state must be their allies or representatives advocating on their behalf. The government
should take orders from the working class not the other way around with the ruler giving
orders to the workers. Unless the workers are in charge, share in the profit of the
business, and or exercise some kind of influence over production and or marketing, they
will not work to the best of their ability for the growth and profitability of state
corporations. The workers must be seen and feel that they control the means of
production and that the state value their role in the social development of the society.
Unless the state is under working class control, it cannot succeed in abolishing class
exploitation. Conflict, both racial and class, characterized the Guyanese society under
PNC rule because the working class was so far removed from control of the government
owned industries and members of ethnic groups not supportive of the PNC were excluded
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from decision-making, and at times even employment. (SN Nov 8, 2014; see also
www.guyana.org/.../conflicts_i... ; www.guyanajournal.com/race1_pt.html;

foreignpolicy.com/.../cooling-ethnic-conflict-in-guyanas-e... Mar 13, 2013).
Nationalization, as it turned out, served the interests of the state, party, and
dictator rather than workers interest. It was state capitalism that employed the same
exploitative methods as private capitalism. There was no working class hegemony of the
society. Instead, there was PNC party hegemonic control. There were conflicts between
the working class and the state. As Pierce intoned, the PNC should have democratized the
state or at a minimum include the working class in decision-making in the affairs of
nationalized industries. Unless the working class has some role in decision-making, they
will feel insecure about the intention of the state. And unless they have freedom, they
won’t trust the state and they won’t labor to their full potential to maximize production.
Pierce also noted that internal and external forces were not propitious for non-capitalist
development and for the establishment of a class society or a society of equals.
Pierce (1984) noted that suppression of dissent was widely used by Burnham for
those whom he perceived as serious challengers to his authority or who questioned his
legitimacy as supreme ruler. Prof. Walter Rodney who returned home from the
University of Tanzania challenged and ridiculed Burnham’s authoritarian rule. During
the mid 1970s, History Professor Dr. Walter Rodney and a group of academics from the
University of Guyana and other prominent individuals from civic society and religious
organizations engaged in political activism speaking against the abuses of the Burnham
regime. The group was welcomed in several parts of the country where it held meetings.
In May 1979, the group formally became a political party, Working People’s Alliance
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(WPA). Rodney became its de facto leader. The party’s program focused on bridging the
wide racial gap in the society, removing the PNC ethnic dictatorship from office, and
pursuing what it described as a humanistic socialist vision for Guyana that would loosen
up state control of the economy, empower the working class, and promote democratic
governance (SN Jul 1, 6, 2013). But Burnham had given clear-cut orders to the police and
the army to "shoot to kill" anyone who was considered a "subversive element" (KN Nov
26, 2014; SN May 5, 2014). Anyone who challenged Burnham was an enemy. But the
order was really directed against the leadership of the WPA to eliminate it. Rodney was
killed (KN Jul 1, 2, 2011). http://pics3441.upmf-grenoble.fr/articles/sopo/''The%20NonCapitalist%20Path''%20As%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20of%20Decolonization%2
0and%20Socialist%20Transformation.pdf; Trinidad Express May 3, 2014; Guyana
Journal Mar 2008) (see also www.nationsencyclopedia.com › Americas).
Also, several political dissidents or those whose loyalty to Burnham were suspect
disappeared with their lifeless bodies found in some lonely alleyway or at the ocean’s
foreshore or in a koker (sluice) of a canal leading into the ocean. Any threat to
Burnham’s rule was removed. Many people are still unaccounted for years following
their disappearance after being picked up by the state’s secret agents or by members of
the terror gangs and death squads attached to the House of Israel (SN Jul 27, Jan 10,
2013). Terror stalked the land during the PNC era of governance (KN Jun 12, 2013; Jul
29, 2009; GT Nov 28, Jun 26, 2014). In spite of the terror unleashed on the WPA, the
party, represented by an impressive multi-ethnic leadership cadre, was unsuccessful at
penetrating the steep ethnic polarization that engulfed the country. After its charismatic
political leader Rodney was assassination by the PNC regime in June 1980 (SN May 2, 5,
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6, 2014; Dec 6, 2010), the WPA dissipated, faring poorly in democratic elections barely
winning a seat in 1992 and failing to attract cross racial support (SN Jan 21, 2010).
As Pierce (1984) and others commented, Burnham’s handling of sensitive race
relations, especially his ill-treatment of Indians and other groups and his authoritarian
rule, impacted on the NCPD and badly hurt his party and his racial grouping. His
determination that Africans dominate the state and the other ethnic groups forcing them
to accept his and African PNC rule – the policy of paramountcy of the African PNC over
the courts, all other parties and agencies and instruments of the state as well as the policy
of excluding Indians from governance and NCPD – was unacceptable even among
several prominent Africans (SN Nov 7, 2014). Burnham’s position was that since the
PNC was in charge of the government, it must be paramount over all state institutions
including the judiciary, and by extension his supporters must be paramount over the
supporters of other parties (Spinner: 1982, 1984) because they won the elections with
overwhelming support over the other groups. The concept of ‘party paramountcy’, in
which the ruling party is superior to and paramount over other state organs, was very
much in evidence in the appointment of all key public officials, including that of judges
and magistrates. Burnham and his PNC were not concerned about competence of staff
and their professionalism in executing their duties, but only with loyalty and ethnic
supremacy over other groups a la African dominance over the state (KN Nov 10, 2011).
The conditions that existed in Guyana made it virtually impossible for noncapitalist development to succeed in Guyana. Burnham murdered or jailed socialist
leaders and those trade unionists who criticized him or who were critical of his dalliance
with the imperialist forces. Burnham carried out attacks on anti-imperialist forces and the

- 324 -

murder of the revolutionary Walter Rodney (GT May 8, 2013). Under Burnhamism (GT
Jun 20, 2014), the masses had to struggle for wage increases and other perks including
vacation time, sick leave, bonuses, etc. There were frequent labor strikes to obtain a
livable wage and various standard perks like compensation for injury (SN Mar 13, Mar
10, 2007). Also, the government taxed the profits of the industries instead of sharing
them with the workers (SN Oct 29, 2009). Had Burnham adhered to all the prerequisites
of non-capitalist development identified by Prof. Pierce, including allowing democracy to
flourish, and had he embraced Jagan (PPP) in a national unity government, those actions
may have helped to unite the various groups against imperialism and capitalism and
contribute favorably towards non-capitalist development.
Some writers in Guyana’s papers defended the oppressive PNC government for
not involving Indians in its policies of development arguing that since Indians did not
vote for and were not supportive of the PNC, Indians should not be included in
governance or enjoy the resources and rewards of the state under the PNC. In addition,
they said that Burnham could not trust putting Indians in charge of developing state
policies because the Indians could have sabotaged the government or pass on secrets to
the PPP. After all, they claimed that the Indians were only loyal to their own party, the
PPP. As such, they argued, the PNC was acting rationally by not seeking an Indian input
in governance or on policy matters (SN Aug 17, 2010).
The defenders of the PNC’s racist rule could not explain why the PNC had to
pursue discriminatory policies against Indians denying them state jobs and resources to
grow food that would have fed the entire nation. The defenders of the PNC also noted
that the PNC did not get the support of the Indian PPP opposition to work towards
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national development goals and that the PPP pursued measures to sabotage and bring
down the African government. As such, the PPP (and its supporters) could not be trusted
to assist the PNC in its developmental goals (KN Jan 1, 2011). It is factual that Indians
did not support the PNC. But PNC supporters and defenders have completely ignored the
fact that Burnham rigged elections (Avebury: 1981) to deny a legitimate and meaningful
participation of Indians, Portuguese, Chinese and Amerindians in government and in
parliament (KN Dec 9, 2012). Having been denied the vote and made victims of racial
discrimination, members of these ethnic groups had no reason to support the PNC
regime. And even after it rigged elections and secured for itself its two-thirds magic
majority, the PNC made no meaningful effort to work or consult with the Indians and the
other ethnic groups and their legitimate representatives via their ethnic parties for
inclusive governance. Also, the PNC did not trust the handful of Indians, Portuguese,
Amerindians and Chinese who accepted membership in the party and who were the token
face of these groups. Apologists fail to take into consideration that the PNC discriminated
against Indians and others making it virtually impossible for them to work with the PNC
(www.guyanaundersiege.com/Leaders/Burnham2.htm). Burnham kept the Indian
opposition, the largest ethnic group in the country, and members of the ethnic minorities
from participating in governance by fraud and violent terror (SN August 18, 2008)
thereby preventing the Indians (as well as wealthy Portuguese and Chinese who took
their money and left the country) from making a meaningful economic contribution to the
nation even if they wanted to cooperate with the PNC government.
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Chapter 8, Section A. Economic Reforms & Restructuring Under IMF Conditions:
The country would receive a reprieve when Burnham suddenly passed away from a
massive heart attack in August 1985. His successor, Desmond Hoyte, reversed Burnham’s
autarchic economic development policy embracing a gradual economic opening dubbed
“Hoytestroika", modeled after Gorbachev’s Perestroika in USSR – tentative steps towards
economic reforms that gave people greater control over their produce as well as private
ownership of businesses and a relaxation of government control overall the major aspects of
the economy (SN Sep 17, 2009). He also began to embrace Indians granting them various
concessions to do business and import foods that were previously banned and hiring several
of them in his administration. To show he was serious about making a radical break with
his predecessor and to get foreign loans, Hoyte set his sights at reforming the economy by
welcoming foreign investments (SN Jul 31, 2012). He began to undo Burnham’s ethnic
Socialist economy, broke ranks with the Soviet bloc, and introduced what were considered
radical liberal reforms for a socialist state. Hoyte denationalized government owned
corporations selling them at bargain prices to domestic investors, PNC friends and affiliates,
and foreign entrepreneurs – embracing crony capitalism. Hoyte also opened the economy
for domestic and foreign investment. And under foreign pressure, he introduced some
democratic reforms like a free press and allowed opposition political parties to hold rallies –
reforms that would lead to the eventual downfall of the dictatorship (SN Jun 11, 2014; Sep
17, May 21, 2009; Mar 1, 2007)(http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5417.html).
Hoyte was warned that unless he adopted economic and political reforms, foreign
loans and aid would not be restored (SN May 21, 2009). The US $2 billion debt that
accrued under the PNC sucked the life out of the country, becoming a major economic
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bottleneck for growth and development. It had become a millstone around the economy
as investments and loans were not coming in and enough taxes were not generated to pay
state workers. Also, not enough jobs were created in the private sector. The regime
desperately needed funds. Rather than risk a continuation of the denial of loans or
curtailment of foreign credit (even short-term loans for imported machinery and
merchandise), the Hoyte government agreed to embark on an IMF-backed austerity and
economic recovery program (ERP). So the Hoyte regime had to take actions to control
the debt situation reluctantly embracing the ERP. The ERP was the work of an
international team of economists arranged by the British Commonwealth Office in
London and a group of international bankers for the World Bank and IMF. The plan got
the blessings of Canada, the UK, and the US. The ERP amounted to a reversal of the
statist policies that were undertaken by Burnham and that had shaped Guyana's economy
for two decades (http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html). The
ERP led to a full-fledged shift towards a market-based strategy in 1989 marking a drastic
reversal in government policy away from a predominantly state-controlled, socialist
economy that favored party supporters. The government eliminated price controls,
removed import restrictions, promoted foreign investment, and divested itself of several
state-owned enterprises. The government’s economic strategies were directed towards a
more open, free market system that existed during pre-independence period. State owned
marketing boards and development agencies were dismantled or privatized. Some 15 of
the 41 government-owned (parastatal) businesses were sold. International corporations
were hired to manage the huge state sugar company, GUYSUCO, and the largest state
bauxite mines, Linmine and Bermine (SN Dec 7, 2008; SN Jul 22 and Jul 15 2009; KN
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Jun 28, 2011, Aug 31, 2008; http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/GuyanaECONOMY.html)(www.guyanajournal.com/privatization_guyana.html).
The economy would make dramatic progress after the IMF conditions began to
kick in from 1990 (Table section p x). Hoyte's economic recovery program (ERP) opened
up to Indian investments that were rebuffed in earlier years. At the recommendation of
the World Bank, Hoyte decided to include non-supporters of the PNC and Indian
professionals in government positions and as advisors to the regime. The government
guardedly implemented recommendations to include Indian functionaries on its
administrative and management level to win over support of Indian investors. Advisors to
Hoyte recognized that the government could no longer sustain socialist enterprises or
state capitalism and or to continue to keep on its payroll a bloated staff of PNC party
supporters (SN Apr 29, 2008). Revenues were in short supply and loans had dried up.
Indians and members of other ethnic groups who were persecuted were not going to
contribute to the economy unless there were serious economic reforms that would allow
them a significant role in the economy including full freedom to own and run businesses
(SN Dec 10, 2008). The dictator Desmond Hoyte met regularly with Indian groups urging
them to invest in the economy with promises of protection of their assets and assurances
of their physical safety from bandits. The Indians made several demands and Hoyte
acquiesced on all including on providing security, removal of the ban on cultural foods
and religious practices and on price controls of goods, and the inclusion of Indians in his
administration (SN Sep 4, 2010; Feb 29, 2012; Feb 16, 2008; Aug 27, 2011). The
economy moved away from one controlled and dominated by PNC party supporters
towards a more open, free market system that welcomed non-traditional supporters of the

- 329 -

party to invest in development. The regime began to move away from employment
practices and granting of business licenses and contracts based on party patronage
(ethnicity and party loyalty) and towards policies based on some level of competence,
ability and meritocracy (SN Dec 16, 2014; Jan 20, 2010; Sep 17, 2009; KN Jul 21, 2011)
Hoyte began to crack down on criminals who regularly preyed on Indian owned
businesses hanging several criminals who were supporters of the PNC. Against the
wishes of executives of the PNC, he allowed Indians to directly import their cultural
foods that were banned by his predecessor, dictator Burnham. Price controls on goods
were removed and the market dictated prices. A few years into the Hoyte administration
saw the beginning of a trend towards privatization of most government owned enterprises
and the easing of racial discrimination against Indians, a general outreach to Indians by
Hoyte himself rather then the PNC, hiring of several Indians who accompanied Hoyte
everywhere and eventually the removal of the ban on importation of basic items like
flour, split peas and potatoes, three main staples of the Indian diet (SN Oct 11, 2013).
Hoyte bent over backwards to agree to virtually all demands of Indians so much so that
he earned the sobriquet or nickname “Desmond Persaud” (a common Indian surname
name) (KN May 31, 2011) by Indians. And he was criticized by African leaders for
“selling out to the Indians” with the Africans also referring to him as “President Persaud”
(SN Aug 29, 2012) (see also motherearthtravel.com/history/guyana/history-9.htm).
Businesses also benefited from the government policy to reform its monetary and
fiscal policy establishing a free market in foreign currency, which was designed to
stabilize the exchange rate of the Guyana dollar against hard currencies and put an end to
runaway inflation. Tax reforms designed to promote exports and agricultural production
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in the private sector were enacted (CIA World Factbook 2009). The privatization
program was sweeping (Guyana Journal N.Y Oct 2007). Indians welcomed privatization
of state corporations seeing it as an opportunity to re-acquire businesses they once owned
and controlled and would be able to gain access to goods that were on the banned list and
return to the farms to increase food production; GT Apr 27, 2013; SN Dec 23, 2009;
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/Guyana-ECONOMY). Hoyte hired and
or promoted several Indians in various government positions and state agencies. The
inclusion of Indians in his administration, coupled with the cracking down on bandits
who targeted Indians, instilled some confidence among Indians businessmen who began
to infuse money into the economy. Indian businessmen bought out several state
companies and invested in private ventures resulting in a turn around in economic
fortunes for the overall economy. Guyana's economy improved dramatically under ERP
and registered significant growth gains. Guyana's GDP increased a nominal six percent in
1991 reversing 15 years of economic decline (Ibid) (World Bank Report: 1993; SN Sep
17, 2009). Such a positive development continued during most of 1992 as racial tension
subsided and Indians cooperated with the government in the economic realm.
Race relations improved as the government continued to embrace Indians granting
them various economic concessions including freedom to directly import goods into the
country (KN Apr 10, 2011). Indian cultural foods that were on the prohibited import list
for almost two decades were re-allowed into the country (KN Sep 13, 2010; May 30,
2010; SN Feb 18, 2007). Several Indo-Guyanese (at home and abroad) businessmen took
advantage of the sudden openings and poured money into new investments (mining,
fisheries, agriculture, agronomy, etc.) thus earning huge profits. Savvy investors bought
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real estate and skilled farmers began reclaiming and tilling fallowed lands. The result was
that the economy in 1992 experienced 3% nominal growth over 1991 World Bank
Report: 1993; KN Oct 20, 2014). In 1993, the Indian PPP government investment heavily
in agriculture rebounded and the economy grew at a rapid pace creating numerous jobs
resulting in a better quality of life (KN Oct 20, 2014; Feb 24, 2012).
Under the new Indian PPP administration, Indians farmers returned to tilling the
land investing heavily in the farming sector and also opening businesses. Agriculture
boomed with record outputs in sugar, rice, timer and fishery production as well as in cash
crops that had fallen drastically under the PNC regime. The overall economic result from
1993 thru 1997 is that Guyana’s economy grew at about 8% a year (World Bank Report:
2001). But with the return of racial violence in late December 1997 (following general
elections) that continued throughout 1998, there was a 50% contraction in the economy in
1998. For the next few years, Guyana remained unstable and the economy could not
make significant gains. From 1998 thru 2004, there was a wave of violent antigovernment protests and occasional racially inspired violence targeting Indians for
robberies and the burning of their businesses in the heart of the capital city of
Georgetown. Stores and schools were intermittently shuttered severely affecting business
activities. This resulted in the economy stagnating or growing negatively from 1998 thru
2004. For example, economic growth in 2000 was 1.8% less than what it was in 1999 (SN
Feb 6, 2001) and the following four years also saw stultified growth (hovering at around
zero percent) as the PNC used violence to force an early election (two years before it was
constitutionally due) producing almost the same result as in 1997 (KN Apr 26, 2010; Feb
23, 2009; Jun 29, 2009). The economy took another negative hit (SN Apr 9, 2014; Jul 22,
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2012; Apr 30, Mar 5, 2009; www.guyanajournal.com/Guyana_at_the_Crossroads.html).
The period from 2005 to the present has been one of relative calm, stability and
peace in race relations (except for brief interludes of violence such as the killing of Indian
businessmen and the massacres of Indians by gunmen (calling themselves African
freedom fighters) in two Indian villages in early 2008) (SN Sep 17, 2008; KN Mar 4,
2014; GC March 16, 2008; GC Jan 28 2014; GT Jan 28, 2014). During the period of
ethnic peace under PPP governance, Guyana achieved a positive nominal growth rate of
about 2.5% a year between 1993 and 1997 and a positive nominal growth rate of about
2% a year between 2005 to 2010. For the period between 1998 and 2005, when there
was instability and racial violence, the country experienced a nominal negative growth
rate of about 2% (SN Sep 3, 2008). Overall, for the entire period, the country
experienced a negative growth when accounted for inflation and the declining value of
the Guyana dollar or when measured against the purchasing value of the 1960 Guyana
dollar. The GDP real growth rate over each previous year was: negative 1.2% (2009),
3.2% (2008), 5.3% (2007), and 5.1% (2006). Growth was negative in 2009 (over 2008)
because of the racial violence that year that that impacted on economic activities (CIA
Fact Book 2009). In sum, Guyana achieved the following yearly (nominal) GDP growth
rates from 1993 to 2011 inclusive: 1993: 8.2%, 1994: 8.5%, 1995: 5% and 1996: 7.9% -years that coincided with President Cheddi Jagan’s tenure. Under President Janet Jagan’s
tenure, Guyana achieved annual GDP growth from 1997 to 1999 as follows: 1997: 6.2%,
1998: -1.7% and 1999: 3%. Under President Bharrat Jagdeo, who succeeded Janet Jagan,
growth rates were as follows: 2000: -1.4%, 2001: 2.2%, 2002: 1.1%, 2003: -1%, 2004:
3.3%, 2005: -2%, 2006: 5.1%, 2007: -3.6%, 2008: 2%, 2009: 3.3%, 2010: 4.4% and
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2011: 5.4% (SN Apr 9, 2014) (World Bank Annual Tables; data.worldbank.org). (See also
www.tradingeconomics.com/guyana/gdp-growth-annual; www.indexmundi.com)

Guyana’s economy performed the best under Dr. Jagan’s presidency with an
average annual growth rate of about 7%. This was not surprising as the country
experienced a period of peace and stability. Under Janet Jagan’s presidency, growth rate
averaged about 2.5% -- a result of political instability accompanied by racial violence.
Under Jagdeo’s presidency, Guyana experienced an average of 2.2% annual growth (SN
Oct 5, 2012) – with some years positive growth and other years negative growth – with
the ups and downs being attributed to racial violence and political instability. The GDP
per capita (or purchasing power parity) for these years when adjusted for inflation
actually declined especially when measured against the value of the 1960s dollar of what
the Guyana dollar could actually buy. The GDP per capita was relatively low: US $3,900
(2009 est.), $3,900 (2008 est.), $3,700 (2007 est.) $3,600 (2006 est.). But the data are in
2008 US dollars and not in 1960 dollars. If 1960 purchasing dollars were used or if the
data were adjusted for inflation over the preceding 30 years, the actual per capita income
would be less than $200 suggesting a declining standard of living from the 1960s (when
the GDP per capita was around $300) till the present. The 1960 purchasing power parity
indicates that the economy performed poorly in 2009 and not much better in 2008 over
2007 or over 2006 or compared with preceding years. In fact, using real 1960 US dollars,
the economy (per capita) had declined to almost a hundredth in 2009 of what it was in
1960 when comparing it with the purchasing power of the 1960 Guyana dollar (KN Feb
17, 2013; Oct 5, 2011; May 26, 2009; SN Aug 24, 2008; SN Feb 22, 2009).
In sum, some 47 years after obtaining political independence in 1966, race
relations has deteriorated and the social, economic and political development in Guyana
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have also deteriorated (SN Apr 21, 2011; Mar 24, 2009). Overall, in terms of real growth
rates (adjusted for inflation), for the period from 1955 to now, Guyana's growth rate and
GDP per capita have gone through various periods of expansion and decline depending
on the relative racial stability in the nation. One trend observed is that when there was
racial stability, the economy registered improvement in growth (1957 thru 1960, 1992
thru 1997, 2003 thru 2006) and when there was racial instability (1961 thru 64, 1968 thru
1990, 1998 thru 2002, 2008-2009) there was a declining growth and economic
contraction. As data showed (http://data.worldbank.org/country/guyana; World Bank
Tables), overall, the economy grew slowly but steadily during the period from 1950 thru
1960 when there was relatively peaceful race relations and the colonial authorities kept
tight control on racial conflagration. Then the economy experienced a small decline from
1960 thru 1964 during the period of severe racial instability and violence encouraged by
colonial authorities. The economy has not registered much gain from the time the British
handed over control of affairs to the local politicians in 1966 to the present time.
Governance descended into an ethnic dictatorship in 1968 and the economy only
worsened. The period from 1966 thru 1992, although relatively peaceful, was marked by
anti-Indian state policies that impacted upon investment and discouraged participation of
Indians and other groups in the productive sectors of the economy (KN Aug 26, 2012).
This period also witnessed some of the worst forms of racism in the country when
Indians were deliberately victimized and denied employment, job promotion, and a role
in the affairs of the state, and encouraged to migrate (KN Jul 29, 2013; Sep 2, 2012). The
economy declined precipitously during this period so much so that by 1992, the real per
capita income was about fifth of what it was in 1965 when Burnham took office as
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Premier (or 1957 when Cheddi Jagan took office as Chief Minister) (SN Nov 12, 2009;
Dec 31, 2008; Dec 3, 2008; Jun 28, 2010) (World Bank Report 2010; data.worldbank.org).
From 1957 thru 1992, Guyana’s economy registered negative growth (SN Dec 3,
2008), which was matched during this period by a steady decline in race relations
between PNC Black supporters and other ethnic groups. While the global economy has
grown from the 1960s and countries with similar conditions to Guyana have also grown,
Guyana has not experienced such positive development (or similar growth). And even
from the 1990s (when almost the entire world, including communist countries turned
towards market economics) resulting in growth, Guyana (which also embraced market
economics) has seen a continuation of economic turbulence while the other former leftist
countries are expanding and their economies are growing significantly. Guyana’s economy
is just barely keeping afloat and in fact is sinking and has not even kept close to the progress
made by several other third world nations or the fellow Caribbean nations (Caricom) or
OAS nations with which it is grouped. For example, Guyana was at the bottom of Caricom
nations (English speaking group of 13 nations in the Caribbean) in GDP per capita or in
growth rate during the 1970s and 1980s and consistently thereafter. However, its economic
performance was well above these same countries during the 1960s and earlier. The same is
true for her economic status among fellow OAS nations (data.worldbank.org; (SN Feb 22,
2009). Overall, real economic growth for Guyana from 1993 thru 2010 was also negative
when measured against the 1960 Guyana dollar although the economy performed better
during the period 1993 to 2010 (the liberal market era) than the period from 1966 thru 1992
(during the period of state control of the economy). But from 1993 till now, the economy
has not seen significant improvement in growth and at the same time race relations have
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also worsened. Although democracy has been restored since 1992, and one can point to
some improvements in political and social conditions in the country, the economy is still
floundering and the standard of living has remained relatively low compared with other
developing countries (Tables p x). The opposition PNC has remained strongly opposed to
the Indian dominated government and is demanding power sharing or else it will bring its
supporters out onto the streets (SN Oct 5, 2013; Aug 13, 2010). If there is further racial
violence, the economy will inevitably decline as happened in previous such cases.
As the data reveals, overall, from 1953 to now, the economy has performed badly
as racial tension became progressively worse. It was noted that between 1953 and 1959,
Guyana’s GDP per capita was within the top 40 nations on the planet (PPP governed
between 1957 and 1959. But it began to slip in ranking so much so that by 1960, still
under PPP rule, GDP per capita was US$299 for 43rd place in the world. By comparison,
Jamaica’s was US$429.14 (31st), Trinidad’s was US$635.43 (25th) and Barbados’ was
US$378.84 (37th). By 1964, Guyana’s per capita GDP grew to US$308, a mere US$10 in
four years at US$2.50 per year. Guyana’s world ranking slipped to 50th. By comparison,
Jamaica’s increased by almost US$89 to US$518 (36th place), Trinidad’s by almost
US$170 to US$805 (28th place) and Barbados by US$84 to US$463 (41st place) (SN
Apr 21, 2011). When the PNC took over the government in December 1964, the
economic decline accelerated. The country’s GDP per capita (not adjusted for inflation)
went from US$308 in 1964 (50th ranking) to US$506.37 in 1992 (133rd ranking), a
dismal growth of US$198.37 in some 28 years at US$7.08 per annum. Between 1992 and
2011, the nation’s GDP per capita grew (nominally) from US$506.37 to US$2656.
Guyana’s GDP was ranked 115th in 2011 GDP per capita compared to the rest of the
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world. And it still was/is ranked as the second poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere
(SN Apr 21, 2011). It should be noted that Guyana went from having the 43rd highest
GDP per capita in the world in 1960, higher than Brazil, South Korea and other Asian
giants, and China and India to a nation struggling to stay afloat economically. Neither the
PPP nor the PNC has been successful in developing the nation (Ibid)(data.worldbank.org).
Section B - Political Reforms and Democratic Elections
Although Desmond Hoyte freed up the socialist oriented economy with radical
reforms and toned down the PNC’s racist economic policies that resulted in a turnaround
of the economy, he was not particularly enthusiastic about introducing political reforms
to address rising internal dissension among the working class and political opponents of
continued PNC’s authoritarian rule. Hoyte, like other dictators, feared that a political
opening could ultimately lead to loss of office (and consequences for those who presided
over the dictatorship and political murders) as happened in several other former socialist
countries. Besides, his party, the PNC, was totally opposed to loosening the control of
government or introducing political reforms fearing their loss of political and economic
perks and the trappings of office. Thus, the fundamental tenets of the authoritarian state
remained intact during Hoyte’s tenure including the control of the media, police and
armed forces, election commission, the rubber stamp parliament, and importation of
newsprint. Hoyte also continued his control over the judiciary that protected the regime
against political opponents and critics, and he retained Burnham’s policy of paramountcy
of the ruling PNC party over all state institutions. However, while people were pleased
with and praised Hoyte for the economic liberalization he engendered, they also wanted a
taste of political freedom organizing protests and rallies demanding the restoration of
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democracy (SN Jun 23, 11, 2014; Jul 12, 2012; Nov 1, 2009).
With dictatorships around the globe freeing their population and with most of the
communist countries transitioning to democratic rule by 1990, Guyanese felt their time to be
freed of ethnic autocratic rule had arrived. The overseas-based (mostly, but not exclusively
Indo-Guyanese urged their democratic governments (US, Canada, England) to isolate and
punish the oppressive PNC government unless it released political prisoners and free up the
political process to allow the people to choose their own government (SN Aug 31, 2009) in
free and fair elections. The major donor countries listened to the complaints and turned the
screws on the PNC regime tying aid to political reforms. The George Bush administration,
for example, in 1991 warned Hoyte to return the country to democratic rule in order to
continue receiving American food assistance under the PL 480 program giving Guyana
wheat to produce flour. Senator Ted Kennedy and several other Members of Congress also
issued public statements calling for the restoration of democratic rule in Guyana (SN Aug
27, 2009). The Hoyte government responded to the external and domestic pressure by
granting a limited political opening for the opposition parties and civic groups to hold
rallies without police intimidation. Against the advice and wishes of his party (SN Oct
23, 2013), Hoyte allowed opposition groups to organize and hold public meetings; unlike
in the past, thugs were not sent to beat opponents or break up their meetings or to spy on
the movements of opponents and family members or harassing and intimidating them (SN
Sep 17, 2009). The opposition and the population at large were able to freely vent their
feelings after years of pent up frustrations. This political aperture was the start of a muchdesired political change people sought from the repressive policies of the PNC.
As a precondition for further aid, the western countries forced Hoyte to undertake
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other political reforms including scheduling a free and fair election that included electoral
concessions to the opposition as well as allowing foreign observers to monitor the
elections. The US, under Bush Sr., insisted that President Jimmy Carter’s Electoral Group
be invited to observe the election to guarantee its fairness. Also, the opposition and the
observers insisted that ballots be counted at the polling places so as to eliminate or reduce
voting fraud as happened in earlier elections when PNC agents, protected by soldiers and
supporters, switched ballot boxes en route to the counting stations. Hoyte acquiesced to
these basic demands against the wishes of his party, putting in jeopardy his and the
PNC’s continuation in office (KN Jan 14, 2015; Dec 19, 2013; Oct 5, 2013).
Hoyte felt confident that his PNC party was winning over Indian support having
made so many (dietary, cultural, business) concessions to them. The dictator, himself,
led the PNC reform effort embracing Indians and putting several of them in influential
positions in the PNC party itself and as close advisors to Hoyte himself in the Presidential
secretariat. He appointed Indians as his personal secretary and as head of his office, and
wherever he traveled Indians accompanied him. This was a marked departure from the
past when he (or his predecessor Burnham or other PNC leaders) surrounded himself
with only African supporters. Unlike in the past, Hoyte developed an open door policy
welcoming Indian businessmen and farmers to his office granting them all kinds of
concessions to grow food, expand production, and invest in various kinds of businesses
as well as to purchase money losing state corporations. He even met with leaders of the
opposition political parties and welcomed the Indian leader Dr. Jagan to his office for
political consultation, which had not happened for many years (SN Dec 1, 2009).
Caving in to demands of the international community, Hoyte scheduled an
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election in October 1992 in opposition to the advice of his ground troops, supporters, and
influential members of his party who warned him that the party could not win without
rigging the voting process (KN Sep 10, 2012; Jul 16, 2009). Even his Prime Minister,
Hamilton Green, was against holding a free and fair election calling him a “school boy”
who did not understand the political reality that the PNC could not win a democratic
election (SN Oct 23, 2013, Mar 25, 2010). But Hoyte decided he would risk holding the
first free and fair elections after 28 years of electoral fraud. He felt confident that he
would get a fair amount of Indian support which when added to his African/Mixed base
would enable him to retain political power. Hoyte felt confident of his support among
voters in light of his economic and political reforms that granted people freedom they had
not experienced since colonial rule. At any rate, Hoyte recognized that the party could not
get away with another election rigging and he ignored his party’s dire warning about
losing power, and he decided to test his popularity with the electorate (SN Dec 19, 2013).
He was soundly trashed at the polls in October 1992 with the electorate casting ballots
largely along racial lines as they did between 1957 and 1965 (SN Aug 29, 2012).
The opposition PPP was elected in what was a racially polarized vote in October
1992 with the Marxist Dr. Jagan becoming the country’s first legitimately elected
President. Africans and Indians gravitated towards their natural parties with Indians for
PPP and Africans/Coloreds for PNC. Since Indians, Whites and Amerindians suffered
during PNC rule, it was understandable why they voted against the PNC. But it was
disheartening to the WPA and other parties that Africans still voted PNC after 28 years of
misrule. Africans, like other groups, also suffered from the undemocratic tyrannical
practices of the PNC and its mismanagement of the economy. Africans were also affected
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by food shortages and declining standard of living from PNC’s oppressive rule. Many
Africans were laid off from state jobs when the economy took a turn for the worse and
when state corporations were privatized under the economic recovery program. Yet,
Africans/Mixed stuck it out with the PNC not willing to take a chance with the Indian
PPP or a host of other parties that included the multi-racial (WPA) that advocated for an
ethnically neutral state and was perceived as an African party with an African academic
(Prof. Clive Thomas) as its Presidential candidate (SN Mar 30, 2011). With regards to
the ethnic minorities, by 1992, almost all of the Portuguese and other Whites and the
Chinese had migrated with the remaining few dividing their votes among the opposition
parties to defeat the PNC. The Amerindians, who historically supported the UF, split
their votes between the PPP and the UF (SN Feb 2, 2010; Mar 5, 2007).
The Africans rejected the outcome of the election chastising the Indians for not
supporting Hoyte who they pointed out removed the ban on their cultural foods,
employed many Indians, and allowed Indian businesses to flourish. The PNC leadership
and Africans viewed the Indian as ungrateful and turned to violence when the PPP
victory was officially announced. Led by their ethno-nationalist Prime Minister Hamilton
Green, they refused to accept the election outcome that would give political power to
their nemeses Indians (KN Jan 20, 2013). They vowed not to give up power and urged
Hoyte not to be pressured by Carter to step down or to accept the outcome of the election
as announced by the Election Commission. In Georgetown and other urban areas, Indians
were openly attacked and sexually molested and their business places were looted and or
burnt. Indian homes and businesses were also violently violated. The elections
commission office, where former American President Jimmy Carter was holed up, as
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head of the Foreign Observer Mission, came under attack. For days, Indians stayed off
the streets. This rioting shuttered businesses, the ports, government offices, etc. affecting
the entire economy. President Carter, who led several teams of international observers,
sternly urged Hoyte to bring out the security forces to restore public order. Embarrassed
by the actions of his PNC supporters, Hoyte reluctantly called out the troops and went on
TV warning those who disrupted the peace that that the security forces were empowered
to take actions to restore order. The police did open fire and used tear gas to end the
violent disturbances. He conceded defeat to the PPP. And he half-heartedly urged PNC
supporters to accept the outcome assuring Africans that the Indian PPP government
would not last very long and that the PNC would return to power soon (SN Jan 20, 2013;
Mar 6, 2012; Nov 7, 2011; KN Aug 9, 2014; Dec 2, 2011; Apr 15, 2009).
The anti-PPP, anti-Indian violence continued for days after the new President, Dr.
Jagan was sworn in inflicting tremendous harm to the economy that started to make a
recovery after years of state control and mismanagement. But the country would soon
stabilize as Dr. Jagan convinced Africans that he was not interested in retribution or
vengeance for the wrong doings of officials of the PNC, and that he would not
discontinue the racial patronage jobs of PNC supporters. Many Africans felt an Indian of
the reputation of Dr. Jagan should be given a chance to govern since the African
government of 28 years had bankrupted the economy with its racist policies and inflicted
so much damage to the country. Protesters withdrew from the streets. This led to
abatement in racial tension allowing the PPP government to settle down and to begin to
tackle the serious social and problems stymieing development. Dr. Jagan continued the
liberal economic measures started by Hoyte. President Jagan would succeed in
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maintaining four and a half years of social peace and stability that would allow the
economy to expand and grow and the standard of living to rise (KN Feb 25, 2014). Still,
many Africans complained that Dr. Jagan was focusing development policies in rural
communities where Indians reside and on farming that was dominated by Indians. But
Jagan defended his policy stating that rural areas were severely devoid of infrastructure
development (no proper roads, drainage, telephone or running water) during the 28 years
of PNC rule (SN Jul 25, 2011; Feb 5, 2010; KN Dec 7, 2008). The country needed to
rehabilitate the farming sector to revive the decrepit economy in order to bring in
revenues to pay state workers where African dominated. Indeed, the economy did turn
around primarily because of growth in production in rice and sugar (KN Nov 4, 2011).
Section C. Return of Racial Stability & Economic Growth under Jagan:
The years of the PPP administration under Dr. Jagan’s tenure were marked by progress in
economic growth and social conditions. Although he welcomed investment and
liberalism, he did not abandon his working class credentials. Dr. Jagan was a fiscally
disciplined conservative and an economic nationalist pursuing policies that would
redound to benefits for the working class. His tight money supply led to a steep drop in
inflation (from about 100 percent in 1991 to 4½ percent by 1996). Also, the large
overvaluation of the exchange rate, which was a principal feature of the economy during
most of the 1970s (G$2 to US $1) and 1980s (G$4 to US $1) was corrected with the shift
to a flexible exchange rate system in 1991 (G$140 to $1US) and ($175) by 1996. The
dollar continued to slide downward with demand for foreign currency. The good news
for the economy was that real GDP growth accelerated from an average of less than one
percent a year during the decade of the 1980s to 7 % during 1991–96 (Dacosta: 2005,
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2007; KN Apr 24, 2014). Also, the proportion of the population living in poverty fell
from 67 percent in 1989 to 35 percent in 1999 (KN Nov 12, 2010). And most of the 40
public enterprises that were operating in 1985 were sold by the year 2000 including the
state airline and shipping agencies. More land was brought into rice and sugar cultivation
boosting production and income including foreign reserves and creating jobs. Reflecting
this new privatization trend, public sector employment fell from the equivalent of 35
percent of the labor force in 1988 to just 13 percent in 1999. Also, there was an upturn in
foreign investment, mainly in the forestry sector, fisheries, and mining and the country
had registered impressive gains (1993 thru 1997) at more than 6% annually
(http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/Guyana-ECONOMY;. data.worldbank.org)

Because of the many initiatives undertaken by Dr. Jagan and his policies of good
governance, growth was consistently above six percent between 1993 and 1995, when it
dipped to 5.1 percent as a result of labor disputes with African state workers who
withheld their services creating a brief period of instability. Following a labor agreement
that restored political stability, the government reported that the economy grew at a rate
of 7.9 percent in 1996. It continued its real growth in 1997 registering 6.2 percent (Ibid).
However, the gains the country made under Dr. Jagan’s rule would be temporary as
tragedy struck Guyana. Dr. Jagan died of a massive heart attack in March 1997 as the
country was preparing for elections. His death and the organizing of elections would lead to
political and racial instability with racially inspired violence taking a serious toll on the
economy. After Dr. Jagan’s death, the country would explode with a fresh round of racial
violence when it was time for holding new elections (SN Nov 28, 2011). The racial
instability would last for several years resulting in a severe economic downturn during
that period of time (KN Feb 2, 2011; Jul 26, 2009; Dec 17, 2008).
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Chapter 8, Section D. Resumption of Racial Violence & Economic Downturn:
Dr. Jagan’s widow, Janet, a Chicago-born educated nurse turned Marxist politician, was
chosen as his successor as the PPP Presidential candidate for elections in December 1997.
The election campaign engendered a period of political instability and intense racial
tension that had not been seen since the 1960s or 1992 when the PNC intimidated
opponents and brought its supporters onto the streets in a desperate attempt to derail the
elections that the PNC lost (KN Apr 27, 2011). The 1997 electoral campaign and its
aftermath that resulted in the PNC defeat were characterized by racial violence, labor
unrest, psychological fear and non-cooperation by the opposition African. Indians were
frequently attacked when it appeared that the PPP would win the election. The country
was once again pushed to the edge of an ethnic civil war reminiscent of 1962-64 when
the country literally exploded with firebombs and wide scale destruction (KN Feb 7,
2011; Apr 30, Mar 29, 2009). The 1997 election aftermath was a repeat of 1992, except
this time it was worse and violence lasted for a longer period.
As was expected, because of the political arithmetic (numerical advantage of
Indians over the Africans) and the sympathy vote for their late hero Jagan, the PPP won
re-election easily receiving more support than in 1992. But the PNC refused to accept the
outcome. As Seenarine (2006) noted, “the PPP victory under Janet Jagan’s Presidency
became a catalyst for a spate of racially inspired violence against Indians that continued
non-stop for several weeks”. Africans took to the streets saying they would not accept a
foreign-born White woman as their President. Indian privately owned and government
property were set ablaze in the capital city of Georgetown resulting in untold losses of
wealth and damage to the economy. There was also fear among Indian workers and
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business people who were hesitant to open businesses in the capital or to continue with
their usual activity and or to invest in the economy. And even when the situation quieted
down days later with the help of security forces, the opposition organized and encouraged
sporadic violence that targeted and intimidated Indians. The violence led to deaths and
rape of several Indians and displacement of many. The fear and terror continued for
weeks especially among those who commute to Georgetown or owned businesses in the
commercial center of the city. The violence also left a psychological scar on Indians
regarding their safety discouraging them from investing in new or in expanding their
business (KN Jan 8, 2012; Ibid; SN Apr 30, 2009; Apr 5, 2009; Jul 29, 2008).
Such violence repeated itself intermittently between after 1997 resulting in a
severe negative effect on the economy. The PNC was complicit in all of the violence (GT
Jun 19, 2014; SN Jan 14, 2013; Oct 5, 2012; KN Feb 2, 2011). A survey conducted by
Swiss academics, representing a body called the “Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies” in Geneva, provided a historical synopsis of the PNC’s association
with gang violence in Guyana assailing the party for bringing tragedy into so many
peoples’ lives (KN March 22, 2012). Since December 1997, the PNC supporters
sporadically took to the streets engaging in racial violence that closed down the city
resulting in fall out in the economy. Hoyte refused to accept the outcome of the elections
and he demanded that the PPP step down from office or face his wrath. Hoyte called on
his supporters to take to the streets and not accept the outcome of the 1997 democratic
elections. He declared he would make the country ungovernable calling on his supporters
to utilize a policy of “slow fire and more fire” to bring the capital city to a standstill (KN
Mar 21, 2013; SN Jul 13, 2012). And his supporters responded zealously to his rallying
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cry of halting daily life in the capital city forcing business closures. The Hoyte supporters
led marches and engaged in arson in Georgetown resulting in severe urban damage (KN
Aug 31, 2009). The flames of destruction were even worse than was experienced during
the civil war in the 1960s and 1992. Because of the political instability, the economy
took a turn for the worse resulting in a drastic downturn (SN Apr 9, 2014; Jul 7, 2010).
The newly sworn in Janet Jagan government faced not only racial woes and
political instability, but also a restive public service aligned with the PNC (which
supported the public service) that was making unreasonable wage demands. During 1998
and 1999, public service workers, 90% of whom were Africans belonging to Black labor
oriented unions affiliated with the opposition PNC, demanded higher wages the country
could not afford. They engaged in labor actions against the government crippling much
of the economy. Their continuous protest, sabotage of government offices, and wildcat
actions affected political stability and by extension the performance of the economy. The
African workers went on strike in 1999 to force the government to give in to their
demands for higher wages (SN Nov 23, 2012; Feb 11, 2010). The government resisted
the workers’ demands saying it cannot afford them. But after a series of street
demonstrations reminiscent of the violent-prone PNC protests of the 1960s and 1998 that
disrupted the economy, the PPP capitulated. Fearing further instability in the business
community and a drop in national productivity, and responding to appeals of the private
sector for the government to settle the strike, the government eventually set up an
African-led tribunal to arbitrate the labor dispute between the Indian PPP government and
the African unions that wee supported by the PNC. The arbitrators, a majority of whom
were Africans and chaired by U.G Prof. Clive Thomas, ruled in favor of the workers
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giving them a generous pay package doubling their salary, unprecedented in its award. It
led to charges from the Indian government that the tribunal made a ruling that was
ethnically biased in favor of the workers from the same ethnicity as that of the tribunal
members (SN Feb 11, 2010). Although the government said it could not afford the huge
pay package, it accepted the arbitrators’ ruling granting the hefty pay increases to public
sector workers. The police and armed forces (95% of whom were Africans) also made
excessive wage and fringe benefits demands that threatened political instability (SN Aug
4, 2011). They received generous pay packages and other benefits adding to the
economic costs of running the country. But additional revenues were not coming in to
meet rising public sector wages; the large public sector had become a huge drain on the
economy (KN Jul 3, 2011; Dec 20, 2008)(www.guyana.org/.../chap13.ht...).
All this time, the PNC refused to accept the legitimacy of the PPP regime that was
democratically elected in December 1997. The PNC and its supporters continued with
their protests demanding the Indian dominated government demit office and new
elections. The sustained African campaign and violence to oust the government
profoundly affected output and development of the nation thereafter with negative growth
resulting between 1998-2001. GDP fell 1.3 percent in 1998 after months of political
violence. The 1999 growth rate shot up 3% when political stability returned that year. But
the growth rate between fell in 2000 when there was a resumption of racial protests. As a
result of Caricom intervention and goodwill of the office of Prime Minister James
Mitchell of St. Vincent, an agreement (Herdmanston Accord) was ironed out in which
PPP would give up two years of its term in office with new elections (SN Sep 6, 2011;
Jun 21, 2009). Between 2000 and 2005, there was a mere 0.5 percent yearly growth –
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attributed largely to political violence especially between 2001 (when elections were held
and the PNC refused to accept the outcome) and 2003 (Ibid; econ.worldbank.org).
The violence against Indians would worsen over time prompting Indian leaders to
describe attacks as “a crescendo of African extremism that threatened the social fabric of
Guyana” (GC April 26, 2001). Several prominent Indians (businessmen and
professionals) were robbed and or brutally executed in broad daylight between 2001 and
2003. The attacks caused Indians to lose faith in the state to protect them, and they began
seeking private security measures for contracted protection in going after the rampaging
killers. Also, many Indians sought visas to migrate and businesses put expansion on hold
resulting in a contraction in the economy and a decline in growth. On the anti-Indian
attacks, a commentator penned: “There was a certain emotional approach to political
discourse in which violent propaganda, race hate advocacy, extra-parliamentary
machinations and psychotic violence form the agenda of African based organizations that
openly sought to remove the PPP government” (GC April 26, 2001). Ever since, contrary
to what many politicians may feel and say, ethnic conflicts and perceived insecurity in
Guyana has increased (KN May 19, 2014; May 5, 2009).
During this period, several businessmen were killed by, what PNC leaders
described as, “ethnic freedom fighters” (KN Sep 22, 2013) associated with the PNC.
Indian and White owned businesses were fearful of expansion and investment and of
opening their business after dusk. The terror continued for almost three years as the
terrorists gunned down even police officers. In early 2006, when the PNC “ethnic
freedom fighters”, so dubbed by African nationalists, were eliminated through extrajudicial means since police lacked the wherewithal to bring them to justice, political
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stability returned. The GDP went up to 3.2% for 2006. Since then, instability, tied to the
ethnic conflict, has continued unabated impacting on the economy (with some violent
prone years seeing almost no growth) although for those years when there was peace and
calm, the economy grew (as for example, 4.5% in 2013 that was characterized by relative
peace) (SN Apr 9, 2014; Dec 19, 2013; KN Apr 27, 2014; Dec 11, 2013).
The election periods in 1992, 1997 through the 2001 and up to this moment in
time in 2015, have seen a spike in racially inspired (real and palpable) violence (except
intermittently between 2006 and 2011; SN Jul 12, 2012; Nov 28, Apr 28, 2011). It has
also seen the assassinations of prominent Indian politicians including a Minister of
government and an advocate for African rights attached to the opposition (KN Aug 26,
2010). As several people have commented in the media, the social fabric of the nation has
been severely lacerated (KN Dec 1 & 2, 2014; SN Nov 8, 2014)) hanging in the balance
ready to explode anytime (in fact did in July and November 2012 with killings, ethnic
molestations, racially inspired robberies, beating, etc.) especially after the November
2011 general elections with the African opposition demanding to be part of the
government through some undefined power sharing formula (SN Jan 15, 2015).
Clearly, evidence in the form of racial compartmentalization (like the ethnic
enclaves in the US) and ethnic violence (riots, rapes, arson, looting) as occurred during
the 1960s, 1990s, 2000s, 2012 and as being threatened recently now, (GC Jan 24 2014;
GT Jan 25, 2015, Jan 24, 2014; KN Jan 28, 2012) reveal there is deep racial suspicion and
hatred (or what can be described as ethnic insecurity) between the two major races and
the political parties (as well as among ethnic organizations) representing them.
After centuries of colonialism and imperialism, almost three decades of brutal

- 351 -

PNC dictatorship (economic policies and programs post-independence) and three decades
of democratic PPP rule and the return of free and fair elections, democratization of the
political process and a free media, Guyana has not made any major economic or political
progress nor has it shown much success in containing its ethnic conflict or seen
significant social change as compared with similar countries. Guyana remains stuck in its
racial quagmire of the colonial days of divide and rule and the economy ravaged by racial
instability negatively affecting development. Progress has been stifled by endemic
corruption (KN Dec 6, Aug 12, Jun 11, 2012), crony capitalism, crime (many raciallymotivated), the region’s highest suicide rate, mass migration, threats from the political
opposition, sporadic ethnic violence and other social ills. People are still reeling from the
racial violence of the recent past and worry about what the future holds for them. Not
surprisingly, many are calling for the return of the colonial rulers to re-colonize Guyana –
seeing that option as the only rescued salvation for the country as they have lost faith in
the national leaders to effect development (KN Feb 4, 2013; Aug 4, 2011; Dec 7, 2008).
Section E. Blame for Lack of Guyana’s Development:
There are differing opinions about whom or what forces should be blamed for
Guyana’s stillborn economic potential. Some individuals blame the policies of the
government (both PPP and PNC) and the racial division in the nation for the economic
decline while others attributed it to the colonial legacy of divide and rule of the locals and
generally prejudicial policies of the PNC regime. The diplomatic community in Guyana
from the major western countries, US, Canada, and England, all of who expressed a
serious concern about ethnic conflict, cited race-based politics as a hindrance to Guyana’s
development (SN Dec 5, 2011). The British Ambassador to Guyana Mr. Gordon
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Wheeler, for example, stated in 2010 that the current “politicized racial divide has
hindered development in Guyana”. However, PPP government Senior Minister, Mr.
Clement Rohee, countered that it was British colonial rule that was/is responsible for
hindering Guyana’s development. Rohee accused the Ambassador of “falsifying history”
charging that the British was involved “in a history of resorting to a divide and rule
policy in colonial Guiana that led to violence and destruction that was responsible for
Guyana’s economic and political problems”. Minister Rohee wrote in a newspaper: “It
was this political millstone (divide and rule) around the country’s neck that held back the
colony’s development creating a lop-sided economy which future generations inherited.
Thus, as history has demonstrated, it was the lop-sided economy that was foisted on the
colony and the shameful divide and rule politics that left a lasting legacy of British
colonial rule in British Guiana and which contributed largely to hindering development in
Guyana. The British Ambassador must know that this country’s development was
hindered by the manipulation of the racial conflict. During 1950s and 1960s when the
communist bogey was used in the political and labor movement, race and class,
manipulated by London, played a determining factor in the country’s political and
economic development” (Stabroek News Jul 3, 2010).
Few would dispute the charge that the economy took a toll because of the racial
politics that was utilized first by the colonialists to exploit primary resources and
subsequently by the PNC to retain power and control the nation. The British, as
colonialist exploiters, did oppress the people. But the economy made some strides under
colonial rule. However, a commentator (SN Jul 3, 2010) noted, “the PNC during its 28
years reign of terror showed they were worse oppressors than the colonial masters, and
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not only hindered national development, but regressed the nation fifty years”. The
commentator added, “PNC rule led to a brain drain and inability to develop its resources
for the benefit of the nation. The country became like a wrecked ship under PNC rule”
(Ibid). Some of the defenders of the PNC blamed the opposition PPP and its Indian
supporters for the collapse of the economy claiming the PPP politics of boycott made
sure that the Indians shun participation in so many activities organized by the PNC. They
say, “it is the misguided Marxist ideology and eventual fulminations of the opposition
PPP and Indians that helped shape the West's view of Guyana as a basket base. The
entrenched politics of boycott by the PPP and the clever exploitation of race and power
"turned Guyana into the basket case of the Caribbean." (SN Aug 18, 2008). Minister
Rohee’s conclusion about British guilt in retarding growth seems to have some merit as
this study has found British (and American) culpability for the limited civil war during
the 1960s (Rabe: 2005; Schlesinger: 1965). But the extent of British culpability in the
slow development of Guyana is debatable as the British were not responsible for poor
economic policies post independence and the state sponsored racism (against nonPNCites) that followed colonial rule that continually discouraged investment, a
prerequisite for development, growth, and a higher standard of living (Rampertab: 2001).
The leaders (Jagan and Burnham) of the races and political parties (PNC and PPP)
during the anti-colonial as well as post-colonial eras must also share part of the blame for
persistent ethnic conflict and the failure to pursue policies that would have led to racial
reconciliation and political stability to facilitate economic development (Pierce: 1984).
Ethnic discrimination and the polarization of the society have led to varied periods of
stability and instability and immobilized the political system affecting development in
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Guyana from 1957 till now. For example, although the Indian PPP governed
democratically between 1957 and 1964 and pursued policies for national development,
the supporters of the other ethnic parties viewed the government as governing for the
primary benefit of its supporters. And they undertook acts to undermine the stability of
the government. Between 1965 and 1968, although Indians refused to cooperate with the
ruling alliance of the other ethnic groups, relative political stability allowed for
investment that led to limited growth. And between 1968 and 1992, with the
establishment of the ethnic dictatorship under the exclusive dominance of the African
PNC, when Indians, Portuguese, Amerindians, Chinese, and others were marginalized
and ostracized and racism became institutionalized, the economy literally collapsed. The
dominant political culture during one party PNC rule (1968 thru 1992) was Afro-centric
despite the fact that Indians constituted more than half the total population for most of
that period, when combined with the other victimized groups made up two-thirds of the
population, with Africans constituting only about 32% of the population. Racial
stereotypical and scapegoating attitudes that originated under and reinforced by the
British during colonial rule, from the grass roots level to the top echelons of society, were
transformed into institutionalized racism during PNC rule (KN Apr 4, 2013; Nov 2,
2011). The result was Indians and the other ethnic groups non-supportive of the PNC
refused to actively participate in development policies. No amount of threats and ethnic
persecution were successful in forcing non-supporters of the PNC to contribute to
national development. There is no doubt that PNC rule of tyranny and oppression
destroyed the long term potential for sustained levels of economic growth in Guyana (KN
Sep 19, 2013). Its decades of racially prejudicial governance and economic
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mismanagement were the principal causes of economic decline between 1966 and 1992.
Since democracy returned to Guyana in 1992, under Jagan’s non-racial policies and good
governance, the country has seen an increase in its global trade and food security with the
standard of living rising slightly. Yet the country is far from reaching its full potential
and the promise of being the Singapore of the Caribbean. Singapore too, like Guyana,
has its ethnic conflict. But Singapore manages its conflict with multi-ethnic rule granting
ethnic equality and economic freedom and not surprisingly has a GDP per capita ten
times that of Guyana. In Guyana, on the other hand, racial competition for power and the
desire of members of ethnic groups to prevent each other from making gains affect
national development. The members of ethnic groups are determined to bring each other
down rather than help each other climb the social ladder of progress and higher standard
of living (SN Aug 4, Sep 26, Jan 31, 2014; Aug 16, 2013; Jul 2, 2009).
This zero-sum competitive game for political power and by extension economic
control between Indians and Africans has devastated development. It is a case of one
party in government being unable to govern because of the strong opposition from the
other party. Neither side can win even when in power for the country will remain at a
standstill with the opposing group unwilling to lend a supporting hand to move the
country forward or see it experience development. In fact, the opposing party will seek to
bring down the ruling group. The politics of ethnic exclusion or zero benefits for the
other side in which the winner “takes all” (that is, controls the state) is unworkable in
Guyana (Guyana Journal Mar 2007). The leaders need to be reminded that one hundred
percent of zero is still zero – control of the state amounts to limited progress.
Power and resources must be shared equitably between or among the diverse
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groups. No country can successfully develop when half of its population feels alienated
putting in a half-hearted effort at work. But that has been the history of the country since
1957. Some half of the country has been excluded from governance and full participation
in political and economic activities (lacking motif to engage in activities that would
benefit the governing half) – first under the PNC ethnic dictatorship (that excluded
Indians from governance) and now under democratic PPP rule (because Africans feel
they cannot win a democratic election having been outnumbered by Indians) (KN Oct 16,
2012; Apr 17, 2010; Mar 16, 2014). The excluded half historically has been inclined to
engage in a destructive response to the economy (espionage, sabotage, forming alliance
with imperialists, arson, boycott, withholding labor and reduced productivity). As long as
people feel excluded from the system, as was the case with Black Americans in the US
up and until the 1960s, they will continue their opposition to the party in government
engaging in protests, marches, rallies, and sabotage that can threaten and or undermine
the economy. Every ethnic group, especially in a multi-ethnic polarized state like
Guyana, must have an input in the governance of the state otherwise it will remain
unstable. The leaders cannot pretend there is no ethnic problem or proverbially sweep it
under the carpet (KN Dec 21, 2014; Aug 12, 2013). The politicians cannot blame each
other for bringing up what they often say is a non-existent problem. And they should stop
describing as “trouble makers” those who engage in a serious discussion on how to
resolve ethnic conflict. Conflicts don’t go away by being simply dismissed them as nonimportant or pretending they do not exist (SN May 30, 2014; Mar 11, 2013) or blaming
others. Ethnic conflict is real and it must be addressed to find a workable solution
because of its devastated effects on national development (SN Aug 28, 2014).
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Chapter 9: Conclusion:
Section A. General Summary of the Ethnic Problem & Urgency for a Solution:
The study argues that ethnic conflict has been the major stumbling block to
national development in Guyana ever since it was granted self-government in 1957 and
followed by independence in 1966. Racial conflict between Indians and Africans over
political power has undermined the nation’s ability in achieving its economic potential or
in significantly raising its standard of living or bringing about major social change.
This study has noted that race or ethnicity is a complex, complicated, emotionally
charged issue that influences peoples’ behavior in virtually every multi-ethnic society.
People tend to be identity conscious with ethnicity (racial affiliation as in Guyana)
influencing their behavior and being a dominant aspect of the national discourse in many
societies. As historians pointed out, the European establishment of colonies (through war,
conquest, exploration, among other methods) in many cases led to the creation of multiethnic societies through the importation of diverse groups and or racial miscegenation to
serve capitalist labor’s needs. In many of these societies, there initially emerged
heightened ethnic group solidarity followed by ethnic conflict among the diverse groups.
Competition for resources and political power exacerbated ethnic group conflict.
Eventually, new multi-ethnic nations were born when the colonies obtained
independence. This, inevitably, led to struggles for political power centered on ethnicity
(ethnic appeals). Political rivals in many of these multi-ethnic societies have not been shy
in effectively (some boldly) exploiting tensions and hostility among ethnic groups as
propaganda weapons in the struggle for attaining or retaining power. Ethnic conflicts
arising out of a struggle for state power tend to lead to social breakdowns (sometimes
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violent conflict) and or political instability in a society. Issues and questions about
ethnic-cultural identity go to the heart of ethnicity's possible roles in society, particularly
with regard to its impact on the economy. Violence and political instability hinder
economic growth and development through delays (or even cancellation) of planned
projects, business expansion and new investment. It can also lead to destruction of
property, work stoppages, and wastage of resources. Ethnic conflict often leads to
political patronage and nepotism, hiring of unqualified staff, general mismanagement of
the economy, brain drain, and the like, all of which negatively affect an economy. So
ethnicity, as a defining factor of social relations and as an influence on a society’s
economy, is real and cannot be ignored or lightly dismissed (SN Dec 5, 2011). (see
http://www.guyana.org/features/conflicts_indiansandblacks.html; SN Nov 28, 2007;
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/13/cooling-ethnic-conflict-in-guyanas-elections/;
https://www.monroecollege.edu/uploadedFiles/_Site_Assets/PDF/The_Social_Constructi
on_of_Race-Ethnic_Confilct.pdf ; www.guyanajournal.com/race1_pt.html)
The effect of ethnic conflict on a society has been amply demonstrated in this case
study on Guyana that experienced relatively stagnant or negative development as a result
of racial conflict (that is often accompanied by violence in Guyana). The country has
failed as a nation to give its people an equal opportunity, regardless of ethnicity or
political affiliation, to pursue or to realize their full potential to be whatever they want
and to contribute to the country’s economic development. People are defined by their
ethnicity, and their quality of life is linked to their ethnicity. The PNC government
formulated policies and distributed resources based on political and ethnic affiliation.
Those who supported the government during the PNC era (December 1964 thru 1992)
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were favored over those who supported other parties, and as such, PNC supporters
enjoyed a higher standard of living than those not supportive of the regime. As a result of
racial discrimination and persecution, the country could not achieve its full potential as
racial victims simply withheld their services, activities, investment, and labor.
Productivity declined and economy shrank and with it the deterioration in the standard of
living. (see https://sarabharrat.wordpress.com/tag/racism/; GT Jan 25, 2015).
Economists have pointed that Guyana should have been a country in which
everyone should have had a relatively equal and a fairly high standard of living given its
enormous natural resources and the size of the country’s landmass with only three quarter
million people. The people should have been living in peace and harmony and the
country should have put its enormous resources to constructive use so that everyone
could enjoy a relatively high standard of living. Instead, what was obtained right after
independence was institutionalized racism with the ruling PNC politicians playing on the
racial division of the population so as to manipulate and control them (Africans in
particular). The PNC established a system of governance that favored their own
(African/Colored) supporters over those of other parties and that enriched the PNC elite
to the exclusion of others (KN May 10, 2013; May 1, 2011). In addition, the PNC
politicians created a dependency syndrome of their supporters (KN Nov 24, 2013) using
patronage of the state to keep them in tow so that the elite can hold on to power illegally
(1964-1992). That dependency syndrome, while serving the self-interests of the PNC
elite, militated against the productive capacity of PNC supporters denying many of them
the ability to purse self-development, and by extension a meaningful contribution to
growth and development. The PNC established a governance system geared towards self-
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preservation and self-enrichment rather than towards national growth and prosperity (KN
Jul 21, 2011) or granting people, including its own supporters, freedom of choice.
Similarly, the PPP politicians also sought to retain an ethnic base to capture and maintain
power though it did not (has not) practice (d) racism in government or has adopted a
dependency patronage approach of its supporters to the extreme extent as the PNC did
during its tenure (KN Nov 22, 2011). The PPP supporters have hardly depended on the
state for economic survival or for employment as most of them are self-employed or
worked in the private sector. And, at any rate, the greater proportion of the state’s
resources under the PPP regime have been expended in non-PPP strongholds (KN Nov
18, 2013). However, PPP supporters have depended on their party to provide them with a
feeling of ethnic security against planned violence orchestrated by the PNC (SN Dec 24,
2008) as well as on adequate physical infrastructure to facilitate economic enterprises
such as agricultural production (KN Apr 24, 2011; Sep 4, 2009) and business activities.
Without ethnic security and appropriate infrastructure, Indians would not be very
productive. And during PNC rule, ethnic crimes, poor infrastructure and racist policies
made development almost impossible. Indians withdrew their participation in
development policies. So in spite of the enormous promise of the making of an
economically prosperous nation at independence in 1966, Guyana has failed as a country
to grow, experience positive social change, and give its people a prosperous life because
of ethnic conflict (KN May 26, 2013). Yet the literature on Guyana or on other multiethnic societies has not stressed the effect of the ethnic factor on development.
As this study notes, the economic literature on post-colonial societies has
generally tended to emphasize the economic causes for underdevelopment of a nation like
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Guyana. Much of the literature is on the external sources of exploitation and domination
and misguided domestic policies as being the main culprits (factors) behind a country’s
underdevelopment. The literature places less emphasis on non-economic factors (on
social factors such as the dynamics of internal conflict resulting from political and or
ethnic competition) for failed development in divided former colonies like Guyana. Also,
academics tend to overemphasize the external sources (colonialism, imperialism, terms of
trade, etc.) at the expense of the internal social aspects such as ethnic conflict in
explaining why former colonies have failed to develop. It is a given that the economic
and political activities of the colonists or colonialists were usually congruent with the
interests of the imperial or mother country or the local plantocracy, and that they did not
give a hoot about the development of their colonies. Colonizers and imperialists were
interested in profit making and in developing their own nations rather than their colonies.
No one will dispute the fact that imperialism (as practiced by colonial powers like the
US, UK, France, etc.) and capitalist exploitation of the society from within (by plantation
owners and local bourgeoisie) have played a significant role (through divide and rule and
other policies) in the failure of Guyana to develop. And it is also indisputable that the
economic external and internal factors were responsible for the uneven level of
development (neglect of rural and hinterland communities) of various regions of the
country (urban-rural divide) because the dominant ethnic group and the colonizing elite
are concentrated in the urban areas. But why should lack of development be attributed
almost exclusively to economic external and internal factors? Should not non-economic
domestic factors (like ethnic conflict and the role of political struggle for power) also be
invoked to explain underdevelopment?
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The study has illustrated that political and to a large extent economic life in
Guyana is largely defined and shaped by ethnicity. In Guyana, there is a strong linkage
between ethnicity and economic occupations with Indians mostly involved in farming
and retail businesses, Africans in mining and government employment like the civil
service and security sectors, Chinese in laundry and shop keeping, and Portuguese in
trade and wholesale operations as suppliers to retail shops. Also, the link between ethnic
identity and political affiliation has provided the underlying basis for governance and
politically motivated ethnic violence that impacted on development.
As the study argues, ethnic conflict, promoted by political leaders, parties and
organizations, and outside forces is the primary reason why Guyana has failed to prosper.
The research in this study finds that the post independence Guyana rulers had become the
problem in the way of development as they: 1. had played on ethnic fears to hold on to
their support 2. had persistently refused to cooperate on national development and 3.
when in opposition, had taken every step to undermine the policies of the opposing ethnic
party in control of the state to enhance internal support and acquire further resources for
their own group. For partisan purposes, the leaders of post independent Guyana have
been obstacles to development (SN Apr 30, 2009).
As Prof. Paul Erriah (2011: 96) opined, nation building has been hindered by a
variety of forces inherent in the social, political and economic systems that range from
ethnic differences, to political exclusion, to domestic politics, to racial rivalry, to
international factors relating to the cold war, nepotism, trade issues, and a variety of other
socio-economic, psychological and political factors (Erriah: 96). The major obstacle
facing Guyana is the ethnic political parties, their ethnic leaders and their ethnic

- 363 -

supporters don’t want to cooperate or share power with each other to allow for peaceful
coexistence and stability that can lead to economic progress. They have focused on
winning elections and governing alone. From the time of the split of the anti-colonialist
nationalist movement in 1955, ethnic conflict has been very threatening and disruptive
leading to one crisis after another in the social, economic and political structure of the
country. The political leaders had been unwilling to accept that winning an election is
not enough to stem ethnic violence because electoral democracy has not stopped violence
in Guyana or other multi-ethnic states like Kenya, Ghana and Ukraine; in fact, it has led
to more violence and disallowed inclusive governance.
Electoral democracy has not worked well in multi-ethnic Guyana (SN May 10,
2014; Feb 13, 2013; Mar 12, 2009). With its African supporters being a minority, PNC
rigged elections because it could not win a free and fair election. The PPP, on the other
hand, did not need to engage in electoral rigging. The political arithmetic had favored
Indian PPP to win democratic elections between 1957 and 1964 and again between 1992
(in coalition with Amerindians and a sprinkling of others) and now making it difficult for
the African/Mixed minority to win office through free and fair elections. Because the
Africans and Mixed/Coloreds combined (largely supporters of the PNC) recognized they
could not win democratic elections, with their numbers less than that of the Indians
(supporters of PPP), the African/Coloreds supported rigged elections to remain in office
and largely excluded the Indians in policy making as well as access to state resources
(KN Jun 22, 2012). International pressure forced the PNC (supported by Africans and
Coloreds) to yield to democratic elections that were won by the Indian PPP. But out of
office, the minority PNC has destabilized the government at every turn.
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Neither party, when in office, wanted to share political power, but when in
opposition advocated for some kind of ethnic power sharing mechanism. When in control
of the state, the political elites of the races have been unwilling to accept or even to
recognize ethnic bargaining and negotiations over resource allocations to the various
groups. They have sought power for their group at the expense of the other groups (KN
Apr 29, 2014). They have not given serious consideration to the enactment of some kind
of institutionalized system of distribution of resources and a governance power-sharing
mechanism as legitimate means of addressing political and ethnic conflict. It is noted
that when defeated after a democratic election, the losing party usually calls for power
sharing among the races. Not surprisingly, there have been ongoing demands for power
sharing from the African leadership and threats of violence if the Indian PPP leadership
of the country does not acquiesce to their demands (Stabroek News letters May 3, 4,
2011). When the PPP was in opposition during the period 1965 to 1992, it suggested a
power sharing formula that was rejected by the PNC that opted for exclusive governance.
When the PPP offer was rejected, the party engaged in activities that undermined
development. Growth and development cannot take place under such uncertain and
unstable circumstances. Multi-ethnic inclusive governance is required for stability that in
turn encourages economic activities that lead to prosperity.
As argued, one of the prerequisites of growth and development is stability and
national unity. Guyana has not experienced continuous political stability primarily
because of ethnic conflict. As experienced in Guyana and so many multi-ethnic states,
ethnic peace is very fragile, and it can easily succumb to the least provocation between
members of groups throwing nations into serious conflict and turmoil. Psychological
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trauma follows when violence breaks out impacting on investment. And in Guyana, it is
well known that opportunistic politicians encourage ethnic provocations because such
ethnic confrontations suit their interests as a way to retain their base and to remain
relevant to their supporters (KN Nov 22, Jun 5, 2011). In Guyana, ethnic conflict
occurred intermittently from the 1950s till now and even led to the establishment of an
authoritarian Black state similar to apartheid South Africa between 1966 and 1992. As
illustrated, democracy was not the only victim of ethnic conflict. The economy also
suffered. Needless to say, economic decline is usually accompanied with a lowered
standard of living and increased levels of poverty and suffering among the masses
thereby hindering social change. (see www.unesco.org/most/girvan.htm).
As this study illustrates, ethnic conflict20 provides a useful and heretofore
neglected explanation for the decline and or lack of economic growth and for (negative)
social change and declining standards of living in developing countries. One simply
cannot ignore the effect that ethnic conflict has on societies as exemplified by the Guyana
case. Racial tension that emerged out of the introduction of varied races during the mid
1800s has persisted throughout Guyanese history. It has crossed over into political affairs
from 1957, and it led to racial violence during the 1960s and intermittent violence
thereafter as the racial groups competed for political power and control of the state
(http://www.mongabay.com/history/guyana/guyana-health.html). Such racial tension and
violence affected productivity, business and investment by impacting on all aspects of the

20

The most important sources of ethnic group conflict are the highly visible characteristics of
race, tribalism, skin color, nationality, language and religion. Donald Horowitz’s study Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (1985) confirms that most conflicts in the world are associated with
differences in racial, linguistic, and religious characteristics (p 10). In Guyana, ethnicity replaces
class as the precursor of conflict – a contradiction of socialist and Marxist expectation.
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economy, particularly growth as the economy declined, especially after independence.
From 1957 thru 1965, while Guyana was still a colony under British control, the
economy was still somewhat stable and growing negligibly to sustain the quality of life.
However, after independence in 1966, Guyana’s economy regressed, particularly so thru
the year 1992 with the standard of living in 1992 being a mere fifth (in terms of real
purchasing power parity) of what it was at the time of independence in 1966. During the
period 1966 to 1992, the country experienced many social ills including negative
population growth, brain drain, and decline in health and social indices. Per capita
income collapsed drastically. The per capita debt exceeded US $30K (among the highest
in the world) by 1992. Most of the intervening years saw negative or stagnant growth
rates. During that period and since then, there has been and a steady decline in the Human
Development Index (HDI) and other social indicators since independence. Of 186
countries, Guyana ranked fifth from the bottom on the human development index in
1992. It is noted that in 2014, Guyana remains the second poorest country in the Western
hemisphere. Over 36% of the population lives below the poverty level, though an
improvement from 67% in 1991 (GT Jan 8, 2015). Some 20% of the population is
unemployed (GT Apr 29, 2014) and that number does not include those who are
underemployed and have given up looking for work. The country has the lowest GDP
per capita ranking in Caricom. All of the preceding social and problems are attributed to
ethnic politics (prejudice, racism and conflict) and gross mismanagement of the economy
– opposition groups undermining development because they feel excluded from
governance and are convinced they don’t get their fair share of resources.
Clearly, economic progress will not be made in Guyana as long as the ethnic
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problem remains unsolved and or until there is a workable solution that would encourage
and motivate the groups to become involved in development. So far, the political leaders
have failed to forge a united nation allowing people to live peacefully and work together
to help make rapid strides in economic development. Unless the government (both ruling
party and opposition) addresses the issue of ethnic conflict and finds a way to construct a
political arrangement that provides for equitable ethnic representation in the government
and allocation of resources to the various groups, violence and instability will remain a
part of civil society. And if social peace is absent, development is virtually is virtually
impossible. And the ethnic temperature in Guyana is inexorably rising with explosions
possible at any moment. Immediate actions need to be taken to address the ethnic
conflict. The situation is one of urgency to avoid violent clashes.
Ethnicity must be tackled head on regardless of which party wins an election and
forms a government so that conflict does not affect development. In terms of a solution,
the state must not smother ethnic aspirations like the PNC did with repressive policies
when it governed between 1965 and 1992. Ethnic persecution would only exacerbate
conflict. An inclusive form of governance is needed to address the problem. This study
has contended that economic progress cannot come about without sound multi-ethnic
democratic principles, political stability, good governance, respect for law and for each
other, ethnic fairness, economic equity, sensible policies, and national unity. The failure
of the political forces to adequately address and settle the ethnic conflict has invariably
led to intermittent periods of violence (political and social instability) that have impacted
on production affecting the economy. The political leaders need to find a solution to the
conflict and not evade or ignore it or pretend it does not exist as happened heretofore as

- 368 -

this produces instability. The challenge for Guyana and other ethnic violence plagued
societies is to find a workable solution to ameliorate conflicts that would lead to peace
and political stability and that would motivate people to work wholeheartedly towards
national development. Permanent political stability (brought about by ethnic peace and
harmony) is needed for investment and development that will lead to economic growth
and a rising standard of living and other social change. So how can stability be achieved?
Section B: Proposed Solutions & Recommendations for Stability:
This study recommends that ethnic conflict be managed in a (creative) way to
eliminate strife that can lead to political instability. Theorists have propounded that
stability and nation building can be obtained through an ethnic control model that is
dependent on a monopoly of the use of violence (repressive dictatorial rule) by a
government against its political opponents (or against an ethnic group) so as to resist all
appeals based on ethnicity (tribalism, in particular) (Horowitz: 1985). (see also
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9036100585). That model, while controlling
dissent, was not successful in bringing about development in Guyana. Such a
totalitarian/authoritarian process has been prevalent in Africa with the nations (Kenya,
Malawi, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, among many others) adopting such
authoritarian/totalitarian measures in order to enforce a process of nation building (see
www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/.../kenya.htm). Guyana falls under this repressive
approach during the PNC era between 1966 and 1992 when the dictatorship kept a tight
lid on ethnic conflict using violence to prevent dissent against its racist rule. Also, most
multi-ethnic former communist nations (not least USSR and Yugoslavia) and countries in
Africa have depended on dictatorial measures to prevent ethnic conflict. The various
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forms of social control used by Burnham and the PNC between 1966 and 1992 ranged
from the use of force and violence to legal restrictions imposed on peoples’ cultural
beliefs, ideologies and economic activities. Such repressive actions drove fear in people
forcing them to tow government line. To not follow the government line, the penalty
could include death, acts of cultural genocide, denial of food rations, withholding
supplies to shopkeepers, and ethnic cleansing (job dismissals or replacement by
supporters of the PNC). These repressive methods were used by the PNC to control the
Indians and members of other groups that did not support it. Persecuted people are
unmotivated to support national development.
As in other authoritarian/totalitarian societies, the coercive apparatus of
Burnham’s state permeated all spheres of daily life including diet, religious worship,
education, sports, culture, and politics. The coercion in Guyana was of such a degree that
fear of the “comrade leader” became the central fact of existence but that fear did not lead
to enhanced productivity – people did fear the leader and he did punish those who did not
follow his directives or those who challenged. The fear of the dictator did not motivate
people to maximize their productivity. People did the bare minimum for their survival as
well as to avoid victimization by the omnipresent state. It should be pointed out that
productivity in every sector of Guyana’s economy declined and the overall economy
grew negatively during the period of the ethnic dictatorship. As the Guyana case has
illustrated, the repressive authoritarian model does not produce a permanent or long term
solution to ethnic conflict, and at any rate, repressive solutions do not lead to
development of a nation as exemplified in Africa and the former Soviet Union. When
democracy returned to the former authoritarian nations, ethnic conflict and ethnic
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demands raised their ugly heads once again. The problem did not disappear. On the
contrary, it worsened. Similarly in Guyana, repression did not result in improved
relations between the ethnic groups. On the contrary, relations worsened. There was
relative political stability but no development. People were not motivated to produce to
their potential, and they found clever ways to outsmart the political system and meet their
basic needs. Porous borders and migration created an outlet for many to escape the
repressive power of the state, and many Guyanese found their way to North America.
Once freed from the arms of the oppressive state, former persecuted people can use their
newly found freedom outside the border to organize revolutionary activities to undermine
or destabilize their former state like what happened in Nicaragua by the Miskito Indians
(www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/.../indian/miskitos.htm) or Indo-Guyanese in North America
(www.caribbeannewsnow.com/headline- Nov 28, 2014) resulting in a worse situation for
the oppressive government forcing it to democratize and lose power.
Clearly, stability imposed under a threat of state persecution will not encourage
people to increase production. It is better for government to win people over using a soft
approach such as granting them freedom, cultural autonomy and including them in
governance. The dictator, Desmond Hoyte, achieved some success when he tried the soft
approach embracing Indians between 1988 and 1992 that saw the economy rebounding.
Also, no government will forever be able to hold the lid on reasonable ethnic demands
like freedom to practice one’s religion cultural retention or to stop a democratic
opposition bent on toppling it as happened in former dictatorships in Africa, Central
America and Eastern Europe. Violent, repressive measures by authorities against an
ethnic group do not produce permanent relief to a lingering ethnic problem. Such state
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actions may provide stability for a brief period, but the problem will raise its ugly head as
soon as the repression ends as has happened in Ukraine and Guyana. And repressive
actions may not be successful to completely eradicate a group or its cultural (language,
diet, customs, etc.) norms or demands. (www.unesco.org/most/pp4.htm). Even when
living under the most oppressive regime, history has shown that groups find creative
ways to retain their cultural or ethnic identity as was the case of Jews in Germany under
Hitler. When repressive measures ease up, ethnic groups will return to their cultural
norms and make (justifiable) demands that may lead to a return of instability as in the
former USSR. In addition, repression does not lead to maximization of economic output.
It de-motivates people from engaging in productive work. People tend to withhold their
labor when their rights are violated as history as witnessed in so many societies.
Actually, Guyana, itself, was an example of this fact between 1966 and 1992 when
Indians, Chinese, and Whites largely withheld their labor and economic investment in
response to ethnic persecution and victimization to pursue their trades and callings. As
soon as repression ended in 1992, there was a burst in economic activities and the
economy grew. So ethnic dictatorship, while it may result in stability if people don’t
challenge it, does not enhance economic development (Erriah: 2011). Actually, it reduces
growth as the case of Guyana illustrated during the period of tyrannical rule. The
government found it impossible to force people to labor even when guns were pointed at
them, and there were numerous labor strikes and arson of government farm production
during the dictatorship. Any program or policies that significantly increase the risks of
violent ethnic conflict or promote discrimination have proven to be economically
unsound or impractical to implement. The experience under Burnham should alert present
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and aspiring national leaders (especially from PNC) to a harsh reality: the short term
benefits from ethnically divisive political strategies do not justify the long term social
economic and political costs (SN Oct 1, 2013)(see also www.guyana.org/.../conflicts_i..).
Democratic elections and inclusive governance may provide the best option for
stability. But democratic elections alone may not necessarily bring peace and stability as
illustrated in Guyana where there was much racial violence as groups refused to accept
defeats in elections. Ethnic groups want to be part of the government even when they
were defeated in democratic elections. Democratic elections were not sufficient to
appease Guyana’s opposing groups as saw observed during 1957-65 and again from 1992
thru the contemporary period. Defeated ethnic groups are unwilling to accept the
outcomes of democratic elections. In a pluralist society, like Guyana, where one group is
over fifty percent of the population, “democratic elections” are not very comforting to
minority groups because they are not likely to win free and fair elections. In fact, it was
because the Africans were numerically less than Indians that the PNC resorted to election
rigging recognizing it could not win democratic elections. During the period of election
rigging and the establishment of the dictatorship between 1966 and 1992, indeed even
before that, unrestrained political competition, particularly where the ethnic groups were
of roughly equal sizes, led essentially to a zero-sum situation – neither group was real
beneficiary in the racial competition; their energies were spent on preventing the other
group from making political and economic gains rather than on development of the state
to the benefit of everyone. And even when there is a democracy, as Guyana has been
since 1992, there is still ethnic conflict in a continual stalemate. So while democratic
elections are welcomed, they alone may not be a sufficient remedy for ethnic problems in
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polarized states like Guyana; such elections may simply be a prescription for the
permanent exclusion of minorities or certain ethnic groups from power when they are less
than 50% of the population. Nevertheless, democracy must not be dismissed as an
important tool to bring about political stability in divided society; stability without
democracy does not augur well for development (Pierce: 1984).
A stable political system (resulting from democratic elections or negotiated by
party or ethnic elites) must be democratic and must be seen and accepted as having
legitimacy by all groups. It must provide for a fair system of competition and sharing of
power and resources among all groups and as such it cannot be based on a “winner takes
all” democratic system. Acceptance of such a government is enhanced when there is a
fair distribution of state resources among the diverse groups and when opponents feel that
they have a fair chance of being part of an administration and when the system does not
discriminate against them based on their identity. People will become more amenable to
and accept a system that gives them a fair chance based on skills, talent and ability to
fulfill their potential. Stability is greatly enhanced when the political system makes it
possible for members of all groups to partake in the system, have equal opportunities, and
allow a meaningful role in the government. Exclusion (or even a perception of exclusion)
of any group will lead to instability as witnessed in Guyana and several other societies.
Thus, a political system needs to be constructed in which ethnic conflict is
minimized or regulated through some kind of constitutional arrangement or parliamentary
procedure for sharing of resources among diverse groups, inter-group (as well as intragroup) accommodation, and ethnic elite negotiation for power sharing and resource
allocation among such diverse groups (Erriah: 2011: SN May 27, 2011). One such
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proposed arrangement is consociational democracy that proponents posit would bring all
the ethnic groups (in conflict and in competition) together in some form of shared
governance (KN Jun 2, 2013, SN Sep 1, 2014). Consociational theory, as posited by
Arendt Lijphart (1969) involves negotiation among the representatives of the ethnic
groups towards an acceptable solution of shared governance and resources. Conflict is
managed by the leaders of the groups for cultural or linguistic or religious autonomy, or
for self-rule, etc., or for some kind of equitable distribution of resources (Ibid). The
political leaders of the different communities will bargain for resources to prevent
political disorder or ethnic conflict. The model assumes that the political actors and their
supporters would accept this type of constitutional arrangement. As Prof Erriah (2011)
noted, stability in such a multi-cultural setting will be maintained if the leaders of
political groups engage in cooperative efforts to counteract the tendencies toward
instability. In other words, there must be accommodation of the elites of the different
groups and their supporters (Erriah: 75-76). It is felt that this approach or a similar one is
necessary for a country like Guyana to transcend intense ethnic conflict and to bring
about peace and stability. Prof. Erriah (2011) has argued that, “the failure of nation
building and construction of smooth ethnic fences in Guyana must be attributed to the
idiosyncratic rationalization of the political leadership. If Guyana had gone into
independence with a Jagan-Burnham coalition, the government would have been more
representative of the entire composition of the country and a consociational democracy
would have been born. However, political opportunism prevailed and a repressive state
was the only formula for the survival of the PNC government” (Erriah: 95).
In Guyana and in several plural societies, rulers turned to authoritarian rule and
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what Dr. Ravi Dev and Prof. Baytoram Ramharack (New York University and Suffolk
Community College) called “hegemonic control” to manage ethnic conflict (KN Feb 21,
2010). This political system, they argue, is unworkable as a solution to ethnic conflict and
is similar to the repressive model described earlier. As Dev and Ramharack explained,
authoritarianism and hegemony (total domination including use of force) are effectively
utilized by the dominant ethnic group to hold the society together and preserve its control
because of fear of chaos from power sharing formulas or of losing power to other groups
through democratic governance (www.kaieteurnews.com; Feb 8, 2010; Dec 11, 2011;
Oct 12, 2010; May 13, 2012). The groups in opposition to the government worry about
their security and make demands for participation in governance. The minority groups
generally worry about the electoral outcome fearing they would never win an election to
get into office while the majority group demands democratic governance. Dev and
Ramharack (Ibid), both of them belonging to the Indian-based ROAR political party (that
has not been successful in electoral battles), have coined the term “ethnic security
dilemma”. Such a term describes the situation whereby the dominant ethnic group (could
be a minority as was the case between 1965 thru 1992 in Guyana or apartheid South
Africa or White ruled Rhodesia or Alawite controlled Syria or Sunni controlled Iraq
under Saddam Hussein) attempts to maintain hegemonic control over the rest of the
society in order to guarantee its own dominance, freedom of activities, and policies to
ensure its physical security as well as to secure the rewards of socio-politico control (KN
Nov 11, 2012). Dev and Ramharack suggest a federalist system that decentralizes power
groups as a way to resolve ethnic conflict (KN Jul 28, 2011; Mar 21, 2010).
Dev and Ramharack describe Guyana’s ethnic conflict in terms of an “Ethnic
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Security Dilemma” in which each race (one in control of the state and the other in
opposition) feels insecure about the intention of the one in government and as such they
face off against each other for control of the government that they feel provide them with
some sense of security (KN Jan 13, 2012). They note that the ethnic security dilemmas
that flowed from that premise within the country’s political framework have not been
successful at finding a solution since the 1950s. Ramharack and Dev feel that the best
way to address the ongoing security dilemma is through the establishment of a federalist
governance (decentralization of power) structure that would allow each ethnic group
control over certain local government to manage their own ethnic affairs and address
their own ethnic issues while remaining loyal to the state (ibid; SN Jul 30, 20, 2014; Nov
12, Apr 15 2013). The federalist structure would be modeled after that in the US where
Guyana will be divided into (four or more) “provinces” that may result in the major
ethnic group in the province capturing power but a mechanism will be put in place to
prevent ethnic domination once there will be some kind of shared governance (KN May
8, 2011). The group in charge of the regional (or local) government would not neglect the
legitimate aspirations of the other groups and or deny them equitable participation in
governance (KN May 8, 2011; SN Jan 29, 2008).
Another proposal advanced by other theorists that can help to bring about stability
is that of a multi-ethnic or multi-party coalition or shared governance. Dr. Ravi Dev,
leader of the Indian-based ROAR party, that won representation in parliament in the 2001
election, proposed a government of national unity be formed (comprising of
representatives of all groups in a multi-ethnic inclusive government) as in South Africa in
the short term to discuss, debate, and formulate a more appropriate and permanent
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governance and state structures for Guyana. This proposal was turned down by the
leadership of the two major political contenders – both of whom were opposed to any
form of shared governance (KN May 8, 2011). The PNC was opposed to any kind of
shared governance initially saying it wanted to govern alone, but it is now advocating
such cooperation (wants to be part of a multi-party coalition government) while the PPP
has expressed opposition to such a plan. However, when the PPP was in opposition after
being engineered out of office in December 1964, it advocated power sharing.
The theory of shared governance involves a government of all political parties
based on proportional representation of votes garnered in an election with a minimum
threshold needed to gain cabinet berths as used in South Africa in 1994 and also designed
for Fiji (but never implemented). It is often referred to as the consensus approach21 to
national integration “which relies on modernization as an evolutionary process that
eventually leads to nation-building. It regards ethnic demands and societal disruption,
ethnic conflict, etc. as a natural phenomenon that will eventually be replaced by
consensus-building, cross-cutting affiliations and shared societal values that in turn will
lead to greater integration” and a reduction in conflict. Many theorists feel several multiethnic societies fall under this social integration model with groups seeking consensus
solutions (acceptance of election results, as for example, and willingness to include
members of other parties in governance) to their ethnic problems as happens in
Switzerland and Belgium. It is somewhat similar to Lijphart’s consociational model in
that elected representatives obtain consensus on governance issues. Fiji had a kind of
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See Karl Deutsch and William Foltz (eds), Nation-Building (Chicago: Aldine Atherton
Press,1966); and, Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (Cambridge, Mass.:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,1970).
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consensus ethnically inclusive model enshrined in its 1997 constitution, but the severely
restrictive ethnic government refused to implement it after elections to include the Indian
opposition members in the cabinet leading to the perpetuation of ethnic instability. South
Africa also has this system for its 1994 constitution, but the Whites withdrew from the
cabinet and refused to participate in the government saying it has negligible influence in
how the country has been governed. This type of consensual governance, it is suggested,
by utilizing the reputation and respect of leading personalities of all the major groups,
will result in political stability (Erriah: 77). In such an arrangement, all the political
parties (leaders representing ethnic groups) will partake in cabinet decision-making based
on percentage of votes received. Each ethnic community will be allocated a fair amount
of resources based on its size and needs. Even if some people cry discrimination and
oppose such a coalition system claiming their rights are violated, stability will remain
providing opportunities are available to them as exists in a democratic polity to express
their grievances. The leaders, who sign on to the system and are represented in the
cabinet, will be responsible for control their group to maintain political stability.
The objective of a consensual approach is to minimize ethnic grievances and to
maximize acceptance of the system thus insuring political stability. Once a (democratic)
government serves the interests of the large majority of its citizens, to achieve their selfinterests and potential, political stability will hold as exemplified in the US, Canada,
England, Singapore, etc. allowing for growth and development. In developed multi-ethnic
countries, stability is obtained through ethnic accommodations, compromises, coalition
building, and respect for the minority and a system is implemented that addresses real or
imagined ethnic discrimination allowing for the development of communities so they
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don’t feel alienated and marginalized. Since these societies don’t experience prolonged
periods of instability, they exemplify or showcase conditions that will attract investment
leading to economic expansion and experiencing national development. In Third World
societies, however, especially in culturally plural societies that are characterized by
serious social cleavages, compromises and democratic governance are often limited (as in
Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Surinam, Guyana, South Africa, Fiji, etc.) if not completely absent
(as in Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, among others).22 Stability is almost
completely absent in most of these societies. They lack the conditions for investment, and
as such they have not been able to experience their full economic potential as contrasted
to the developed societies such as Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, etc. that have managed
their ethnic conflict and have experienced political stability to facilitate development.
Even in multi-ethnic societies with democratic governance, ethnic racial divisions
can create situations (as in South Africa, Guyana, Fiji and Trinidad, etc.) where it is very
difficult to implement a system of majoritarian rule involving the "winner takes all"
paradigm. These countries face serious development issues with subordinate ethnic
groups reluctant to cooperate with the dominant group unless they are allowed some form
of cultural autonomy and an equitable share of resources, state positions, offices of
political management, and a fair opportunity to win political office. In culturally or
ethnically plural societies that maintain a Westminster-style democratic structure,
22
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majoritarian rule or "one man, one vote" type system virtually guarantees the group, with
a numerical preponderance over the other groups, the advantage of winning a free and
fair national election and the authority of controlling political power. This has been the
case in Guyana during the era (1957-64 and 1992-present) of democratic elections. From
the perspective of the subordinate or minority groups, majoritarian control can lead to
what is known as "tyranny of the majority" or perpetual domination by one ethnic group
over the other (s). On the other hand, a minority ethnic group (Whites in South Africa,
Blacks in Guyana, ethnic Melanesians in Fiji before the coup, etc.) that lacks the plurality
of votes necessary to win a free and fair election may be forced to resort to extraconstitutional (election rigging or coup) and authoritarian measures (exclusion of others)
in order to maintain political as well as economic domination. So, some kind of
compromise towards multi-ethnic inclusive governance is needed for social and political
stability to facilitate development. No one can deny that the current Indian dominated
PPP government is doing its utmost best to improve the lot of the people’s well being.
Indeed, the country has made a lot of progress under PPP’s democratic governance since
1993. But the African opposition is still determined to create obstacles (engaging in
frequent mass protests, for example) against progress. Since they have been excluded
from office for 22 years, via the outcomes of democratic elections, they are demanding a
representative voice in governance. In short, the Africans want power sharing
(proportional share in the cabinet based on the percentage of votes they obtained in the
elections) (SN Mar 2014; Jul 6, 2011; KN Mar 7, 2014; Nov 27, 2012). The Indian-based
PPP is opposed to such a demand (SN Apr 4, 2014).
As a reminder, when an ethnic group or party (the PNC) held power (illegally) for
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28 years and practiced ethnic exclusionary politics unwilling to share power with others,
once another group (Indians) captures or acquires power, it will be just as unwilling to
share it with other groups, particularly the one that previously oppressed it. It is not a case
of forgive and forget and bury the hatchet. Former persecuted people may want revenge
and after capturing or tasting power, the newly liberated group may not want to give it
up. The dilemma facing the Guyanese nation, as a writer penned in a letter column,
“Guyanese remain trapped in an infinitely regressive series of accusations as to who
(which ethnic group) did what to whom, and when? Inevitably, the past rears its head,
bares its fangs, and ensures that skittish minds become even more paranoid” (KN Mar 29,
2013). And the politicians keep reminding their supporters about those terrible
experiences telling them they could be repeated if the other side acquires or retains
power. As the letter writer commented, Guyanese need to alleviate themselves of “the
reflexive assumptions that each side is about to do to the other side …” (Ibid). It is just a
matter of time before there is another round of racial violence and political instability as
the Africans will not accept their inferior status in perpetuity. Ethnic reconciliation for
past misdeeds and compromise may be the way to go as happened in South Africa. Some
type of compromise is necessary to ease the lid on pent up racial anger arising out of
exclusion from government. But at the same time, ethnic bullyism (making unreasonable
demands with threats of attacking Indians and their businesses as happened between 1957
and 1964) and since 1998 will not work. The opposition has to show that it is willing to
accept the outcome of democratic elections that is fair and open to all.
As many commentators in the daily media in Guyana have pointed out, Africans
and Indians behave as if they can't live with or even near each other. But in reality they
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can't live without each other (SN Nov 30, 2103). Even though they won't admit it, they
need each other through mutual dependence. There is intense mistrust between the
parties and their loyal supporters. Prof. Ramcharan of the United Nations Geneva
Institute pointed out how after a brief period of “a united national movement in the
1950s, Guyana has been tugged between the political aspirations of Africans and Indians”
(SN Sep 3, 2010). Long after the deaths of Burnham and Dr. Jagan, African and Indians
are still influenced by them. He wrote: “We have had twenty-eight years of PNC rule that
was resented by Indians and, since 1992, we have now had eighteen years of PPP rule
that is resented by Africans. In making this statement we do not mean to reflect in any
way on the patriotism or statesmanship of any of our leaders or on the aspirations of our
political parties. We simply wish to recognize in good faith the feelings of many
Guyanese in our country and abroad” (SN Sep 3, 2010). Prof. Ramcharan laments the fact
that supporters of the PNC and its leadership make many claims about their contributions
to nation building, and likewise the leadership of the PPP and its supporters about their
claims regarding their contributions to national development. But they are unwilling to
work jointly for national development. Prof. Ramcharan asserts that “politically, Guyana
lacks a national consensus and that if we are to go forward as one people, one nation,
with one destiny, the national motto of the nation, we shall need to work more
consciously at nation-building” (SN Sep 3, 2010).
No politician or academic seems to have a workable solution for ethnic conflict
that is crippling real growth and development that could ideally make a resource rich
nation proudly affluent. But there is great reluctance of political leaders and or of a
government to address ethnic conflict in ethnically pluralist societies. Such behavior is
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self-defeating. Ethnic Conflict often degenerates into violence between or among groups.
The consequences of conflict, especially when there is violence and or when there is
extreme tension in the society, can destabilize the political environment within which the
officials and or government agencies operate, undermining their effectiveness at
policymaking. Empirical evidence reveals that ethnic conflicts, once they become violent,
are exceedingly difficult to resolve, and they can spiral out of control with devastating
consequences. Violent ethnic conflict retards economic growth by destroying physical
infrastructure, motivating talented individuals to migrate, frightening away investors,
keeping workers off their jobs, damaging the psyche of people, creating a sense of
hopelessness, discouraging people from maximizing their output; among other
debilitating effects – all critical for development and growth. The failure to find a
solution to escalating ethnic conflict can lead to political disagreements, exacerbating
ethnic polarization, social disintegration, and economic decline in the society. This
scenario has been all too prevalent in multi-ethnic developing nations since they became
independent and increasingly so in former Communist nations.
It is incumbent upon the politicians to come together and construct a system that
will lessen the feelings of ethnic insecurity and fear and that will allow the various ethnic
groups to live in peace, trust each other, and develop their respective communities for the
best interests of themselves and the nation. Plural societies like Guyana have to take
measures that will lead to a racial harmony while preserving cultural autonomy and
endogamy. Racial assimilation, integration, apartheid, genocide, forced miscegenation,
ethnic cleansing, ethnic liquidation, ethnic repression, totalitarianism, fascism, and other
such practices have all been tried in Guyana and other divided societies without much
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success in solving the ethnic question. Seclusion and or separation of groups (ethnic
homelands as in apartheid South Africa) are also unacceptable models for an ethnic
solution in this age of globalization. All ethnic groups must be accommodated in a plural
state. Rulers must show respect for heterogeneity and the desire for groups to be
endogamous and culturally autonomous – people must be free to pursue their own way of
life and celebrate their culture without the state dictating to them about their lifestyle. In
light of complaints about ethnic discrimination and marginalization, it would be prudent
for a nation like Guyana to establish an independent institutional body that conducts
investigations into complaints of ethnic bias (imbalances, nepotism, discrimination, and
the like) and provide prompt responses (resolution) where ethnic inequality exists in
multi-ethnic states. In this way, no group will feel alienated from the state prompting
them to engage in anti-national activities that would disrupt productivity forcing the state
to divert resources away from development to clamp down on dissidence.
Guyana is a very poor state struggling with development issues and cannot afford
a commitment of scarce resources to address ethnic quarrels. The resources will be better
spent on addressing peoples’ fundamental needs and developmental goals or else the
country will remain underdeveloped. Thus, a system of governance that promotes an
amalgamation of the diverse groups in running the affairs of the country is best to
ameliorate conflict. This big tent type government must accommodate all the groups and
distribute resources fairly and equitably to all communities without final regard for
ethnicity and not judge people by their ethnicity (SN Sep 25, 2009). Maximum attention
must be directed towards constructive developmental objectives. In so doing, Guyana can
reap great rewards from the development of its abundant natural resources. The country
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can expand economically if it can straighten its politics allowing all ethnic groups to
participate fully in the national development objectives and if the ethnic groups (leaders)
are willing to cooperate towards that objective. Also, the parties and the government need
to involve the entire population (or the representatives of the diverse ethnic groups) in
their planning and goals for national development.
The Guyana case suggests the legitimate expectations of competing groups cannot
be ignored regarding policymaking – not even in a dictatorship that uses repressive,
brutal force to bring opponents in line. Groups could be forced into silence out of fear for
their safety and accept their inferior status and repression, but they will still harbor strong
inner resentments against their oppressors. In this sense, the Guyana case resembles the
ethnic-political histories of Russia, former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and other former
dictatorships. In ethnically diverse plural societies such as Guyana, care must be taken in
planning and implementing policies so as not to alienate or marginalize any group. All
constituencies (and or their leaders) must be consulted, even when policymaking is done
democratically so that ethnic groups don’t feel they are neglected or victimized.
Otherwise, society can erupt with violence over any bias (perceived or real or deliberate)
as happened in so many countries as well as in Guyana. Democratic strategies must
emphasize a balance between competitive political behavior (among the ethnic groups)
and the objective goals of society23 to benefit all constituents (with a fair amount of
resources) and not to wish away potential violence from certain actions or biased policies
– address them! (SN Dec 30, 2014). The country needs a system (Thakur: nd) of inclusive
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Although Lijphart closely associates democracy with consociational democracy the latter
places emphasis on accommodation, consensus, bargaining and cooperation among ethnic
political leaders. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.4. see also Erriah (2011).
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governance) to move away from the politics of zero-sum mode that it has been stuck in
since the 1950s that has prevented it from achieving its economic potential – perhaps of
becoming a Singapore in terms of a development model? What I have proposed as
potential solutions will not sound appealing to leaders of dominant ethnic groups or those
(from the subordinate groups) who are seeking to gain and maintain power on the basis of
ethnic nationalist appeals. But it is in the interests of their followers and the entire nation
that there be some kind of multi-ethnic inclusive governance so that ethnic peace can
prevail because everyone benefits under such condition.
The leaders of the political parties (representing ethnic groups), therefore, have to
take measures to encourage social peace. Politicians of all stripes and ethnicity in the
nation have to address the issue of the impact of ethnic conflict on society because it
could have the potential of undermining an economy (Guyana Chronicle Feb 12, 2013) as
illustrated in this dissertation. This can come about by working out a constitutional
political formula for inclusive multi-ethnic governance (not ethnic token participation in
government positions as currently obtains) that will make the groups (through their
leaders) feel that they have a real voice in policy planning and decision-making that will
help to appease the leadership and supporters of the diverse ethnic groups.

Section C: Implications for other Multi-ethnic Societies & Further Research:
The dissertation offers a perspective (with empirical evidence) on ethnic conflict
and discusses some theoretical insights into the relationship of ethnicity (tables below) in
the development experience of Guyana, a third world country. The Guyana case offers
important observations into the workings of ethnic conflict with the dissertation showing
that development plans are seriously affected by communal struggles also known as
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Table 1 Showing Population Breakdown of Guyana by Ethnicity (2000)
Ethnic groups
Percentage
East Indian
50%
Black or Africans
36%
Amerindian
7%
White, Chinese, & Mixed 7%_____________________________________
(Source: CIA - The World Factbook 2002; www.ired.com/news/mkt/guyana.htm; SN
Aug 20, 2104).
*Whites, Chinese, and Mixed dropped considerably from 11% in 1964. The Indian
population declined from a high of 55% in 1980 (due to migration) and in 2015 accounts
for only about 45%. The African population increased from 30% in 1980 and is around
32% today. Amerindians have been constantly increasing from 5% in 1980 and make up
10% of the population today. The Mixed population has also increased to about 12%
today. Whites and Chinese are less than 1%.
(See also http://www.indiana.edu/~afroamer/archived-events/_0506Farrier.html; SN Aug
6, 2014).
Table 2 Showing Several Indicators on Guyana (Year 2002)
Aid as % of GDP
15.2%
Consumer price index*
127.53 %
Debt service as % of national income
6.63%
GDP growth rate annual % **
-2.24 annual %
GINI index#
43.20
Human Development Index@
0.72
Income distribution Poorest 10%
2.40%
Income distribution Richest 10%
32.00%
Income distribution Richest 20%
46.90%
________________________________________________________________________
*Consumer price index reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring
a fixed basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals,
such as yearly.
Year 2000 = 100; CPI has fallen steadily between 1990 and 2010 (SN May 2, 2008; Oct 20,
2011).

** GDP Growth has been on a see saw curve since 1960 (www.imf.org; SN Apr 21,
2011; Oct 5, 3, 2012; Sep 22, 2012).
# The Gini index is a measure of the inequality of a distribution of family income in a
country. The more nearly equal a country's income distribution. The more
unequal a country's income distribution, the higher is its Gini index. A value
of 0 expressing total equality and a value of 100 represents maximal inequality.
@ The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite statistic of life expectancy,
education, and income indices (decent standard of living) used to rank countries in terms
of their human development. The higher the index, the higher the standard of living
SOURCES: Calculated on the basis of data on ODA from OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development), Development Assistance Committee. 2002.
DAC Online. (IMF International Finance Statistics; /pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK761.pdf).
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Table 3: Social and Demographic Indicators for Guyana
Population (1998)*
773,000
Rate of Increase
-0.2
Density per square mile of agro land (1990)
113.5
GDP per capita in US dollars (1997 nominal) @
932
Life Expectancy at birth@@
65
Crude birth rate per thousand
27
Crude death rate per thousand
6.8
Infant Mortality per thousand live birth **
24.2
Income distribution highest 20% in % @@
52
Income distribution lowest 20% in %
6
Population per physician ***
2326
Population per hospital bed
236
Access to safe water – total (1995)#
83
Access to safe water – urban
100
Access to safe water – rural (1995)
75
Secondary Education Enrollment (1993)##
98
Source: World Bank Tables: Washington D.C (several years). The figures above have not
changed significantly as described below for several indicators.
* Population has been decreasing and is around 750,000 (current) (SN Aug 10, 2014; Feb
26, 2010; Feb 10, 2009).
@ GDP has been climbing slowly hitting $1270 in 2007 (SN Apr 8, 2008). In 1992, it
was $380 (SN Apr 8, 2008) and 1960, it was $300 (SN Apr 21, 2011).
@@ Life expectancy in 2002 was 66 (Caricom Secretariat Figures, Georgetown,
Guyana) and is currently around 70 years (SN Oct 5, 2014; Aug 31, 2011)
** Guyana currently has the second highest infant mortality rates (25) just behind Haiti
(SN May 10, 2014). In 2002, it was 54 while Haiti was 67 (Caricom Secretariat Figures).
@@ Income inequality remains very high at 46 (SN Nov 23, 2014; Sep 7, 2014; Apr 25,
2011; Nov 13, 2010).
*** Health care remains a major challenge in Guyana with retaining medical personnel
who seek to migrate after qualifying in Guyana (SN Oct 10, 2014; Jul 8, 2012). Patients
have had to share beds and conditions at hospitals have been poor (SN Jun 15, 2013).
#Access to water has improved over last two decades but still remains a major problem
especially in rural and hinterland areas (SN Feb 27, 2014; Dec 5, 2009; Feb 27, 2009).
## Refers to enrollment in school of school age population, but is not a measure or
reflection of literacy; Drop out rates are not available but they were very high during the
1970s and 1980s. Literacy declined significantly during the 1970s and 1980s and has
rebounded over the last two decades (SN Sep 14, 2014; Jun 20, 2013; Dec 25, 2008).
Table 4: Change in GDP over previous year in constant 1988 market prices
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
8.2
8.5
5.0
7.9
6.2
-1.5
Note: The years 1993-97 were very stable and GDP increased over preceding year,
whereas, there was political instability and violence in 1998 and GDP declined. Since
1998, GDP has gone up and down thru 2013. But overall, it has been positive.
Source: World Bank Tables: Washington D.C. (SN Aug 31, 2011; Dec 30, 2013).
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Table 5 shows Growth Rates for Guyana for Selected Years 1960 Thru 1990
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
0.8
0.6
4.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
-4.0
Between 1960 and 1965, there were violent race riots and the GDP declined. Between
1965 and 1970, political stability returned and the country grew an average of 2%.
Between 1970 and 1975, GDP went down growing hitting negative 4% in 1972 and
making a turn around experiencing a high of 8% in 1975. And then GDP went spirally
downward thereafter reaching a low of negative 14% in 1982 before making a
turnaround. In 1989, economic recovery policies of the IMF and World Bank kicked in
and the economy began making progress. By 1991, Guyana experienced positive growth.
Sources: www.imf.org; ICW Sep 19, 2012; Caricom Secretariat: Georgetown, Guyana

Table 6 shows various Debt Items
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997 1998
Debt service ratio
19
17
17
15
17
19
Current acct as %
-29
119
-18
-9.3
-14.2 -13.5
of GDP
External debt as % 461
392
318
223
183
192
of GDP
Source: World Bank Tables: Washington D.C
Today, Guyana remains a very heavily indebted nation (SN Jan 27, Feb 11, 2013). Budget
deficit is rising. In 2009, the deficit was 3.4% of GDP. At the end of 2011 it was 4.4% of
GDP. In 2012, it was projected at 4.6% of GDP (SN Apr 14, 2012).

Table 7 compares GDP Per Capita (in current US dollars) of Guyana and Singapore
Year
Guyana Singapore Sub-Sahara Africa
1960
299
395
175
1965
331
516
190
1970
371
914
200
1975
674
2506
325
1980
793
4859
800
1985
602
6485
700
1990
543
12091
850
1995
841
23916
850
2000
970
23019
900
2005 1073
28079
1200
Sources: World Bank Indicators 2009; www.imf.org
Not only in GDP, but in every single indicator, Singapore is way ahead of Guyana till this
day when in 1960, they were almost at par in GDP/capita (SN Jun 28, 2014; Sep 20, 2013).
And today Singapore’s GDP per capita is some twenty times that of Guyana
(www.imf.org). Sub-Sahara Africa was way below Guyana in GDP per capita 1960 and
overtook Guyana by 1980 and is still ahead of Guyana some 25 years later (World Bank).
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Table 8 Compares GDP Growth Rates of Barbados and Guyana.
Year Guyana Barbados
1970 -11
4
1974 -12
3
1978 -13
2
1982 -14
2
1986 -15
2
1990 -06
3
1994
00
3
1998 -02
2
2002
02
3
Sources: World Bank Indicators; www.imf.org;
Both countries became independent in 1966 and had similar GDP. Barbados experienced
positive growth while Guyana grew negatively (SN Feb 5, 2014; Dec 5, 2012; Nov 1, Apr
21, 2011). Barbados was (is) a liberal capitalist democracy while Guyana was an ethnic
socialist dictatorship – perhaps accounting for the sharp difference in growth.
Table 9 Shows Number of Seats and Percentage of Voter Support (1961 and 1964)
Party*
1961
1964
PPP
20 (42.6 %)
24 (45.8 %)
PNC
11 (40.9%)
22 (40.5%)
UF
4(16.3%)
7 (12.4 %)
* Other parties received insignificant support; people voted by racial affiliation.
Sources: Guyana Chronicle Dec 7, 2009; see also Jagan, C.B. West on Trial: The Fight
For Guyana’s Freedom (NY: International Publishers, 1972) pp. 324-325).
Elections for the two years are significant because 1961 used the First Past The Post
electoral System while in 1964 the system was changed to Proportional Representation.
In 1961, Jagan’s PPP got 57% of the parliamentary seats with 43% of the votes. The PNC
and UF combined got more votes than PPP but received 5 less seats. The CIA and British
Intelligence changed the electoral system to defeat Jagan whose doctrinaire
Marxist/Leninist position was opposed by the western powers. In 1964, the seats were
more reflective of the percentage of votes each party received. Jagan was defeated. The
two opposition parties coalesced forming a government. That was the last democratic
election in Guyana till 1992. Racial voting has persisted till this day (SN Jan 29, 2015;
Sep 5, 2014; Mar 5, 2007; GC Feb 21, 2011).
Table 10 shows % Average Breakdown of Senior Government Ranks by race (1970s)
Total Number of Personnel
Indian African Others
342
23%
64%
13%
The Public Sector accounted for over half of the work force during the 1970s and 1980s.
The central government alone accounted for a third of the work force, not including the
security forces. Some 90% of the civil service government bureaucracy and 95% of the
security forces were African. Indians and other races were marginalized. Sources: (Misir:
nd; GT Jan 25, 2015; Jul 28, 2014; GC Mar 22, 2012; Nov 15, 2011; Feb 21, 2011).
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ethnic conflict. Not only in Guyana (list of tables, p xiv, and tables 1 thru 10 above on
social, political and economic indicators), but around the globe as well, ethnic conflict is
increasingly destroying infrastructures of economies and undermining their development,
leading to rising poverty and a declining standard of living in so many countries.
The study has also offered some perspectives on how governments can forge
public policy aimed at controlling the adverse effects of ethnic strife and bringing
different groups together to work harmoniously towards national development. It
recommends inclusive governance comprising of a meaningful role of representatives
from all groups in policymaking. The dissertation argues that multi-ethnic inclusive
governance is an acceptable solution to Guyana’s conflict that will provide much needed
political stability to bring about development. Political stability provides a signal to the
business community to invest in the society and investment is about the only practical
means of obtaining economic growth, rising standard of living, and social change.
The Guyana study has implications for similar societies for how Guyana manages
(peacefully settles) its ethnic conflict can be very instructive for other societies
experiencing communal strife around the world. Every multi-ethnic conflict-ridden
country is seeking a solution to its conflict. The study is undertaken in the belief that data,
analysis, lessons, findings, and conclusion derived from herein can offer important
building blocks towards constructing a wider theory and more comprehensive theory on
the connection between ethnicity and development. Clearly, there is need for more
thorough and comprehensive studies in sociology and other disciplines on the
development problems associated with ethnic conflict as well as a need for more
proposals on solutions to the attendant problems associated with ethnic conflict.
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